COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

INTERVIEW OF: SCOTT BRADY

Monday, October 23, 2023
Washington, D.C.

The interview in the above matter was held in room 2237, Rayburn House Office Building, commencing at 10:01 a.m.

Present: Representative Jordan.
Appearances:

For the COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY:

7, COUNSEL
8, GENERAL COUNSEL
9, COUNSEL
10, COUNSEL
11, SENIOR COMMUNICATIONS ADVISER
12, DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL
13, SENIOR ADVISOR
14, PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER
15
16, DIGITAL ASSISTANT
17, CHIEF COUNSEL FOR OVERSIGHT
18, MINORITY OVERSIGHT COUNSEL
19, MINORITY CHIEF OVERSIGHT COUNSEL
20, MINORITY OVERSIGHT COUNSEL
21, MINORITY PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER
For SCOTT BRADY:

ANDREW LELLING

BRITTANY WILHELM

Jones Day
Good morning. This is a transcribed interview of Mr. Scott Brady, former U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Chairman Jordan has requested this transcribed interview as part of the committee's oversight of the Justice Department's commitment to impartial justice in its handling of its investigation into Hunter Biden.

Would the witness please state your name for the record.

Mr. Brady. Scott Brady.

We encourage witnesses who appear before the committee to freely consult with counsel if they so choose. And it is my understanding that you are appearing today with personal counsel. Is that correct?

Mr. Brady. That's correct.

Could personal counsel please state your name for the record.

Mr. Lelling. Andy Lelling.

Ms. Wilhelm. Brittany Wilhelm.

Thank you.

On behalf of the committee, I want to thank you for appearing here today to answer our questions. The chairman also appreciates your willingness to appear voluntarily.

My name is [redacted] and I'm with Chairman Jordan's staff.

I'm going to have everyone else from the committee who is here in the room introduce themselves as well.

with Mr. Jordan's staff, the House Judiciary Committee.

Chairman Jordan's staff.

Oversight counsel on Mr. Nadler's staff.

Ranking Member Nadler's staff.
Oversight counsel with Mr. Nadler's staff.

Chairman Jordan's staff.

Chairman Jordan's staff.

Chairman Jordan's staff.

Chairman Jordan's staff.

Chairman Jordan's staff.

Chairman Jordan's staff.

I'd like to now go over the ground rules and guidelines that we'll follow during today's interview.

Our questioning will proceed in rounds. The majority will ask questions first for 1 hour, and the minority will have an opportunity to ask questions for an equal period of time, if they so choose. We'll alternate back and forth until there are no more questions and the interview is over.

Typically, we take a short break at the end of each hour, but if you would like to take a break apart from that, please just let us know.

As you can see, there is an official court reporter taking down everything we say to make a written record, so we ask that you provide verbal responses to all questions.

Do you understand?

Mr. Brady. Yes.

So the court reporter can take down a clear record, we'll do our best to limit the number of people directing questions at you during any given hour to just those people on the staff whose turn it is. Please try and speak clearly so the court reporter can understand and so the folks down at the end of the table can hear you as well.

It's important that we don't talk over one another or interrupt each other, if we
can help it, and that goes for everybody present at today’s interview. We want you to
answer our questions in the most complete and truthful manner as possible, so we will
take our time.

If you have any questions or if you do not understand one of our questions, please
let us know. Our questions will cover a wide range of topics, so if you need clarification
at any point, just say so. If you honestly don’t know the answer to a question or do not
remember, it is best not to guess. Please give us your best recollection, and it is okay to
tell us if you learned information from someone else. Just indicate how you came to
learn that information.

If there are things you don’t know or can’t remember, just say so, and please
inform us who, to the best of your knowledge, might be able to provide a more complete
answer to the question.

You should also understand that, by law, you are required to answer questions
from Congress truthfully.

Do you understand that?

Mr. Brady. Yes.

This also applies to questions posed by congressional staff in an
interview.

Do you understand this?

Mr. Brady. Yes.

Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony could be subject
to criminal prosecution for making false statements under 18 U.S.C., section 1001.

Do you understand this?

Mr. Brady. Yes.

Is there any reason you are unable to provide truthful answers to
today's questions?

Mr. Brady. No.

Finally, I'd like to make note that the content of what we discuss here today is confidential. We ask that you not speak about what we discuss in this interview to any outside individuals to preserve the integrity of our investigation.

For the same reason, the marked exhibits that we will use today will remain with the court reporter to go into the official transcript, and any copies of those exhibits will be returned to us when we wrap up.

That is the end of my preamble.

Is there anything my colleagues from the minority would like to add?

No. We just thank the witness for joining us today.

And I understand your counsel, Mr. Lelling, has some statements that he'd like to make.

Mr. Lelling. Thank you.

I just wanted to note that Mr. Brady has received an authorization letter from DOJ. I've given the committee a copy. I'd ask you to make it part of the record.

I think, following the guidelines they followed in the past when having witnesses before the committee, they have basically told him to abide by the attorney-client deliberative process privileges when testifying today, and also, whatever ethical obligations cover the use of confidential client information.

They have also directed him to identify by name only senior supervisory personnel in the course of his testimony but others by title only. So that may come up from time to time.

And that's it. Thank you.

Could we have a copy, please?
Yes. We're going to make it exhibit No. 1.

[Brady Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

Okay. The clock now reads 10:06 a.m. We'll begin with our first hour of questioning.

EXAMINATION

BY

Q  Mr. Brady, can you tell us a bit about your professional background?

A  Sure. I attended Harvard University undergraduate, had a bachelors in government.

I spent 7 years working in the field of international relief and development,

including 4 years overseas in Europe, the Caucasus region, and the Middle East.

I came back to law school at Penn State, started my career as an associate at Reed Smith in Pittsburgh, and then clerked for a Federal judge, Tom Hardiman, when he was on the U.S. District Court in WDPA. Now he's on the Third Circuit.

And was an AUSA in WDPA for 6 years. Three years, approximately, was doing drugs and guns. The second three was doing white collar and antiterrorism work.

Then was an associate at Jones Day for roughly 2 years, and then was head of litigation for a public financial services company in Pittsburgh for five.

Was then appointed U.S. attorney in the last administration by President Trump.

Served from 2017 to 2021.

And then was a partner at Jones Day in the white collar practice, and recently moved to be chief compliance officer for a public company in Pittsburgh.

Q  And when were you nominated by President Trump to become the U.S. attorney for the Western District?
A I was nominated in the summer of 2017, and then, actually, was sworn in and took office on December 23rd of 2017.

Q And were you asked to resign by the Biden administration at the beginning of President Biden's Presidency?

A Yes. It was roughly the middle of February, and our exit date, for those of us who were holdovers, was I think the 28th of February. So the end of February.

Q So how many years did you spend at the Department of Justice in total?

A Total? I think 9 or 10 years.

Q Did you ever do any time at Main Justice or just at the Western District?

A Just in the Western District, but I was on General Barr's advisory committee. So I spent a good bit of time at Main Justice but no positions at Main Justice.

Q Okay.

Q Whose decision was it to ask you to -- and the rest of the U.S. attorneys -- to depart? Was it the White House counsel's office? Does that come from DOJ?

A I don't know who made the decision, but the Acting Attorney General had a conference call with all of us who were remaining and thanked us for our service and told us that they would request our resignation that day, effective the end of February. So it was, roughly, you know, February 15th or so.

Q But, ultimately, it's the White House's decision. Correct? DOJ doesn't get to pick its own U.S. attorneys, right?

A I don't know. I assume but I don't know.

Q And for those U.S. attorneys that did stay on, do you know who made that
A No.

Q So you left the Western District's office in February 2021. Is that accurate?

A That's right.

Q While you were serving as the U.S. attorney, did then Deputy Attorney General Rosen assign you the responsibility of vetting information related to Ukraine?

A I don't -- it wasn't DAG Rosen. I got that information from the PADAG that I had been given this assignment.

Q And who was the PADAG at the time?

A It was Seth DuCharme.

Q And when did Mr. DuCharme reach out to you?

A I think it was January 3rd of 2022.

Q And who had been vetting the information coming in related to Ukraine prior to your assignment?

A I don't know.

Q You don't know, okay.

I'll mark as exhibit No. 2 a February 18th, 2020, letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen Boyd to then Chairman Nadler.

[Brady Exhibit No. 2 Was marked for identification.]

Take a moment to review.

Mr. Lelling. What number.

This is No. 2.

BY
Q I'll direct your attention to the third paragraph on that first page, and I'll just read it into the record.

It says: In light of several open matters being handled by different U.S. attorneys' offices and Department components that in some way potentially relate to Ukraine, the existence of which have been publicly reported, Deputy Attorney General Rosen has assigned Richard Donoghue the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York to assist in coordinating such matters.

The Deputy Attorney General implemented this policy to avoid duplication of efforts across Department offices and components, to facilitate information sharing, to ensure there are no conflicts among potentially overlapping matters, and to efficiently marshal the resources of the Department.

To protect the integrity of ongoing matters, particularly with respect to unsolicited information offered to the Department, the Deputy Attorney General has also assigned Scott Brady the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania to assist in the receipt, processing, and preliminary analysis of new information provided by the public that may be relevant to matters relating to Ukraine.

So, with respect to your responsibilities, does the last sentence of that paragraph accurately depict what your responsibilities were?

A Yes.

Q And can you provide any additional context as to what the process looked like for incoming information?

A Well, as Stephen Boyd describes to Representative Nadler, ours was an intake and a vetting process, kind of akin to a due diligence, where we were to take information provided by the public, including Mayor Giuliani, relating to Ukrainian corruption. We were to vet that, and that was how we described it internally, a vetting
We did not have a grand jury. We did not have the tools available to us that a grand jury would have, so we couldn't compel testimony. We couldn't subpoena bank records. But we were to assess the credibility of information, and anything that we felt was credible or had indicia of credibility, we were then to provide to the offices that had predicated grand jury investigations that were ongoing.

Q And how many people within your office worked on vetting information?
A Including me, there were five of us.
Q And were all of those other individuals AUSAs or --
A Yes.
Q -- what was their role?
A Yes.
Q Okay.

And how did you assess the credibility of information coming in?
A Well, we would look at public sources. General Barr in other public statements had said that we are to coordinate with the FBI and intelligence services, so we did. We asked -- we met with them on a regular basis, asked to, you know, run names, emails, bank account numbers through their existing files. We would vet that against information that was provided by the public. And, again, open source information, and then make a determination about credibility or next steps.

Q And so, after you made an assessment regarding the credibility, then you would pass that information along to other offices who had predicated grand jury investigations. Is that correct?
A That's right. At the end of our process, we then would brief those offices
with information that we believed was either credible or had indicia of credibility and we felt, in our judgment, required some additional investigation, probably using tools available to a grand jury. But, ultimately, it was their decision. Our visibility beyond that point was over.

Q And were those briefings ongoing, or did they all happen at one point in time?

A We would have ongoing conversations with the different offices to coordinate and to apprise them of what we were doing, but at the end of our vetting process, we provided substantive briefings to each of the offices, which was the handoff of any information we felt they might want to look at or should be interested in.

Q And, when you say "offices," are you referring to other U.S. attorneys' offices or FBI field offices? What are you referring to?

A Other U.S. attorneys' offices. So our interface was U.S. attorney's office to U.S. attorney's Office. So specifically, I'm talking about Delaware, EDNY, SDNY.

Q And, when you were speaking with those other offices, did you have direct points of contact?

A We did. We had multiple points of contact. So there were FBI contact to FBI contact in the FBI field offices that were supporting the U.S. attorneys' offices. Our litigation team, as it were, had primary interface with AUSAs that were running those investigations in those offices, and then I would usually interface with the U.S. attorneys or the first assistants from those offices.

Q And so, when you reached out to the other U.S. attorneys' offices, was it first at the line level between AUSAs, or did you make the first contact with the other U.S. attorneys?

A I made the first contact with other U.S. attorneys.
Q  Okay.

On the second page of the letter, at the top, it says: Nor do these procedures
grant any individual unique access to the Department. Indeed, any member of the
public who has relevant information may contact the Department and make use of its
intake process for Ukraine-related matters.

So did this mean that any member of the public could reach out to you, or was this
just for Mr. Giuliani to reach out to you?

A  No, this was any member of the public. And that happens in other types of
investigations where, if people from the public have information they want to provide to
Federal law enforcement, they will reach out to the FBI, to the U.S. attorney's office, any
number of Federal agencies. It's not uncommon.

Q  And it wasn't unusual for the Deputy Attorney General or the PADAG to
assign these responsibilities to you, as that happened before. Is that correct?

A  That I can't speak to.

Q  In the letter, going from the first page to the second page, it says: The
Department regularly assigns U.S. attorneys to coordinate or focus on certain matters.

Did you have any awareness of other assignments similar?

A  I know that Jeff Jensen was assigned to look at the matter involving General
Flynn. I had no interface with him during the pendency of his inquiry.

You know, because we were on AJC, I know from time to time, and I can't provide
specifics, but I know that different U.S. attorneys were given different assignments, some
involving investigations, some involving new initiatives, some involving task forces that
we all sat on at different times at the pleasure of either the Attorney General or the
Deputy Attorney General.

So it wasn't uncommon.
Q And, further on in this paragraph, it states that all information provided through this process will be treated just like any other information provided to the Department.

So would you say it's accurate that the information that you would have received as part of this vetting process was not afforded any sort of special treatment?

A No. No, it was not.

Q So the Deputy Attorney General gave you the authority to vet new information. Would you say that your role was limited in what you could do with that information?

A Yes, it was. And it was limited by both the scope of what we were to look at and the tools that were available to us, as I mentioned. It really was a vetting to assess credibility. It was not to make determinations about whether there was evidence sufficient to open criminal investigations, anything like that.

It was really to say, yes, we believe that this, again, as I said, is credibility, has indicia of credibility, and then pass it on to one of the offices with the predicated jury investigation.

Q And can you just tell us again which tools were not available to you to use?

A Sure. Anything that could compel testimony or the production of documents. Witnesses, bank records, emails, we weren't able to access any of those kinds of things or compel them from third-parties.

Q Could you interview any individuals involved with the information or no?

A We could. So that was something that was available to us and that we did.

Q And so you weren't able to act upon the information to open an assessment or preliminary or full investigation. Is that correct?

A That is -- those are administrative categories that the FBI has pursuant to
their DIOG. That is not how we do things in the Department. In the Department, we open a matter, and then we assess whether, in a traditional investigation, whether a grand jury should be impaneled to investigate that, and then that case moves forward. Our tasking was more narrow. We opened a matter, and then we did our task. The FBI has different steps administratively that they identified and that we discussed with them, but, ultimately, that didn't impact what our job was.

Q So could you close any matter?
A Internally, in the U.S. attorney's office? Yes.
Q But, after you passed that information along to another U.S. attorney's office or you could -- were you involved in the investigation at all?
A Not after we gave the briefing. We weren't involved. We had no visibility into what they did with that after we gave our briefings.
Q And can you kind of quantify, if you can, how much information you received when you were vetting?
A I'm not sure I can quantify that. You know, there were a number of names and information relating to those names, including phone numbers, email addresses, bank account numbers that were provided to us, some of which we were able to look into, some of which we were not.
Q And how much time would you say was devoted by the Western District and the other five individuals that worked on this information? How much time did they spend on these matters?
A With stops and starts, they worked -- our final briefings were in mid-October. So, from January 3rd, when we were given this assignment, for two of our members, it was their full-time assignment. And two of the supervisory AUSAs who were more senior would be involved on an as-needed basis but provided significant
And then I was involved as well on a regular basis.

Q  But you continued doing your other duties as U.S. attorney, is that correct, in addition to these duties?

A  Yes, that's correct.

Q  As part of this work, did your office obtain an FD-1023 dated June 30th, 2020?

A  We did not obtain a physical copy, but there was one that was generated from the investigation. That's correct.

Q  And so how did this information come in then?

A  Well, again, respecting the privileges that attach to this, during the course of our investigation, we were made aware of a confidential human source who -- and because the 1023 is public, I can speak to that.

A confidential human source in a previous 1023 had identified an interaction with a Ukrainian national who discussed -- it wasn't the focus of that 1023 from several years prior but had made reference to Hunter Biden serving on the board of Burisma.

At my direction, we asked the FBI to re-interview the CHS. And, again, in the previous 1023, it wasn't really the focus of the information that was being provided to the FBI. It was just one sentence. And so we said, "We need to understand what this is or is not, so can you please re-interview him or her," which they did, and that then resulted in the January 2020, 1023.

And we'll offer that as exhibit No. 3, just so you can have it in front of you while we're talking about it.

[Brady Exhibit No. 3 Was marked for identification.]
Mr. Brady. Sure.

Q Can you detail for us what an FD-1023 is?

A Sure. A 1023 is a report of a confidential human source. They are very sensitive because, obviously, the FBI and the Department of Justice want to protect the identities of the confidential human source. They assist in investigations.

And so the normal form for memorializing interviews during the course of an investigation is an FD-302. Because of the sensitivity and how they are handled, they are categorized differently, and they are -- you know, the number assigned is an FD-1023.

But they assist in ongoing information. It could be an investigation. It could just be background information about certain subjects or targets. That's what's, you know, that's what's represented here.

Q And so, when your office discovered the information in the previous 1023, did you have an understanding of whether the field office in possession of that 1023 was doing any sort of investigating regarding the information that was contained in the 1023?

A We did not. We don't believe that it was because it wasn't the focus of the previous 1023. That was about a different subject but also interfacing with a Ukrainian national.

Q You said that you had an interaction with the FBI asking them to re-interview the CHS. Can you tell us a little bit more about that interaction? When did it occur?

Mr. Lelling. You can say when it occurred, if you remember.

Mr. Brady. Yeah, so we identified the previous 1023 probably at the beginning of June and then went back and forth with the FBI about reaching back out to the CHS and doing a full interview on the line referencing Hunter Biden and Burisma. But it took a while.
Q   And when you say there was a back and forth, what do you mean by that?
Was there pushback from the FBI?
Mr. Lelling. I would describe it generally.
Mr. Brady. I think there was concern by the FBI about the sensitive nature of both the information and also the fact that this was an important confidential human source who had provided information to them in the past, that had been used in other investigations. So it was an important CHS to them.
Q   And, when you say that the information was sensitive, what do you mean by that?
A   Certainly anything relating to Ukraine, Ukrainian nationals that intersected with Hunter Biden and his role serving on the Burisma board was sensitive and certainly in 2020, months before an election cycle when different policies kick in for the Department and for the FBI.
Q   And was it sensitive because Hunter Biden’s father, Joe Biden, was running in the 2020 election?
A   Yes.
Q   And talking about the CHS a little bit, you said that the CHS was important to the FBI. Did you get a sense of the CHS’ credibility from the FBI?
Mr. Lelling. I would ask you not to answer that.
Q   The FBI has said that they had a pre-existing relationship with this source, as well as they had been used in multiple investigative matters, including during the Obama administration. Are you aware of those public statements from the FBI?
A: I'm not aware of those, but that's consistent with my understanding.

Q: The FBI has also said that they've reviewed information that the CHS has provided and found them to be, quote, highly credible. Have you seen those public statements?

A: I have not, but that's consistent with my understanding.

Q: And can you tell us about the process that your office went through to vet the information that's now contained in this FD-1023?

Mr. Lelling. You can speak generally to that. I would not get into details.

Mr. Brady. So we attempted to use open-source material to check against what was stated in the 1023. We also interfaced with the CHS' handler about certain statements relating to travel and meetings to see if they were consistent with his or her understanding.

Q: And did you determine if the information was consistent with the handler's understanding?

A: What we were able to identify, we found that it was consistent. And so we felt that there were sufficient indicia of credibility in this 1023 to pass it on to an office that had a predicated grand jury investigation.

Q: And did you determine that the CHS had traveled to the different countries listed in the 1023?

Mr. Lelling. I would decline to answer that.

Q: And what did -- after you corroborated some of the information that was obtained in the FD-1023, what did you do next?

A: So we received this at the end of June. We did what we could to
corroborate certain things, and then that was a part of the briefing that we gave to, in this
case, the District of Delaware.

Q So you passed this information along to the District of Delaware. Is that
correct?

A We did and confirmed that the FBI -- we did not have physical possession of
the 1023, though we saw it and reviewed it. We also then, after a briefing, confirmed
that the FBI provided a copy of the 1023 to not only the Baltimore Field Office, which
supported the District of Delaware, but also the U.S. attorney's office in the District of
Delaware, and the FBI confirmed that they had done so at our request.

Q And so, regarding this 1023, when you were passing this information along
to the USAO in Delaware, did you have a communication with Mr. Weiss, the U.S.
attorney there?

A I did.

Q And was that the first time you had spoken with Mr. Weiss?

A No. Mr. Weiss and I had spoken on a number of occasions. We also
overlapped on AJC, so I knew Mr. Weiss well.

But, concerning this particular assignment by DAG Rosen relating to Ukraine, we
had several conversations and interactions, both between David and me and then
between our respective teams that were running our -- vetting on our side, investigation
on their side relating to the sharing of information from, you know, January, let's say,
10th through mid to late October when we provided the final briefing to the District of
Delaware.

Q And how would you describe how regular those interactions occurred
between you and Mr. Weiss specifically?

A They were really on an as-needed basis. So they might be every, you know,
4 weeks, 6 weeks.

Mr. Lelling. Just to clarify for the record, this is you personally, not your subordinates?

Mr. Brady. Yes. This is between David and me, between Mr. Weiss and me. He and I would speak on a semi-regular basis, but usually it was when certain issues would rise up to us that we needed to speak directly and resolved.

BY Q And this was regarding specifically the assignment from DAG Rosen regarding vetting Ukrainian information. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q And did you pass a lot of information that your team had vetted and deemed credible to the U.S. attorney in Delaware?

A I'm not sure what you mean by a lot of information, but we gave a substantive briefing with the information, including the 1023 that we thought would be of interest to them or that they should investigate further, and made other recommendations about possible investigative avenues that we would recommend that they take.

Q So the October, the late October briefing, did it include materials additional to the FD-1023?

A Yes.

Q And so was that a final briefing of everything that you had sent over to the Delaware office?

A That's correct.

Q But you had had interactions with Mr. Weiss leading up to the October 2020 briefing. Is that correct?
A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Besides you, who communicated with the Delaware U.S. Attorney's Office?

Mr. Lelling. I would identify them by title only.

Mr. Brady. My first assistant would communicate with the Delaware first assistant. They had a professional relationship prior. And then most of the regular communication would be between -- there were particularly two AUSAs that were kind of leading the day-to-day taskings and interfaced with the FBI on our process, and they would interface with AUSAs on Mr. Weiss' team that were leading the investigation.

BY [Redacted]

Q. Did you ever have any interactions with an AUSA in the U.S. attorney's office for Delaware named Lesley Wolf?

A. I believe I was on some initial calls in which Ms. Wolf was a participant. I believe we also had a global meeting with members of various U.S. attorneys' offices and leadership in the FBI in April that Ms. Wolf attended. Otherwise, after that, all my interaction was with Mr. Weiss directly.

Q. And, when you were on that call where Ms. Wolf was a participant, was Mr. Weiss on that call as well?

A. On the early calls, yes. Yes. I was never on a call with Ms. Wolf that [Redacted] was not a part of.

Q. And did the AUSAs from your team correspond regularly with Ms. Wolf, to your understanding?

A. Fairly regularly, as needed, but, yes, on a regular basis over the course of our process.

Q. And were there other AUSAs that your team would reach out to at Delaware besides Ms. Wolf?
I am not familiar with any. I believe the primary interface was with Ms. Wolf.

And do you remember the date of the October 2020 briefing at all?

I want to say it was October 20th or 22nd. It was the final briefing of the three briefings that we gave to other U.S. attorneys' offices.

And so the other U.S. attorneys' offices that you interfaced with, other than the District of Delaware, what were those U.S. attorneys' offices again?

SDNY, the Southern District of New York, and EDNY, the Eastern District of New York.

And did you have a final briefing with the Southern District and Eastern District around the same time?

Yes, earlier in October, and each briefing was separate. So the information was limited to and provided to only members of that office. So we had one for SDNY, one separate one for EDNY, and one separate one for Delaware. There were no kind of shared communications where one would sit in on another's briefing.

And those briefings were provided by my team, and the FBI participated, but the briefings were given by members of my team.

And similar to your interactions with the U.S. attorney's office for Delaware, did you have ongoing communications with the Southern District and the Eastern District of New York?

Again, on an as-needed basis. There were more at the beginning of the project because we were trying to define the rules of engagement among the offices to understand how information would be shared and utilized and what information would come back to us and be shared with us.

But, yes, Geoff Berman was the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New
York, so he and I would speak occasionally. Rich Donoghue at that time was the U.S.
attorney for EDNY before he became PADAG and replaced Seth DuCharme later in the
administration.

And, as the letter from Stephen Boyd to Mr. Nadler, Representative Nadler states,
Rich and I would also speak on a regular basis because he was responsible for overseeing
all of the Ukraine-related investigations that were going on, was kind of an air traffic
controller to make sure, you know, we weren't duplicating efforts, that we were aware of
the things that were going on in the other offices.

Q And I think you mentioned FBI, the Pittsburgh Field Office being involved
with the 1023 and passing that along to Baltimore. Is that correct?
A That's correct.

Q And did they have any involvement in the vetting process, FBI Pittsburgh?
A Yes. FBI Pittsburgh was our primary support on a day-to-day basis in, you
know, running things to ground, looking at FBI files, and anything that we asked them
relating to the vetting process.

Q And were there regular points of contact at FBI Pittsburgh that you would
work with?
A Yes, I and my team.

Q And who was your primary point of contact by title?
A Mine was mostly the SAC or one of the ASACs, one of the senior ASACs.
And then my team worked on a regular basis with, to a lesser degree, the ASACs but
primarily an SSA, supervisory senior assistant.

Mr. Lelling. Supervisory special agent.

Mr. Brady. Supervisory special agent. Thank you.

And, as I say, and the special agents who were on the vetting team for the
Pittsburgh Field Office.

Q And how many individuals were involved in the vetting team at FBI Pittsburgh, to your knowledge?

A To my knowledge, it was unclear. There was a small group that did day-to-day assignments. There was a larger group at the FBI, including FBI Headquarters, that had eyes on what was happening and which required signoff for any investigative steps that FBI Pittsburgh was asked to take by us.

Q Okay.

And so they would only elevate an investigation if you had asked them to take investigative steps?

A It was my understanding that they could not take any steps absent the approval, the review and approval of FBI Headquarters, not just the leadership of FBI Pittsburgh.

Q And when you would reach out to Delaware or the Eastern District of New York or Southern District of New York, did FBI Pittsburgh also reach out to the corresponding field office for that district?

A I don't know what the regularity of their communications was. Sometimes our conversations were just U.S. attorney's office to U.S. attorney's offices to make sure we were sharing information, communicating. The interaction regularity, content among the different FBI field offices I'm not aware.

Q And you were aware that the FBI Pittsburgh Office sent the 1023 to the FBI Baltimore Field Office. Is that correct?

A That's right. That was at our request/direction.

Q Did you have any understanding of how regularly FBI Pittsburgh
communicated with FBI Baltimore?

A I don't but I think it was regular.

Q Did you have any interactions with the FBI Field Office?

A I did not personally, no. I think my team did. So, for example, when we did the briefing to Delaware, I think there were members of the Baltimore Field Office who participated in the call, in the briefing. It was my understanding that Lesley Wolf, perhaps another AUSA, and unknown number of special agents for FBI Baltimore were on the receiving end of our briefing.

Q And, when did you give the direction to pass the FD-1023 on to the U.S. attorney's office in Delaware and FBI Baltimore?

A I can't remember if it was prior to the briefing or during the briefing, but we requested that, and FBI Pittsburgh ASAC confirmed that they would and then, after the fact, confirmed that it had been transmitted.

Mr. Lelling. You're referring to the briefing in October 2020?

Mr. Brady. Correct, yeah, our briefing in October 2020 to the Delaware U.S. Attorney's Office.

Ms. Vector. And, when you passed the FD-1023 along to the other offices, did you let them know that you had concluded the information in the FD-1023 was credible?

Mr. Lelling. I don't know that he can accept that as phrased, characterization.

Mr. Brady. Yes, and I can explain.

We were not making a representation that everything in this 1023 was credible. That was not our process. We didn't have the tools to do so. We were not making that kind of representation.

What we were doing was, as a part of the briefing, giving them the investigative steps that we had taken within our limited ability to corroborate the information that the
CHS had provided us, and we informed them that we felt that the 1023 had indicia of credibility sufficient to merit further investigation. And so that's what we communicated to them.

Q: And you did this in the form of the October 2020 briefing. Is that correct?
A: That's correct.

Q: And do you remember who was present for this briefing? Who from your office was present for the briefing?
A: The two AUSAs who were running points on the investigation and really had the most substantive knowledge were present. I believe at least one or two of the FBI special agents in the Pittsburgh Field Office were also present. And, as I sit here, I don't recall whether either of the two senior members of our office were a part of that briefing or not. I was not; neither was David Weiss.

Q: And do you know who attended from [redacted] office?
A: Lesley Wolf. Ms. Wolf attended. There may have been another AUSA from Delaware and then unknown number of special agents from the Baltimore Field Office.

Q: And who gave the briefing? Who was in charge of providing the information?
A: It was the lead AUSA on my team.

Q: And did you ever receive information on how the briefing went from your team?
A: Yes.

Q: What was there overall characterization of how the briefing went?
A: All of our information that we wanted to have communicated to Delaware
was communicated.

Q And was the Delaware U.S. Attorney's Office receptive of the information that you provided?

A I can't characterize their receptivity. As I mentioned, I wasn't a part of it. It was received, however, and we gave that full briefing.

And then, as I mentioned, after we provided the briefing, any documents we sent to them, including the 1023, then our tasking was done, and our visibility into what any of the offices did with that information ended.

Q Did you have any issues developing a channel of communication initially with the Delaware U.S. Attorney's Office?

A Yes.

Q And could you talk to us about that?

A Speaking generally, from a process perspective, I think there was both a skepticism of the information that we were developing, that we had received, and skepticism and then weariness of that information. I think they were very concerned about any information sharing with our office.

It became problematic at different points, which required Mr. Weiss and me to get involved and level set, as it were, but it was regularly a challenge to interact with the investigative team from Delaware.

Q Why do you think that was? I mean, your office contacts their office. I mean, what was the harm in having a telephone call and sharing information? I mean, you certainly don't have any authority of the Delaware U.S. Attorney's Office. What do you think was going on there?

A That's absolutely correct in terms of having no authority to dictate anything
that Delaware did or looked at.

I don't want to speculate as to why, but I know that there was no information sharing back to us about what they were -- or very limited. And, at one point, the communication between our offices was so constricted that we had to provide written questions to the investigative team in Delaware, almost in the form of interrogatories, and receive written answers back.

Q  Okay.

Now, do you think their reluctance was because Hunter Biden was involved?

A  I can't speak to that, but, obviously, this is a very sensitive investigation, and it was an election year.

Q  Did you have to have interactions with the DAG's office to facilitate communications with the District of Delaware?

A  Most of our interactions with the DAG's office was to facilitate communication with the FBI. We did, on occasion, have to involve the DAG's office to facilitate communication with Delaware as well.

Q  Okay.

So you were having trouble talking with the office, so you went to the DAG's office. Who did you go to in the DAG's office?

A  It was usually the PADAG.

Q  And you told the PADAG, like, they're not willing to have an information sharing dialogue. Can you help us?

A  That's correct.

Q  And how did that ultimately get resolved? Did the PADAG then call or?

A  If he did, I'm not aware. I know from public reporting there was a later
communication between then PADAG Rich Donoghue and either [redacted] or his team ordering them to meet with us for the briefing.

Q So he had to order them to meet with you?

Mr. Lelling. This is not your personal knowledge.

Mr. Brady. This is not my personal knowledge. I've only read that in public sources from Mr. Shapley's testimony.

BY [redacted]

Q But, based on your experience, that doesn't conflict with anything you're aware of?

A I'm sorry. I don't -- what doesn't conflict?

Q The public reporting, what Mr. Shapley said.

A No, I have no knowledge one way or the other --

Q Right.

A -- relating to that.

Q But, if the District of Delaware was enthusiastic to meet with you, you certainly wouldn't have to go through the DAG's office. Correct?

A Typical U.S. attorney to U.S. attorney office communication, even on sensitive matters, is fairly clear and transparent. We're all professionals. We all understand our ethical obligations, especially for 60-year grand-jury-derived information. So that happens on a regular basis on investigations that are being run by multiple offices. So this was unusual.

Q So you don't ordinarily have to get the DAG's office involved to pass information?

A Not to pass information. Sometimes the DAG's office has to get involved when two U.S. attorneys' offices or multiple U.S. attorneys' offices are investigating the
same course of conduct or crime, and then which office is the lead office, essentially, for
indictment purposes. This was not that.

So this was very unusual, but we had to involve the DAG's office with Delaware
and the FBI on a regular basis.

Q And did your AUSAs ever communicate to you issues they were having with
Ms. Wolf?

A Not with Ms. Wolf specifically -- well, no strike that.

There was an occasion with Ms. Wolf as well, but they would communicate to me
the issues that we were having, our investigative team was having with both the FBI and
with Delaware and with SDNY. Really the only office we didn't have any issues with was
EDNY. It was Rich Donoghue's office.

Q Okay.

And so, before you communicated with the PADAG that you needed assistance,
did you have an initiative to talk with Mr. Weiss?

A Yeah, I wouldn't always run to the principal right away, right. I would try to
go professional to professional, you know, U.S. attorney to U.S. attorney, and we would
try to resolve things. And, only when we couldn't, would we elevate it to the DAG's
office and involve the PADAG.

Mr. Rosen was never involved directly in our communications. It was always the
PADAG.

Q Okay.

And what feedback was Mr. Weiss giving you during that time period before you
had to involve the PADAG?

Mr. Lelling. Only in general terms.

Mr. Brady. Usually Mr. Weiss was in receiving mode and would say that he
would talk to his team to try to resolve it?

Q At any point did you have to advise Mr. Weiss that you've been, you know, you've been charged by the DAG to collect this information, and part of your charge and your duty, and correct me if I'm wrong, is to analyze it and hand it off?

A That's correct and to coordinate with other offices. And, yes, I reminded Mr. Weiss of that obligation that we have, of that requirement, and the FBI on a regular basis as well.

Q And you certainly weren't trying to go into the District of Delaware and open your own grand jury. You're simply trying to hand this information off.

A That's correct. And what we wanted to do and the whole -- one of the reasons, at least subjectively, my understanding was that this process was set up to protect the predicated grand jury investigations. And so one thing that the coordination would allow us to do would be to make sure that we weren't duplicating any efforts that they had had.

For example, creating two 302s of witness interviews, which might conflict. We didn't want to do that. We didn't want to do anything that would make any of the offices' jobs more difficult or complicate cases. And so we felt that that kind of coordination would obviate that. It wasn't always viewed that way by the other office.

Q And were you aware of what the PADAG did ultimately to get Delaware to take your calls, essentially?

A Not always. No, I didn't always have visibility into that. Sometimes resolutions would be, as I mentioned, you know, we would have to submit interrogatories to get information. Sometimes, again, from Mr. Shapley's testimony, I understand that they were ordered by PADAG Donoghue to participate in our briefing. There was
apparently reluctance to participate in that briefing at the end of our process.

Q And, even if you were presenting a case to Mr. Weiss that was airtight, which
I'm not suggesting this was, but even if you were presenting a case that was airtight, and
you had everything, it was still Mr. Weiss' call whether to prosecute, whether to open up
a grand jury matter. Correct?

A Yes. I understand your question. Yes, we had no ability to direct the
actions of what the offices with predicated grand jury investigations would do with the
information that we believed was either credible or had indicia of credibility. We could
only present what we had identified, explain to them the sources by which we believed
something had indicia of credibility, and then make recommendations about what we
think they might want to do with that. But that was it.

Q Did you ever have any discussions with the DAG's office about the prospect
of special counsel being named here?

A No.

Q Do you think -- at this point, you know, October 2020, did you think that a
special counsel was warranted?

Mr. Lelling. Don't answer that.

Mr. Brady. That was beyond my purview.

BY

Q But clearly there was a potential conflict here. Mr. Weiss was U.S. attorney
in the District of Delaware, which is the home district of the Democratic nominee for
President.

Mr. Lelling. I'm instructing the witness not to answer that.

BY

Q So did you have any communications with anyone on your team about that
of the appointment of a special counsel?

Q  Yes.

A  No.

And, just to be clear, separate and apart from Mr. Weiss and his tasking, U.S. attorneys' offices investigate highly sensitive matters, including matters of potential public corruption in cities across the United States. We do that on a regular basis. And, because of the ethical obligations and the professionalism of the offices and the agencies that support DOJ, we understand what our marching orders are. We, they, understand what the marching orders are and abide by those.

Q  So you weren't particularly invested in encouraging Mr. Weiss to prosecute or not prosecute? You were simply handing off information. Is that correct?

A  That's absolutely right. My goal was for us to do our task, our job that we were given by AG Barr, DAG Rosen. Do it effectively and professionally, with integrity. Make sure that there was no information that was going to the public outside of our team, and then hand that off to those offices and allow them to do with it as they felt best.

Q  So you weren't advocating for any type of prosecution by Mr. Weiss?

A  No, nor would it have been my place to do so.

Q  Okay.

And so the fact that Mr. Weiss wasn't receptive to taking your calls didn't necessarily, you know, frustrate you other than you're just trying to do your job? You weren't out to get the particular targets of this information that you acquired?

A  No, not at all. And he wasn't reluctant, just to clarify the foundation of your question. He wasn't reluctant to take my calls. We usually just had to solve a
problem, and we would engage, U.S. attorney to U.S. attorney, to try to solve the working relationship between our teams.

Q But, at some point, the DAG's office had to get involved to facilitate that?
A Occasionally, yes.

Q So that seems like you weren't always able to resolve it with Mr. Weiss.
A That's correct. Sometimes.

Q Did you ever suggest to Mr. Weiss, like, "We're just looking to have a telephone call, we're just looking to have a meeting, we're just looking to give this information to you, and you can do with it whatever you deem appropriate"?
A Yes.

Q But still you had to get the DAG's office involved?
A On occasion. Not every time.
Q Okay.

BY

Q And, when you said you had to communicate using written questions, how many occasions did you have to do that?
A We did that one time, and I don't remember the number of questions but in excess of probably 20.

Q And that was prior to the October 2020 briefing; Is that correct?
A Yes, that was much earlier.

Q Do you kind of remember the general timeframe?
A I want to say that was around -- that was prior to this, which was June. So I want to say maybe April or May.

Q And the point of the written questions was to obtain information from the District of Delaware; Is that correct?
A Yes, to understand what they had looked at, what they had not looked at to make sure we weren’t, again, to point, duplicating efforts, stepping on toes, doing anything that would in any way complicate their lives and their investigation.

Q And, at that point, you had an understanding that Mr. Weiss was looking into some of the matters in which you were looking into as well regarding the information that was coming into your office?

A Yes.

Q And you said that you had some communication troubles with the FBI as well; Is that correct?

A That’s correct.

Q Was that a specific field office?

A We had -- my knowledge is limited to the issues that we had with the Pittsburgh Field Office and, by extension, FBI Headquarters.

Q And how would you characterize those problems that you were having?

A It was a challenging working relationship. I think there was reluctance on the part of the FBI to really do any tasking related to our assignment from DAG Rosen and looking into allegations of Ukrainian corruption broadly and then specifically anything that intersected with Hunter Biden and his role in Burisma. It was very challenging.

Q And you said reluctant. Did you get a sense of why the FBI was reluctant to take any action?

Mr. Lelling. You can characterize that generally.

Mr. Brady. I don’t know why they were reluctant. I know that, because of what they deemed to be the sensitive nature, and this was sensitive, as it related to Mr. Biden, that there were a lot of steps of approval and a lot of eyes that had to look at things and sign off on any action that the special agents that were doing the day-to-day work and
interacting with our team would take.

   It was my understanding that FBI Headquarters had to sign off on every
   assignment, no matter how small or routine, before they could take action, which then
   just lengthened the amount of time, you know, between us asking them to do something
   and them actually performing it.

   BY [REDACTED]

   Q  And, in your dealings with the FBI, was this level of signoff regular, that the
   special agent would have to get signoff to take any little investigative action?

   A  Not in my experience. In my experience, on most investigations, even
   sensitive investigations, and/or public corruption investigations, it was usually contained
   within the field office. So you would have special agents interacting with their
   immediate supervisor, the SSA, who would bring in maybe an ASAC on occasion or read in
   the SAC.

   Even something as simple as extending the assessment that we talked about, that
   requires a renewal every 30 days under the FBI DIOG. Normally that, either opening or
   renewal, can be by -- at the SSA level. In this case, it required 17 different people,
   including mostly at the headquarters level to sign off on it before the assessment could be
   extended.

   And so, at different times, we were told by the special agents that they had to go
   pens down sometimes for 2 or 3 weeks at a time before they could re-engage and take
   additional steps because they were still waiting on, again, someone within the 17 chain
   signoff to approve.

   Q  And had you ever seen a 17-person signoff required by the FBI?

   A  Never in my career.

   Q  And you had to go to the DAG's office to kind of rectify some of this
challenging relationship and the reluctance. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q And how many times did you have to go to the DAG's office for help?

A With the FBI specifically?

Q Correct.

A It's fairly regular. I want to say at least five or six times on a myriad of different issues.
Q And did you get a sense of where the reluctance and the root of the challenges were coming from? Was it coming from FBI headquarters, or was it specific agents within the Pittsburgh office? Did you get a sense of where that was coming from?

A Typically, when we would elevate an issue that required the attention of senior management of the FBI, the PADAG would interact with the Deputy Director.

Q Uh-huh.

A The Deputy Director at that time was David Bowdich. And Mr. Bowdich was terrific. We would meet, sometimes Seth would talk to Mr. Bowdich directly, and that problem would be solved. Sometimes the three of us would confer and huddle, and I would apprise him, and he would say, "I will take care of it," and he would.

So usually the issues were not at the Pittsburgh Field Office, including the ASACs or SAC levels. It was somewhere at FBI headquarters, and I had no visibility into where that choke point was.

Q And what did the challenging relationship that was going on with the FBI and the reluctance on the part of the FBI to, you know, look into some of the information you were receiving, what did that mean for your process and your assignment?

A It meant, as I stated earlier, there were a lot of stops and starts. Even the process by which the FBI categorized the opening of the assignment -- as I said, they have their administrative procedures that are governed by the DIOG. We could simply open a matter and then move forward. I don't believe, from the time we were given this assignment and it was made public, including when we met with Mr. Giuliani -- that all happened in January. I don't believe that the FBI opened this as an
assessments until the end of March.

And, for a period, they were pens down and not able to do anything until it was
both approved as an assessment and then signed off on. And then, again, it required
every 30 days a renewal. And so there were several times, because of the sign-offs
required, where the agents would go pens down for weeks at a time. And so that was
incredibly frustrating.

Q: And did these challenges continue throughout your whole assignment from
January until, we'll say, October of 2020? Were the challenges consistent? Did they
just happen at one period of time?

A: It happened at the beginning and then through -- the SAC in Pittsburgh, I
believe, retired at the end of March. He was replaced with an acting SAC through
perhaps May and June and then was replaced around that same time -- I don't remember
the dates exactly -- with a permanent SAC. Once that SAC got in place, then things got
moving, and the relationship was much, much better. However, though, there was still
interaction with headquarters and sign-off required by headquarters.

So, in that last period, once the new SAC came on board, it was much better and
we could get things moving. So, really, from January until, again, end of May, it was
incredibly challenging and we did not make much progress at all.

Q: And when you had to, you know, have these meetings between you, the
PADAG, and the Deputy Director at the FBI, was the Deputy Director receptive to what
the PADAG was saying?

Mr. Lelling: You can describe those meetings in very general terms.

Mr. Brady: Yes, Deputy Director was effective. He understood our tasking.

He wanted the FBI to be supportive, and so, to the extent there were issues or problems,
he did his best to solve those. And then we didn't have visibility in what his
communication downstream was, but they were usually resolved.

Q And was there a point in time when the FBI got rolling with their assessment?

A Yes. Later, again, in June-ish of 2020, when the new SAC for Pittsburgh was appointed, he and I had a meeting where we sat down, I explained what our tasking was, what we were trying do, what the history had been, including some of the problems in the working relationship, and things were much better after that point.

We can go off the record.

[Recess.]

Go on the record, please. It is 11:14.

Hi again, Mr. Brady.

Mr. Brady. Hi.

EXAMINATION

Q I have a couple questions just really briefly on the appointment process that we mentioned before. You were asked a series of questions about whose decision it was to remove you from office. Do you recall those questions?

A Yes.

Q Do you know who your predecessor was when you became U.S. attorney in the Western District?

A The Presidentially appointed U.S. attorney was Dave Hickton.

Q Okay.

A And then Soo Song was first assistant and then acting in the interim.
So was your predecessor asked to be removed, as well, when there was a new change in administration?

I have no idea.

Okay. Is that common, in your experience or to your knowledge, that Presidents remove U.S. attorneys when there's a new administration coming in?

It's regularly understood that at the end of an administration that's a change that the U.S. attorneys will resign and then be replaced by nominees, you know, from the party of the incoming administration. That's understood by all of us. We are know that we have a shelf life and that we'll be replaced.

But you didn't think anything unusual happened in your case, is that fair to say, when you were asked to step down?

No. No. We knew it was coming; we just didn't know the timing.

Okay.

And moving on from that, let's talk about your January 2020 assignment. You characterized that as an assignment to vet information. Is that what you would say?

That's correct. And that's what Attorney General Barr, when he spoke of it publicly, also described it, as I recall.

Okay. So the task that you were given came ultimately from Attorney General Barr. Is that right?

I believe so, yes.

And the scope was for you to vet information related to Ukraine that was coming into the Justice Department from members of the public, including, particularly, Mr. Giuliani and his lawyer, Bob Costello, correct?

I don't know about "particularly," but, yes, any member of the public, including Mayor Giuliani.
Q: Okay. So, in your experience, are you saying that you didn't have any expectation that you were going to be receiving information particularly from Mr. Giuliani?

A: We knew he would be one of the members of the public that would be providing us with information --

Q: Okay.

A: -- but the process was open to any member of the public that had information relating to Ukrainian corruption.

Q: Okay. How did you know that the information coming to you was going to be coming from Mr. Giuliani?

A: His attorney reached out to our office once the process had been identified and asked to set up a meeting with our office to provide us with the information that Mr. Giuliani had.

Q: Okay. And his attorney was Bob Costello; is that correct?

A: That's correct.

Q: Okay.

A: Who was the person at the Attorney General's Office who gave you your assignment or informed that you would be the person responsible for this assignment?

A: Seth DuCharme, the PADAG.

Q: Okay. And do you recall how it was that you were informed?

A: I believe I received an email that's in the public, I believe, pursuant to FOIA requests, that he wanted to speak with me and, then, about a new assignment.

Q: Okay.

A: And I am going to mark for the record as exhibit 4 an email. [Brady Exhibit No. 4]
Q  This is the email I think you were referring to, right, Mr. Brady?

A  That's correct. This was the first I was made aware and/or asked about this assignment.

Q  Okay.

A  Correct.

Q  Okay. Do you -- oh, first, just for the record, "OAG" is the Office of the Attorney General; is that right?

A  Correct.

Q  And "ODAG" is the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, correct?

A  That's correct.

Q  So those were the sources of your assignment, correct?

A  Correct.

Q  And Mr. DuCharme refers to your assignment as a, quote, "discreet assignment," correct?

A  Yes. And I think what he meant by "discreet" was limited in scope and duration.

Q  Oh, "discreet" means limited in this case?
My understanding was that it was "discrete" meaning limited in scope and duration.

Okay. Did you think in any way that he was implying that it ought to be kept out of the public, this assignment?

No. I -- no, because, on the one hand, the Attorney General was speaking publicly of the assignment. However, it should be kept secret, to use your words, just as any investigation would be, any process would be that -- whether vetting or an investigation between the U.S. attorney's Office and the FBI or any Federal agency.

You mean the information itself that you were discussing or coming upon in the investigation, that should be kept discreet or out of the public eye?

The investigation, the process, all of that -- none of that is public --

Got it.

-- when we do that.

And you indicated that you believe that the Attorney General at that time was discussing your assignment publicly? Is that -- in your recollection, was he doing that publicly on January 3, 2020?

No. I mean subsequent comments.

Okay. So, after it became known that this investigation or assignment had been given to you, Attorney General Barr did make public comments. Is that right?

Yes.

Okay.

So I am going to mark as exhibit 5 -- this is also part of the FOIA production.

[Brady Exhibit No. 5 Was marked for identification.]
Q. Oh, sorry. Oh, this is the other version.

A. Sorry. I'm sorry. It's not that.

Q. Not this first one?

A. I'm going to give you the transcript. It's easier.

A. No problem.

Q. Sorry. So sorry. Thank you.

A. This is 5?

Q. Yes, sir, exhibit 5.

This is another email. There's actually a Bates number, just for the record, on the bottom. This is part of an American Oversight FOIA case, DOJ-20-0220-A. And the Bates number is 20-0221-B-000002.

At the top of this exhibit, you'll see that this is an email from Kerri Kupec to Bill Ahern. Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And "Bill Ahern" is an alias for the Attorney General, Mr. Barr. Is that correct?

A. I am not aware of that.

Q. Okay. Well, it says "OAG." Does that, again, stand for the Office of the Attorney General?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay. And do you know who Kerri Kupec is?

A. Yes. She was in the Office of Public Affairs.

Q. Okay.

And if you flip through it -- you don't need to read all of it, but this is a series
of -- actually, I only really need you to look at the first page. The first page, these are transcribed comments from an interview that Senator Lindsey Graham gave to CBS.

And if I can direct your attention to the second page -- this is on the back, I think, maybe, of the document that you have.

A  Uh-huh.

Q  Yeah. This is Mr. Graham telling a CBS News affiliate -- middle of the page, this is highlighted: "No, the Department of Justice is receiving information coming out of Ukraine from Rudy."

Brennan says: "Already?"

Graham responds, quote: "He told me that they had created a process that Rudy could give information and they would see if it's verified," unquote.

Do you see that part?

A  Yes.

Q  Okay. Did you hear those comments when Senator Graham made them?

A  No, I did not.

Q  Did you become aware of them at some point?

A  I don't know that I was aware of Senator Graham's comments relating to this.

Q  Okay.

And you indicated that you're not familiar with the alias "Bill Ahern"?

A  I am not.

Q  Okay.

Do you have any idea whether Attorney General Barr was made aware of Senator Graham's comments?

A  I have no idea about General Barr's knowledge.
Okay. And you never discussed it with General Barr?

No.

And you never discussed it with Seth DuCharme?

No.

Okay.

At some point, did you become aware from the public or news coverage that Senator Graham had made comments about this process of receiving information from Rudy?

I don't believe so. I don't remember --

Okay.

-- as I sit here.

Okay.

Now, this email was sent February 9, 2020, so approximately a little bit over a month after your "discreet assignment" was given, correct?

Correct, after my assignment was given.

Okay. Do you recall at that point the Attorney General making public comments about the fact that this process existed and that the public could send in information about Ukraine?

The only comments that I'm aware of were in response to a -- there was a question at a press conference, I believe around this same time, where he explained the intake process for information relating to matters of Ukrainian corruption from the public. And then the letter between -- well, from Steven Boyd to Representative Nadler, which also explained it.

And then, I believe, the other comment I'm aware of is in the summer, when General Barr testified before -- and forgive me, I might be misremembering this -- I
believe it was the House Judiciary Committee, and there was one brief exchange about
my tasking and assignment.

Q  Okay.

And I recall the letter that you mentioned from Mr. Nadler came in response to
Senator Graham's comments. Were you aware of that?

A  I was not. I was only aware of exhibit 2, the response from Steven Boyd to
Representative Nadler.

Q  Okay. Did you ever discuss Representative Nadler's letter with anybody in
the Attorney General's Office during your assignment?

A  I don't believe I did.

Q  Okay.

When we look at the transcript of Senator Graham's comments, again, the ones
that I just pointed out on the second page, do you agree with Senator Graham's
characterization of your assignment from Attorney General Barr, as he describes it, quote,
"a process that Rudy could give information and they would see if it's verified," unquote?

A  I'm sorry. Where is that in the transcript?

Q  That's the second page. So, if you can turn it over to the second page,
there's a ton of highlighting, but the beginning of that quote is, like, in the middle. It
says, "GRAHAM:"

A  I'm sorry. So your question is, do I agree with Senator Graham's
characterization of the process?

Q  Well, as -- yeah, the terms that Senator Graham used to characterize the
process as: "He told me that they had created a process that Rudy could give
information and they would see if it's verified," unquote. That's Senator Graham's
description of the process that you were undertaking.
So, again, the process is, quote, "a process that Rudy could give information and they would see if it's verified."

A    And, I'm sorry, so "he" refers to Attorney General Barr?
Q    Exactly.
A    I don't know that I would agree or disagree with that characterization. It was irrelevant to my tasking. My understanding of my assignment was that it was for all members of the public who ever had information, including Mr. Giuliani.
Q    Okay. So Senator Graham mischaracterized your assignment in this sense?
A    I can't speak to Senator Graham's knowledge or understanding of, you know, what my assignment was on that day.
Q    Okay.
A    So I won't characterize it.
Q    And just record for the record, I want to explain that this highlighting on this document is not highlighting that we did. It was a part of the production under the FOIA case. I don't know who did it.
A    Okay.
Q    And we can set that aside for a second.
A    Okay.
Q    And just record for the record, I want to explain that this highlighting on this document is not highlighting that we did. It was a part of the production under the FOIA case. I don't know who did it.
Q    Okay. So you indicated your understanding of your assignment was to receive information regarding Ukraine from anyone in the public, not just Rudy Giuliani, correct?
A    That's correct.
Okay. But, in fact, the person that you first received information from was Rudy Giuliani, fair to say?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. And the connection that was made actually came via the PADAG. Once again, Mr. DuCharme is the one who put you in touch with Rudy Giuliani’s attorney to start receiving this information. Is that fair to say?

A That's correct.

Q Okay.

And so exhibit 5 is an email, again from the American Oversight production, with Bates number at the end C-00019.

A I don't mean to interrupt you. Exhibit 6?

Q It is, yes.

Right?

Thank you.

This is an email from you to Seth DuCharme at the top, but the original email comes from Mr. DuCharme to you, January 7, 2020, correct?

A Correct.

Q And this was the -- no -- a few days after your January 3rd assignment, correct?

A That's correct.

Q All right. And, in this email, Mr. DuCharme provides you -- the subject matter is "contact information," correct?

A Correct.

Q So he's giving you contact information for Rudy Giuliani's attorney, right?

A He's giving me the contact information for Mr. Costello. That's correct.
Okay. And do you understand Mr. Costello to be Rudy Giuliani's attorney?

A Yes.

Okay. And it gives you his name, his phone number, and a way to get in touch with him, correct?

A That's correct.

The purpose of this email was for Mr. DuCharme to put you in contact with Mr. Giuliani's attorney so that he could start giving you the information that Mr. DuCharme knew was coming into the Department from Mr. Giuliani, right?

A I don't know what Mr. DuCharme's thought process was, but my understanding was it was to give me Mr. Costello's information to coordinate with him if there was information that his client had to give to the Department.

Q Okay. But the information or the contact initially with Mr. Costello was between Mr. Costello and Mr. DuCharme? Or was it between Mr. Costello and you?

A I'm sorry. Could you repeat that?

Q Sorry. That was a terrible question.

A No, that's okay.

Q What I'm trying to say is, who was it that first contacted the -- who at the Department did Mr. Costello first contact? Somebody at the Attorney General's Office or you?

A It was someone in the Department of Justice at Main Justice. How it arrived on Seth's desk I don't know, but Seth communicated it to me.

Q Okay.

A So Mr. Costello did not reach out to us directly.

Q Got it.
All right. Now, as your assignment progressed and you were vetting information provided by Mr. Giuliani, did you keep Mr. DuCharme and others in the Attorney General's Office informed as to what you were doing?

A Yes.

Q And how did you do that? What was the process of keeping them informed?

A At a high level, I would -- Mr. DuCharme and I would speak periodically or on an as-needed basis. And there were a few occasions where I provided an update to the Attorney General.

Q Personally, you updated the Attorney General?

A Personally.

Q Okay. In person or on the phone or something else?

A In person.

Q Okay. And about how many times did you update Attorney General Barr about your assignment?

A Perhaps two?

Q Okay.

A Most of it went through the PADAG.

Q Understood. And how many times would you say that you gave updates to the PADAG?

A Most of my interaction with the PADAG, either Mr. DuCharme or, later, Mr. Donoghue, was to talk about issues that we might be having, so we would speak on a semi-regular basis about that. And then, in those conversations, I would apprise him of, kind of, what our next steps were or where we were in the process.

Q Okay. Did you ever receive any direction from Mr. DuCharme?
No, not that I recall.

Before I move on, could we just pick up exhibit No. 6 again?

Uh-huh.

This is the one we just looked at.

In the body of the email that came from Mr. DuCharme to you on January 7th, Mr. DuCharme indicates, quote, "Give him a call sometime today whenever you're ready," unquote.

Do you see that?

Yes, uh-huh.

And what he is saying there is, he wants -- he, Mr. DuCharme, wants you to call Mr. Costello sometime today, the day of the email, correct?

Yes.

Do you consider that direction?

Oh, forgive me. I thought you meant "direction" in terms of how we conduct our investigation or vetting process.

Okay.

So, yes, in this email, he's saying, get in touch with Mr. Costello. If that's a direction, then, yes, I agree. Beyond that, in terms of steps we were to take in our investigation or how to run ours, no, he left that to my discretion as a United States attorney.

Did you ever consult with him about steps in your investigation?

Yes.

Such as asking him whether he would concur with a decision that you made to interview a witness, for example?

I can't remember specifically, but, yes, in the course of me giving him
updates or talking about issues we were having, yes. Mr. DuCharme had previously been the criminal chief of EDNY, was very experienced, very thoughtful, very professional. And so I valued his input when he would give it. But in terms of direction or marching orders, no, that was not our interaction.

Q Okay. But because of his experience in the Criminal Division, you’re saying that you would ask sometimes his advice or his concurrence on decisions that you were making in your role? Is that fair to say?

A Yes, sometimes. I can't remember specifics, but, yes, sometimes we would have those conversations.

Q Okay.

Would it surprise you that at one point during your investigation, specifically on January 15, 2020, Mr. DuCharme and you exchanged emails, and Mr. DuCharme informed you in an email that he, quote, "concurs with your proposal" to interview a witness in your probe?

A I would have to see the email.

Q Okay. You don't recall that, as we sit here?

A As we sit here? No.

Q Okay.

A So, if you have the email and can show it to me, I'd be happy to see it.

Q I'll show it to you, but I don't have it for everyone else. I'm going to get a copy.

A Okay.

Q Moving on, though, would it be unusual, in your experience as a United States attorney, to -- like, for you, personally, I am asking right now, not Mr. DuCharme.

A Uh-huh.
Q: Is it unusual for a United States attorney to participate in witness interviews directly, personally?

A: No. It depends on the scope and sensitivity of the matter.

Q: Okay. And have you, as a U.S. attorney, ever participated in a witness interview in an investigation or matter under your direction?

A: As U.S. attorney, I have been involved in many meetings with the line AUSAs and agents, including our Tree of Life prosecution for the synagogue shooting. We had a number of high-level investigations and indictments of the Russian intelligence directorate of the GRU, and I was in the room and a part of those meetings. I can't remember if we had a witness interview that I was involved in, but I may have been.

Q: Okay. So, again, if the matter were important or sensitive, it would not be unusual for the U.S. attorney to be involved. On regular cases, line cases? No.

Q: Okay. So, when the U.S. attorney is involved in a witness interview, in your experience, that is because of the sensitivity of the matter, fair to say?

A: It can be. Not limited to that. That would be, you know, a determination by each U.S. attorney, him- or herself, and the size of the office and the type of matter. For me, I felt it was important to be involved in some of those so I also had an understanding of what was going on.

Q: Okay. And with respect to this "discreet assignment" that we're talking about here today, did you ever participate personally in a witness interview?

A: Yes.

Q: More than once?

A: In this vetting assignment, I only participated in one.

Q: Okay. Did you actually conduct the interview, I mean, ask questions of the witness, yourself?
A I did not conduct the interview. I was present.

Q Okay. Who conducted the interview?

You can use just a title. I'm not looking for a name.

A I don't recall, but I believe it was the SSA from the FBI. Typically -- in typical cases or investigation, the agents of the investigative agency would conduct the interview, and an AUSA would participate. Not exclusively, but that was what happened in this case.

Q Okay. And the interview that you were present at of the witness, do you recall when that interview was conducted?


Q Okay. And do you recall where it was conducted?

A It was conducted at FBI Pittsburgh.

Q That's the field office there?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

So you indicated it's not unusual for a U.S. attorney to participate in a witness interview like this, correct?

A For particularly sensitive or important matters, yes.

Q And this was -- I know you may not recall this. When you participated in that interview, was this the interview that you had consulted Mr. DuCharme about and he indicated that he, quote, "concurred" with your proposal to interview that witness?

A Again, it would be best if I could see the email, and then I can speak to it.

You can show it to him to just refresh his recollection, and then you can --

Sorry for the logistics --
Mr. Brady. No, no, no. It's okay.

Yeah. Thank you.

I am going to mark this exhibit 7.

[Brady Exhibit No. 7

Was marked for identification.]

Q And I'll get copies for everyone. It's very short.

This is an email from Seth DuCharme to you, subject: "Interview." The date is Wednesday, January 15, 2020.

And, for the record, the text of the email is, quote, "Scott I concur with your proposal to interview the person we talked about - would feel more comfortable if you participated so we get a sense of what's coming out of it. We can talk further when convenient for you. Best, Seth."

And tell me if you recall that email.

A Yes, I do recall it.

Q Okay. And the date, again, is January 15, 2020, correct?

A That's right.

Q So that was 14 days before the interview that you just described at which you were present, correct?

A Correct.

Q Does that help you recall whether this email between you and Seth DuCharme was referring to the witness that you participated in the interview of on January 29, 2020?

A Yes, it definitely did.

Q Okay. Just for clarity, yes, this email is about that witness?
A Yes, that email is about setting up a meeting and interview of Mr. Giuliani.

Q Okay. So the witness was Mr. Giuliani? That's who you're talking about?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And it was, in your judgment, important to get Mr. DuCharme's opinion or, quote, "concurrence" about interviewing Mr. Giuliani. Is that fair to say?

A As I sit here, I don't know if it was about interviewing Mr. Giuliani or just the logistics of where the interview would take place -- Pittsburgh, New York, D.C. It might've been about that.

Q So you needed Mr. DuCharme's opinion about where the interview would be taking place?

A No, I didn't need his opinion.

Q Oh. I'm just trying to --

A Yeah.

Q -- understand, what was the reason, if you can recall, why you consulted with Mr. DuCharme about that particular decision, about whether or not you should interview Mr. Giuliani and any other aspect of that decision?

A Yeah, I -- I don't know. I may have just been circling back to him, saying, "Hey, here's the plan." And he said, "Yeah, that sounds fine."

Q Okay. Well, he also said that he would feel more comfortable if you participated, right?

A In that email, he did, yes.

Q Yeah. Was that consistent with what your experience with Mr. DuCharme was when you discussed interviewing Mr. Giuliani, or is there something unusual about the email?
I don't remember that there's anything unusual. I would've sat in on that interview anyways, in all likelihood.

Okay.

And just -- I don't want to take this away from you, because I know you and I --

Oh, sure.

-- just have one copy. But just, again, what this email says is, "I concur with your proposal to interview the person we talked about."

And then he says, "Would feel more comfortable if you participated so we get a sense of what's coming out of it."

Do you see that?

Uh-huh.

Okay.

Yes.

So what did he mean by "we"? Who was he referring to by "we"? Do you know?

I don't know.

Okay. Is it fair to infer that he is referring to the Attorney General and the Office of the Deputy Attorney General where he was working?

I don't know. Yeah, some group of people at Main Justice, but I don't know specifically if it was DAG Rosen, Attorney General Barr, or the people that were supporting them in ODAG and OAG.

Okay. But they wanted to, quote, "get a sense of what's coming out of it,"
correct?

From the email, yes.

Okay. Well, from your experience with Mr. DuCharme and others in Main
Justice, did that seem to be fair, that they did want to know what came out of the interview?

A  Yes, I think that's fair. I don't think that would be uncommon for sensitive cases.

Q  Okay.

In other experience that you've had as a United States attorney, some of the matters that you discussed in your earlier answer, like the synagogue shooting or other high-profile matters --

A  Uh-huh.

Q  -- have you had the experience of Office of the Deputy Attorney General or the Attorney General himself asking to hear what's coming out of your witness interviews?

A  Yes. And I can explain.

Q  Yeah.

A  Kind of a basic management rule is: No surprises.

Q  Uh-huh.

A  Right? And so it's important that the people who report up the chain understand, if there are things that are either public or in the news or particularly sensitive, that they are not surprised by things.

So, for example, for the synagogue shooting case, I received a call from both then-DAG Rosenstein and from Attorney General Sessions. And then, after we had met with the victims' families, had a prosecution plan in place, talked about when the President was coming, I needed to keep them informed, again, so they were not surprised by things.

So that's my understanding, as a good U.S. attorney, that you should interface
with ODAG and OAG on an as-needed basis.

Q And this was definitely a sensitive matter, correct?

A This was sensitive given that it was an election year and possibly involved the now-President's son, then-Vice President's son.

Q Absolutely. And it also involved the attorney, the personal attorney, of the sitting President of the United States, correct, during your investigation?

A Yes. That was not a part of our conversation at any level, that he represented the President, but I do understand that Mr. Giuliani was the personal attorney of the President, yes.

Q So you're saying that wouldn't have been a concern and even for the appearance of, you know, some kind of sensitivity in public.

Was that a concern of the Department of Justice, that you were interviewing the private attorney of the President of the United States, who was very publicly trying to push information about his election opponent into every corner of the Federal Government that he could find? Was that a concern of the Department at the time that this was happening?

A What was a concern was that this process be conducted in a way that would be consistent with other cases -- so the same professionalism, the same objectivity be with Mr. Giuliani versus any other member of the public who would bring us information.

So the fact that we would give any kind of preferential treatment was not a part of the conversation. I was informed that Mr. Giuliani had information, and we were the intake for that, and so we set up a meeting to receive that. But it wasn't a part of -- him representing the President, that was not a part of our conversation or my tasking.

Q Okay.

When you got your tasking in January 2020, were you aware that Mr. Giuliani had
been pushing information to other areas of the government, like the State Department, for example?

A I believe I was aware that he had given information to Secretary Pompeo.

Q Okay. And what was your understanding about the information that he was passing to Mr. Pompeo at that time?

A I didn't really have a specific understanding. I believe it was similar to the information that he provided to us, but I don't know. I did not see what he provided Secretary of State.

Q Okay. So you didn't see the packet of information that he gave to Pompeo.

A I don't believe I did, no.

Q Okay. But what makes you say that you believe it was similar to the information that you received in your capacity with this assessment?

A I am trying to remember if, on the day, there was a representation made by Mr. Costello that much of the information was similar to but wasn't complete. I think there was additional information that he was providing us that maybe he hadn't provided Mr. Pompeo.

So I think it was a representation. It wasn't anything that I received information from the State Department or ODAG or OAG.

Q Okay. So it was from Mr. Costello, that --

A I believe so. Yeah, I believe so.

Q Okay. Did you talk to Mr. Costello before you interviewed his client Mr. Giuliani?

A There may have been one coordination call that I was on. Most of the interaction was between the first assistant from my office and Mr. Costello, for logistics.

Q Okay. But fair to say that Mr. Costello gave you some kind of preview
about what was to come when you interviewed Mr. Giuliani?

A  I don't remember that was a part of it. It was really just the logistics of setting up, you know, where, when are we going to conduct this.

Q  Okay. I'm just trying to drill down on what you just said about it was Costello that was source of your understanding that the information you were about to receive from Mr. Giuliani was similar to what the State Department had received.

A  Sorry. Yeah, I believe that was a part of the conversation on the 29th --

Q  Okay.

A  -- but I don't remember specifically as I sit here.

Q  Okay. That was the day that you participated in the interview of Mr. Giuliani.

A  That's correct.

Q  Okay. And Mr. Costello was present; is that right?

A  He was.

Q  Okay.

So this will be our exhibit No. --

A  Eight.

Q  -- 8. Thank you.

[Brady Exhibit No. 8

Was marked for identification.]

Q  So, for the record, exhibit No. 8 is -- it's a letter on letterhead from Rudolph Giuliani, PLLC. The date is November 22, 2019. And it's directed to Lindsey Graham, who was then chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. This is part of the American Oversight production, bearing Bates number 000109.
November 22, 2019, Mr. Brady, that was a few months before your assignment began, correct?

A  Correct.

Q  Okay.  Have you ever seen this letter before?

A  I think I have seen it as a part of -- I have seen the FOIA productions that were provided to American Oversight on their website.  So I'm aware of those productions.  Whether I saw it prior to that, I don't remember.

Q  Okay.

The production to American Oversight from the Department of Justice was documents that were provided to your office during your assessment, correct?

A  Not exclusively.

Q  Okay.  So, then, to your knowledge, was this letter produced to your office from Mr. Giuliani, Mr. Costello, or anyone related?

A  I don't remember.

And, also, just as a matter of practice, the U.S. attorney's offices, we don't usually pay attention to what -- no offense -- Congress is talking about or doing.  Different branch, different motivations, different assignments.  So I can't remember if I saw this or not, but our playbook is different.

Q  Okay.  So I'm assuming that you don't know what's inside this letter as you sit here today?

A  Again, I read it as part of the publicly available production on American Oversight's --

Q  Okay.

A  -- website, but the details I don't remember as I sit here.  I could read it if you want me to.
No, you don't need to read it.

Okay.

Just based on your recollection as you've described it, is it fair to say that this letter contains a range of allegations against Democrats, Joe Biden, the American Ambassador to Ukraine, and other embassy staff?

I would have to read it again.

I mean, in a quick reading, it appears to be that.

Okay. Were you familiar with any of these allegations before you started your assignment?

I was aware that Hunter Biden was on the board of Burisma.

Uh-huh.

I was aware that then-Vice President Biden was Obama's, quote, "point man," on page 2, for the Ukraine.

How about, were you aware of Mr. Giuliani's allegation that the United States Ambassador to Ukraine, Ms. Yovanovitch, and others of her staff were doing some kind of cover-up of investigations that he was pushing in Ukraine?

I don't believe I was aware of that at the time.

Okay. And were you aware of Mr. Giuliani's claim that Ukraine had interfered in the 2016 Presidential election?

I don't believe I was aware of that.

Okay. And just -- were you aware of the intelligence community's conclusion that Russia actually interfered in the 2016 Presidential election?

Wait. Let's unpack that. So -- could you ask that again, please?

Are you aware of the U.S. intelligence community's conclusion that Russia interfered in the 2016 Presidential election?
A I am aware of allegations of Russian interference. Conclusive determinations by the entire intelligence community of the United States, I'm not certain, especially in light of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation.

Q Have you read the Mueller report?
A The whole Mueller report? Parts of it. I have read parts of it.

Q Marking as exhibit 8 -- 9, sorry -- 9.

[Brady Exhibit No. 9

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Brady. This is 9?

Yes.

Do you want me to --

Uh-huh, yep.

Okay.

BY

Q Have you seen this before?
A What is this, please?

Q All right. So what we just introduced is entitled "Background to 'Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections': The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution." It's dated January 6, 2017. And it's a report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of the -- I'm sorry, the National Intelligence Council.

A Was this under DNI Ratcliffe?

Yes.

Mr. Brady. Under --

2017.
Mr. Brady. -- DNI Ratcliffe?

No. This would've been prior to DNI Ratcliffe.

2017.

Mr. Brady. Oh, 2017. I apologize. I was thinking of the 2021 report that he released.

Q So --

A I don't know that I've read this --

Q Okay.

A -- particular -- but generally I understand --

Q So you understand that the intelligence community in 2017 concluded that Russian intelligence agencies conducted cyber operations against targets associated with the 2016 election?

Mr. Lelling. Why are we asking Scott Brady about this? The report says what it says --

Because of his answer.

I'm just asking if he's familiar with this report.

What difference does it make?

Because he just said he wasn't aware of the --

And he's said he's -- he's said he's aware of allegations of Russian interference.

Right, but he wasn't aware of the conclusions.

Sorry, can I --

So?

Let's confirm that.
So I can just wrap this up real quickly.

Are you -- do you have any -- have you reviewed this report before?

I have not.

Okay. And so you don't have any opinion of whether the findings, the conclusions of this report are true and accurate or not?

Well, I don't know what the findings are.

I am generally aware of allegations of Russian interference in U.S. elections. My office has investigated Russian interference in French elections, Georgian elections.

Uh-huh.

So I have no doubt that Russia and other adversaries attempt to interfere in our elections on a regular basis.

And you have no evidence to dispute the findings of the Director of National Intelligence in this report?

Other than what is publicly available given Mr. Mueller's report and then his appearance before Congress and then General Barr's disposition of that matter.

But you have no personal knowledge. In other words, you have not personally investigated the matter.

Could I have a moment, please?

[Discussion off the record.]

I am aware of this.

Uh-huh.

The Pittsburgh office, the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Western District of Pennsylvania, had an investigation into the hacking of the DNC.
Mr. Brady. We were investigating that until it was transmitted to Director Mueller's office for part of his investigation. So, yes, I am -- I am aware.

Okay.

Mr. Brady. I'm not aware of the conclusions --

Okay.

Mr. Brady. -- drawn from that.

Sorry. Go ahead.

So you have no reason to dispute the conclusions that are in that document?

Mr. Lelling. He hasn't read it.

Mr. Brady. I haven't read it.

Okay. Let's bring out exhibit 3 again, which is the 1023. You had a series of questions about that -- or, I'll wait until you grab it. Do you have it in front of you?

Yes. Sorry. Let me just put these in order here.

Okay.

Okay. First, a little bit of high-level. You said in the first hour that you were aware that the FBI had determined that the CHS was credible. Is that fair to say?

That's correct.

Okay. And then you indicated that your investigation or assessment found indicia of credibility with respect to what was in the 1023, correct?

Some indicia of credibility, yes.

Okay. And, just to clarify, when you're talking about "indicia of credibility,"
you're referring to, first, the CHS, him- or herself. Is that fair to say?

A   That's correct. And the FBI's assessment of his or her credibility and what
he or she has done in prior investigations, correct. Their history with the CHS.

Q   Okay. But when you were conducting this assessment, you were not in
position, as you've already explained, to look into the information that's recorded in the
1023 and to assess the credibility of the claims writ large. Is that fair to say?

A   I don't know about writ large, but we were able to corroborate certain
information that was represented by the CHS and is memorialized in this 1023. Some of
the underlying allegations relating to Hunter Biden and President Biden by Mr. Zlochevsky
we were not in a position to investigate further or determine whether they were true or
false.

Q   Okay.

This document contains several layers of hearsay, fair to say?

A   I mean, it's all hearsay, right? It's secondhand from the CHS.

Q   Right. So anything that the CHS is attributing so some other speaker is
hearsay, correct?

A   If this were a trial, perhaps. But --

Q   Okay. Well --

A   -- this is how reports are drafted up by witnesses.

Q   Okay. So what I'm saying is, there's, you might call it a sub-source, more
than one, who is described, or statements attributed to sub-sources are within this 1023,
correct?

A   I'm sorry. I don't know what you mean.

Q   There are statements attributed to sub-sources or people other than the CHS
that are contained in this 1023.
Yes.

Is that correct?


Okay. And with respect to those people that I am going to call "sub-sources," not with any particular, I don't know, legal reasoning -- but I'm talking about the people who are speaking who are not the CHS whose --

Sure.

-- statements are attributed in here.

Yes.

With respect to those individuals, was your office in a position to evaluate the credibility of those people?

I don't know if I can answer that. We were not in a position to interview those sub-sources, and that was not a part of our credibility determination relating to the 1023.

Okay.

So let's just get right down to it. In this 1023, the CHS is reporting alleged statements made by individuals in Ukraine, including Mr. Zlochevsky, correct?

Yes.

All right. The statements that are attributed to Mr. Zlochevsky, did you do any work, you or anyone on your team, to determine whether those statements are consistent or inconsistent with other statements made by Mr. Zlochevsky?

Mr. Lelling. He's not going line by line from a 1023. He's not discussing at that level of detail.

Okay.

Could you answer the question that I asked you though?
Mr. Lelling. No. Do not answer.

That was not a line-by-line question.

Mr. Lelling. Do not answer the question.

You picked the line. You read it. You were asking him --

That's not -- no, I didn't. What line did I read from?

Mr. Lelling. Okay. I'm being figurative.

Okay. I'm asking --

Mr. Lelling. He is not going to go detail by detail through the 1023.

I'm not asking that. No, I'm not going to ask that. I am asking a general question about whether he tried to determine whether there were consistent or inconsistent statements made by one of the sub-sources, generally.

Mr. Lelling. Yeah. No. He can't answer that. This is too much --

So we're going to keep asking the questions -- I understand he may not want to answer. We're going to keep asking the questions to make a record.

If you decline to answer --

Mr. Lelling. Sure. I understand. And some maybe he can. This is --

We're going to keep asking the questions though.

Mr. Lelling. This is a blurry line, a --

Understood.

Mr. Lelling. -- deliberative-process question. And I'm sort of making those judgments question by question. So, maybe, categorically, he can't answer any of the questions you're about to ask. Maybe he can. So --

Well, if you let me ask them, then we can have your response.

Mr. Lelling. Sure.

Fair? Okay.
So the sub-source, Mr. Zlochevsky, did you make any effort in your investigation to look in public sources, for example, whether Mr. Zlochevsky had made statements inconsistent with those attributed to him by the CHS in the 1023?

Mr. Brady. I don’t remember. I don’t believe we did.

I think what our -- broadly, without going into specifics, what we were looking to do was corroborate information that we could receive, you know, relating to travel, relating to the allegation of purchase of a North American oil and gas company during this period by Burisma for the amount that’s discussed in there. We used open sources and other information to try to make a credibility assessment, a limited credibility assessment.

We did not interview any of the sub-sources, nor did we look at public statements by the sub-sources relating to what was contained in the 1023. We believed that that was best left to a U.S. attorney’s office with a predicated grand jury investigation to take further.

Q And you've used the word "limited" here with us just now and you used it in the prior hour a little bit as well. When you're using the word "limited," how did you define that? What does that mean to you, specifically?

A You mean our limited, kind of, tasking and what --

Q When you were using -- just sitting here today, you've used the word "limited."

A Right.

Q What does "limited" mean to you? Can you explain what you mean by "limited"?

A Sure. I mean that our tasking was to vet --
Uh-huh.

-- to basically conduct due diligence, on the credibility of the information that was provided to us by members of the public. And it's limited in the sense that we did not have the tools of a grand jury. We are never going to have the tools of a grand jury. It was never going to develop into a grand jury investigation in the Western District of Pennsylvania. And so that's when I mean by "limited."

And so some of the things that you just described, for example, the purchase of an oil and gas company, for example, or the attempt to purchase an oil and gas company, that's the type of thing that would be in public records, correct?

Correct, open-source records or possibly in existing FBI files. But, yes, those were the limitations of what we could look at.

Okay. So kind of the low-hanging fruit. Is that fair to say?

I don't know if it's low-hanging fruit. It's just a level of process that every investigation goes through.

Okay. Thank you.

All right. You indicated, I think, in the earlier hour that you did interview some witnesses during the course of your assessment, correct?

That's correct.

Other than Mr. Giuliani?

Yes.

Okay. And did you interview any witnesses based on the information that you received in this 1023?

Other than the confidential human source, no.

Okay. And you're saying that was part of the limitation that you found was
on you in terms of the scope of this assignment, correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. But open-source -- so, other than witness interviews, you did do some open-source or your team did some open-source review to attempt to corroborate some of what was in the 1023? Is that fair?

A Just limited to the 1023?

Q Well, let's start with that.

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what does that generally involve, in terms of the open-source investigation?

A It could be looking at -- it could be looking at public financial filings. It could be looking at news articles. It could be looking at foreign reporting as well, having that translated.

Anything that is not within a government file would be open-source, and it could be from any number of -- any number of sources.

Q So, when you look at news reports, for example, would you note if there was a witness referred to in the 1023 that had made a statement that was reported in the news article, for example? Would that be of note to your investigators?

A Relating to the 1023? No. We had a more limited focus, because we felt that it was more important to do what we could with certain of the information and then pass it on to the District of Delaware, because then they could not only use other grand jury tools that were available but, also, we didn't have visibility into what they had already investigated, what they had already done with Mr. Zlochevsky, with any of the individuals named in this CHS report.
Q. When you say "we didn't have visibility" -- you talked in the earlier hour about trying to get information from the District of Delaware.

A. Correct.

Q. And when you say you didn't have visibility, that was part of -- you were trying to get visibility into what they had already done maybe so that you didn't duplicate efforts? Is that fair to say?

A. That's right.

Q. Okay. And so the -- I think you said you passed along -- or, not you personally, but your office passed along interrogatories or questions for them.

A. That's right.

Q. That was along the lines of asking them what steps they had taken. Is that fair to say?

A. Some limited steps. Correct.

Q. Okay. So you were asking them about their investigation to help inform your investigation.

A. Yes, to help focus our process so that we weren't doing anything that, as I mentioned, would be duplicative or would complicate their investigation in any way.

Q. Okay. And so -- okay. Thanks.

A. Sure.

Q. Well, on that topic, since we're there -- so you indicated that there was some back-and-forth of information flow, not just you sending information to other districts but districts sending information to you. Is that correct?

A. It was almost all a one-way street with all of the offices. There was very limited information that was coming back to us from EDNY, SDNY, District of Delaware.
Okay. With respect to Delaware in particular, I think you said earlier, in the first hour, that there was frustration that they weren't giving you information, correct?

Correct.

And by that, are you talking about information about their investigation or some other kind of information?

Mostly about, as I mentioned, things that they had done, steps they had taken. Not what they had received. We didn't want to see the underlying evidence. We just wanted to know, have you looked at these bank records? Have you looked at, you know, foreign bank accounts that are bringing information into -- or, bringing funds into Mr. Biden's accounts?

So, broadly, we were just trying to understand what they had done and what they had not done. Beyond that, we were not asking for specific information, specific evidence that they had received.
Okay. And you wanted to know that because you didn't want to start doing the same investigative steps that they were doing?

Correct.

But you indicated before that you didn't have the power to get bank records, for example; is that right?

Correct.

So was there a reason that you would need to know whether the other district had subpoenaed something if you weren't able to subpoena bank records yourself?

Yes. For example, if we were given a bank account number and wanted to see if they had already looked at that, we would want to know if they had visibility and say, you know: Here's a bank account that we had received; have you, you know, have you subpoenaed these records, have you -- can you examine whether this bank account has sent funds into other Burisma-related accounts or Biden-related accounts?

So you were looking to sort of use their grand jury or subpoena authority to learn information because you didn't have that tool in your own investigation?

We weren't really looking to learn information about their investigation. We just wanted to know if we needed to do anything with that, to try to corroborate it through perhaps other sources or through the FBI, or if we should even hand it over, again, if it was credible or not credible. If there is nothing to be gained, I don't want to waste their time if they said: Oh, yeah, we've looked at that, and this bank account doesn't show up anywhere in our records.

So, if you had some kind of information or question about a bank account,
was there anything stopping you from just passing that onto Delaware without asking
them also to tell you whether they had received any information pursuant to a subpoena
or any other lawful process?

A  We could have, but that wasn't my understanding of our assignment.  Our
understanding of the assignment was to really separate the wheat from the chaff and not
waste their time with a dump of information, maybe, you know, a percentage of which
would be credible or have indicia of credibility.  So they have limited resources.  They
have, you know, a broad tasking.  So we didn't want to waste their time by doing that.
We thought it would be more efficient to engage them, ask them:  Have you seen this?
Yes, no.  And then pass it on, make a determination of what to pass onto them.

Q  So you were looking out for the Delaware office's time, that's why you
wanted to get more information from them about their subpoena practices, and what
they received in response to a subpoena?

A  Well, as I stated, what we were primarily concerned with was protecting the
existing grand jury investigations.

Q  In Delaware?

A  In any of the offices that had predicated investigations that we intersected
with and/or briefed.  That was our primary intent.  And so that was what our
interactions consisted of.

Q  Okay.  I just -- let's move on.

Do you want to do that?

Yeah.

So, sorry.  Turning back to exhibit 3.  We only have a couple minutes left, and I
do want to note for the record, that turning to page 3 of 4 here, the second full paragraph
on this page, I want to look at this paragraph quickly.
Mr. Lelling. Is this the one that starts with "regarding"?

Yeah. Regarding.

BY

Q And this is -- again, you said your office took limited steps to corroborate, but there were other steps you could not take, right?

A That's correct.

Q And so here, the confidential HUMINT source himself said, quote:

Regarding the seemingly open and unsolicited admissions by Pojarski and Zlochevsky be about their purpose for their attention of Hunter Biden and the forced payments Zlochevsky made to the Bidens, CHS explained it is very common for businessmen in post-Soviet countries to brag or show off, right?

A Correct.

Q So, when he said that it was common for them to brag or show, but again that was hearsay that he was relaying. So some people might make untrue statements as part of bragging, correct?

A Well, that's not hearsay. That's his estimation based on his experience.

Q Correct. Referring specifically to the bragging, though?

A Correct. And then, below that, he said: CHS did not perceive Pojarski or Zlochevsky's statements to be unusual, self-serving, or pretextual. So, again, we felt that that was best left in the hands of Delaware to run that to ground to understand that, you know, does puffery exist in conversations with Russian or Ukrainian oligarchs? Yes.

Q Right.

A Is this that? We don't know, as we sit here in Pittsburgh, so Mr. Weiss and team, you guys might want to look at this.

Q And that last sentence of that paragraph provides: However, has CHS only
met Zlochevsky in person on one occasion and has spoken to him only twice on the telephone. As such, CHS is not able to provide any further opinion as to the voracity of Zlochevsky's aforementioned statements, correct?

A    That's absolutely correct, that we were unable to -- the CHS, as my understanding, did not see the recordings Mr. Zlochevsky claimed to have or the documentation relating to wire transfers and payments that Mr. Zlochevsky claimed to have. So, correct.

Q    And the CHS said that you upfront, correct?

A    In the document, yes.

Q    He wasn't trying to hide that fact. He said: This is what I've heard; do with it what you will.

A    Correct.

Q    And you were not in a position from where you sat to do any further investigation on that?

A    In Pittsburgh, correct.

Q    You indicated that most of the information flow was coming your office to the other U.S. attorney's offices that had some interest in the information that you were gathering, correct?

A    Correct.

Q    But sometimes you actually did receive information from those offices to you; is that right?

A    Not evidence, not --
Q  No. Information. I'm sorry.

A  Information. Yes, I believe so. I'm not sure I understand specifically.

Q  Okay. Let me be more specific. At some point, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Mr. Berman, wrote you a letter or email that provided information he thought that you should have because of the material that he knew you were reviewing, that he thought might be inconsistent with what you were finding; is that correct?

A  That's correct. And then we wrote him an letter back saying that some of the contents in his letter was incorrect.

Q  Okay. So you had some kind of dispute with Mr. Berman about the information that they had versus the information that you had, the subject had seemed inconsistent. Is that fair to say?

A  I think there was a clarification process that was important that we shared information and made sure that they especially had an understanding because they had a predicated grand jury investigation, what was in our estimation and our limited purview correct and incorrect. So we wanted to make sure they had the correct information.

Okay. We're out of time. We'll get back to that. Thank you.

[Recess.]
[12:21 p.m.]

Back on the record. It's 12:21 p.m.

Q Mr. Brady, at the end of our first hour, we were talking about interactions that your office had had with the FBI and interactions that you had had with PADAG and the Deputy Director regarding challenges that you had had at the FBI.

Were there any other -- besides the reluctance to, you know, pursue investigative actions, additional signoffs that were required, were there any other challenges that you experienced with the FBI?

A Yes. There was one occasion where we were informed by members of the Pittsburgh FBI team that was conducting this investigation, this vetting process with our U.S. attorney team in Pittsburgh, that they were told by someone at FBI Headquarters that they were not to affirmatively share information with us but that they were only to share information with us if we asked them a direct question relating to that information, which is not typically how the investigative process goes.

At one point, when we were setting up the entire vetting process, and there was a discussion with the FBI about whether -- how, in their administrative process, it should be characterized, and I said: Well let's all sit together around a table and talk this out; could you please share with me your DIOG, which is the FBI's bible for their processes and procedures.

We were told that someone at FBI Headquarters, unknown to me, said: Don't share that with the U.S. attorney's office, to which I said: I'm a presidentially appointed United States attorney. We're on the same team, part of the Department of Justice.

What do you mean you can't share your DIOG with me.

They said: That's what we were told, so we can't, sir.
Q And you said that it wasn’t the typical investigative process for you to have

to ask the specific question to the FBI for them to give you information.

What was the normal kind of reporting process between your office and FBI

Pittsburgh?

A I mean, on a normal case, it's an iterative process, a collaborative process

between agent, investigator, and AUSA and prosecutor. There's mutuality of

information sharing. There's a certain transparency because, you know, the goal is to

conduct an investigation and make a determination at some point with the agency's

recommendation about prosecute, not prosecute. But, even short of that, make

a -- take investigative steps that you discuss and agree on, and you know, to move an

investigation forward or to open other avenues, identify potential witnesses, subjects,

targets. This was not that dynamic.

Q And, with the FBI not following the typical investigative process at the

direction of FBI headquarters, what did that mean for your assignment in vetting

Ukraine-related information?

A It just meant, as I testified earlier, there were stops and starts. It was

sometimes difficult to get full information back from the FBI. Again, as I mentioned,

sometimes they had to go pens down while they were awaiting approval from

headquarters. There were delays when we were trying to re-interview the CHS in June

of 2020. It was challenging.

Chairman Jordan. Did they tell you why?

Mr. Brady. No, sir.

Chairman Jordan. The Attorney General of the United States has appointed you

as a clearinghouse for this investigation. You're supposed to get the information to

figure how it goes, how it works, and you've got people at the FBI telling you: We can't
give you that information, things you're specifically asking for.

No one told you why?

Mr. Brady. Our interaction was with members of the Pittsburgh Field Office, so special agents, supervisory special agents, ASAC, SAC. Whatever orders related to information sharing, not sharing, approvals, delays came from somewhere in FBI Headquarters below the Deputy Director. As I testified earlier, when we needed to elevate these issues, they were elevated to Deputy Director Bowdich and PADAG DuCharme or later PADAG Donoghue, and then they were resolved. So I didn't have visibility into what was happening at that headquarters level below the Deputy Director and above the SAC.

Chairman Jordan. Okay.

Q Did you raise these specific issues of the not sharing unless it was affirmatively asked or not being able to obtain the DIOG to the PADAG and the Deputy Director? Was that something that was brought up at one of those interactions?

A I believe so. I can't remember specifically. But, when we would have those conversations, those would have been the types of issues that we were raising to try to make sure that we could remove those obstacles, do our jobs, do them with integrity and professionalism, and then brief the other offices, and move on with our lives.

Q And were these obstacles ever removed, the having to affirmatively ask the FBI for information or able to obtain the DIOG?

A No, never received a copy of the DIOG. I found a redacted declassified version online that I used in our meeting to refer to. Some were. Some were not. As I mentioned earlier, the interaction between the FBI and our office was improved when
the replacement SAC was appointed in, I think, June of 2020. And then we met, had a very productive conversation, and then they were more responsive. So I don't know what his interaction with headquarters or with other people in that approval chain was, but things became markedly better.

Q Did that reluctance go away? Was FBI Pittsburgh more willing to take investigative action into the information that you were receiving?

A Yes. There was a different appetite to move things, and the SAC owned, I think, more of the decisions. One of the complicating things was, in the interim between the SAC when this assignment began, so from January through the end of March, and then let's say June forward until October when our tasking was completed, there was an Acting SAC who was brought in from main -- from FBI's Headquarters. And so, I don't know whether he felt he had the authority to make those decisions, or they had to go up to headquarters. So that was an internal conversation that I wasn't privy to.

Q When you said there were points in time when the FBI had to go pens down, does that mean that all investigative activity ceased? Was that your understanding?

A Yes. When they were, for example, seeking reauthorization of the assessment every 30 days because it required, my understanding was, 17 different approvals at headquarters, the agents told us they were not permitted to do any investigative work until that was reauthorized. Sometimes that would be 2 or 3 weeks, so they had to go, quote, pens down. They couldn't do any investigative work.

Q And the 17 approvals that were required for the assessment, were those approvals all at headquarters, or were there some that needed to be obtained from FBI Pittsburgh as well?

A I don't know. I assume that that chain from SSA, ASAC, SAC was still
present, but that would have been, you know, perhaps 3 layers of 17. So I'm not certain.

Q And was the three layers more regular than the 17 that were required for the specific assessment?

A I'm sorry. I don't understand your question.

Q The three layers of signoff at the Pittsburgh office, you know, the ASAC, SAC that needed to sign off on the assessment, was that a more regular signoff process than the 17 signoffs that were required for this assessment?

A No. Under the DIOG, when an assessment, a type one or type two assessment is opened, the idea is for a regular case, let's say, you receive information; you have certain information identified that may develop into a full investigation, and so you open an assessment that's limited in duration and scope to probe that information, to see if it's something that should be brought before a grand jury and then use the full tools of a grand jury.

So, because it's supposed to be short in duration, the DIOG has a 30-day time period on that. It should be short because that determination should be made early. Then it requires an additional approval to extend it, and an -- in that authorization, a justification for that to extend it an additional 30 days. In this case -- and normally that is at the SSA level as I testified to before. This having to go through those 17 layers was unusual. I had not seen that before. But it extended the time in which, you know, we could do work. So that was a challenge.

Q And were those all of the challenges that you faced with the FBI, the not being able to obtain the DIOG, having to affirmatively ask questions, and then, you know, the reluctance on the part of the FBI to do investigative actions? Were those all of the challenges that you faced with the FBI, or were there additional?
There were additional. And, without disclosing privileged communications, there were representations made to senior leadership of the FBI about what we were doing or not doing that were not true that we had to correct, both internally at DOJ, with ODAG, and General Barr, and then subsequently with the Director and Deputy Director, but we resolved that. But there was information that was being shared up that chain at the FBI that was incorrect.

Q And, when you say what you were doing, that's in reference to what the Western District of Pennsylvania was doing regarding your assignment from Mr. Rosen?

A That's correct.

Q According to public statements by Attorney General Barr, your office in vetting the information provided by the CHS for the FD-1023, you went back and developed more information that apparently had been overlooked by the FBI. Is that an accurate statement?

A I can't say "overlooked." I don't know that I agree with that characterization because I don't know what -- again, because this was referenced in a previous CHS report, I don't know what the focus of that investigation was. So it might have been ancillary information that wasn't directly related to what they were looking at in 2017. But it had not been developed. It's fair to say that it had not been looked into or developed any further.

Q And so it was by your directive that the information that's included in the FD-1023 was developed; is that correct?

A That's correct. Once we were made aware of it, and my -- the AUSAs who were running point on this project requested to see that underlying 1023, the previous one, identified that line relating to Mr. Biden and his role at Burisma. They brought that to my attention, and we then engaged the FBI and said we need to understand what this
is or what this is not; can you please go out and re-interview the CHS and develop this.

That then led to this June of 2020 1023.

Q And when did you make the request for the re-interview of the CHS?

A I think we identified that in early June, so perhaps the first week of June.

And then there was some back and forth between us and the FBI. And then they interviewed him and memorialized this on 6/30.

Q When you say "back and forth," are you referring to some sort of reluctance on the part of the FBI, or there was just conversations that needed to be engaged in?

A There were conversations. There was reluctance. Again, this was a CHS that was known to the FBI, was credible, had been used -- had provided information that was used in other investigations. And so, there's always a sensitivity in engaging CHSs. You know, the FBI wants to make sure it's for a purpose that they agree with. So we had discussions. I think there was initial reluctance, and then through, you know, a series of conversations they agreed to go out and re-interview.

Chairman Jordan. Can you further describe that initial reluctance?

Mr. Lelling. I don't know that you can go into additional detail.

Mr. Brady. And, sir, as I sit here, I don't remember specifically what those conversations were, that they would have shared with me their internal deliberations, but there was resistance.

Q And the original FD-1023 that you're referring as information was mentioned about Hunter Biden and the board of Burisma, how did that information come to your office?

A At a high level, we had asked the FBI to look through their files for any information -- again, limited scope, right? And by "limited," I mean, no grand jury tools.
So one of the things we could do was ask the FBI to identify certain things that was information brought to us. One was just asking to search their files for Burisma, instances of Burisma or Hunter Biden.

That 1023 was identified because of that discreet statement that just identified Hunter Biden serving on the Burisma board. That was in a file in the Washington Field Office. And so, once we identified that, we asked to see that 1023. That's when we made the determination and the request to re-interview the CHS and led to this 1023.

Q And when did you make that initial request for the FBI to do a search of its databases?

A I don't remember specifically. I mean, it was an ongoing conversation. These were things, these were taskings that we needed to perform. So, sorry, I don't remember when it was, but I'm sure when we made that in May, and they performed it, it was likely not the first time we made that request.

Q And did you make those requests to FBI Pittsburgh or to FBI Headquarters?

A We would make them to FBI Pittsburgh. They would be, again, per their reporting channels. It was our understanding they were reporting that up to headquarters. Again, when we would have challenges or issues, and we would elevate it to the PADAG and the Deputy Director, we would, you know, inform the Deputy Director of things that we were -- steps that we were taking, some of which he was aware of already. So mostly it was through Pittsburgh.

Q And at what point in time did your investigators become aware of first FD-1023 with just the discreet mention of Hunter Biden and Burisma?

A I think it was at the beginning of June.

Q At the beginning of June?

A Early June of 2020.
Q    Okay.

And I'll mark as exhibit 10, an article from The Federalist from July 24, 2023, titled "FBI told Delaware U.S. attorney it had already partially corroborated Biden bribery claims, source says."

That will be exhibit No. 10.

[Brady Exhibit No. 10 Was marked for identification.]

And I'm going to point to specific portions of it. Please take a moment to review.

The pages aren't numbered, but if you count from the first page, the fourth page, the first full paragraph states, following the late June 2020 interview with the CHS, the Pittsburgh FBI Office obtained travel records for the CHS, and those records confirmed the CHS had traveled to the locales detailed in the FD-1023 during the relevant time period. The trips included a late 2015 or early 2016 visit to Kiev, Ukraine, a trip a couple months later to Vienna, Austria, and travel to London in 2019.

Does this kind of match your recollection of what actions the Pittsburgh FBI Office was taking in regards to this.

Mr. Lelling. Don't answer that. Too specific a level of detail.

Q    You had mentioned last hour about travel records. Did your office obtain travel records, or did you have knowledge that the Pittsburgh FBI Office obtained travel records?

Mr. Lelling. That you can answer yes or no.

Mr. Brady. Yes.
Okay. And then, in -- so the CHS is interviewed June 2020, late June 2020, and then your office briefs the Delaware U.S. Attorney's Office and the Baltimore FBI Field Office at the end of October; is that correct?

Mr. Brady. That's correct.

And I'll mark as exhibit No. 11, you referenced last hour some testimony by Mr. Gary Shapley. So this is a September 20, 2023, statement of supervisory special agent Gary Shapley. We'll mark that as 11.

[Brady Exhibit No. 11 Was marked for identification.]

Focus on number four here, paragraph four.

Mr. Brady. Paragraph four.

Yes.

Mr. Lelling. Is this an attachment to his testimony? Is that why it says attachment one? I'm just curious.

These were documents that were provided to the Ways and Means Committee, and then, following an executive session business meeting, they made these documents public. So it was just an attachment that Mr. Shapley provided.

Mr. Lelling. I was just curious. Thank you.

Uh-huh.

Q Have you had sufficient time to review?

A Yes.

Okay. So, looking at paragraph four on page 2, as it continues onto page 2, the second full sentence, it says: The prosecution team discussed the Hunter Biden related work of the Pittsburgh USAO on several occasions, as it was a line item on the
recurring prosecution team's call agenda for a long period of time. Assistant U.S. Attorney Lesley Wolf told us the Pittsburgh USAO and U.S. Attorney Scott Brady requested to brief the Delaware USAO's Hunter Biden's investigative team on multiple occasions, but they were turned down by AUSA Wolf and the Delaware USAO.

Is it accurate that you had requested multiple times, you or your office, to brief the Delaware U.S. Attorney's Office?

A Yes.

Q And do you recall whose decision it was at the Delaware U.S. Attorney's Office not to accept the briefing?

A I don't know.

Mr. Lelling. Do you have personal knowledge of that?

Mr. Brady. I don't have -- yeah, I don't have personal knowledge of it.

Q So those interactions that would have occurred between Ms. Wolf and your team, would that have been at the AUSA level?

A Correct, and they would have been with Ms. Wolf.

Q And were you ever told that the Delaware U.S. Attorney's Office did not want a briefing from your office?

A I believe I was. I don't remember. But I know that we had trouble scheduling it.

Q Okay. And then, further down, it states AUSA Wolf's comments made clear she did not want to cooperate with the Pittsburgh USAO, and that she had already concluded no information from that office could be credible stating her belief that it all came from Rudy Giuliani.

Were you ever made aware of Ms. Wolf's processing and decisions regarding this
briefing, and why she didn't want the briefing?

A I was not. We did, however, make it clear that some of the information including this 1023 did not come from Mr. Giuliani.

Q And did your team ever tell you that they were receiving comments from Ms. Wolf that she didn't find the information your office was receiving credible?

A I don't remember that, no.

Q If those conversations took place, would those have been between a AUSA at your office and Ms. Wolf?

A If they would have shared that with us at all, yes, likely, and had I been made aware, I would have called Mr. Weiss directly.

Q When you would have called Mr. Weiss directly, would you have told him the information the 1023 wasn't coming from Mr. Giuliani, is that accurate?

A Yes, I would have, and that was already communicated to their office, that the 1023 was from a credible CHS that had a history with the FBI, and that it was not derived from any of the information from Mr. Giuliani.

Q And how did you know that that information had already been communicated to Mr. Weiss' office? Was that a communication between you and Mr. Weiss?

Mr. Lelling. Wait a minute. What information?

The information that the FD-1023 did not come from Mr. Giuliani.

Mr. Lelling. Thank you.

Mr. Brady. That would have been relayed to me by my AUSAs who were in communication with Ms. Wolf, and you know, members of Mr. Weiss' team.

Q So one of your AUSAs would have communicated to Ms. Wolf that the 1023
did not from Mr. Giuliani; is that correct?

A    That's correct. And should have been aware in the FBI as well. The FBI Baltimore Field Office should have been aware of that as well, but I can't speak to that.

Q    Did you ever get a sense of why Ms. Wolf was under that belief?

A    No, I did not.

Q    A little bit further on the next sentence, it states, on the October 22, 2020, prosecution team call, AUSA Wolf informed us that because the Delaware U.S. Attorney's Office had been ordered by the principle deputy attorney general at Justice Department headquarters to receive the briefing from the Pittsburgh USAO, it would be happening the next day, October 23, 2020.

Does that match your recollection of how things went down, the PADAG communication?

A    I didn't have specific knowledge that that was what happened between the PADAG and the Delaware U.S. Attorney's Office until I saw Mr. Shapley's testimony.

Q    Did you bring this concern that the USAO in Delaware was not wanting a briefing from you? Did you bring that concern to the PADAG?

A    I'm sure I did. I don't remember the specific conversation. Rich and I talked on a regular -- Mr. Donoghue and I talked on a regular basis, especially once we had transmitted a report to him, and with our recommendation to brief the separate offices.

Q    Did you ever get a sense that there was tension between U.S. Attorney Weiss and AUSA Wolf?

A    I have no knowledge for that, no basis for knowing that.

Q    And the briefing on October 23, 2020, you said you did not attend that briefing; is that correct?
A: I did not. Correct.

Q: Do you know if that occurred in person?

A: No, it did not occur in person, and neither I nor U.S. Attorney Weiss were present at that briefing.

Q: And, to kind of just go back to the last hour where we were discussing this, you said that two of you AUSAs that were kind of the principle on this assignment, they attended the briefing, one to two FBI special agents from Pittsburgh. You weren't sure if your senior AUSAs attended the briefing, and that was all that you could recall from your office that attended; is that correct?

A: Yes. That's correct. And, as I mentioned, the briefing was conducted by our AUSAs, not by the FBI. It was AUSA to AUSA and team.

Q: And, after the briefing, when you were told how it went, did you get a sense of what actions U.S.A. Delaware planned to take on the information that your team had provided?

A: No. None. Once we provided the briefing, our assignment was completed, and we passed that information and recommendations. And then we had no visibility on what they did, nor did they share with us what they planned to do.

Q: So, as part of the briefing, did your office recommend certain actions?

A: We did.

Q: Were those -- did you want them to look further into the allegations in the FD-1023, and the information that you had provided them?

Mr. Lelling. I don't think you can answer that as phrased. You need something more general. I don't think he can testify here to his characterization of the quality of the evidence when he gave it over to Delaware.

BY
Q: So the process of how -- the specific assignment that you were given by DAG Rosen was that you would vet the information and kind of make a preliminary determination about credibility; is that correct?

A: That's correct. The credibility of the information that we were receiving.

Q: And then, if you determined that that information was credible, then you would pass it on to a U.S. attorney's office; is that accurate?

A: Yes. Credible or had indicia of credibility, we would then pass it on to the U.S. attorney's office with a predicated grand jury investigation, including the District of Delaware.

Q: And the U.S. attorneys' offices were the ones that could kind of escalate the information that you found had some indicia of credibility into a preliminary investigation or a full investigation; is that correct?

A: That's a different -- that's FBI nomenclature. That's not how DOJ does that.

Q: So it was on the USAO and their FBI counterparts to kind of further the investigation; is that correct?

A: Right. So two separate streams, right; how the FBI characterized their opening of the work that they were doing, together with us as part of this vetting assignment, was under their DIOG as I mentioned was unique to them. Delaware had a grand jury investigation open, right? So our recommendation and our briefing was on information that we believed in our limited ability to vet information coming from the public should be looked at, required further analysis, further investigation, including using the tools of a grand jury. We made that -- those recommendations, and that briefings and that included information, including this 1023.

Q: So you provided information in that briefing that you thought needed further analysis or investigation; is that correct?
A That's correct, and made specification recommendations that I can't share.

Q And you passed along the information that your office had deemed had some sort of indicia of credibility; is that correct?

A Broadly, yes, and specifically relating to the 1023, yes.

Q And so, in terms of briefing the USAO Delaware's Office, you only had one briefing; is that correct? Your office only had one briefing with them?

A Yes. As I mentioned, we had several conversations along the way, but at the end of our tasking, as I mentioned, I wrote a formal report, our team wrote formal report that went to the PADAG. In that, we made recommendations that -- we made recommendations consistent with our original tasking that we would provide briefings to the SDNY, EDNY, and the District of Delaware, we laid those out in our report to Rich. He and I spoke. He concurred, and as a result, then we scheduled those. And I believe it went SDNY, EDNY, and then Delaware in October. So the report went to Rich's desk in September with those recommendations. He and I spoke. He agreed, and then we scheduled the briefings.

Q So, after the briefing on October 23, 2020, with the U.S. attorney's office in Delaware, did you have any other interactions with -- either between you and Mr. Weiss or your team and Delaware?

A No. That was the end of your tasking. We pulled up our stakes and folded our tent and went on to other things.

Q So when did your assignment officially end?

A To my understanding, it ended when we did the final briefing to Delaware, and then our tasking was done. We had done everything we deemed important and that, you know, we could look at and we could vet the credibility of, and then passed it onto the offices that had grand juries.
Q So, after you passed the information along to the Delaware U.S. Attorney's Office, did Mr. Weiss ever follow up with you --

A No.

Q -- regarding his taskings?

A No. Nor did anyone from the U.S. attorney's office there.

Q And how was it communicated to you that kind of your assignment regarding the Ukrainian-related information had ended or wrapped up? Was that your decision?

Chairman Jordan. One second. Did anyone from Southern District of New York, Eastern District of New York, did any of them follow up with you after that similar briefing was given to them?

Mr. Brady. No to SDNY. We had a different interaction with EDNY for different purposes that I can't get into, but relating to what we communicated to them, I don't believe so, sir. I think that was the end of our assignment.

Chairman Jordan. Okay. I'm sorry.

BY

Q There have been some public statements that, you know, your office closed the investigation of the allegations documented into the FD-1023. Are those statements accurate?

A I know have been several statements from General Barr, some from Representative Raskin. I'd be happy to talk about either or both of those, but probably need to separate them.

Q Okay. So, to the extent that, you know, Mr. Raskin has claimed that you shut down the investigation of the FD-1023 information, specifically focusing on Mr. Raskin, are those allegations correct?
My understanding of Mr. Raskin's public statements is that, based on the
determination that I and my team found the allegations in the 1023 not credible or other
information not credible, we did not escalate the assessment to a limited or full
investigation. That's not true. What General Barr said publicly is true.

What is true is, that the nomenclature of the FBI was immaterial to us. How they
characterized the administrative title of what they needed to assign to begin to work
under their DIOG had nothing to do with our tasking, had nothing to do with our
assignment.

We discussed very frankly with the FBI that this would never be developed into a
full investigation. This would never be a grand jury investigation out of the Western
District of Pennsylvania. Everyone knew that. There was no confusion about that.
So it would never escalate into a full investigation under the lexicon of the FBI.

What happened was, once we had written our report, our memo to Mr. Donoghue
as the PADAG, we made our recommendations about briefing the offices. From our
perspective, A, we wanted to get those to the grand jury investigation sooner rather than
later. We had already had a myriad of delays in this process. The then SAC of
Pittsburgh called me and said: Is there anything left for us to do on your punch list.

I said: No, you know, thank you for your help in this.

He said: Then, is it okay if we close this assessment?

And I said: Yes, that's fine. I don't care what you guys called it from the
beginning, but yeah, there's no more work for us to do. Now we pass it off to the offices
with the grand juries, and our job is done.

Q Okay. And, to the extent that Attorney General Barr had stated publicly in
regards to Mr. Raskin's claims, quote, "It's not true, it wasn't closed down, on the
contrary it was sent to Delaware for further investigation," end quote, that's accurate to
your recollection?

A  General Barr’s statements are all accurate, including his statement that the
information contained in the 1023 was not derived from any Giuliani-related information
and are not from -- this is General Barr’s public statement -- not from known sources of
Russian disinformation.

Q  And, in fact, the FBI has stated publicly, and you said it matched your
recolletion earlier, that the source was highly credible, the FBI deemed the source was
highly credible, and they had used that source in other investigative matters; is that
correct?

A  That’s correct.

Q  To the best of your knowledge, after the FD-1023 and the briefing occurred
with the Delaware U.S. Attorney’s Office, do you know if the Delaware U.S. Attorney’s
Office or FBI Baltimore shared that 1023 with their FBI investigative team?

A  I have no idea.

Q  Do you have any knowledge as to whether they shared it with the IRS
investigators?

A  No contemporaneous knowledge in 2020. I know from public reporting
that it was -- they were not a part of the briefing. That I knew at the time, that it was
only Ms. Wolf as I mentioned, perhaps another AUSA from the Delaware team and special
agents from the Baltimore Field Office of the FBI. There was no IRS involvement in the
briefing. And I know from, you know, Mr. Shapley’s testimony, I believe, that the 1023
was not shared with him or his team or anyone at the IRS.

Q  And did you know contemporaneously that the IRS investigators had asked
to be a part of that briefing that your office was providing?

A  No, I had no visibility into that.
Q When you did learn from Mr. Shapley's testimony that the IRS investigators, you know, weren't told about or the FD-1023 wasn't shared with them, did that surprise you?

A Yes.

Q Why did that surprise you?

A Typically, not specific to this, but in investigations where you have multiple agencies that investigative team; AUSAs, Federal prosecutors, investigators, agents from sometimes, you know, agencies with overlapping or concurrent jurisdiction, you share information pretty transparently, and you know, on a realtime basis.

Because even though they might have different jurisdiction and might be looking at different agency specific statutes and potential charges as part of their investigation, you want your team to have kind of full knowledge of everything that is coming; good, bad, credible, not credible. And so I would have expected that that would have been shared with the IRS.

Q And, prior to your departure from the Western District of Pennsylvania in February 2021, did you ever become aware of attorney -- the tasking being made to U.S. Attorney Weiss that he would be -- have full authority over the Hunter Biden investigation?

A Only from -- only what's publicly reported. That's the only knowledge I have. I haven't spoken to Mr. Weiss since we left the Department, since I left the Department.

Q Okay. Are you aware of an August 2020 assessment that was opened by an FBI supervisory intelligence analyst, Brian Auten, regarding the Hunter Biden information?

A At the time, I was not. I am now from public reporting.

Q So you didn't became aware during your tenure at the Western District of Pennsylvania or
the Auten assessment?

A  This was never shared with me by the FBI, but there was many things. I was not aware of that the FBI was in possession of the Hunter Biden laptop. There were many things that were not shared back with the Pittsburgh Office.

Q  So when did you become aware that the FBI had the Hunter Biden laptop?

A  When it was first reported publicly, I think, December of 2020. I don't remember.

Q  It was October 14, 2020. Is that kind of -- that was when the New York Post article came out regarding the Hunter Biden laptop?

A  Yeah. That was when I was first aware, and I was surprised.

Q  You were surprised. Why were you surprised by that?

A  I would have thought that would be something, especially as has been publicly reported, there's information relating to Hunter Biden's activities on the board of Burisma in Ukraine, that might have been helpful in our assessment of the information that we were receiving about him. I would have expected that be shared. However, not knowing the source, now I know the source. But, you know, if it had been grand jury derived or subpoenaed or seized as a result of a search warrant, that wouldn't surprise me it wouldn't be shared with us. But, yeah, we were all surprised.

Q  And to the extent that you had asked the FBI to do a search of their databases regarding information relevant to your assignment, do you think the laptop information would have been part of that?

A  I would have expected -- if it were information or evidence that the FBI had, I would have expected that to be part of that search.

Q  And, in regards to the Auten assessment, we'll call it, you said you became aware of that after your tenure at the Western District. And what did you learn about
the Auten assessment?

A  Only what was public and broad brushstrokes there was an assessment, that Mr. Auten identified all of the information relating to allegations of corruption, of, you know, Hunter Biden and Ukraine and Burisma to be not credible and/or sourced by Russian mis- or disinformation, and that assessment was closed. That's all I know. I don't know if information that came through the Pittsburgh Office as a part of this vetting process was included in that, excluded from that. I don't know.

Q  So, if that was -- the assessment was done in August of 2020, how did that kind of jibe with the work that you were doing?

A  Separate work streams. We had no visibility into what headquarters was doing. They did not share with us. They were only watching and approving our investigative steps that we requested.

Q  And were you surprised to learn that there was this kind of assessment conducted?

A  Not necessarily surprised an assessment would be conducted, but knowing so little about it, the genesis the scope of it, I would have thought -- I would expect that if it intersected with what we were doing, that someone would have talked to us. Now, maybe that was just headquarters to FBI Pittsburgh conversation. But I would have thought that we would be read into or be a part of that conversation.

Q  And did you have any communications with the Washington Field Office of the FBI?

A  Yes.

Q  And how many communications did you have with the Washington Field Office?

A  They were limited. So headquarters versus Washington Field Office, our
interaction with the Washington Field Office related to the underlying 1023 that predated this one that we looked at and then gave rise to our request to re-interview the CHS in the June-2020 1023.

Q And so did the underlying 1023, did that come from the Washington Field Office? Was that why there was interaction?

A Yes.

Q Who did you interact with at the WFO?

A I don't remember. It would have been my AUSAs, I think, that were interacting with -- AUSAs and Pittsburgh special agents that were interacting with special agents from WFO.

Q Were there any other interactions that occurred between your office and the WFO?

A Not that I recall.

Q Do you know if there was any interaction with the FBI's Public Integrity Section Or Division?

A No.

Q Any DOJ Public Integrity Division interactions that your office had?

A Relating to this?

Q Correct.

A No.

Q Did your office regularly communicate with Main Justice?

A Yes.

Q And who was your point of contact? Was that the PADAG?

A Yes. It would have primarily been the PADAG, first Mr. DuCharme, then Mr. Donoghue.
Q And so, besides the SDNY, the Eastern District of New York, and the U.S. Attorney's Office for Delaware, did you have any other interactions any other U.S. attorney's offices regarding your assignment?

A Yes.

Q What other U.S. attorney's offices did you have contact with?

A Northern District of Illinois, and Northern District of Ohio.

Q And did you give briefings to the Northern District of Illinois and the Northern District of Ohio?

A No. As part of our initial tasking and Mr. Donoghue's role as kind of quarterback or air traffic controller for all Ukraine investigations, there was an investigation in the Northern District of Illinois. So I spoke with the U.S. District Attorney, talked with him about what we were tasked with doing, what I believed the scope of that to be, asked him if that intersected at all with his case and investigation. He said: No.

And so we had no further interaction.

The Northern District of Ohio had a -- it's public -- an investigation into PrivatBank and Mr. Kolomoisky for a series of activities that were occurring in the Northern District of Ohio and elsewhere. There was some interaction with PrivatBank in this case. And so I wanted to, again, do the same thing, talk with the U.S. attorney, say: Here's what we're looking at. Here's where PrivatBank plays a role in this. And does this intersect with yours?

And we determined that it did not. And so, didn't have any followup communications with them.

Q And did you provide any sort of report or product to the PADAG regarding this information?
A. This information, meaning ND Illinois and ND Ohio?

Q. Correct. Correct.

A. I don't know that it would have been written, but I certainly would have apprised him, that yes, I talked with ND Illinois, you know, no intersection. Talked with, you know, Justin in the Northern District of Ohio. We talked about PrivatBank. Theirs is separate from what we're looking at. As I mentioned, all of our work with SDNY, EDNY and the District of Delaware was summarized in our final report and recommendations to Mr. Donoghue. I think we sent that in September.

Q. And did you have an understanding whether the Northern District of Illinois or the Northern District of Ohio had grand jury investigations regarding the information you were passing along?

A. They did. That's why I spoke with them.

Q. And, for the FBI, I know we've spoken about the FBI Pittsburgh Field Office, the Baltimore Field Office, the Washington Field Office.

Were there any other field offices that your office communicated with regarding your task?

A. New York. The New York Field Office, which supported both EDNY and SDNY.

Q. And, when you needed to interact with those field offices, was that normally the FBI Pittsburgh Field Office that was interacting with them, or was it the individuals within your office?

A. Normally, that was -- it depended on what was going on, right? So the kind of normal interface was AUSA to AUSA, special agent on an investigative team to special agent. At times when there were issues with, for example, SDNY, which is supported by the field office, the New York Field Office, then that would be elevated, and we would
speak AUSA to AUSA and either SAC to SAC. Sometimes we had to involve the Deputy Director. So that happened on occasion with the New York Field Office.

Q And, when your office was conducting your review to determine whether the information that was coming in had some sort of indicia of credibility, would your team undertake interviews of individuals?

A For the 1023 specifically?

Q Related to any Ukrainian information that came in?

A Yes.

Q And were those individuals pertinent to the investigation -- or the information that you were receiving as well as individuals who were providing information?

A Yes. They were potential witnesses who may or may not have had information, you know, relating to Ukrainian corruption. So we identified, there were many that were identified that were in the Ukraine. We did not interview them. There were some that were in the United States. So we did conduct interviews in the United States.

Q So your office had additional interviews or meetings with people other than Mr. Giuliani; is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Did you get a sense of why Mr. DuCharme and the Deputy Attorney General had tasked you with this assignment?

A I think there was -- could I have a moment to talk to Andy?

[Discussion off the record.]

Absolutely. We'll go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

We can go back on the record.
Mr. **Lelling.** I'm afraid he can't answer that question.

Can't answer why he was tasked with this?

Mr. **Lelling.** Correct.

Mr. **Brady.** I do think -- so separate and apart from specific conversations, I think we were tasked with this, as was Mr. Jensen and the Flynn investigation, as were other U.S. attorneys, because General Barr and DAG Rosen had confidence that we would conduct our assignment with professionalism, that we would, you know, uphold the best principles of the Department, and that we would do it discreetly to the previous questioning, and we would be thorough and thoughtful.

When I put my team together, without identifying certain names, I put a team of Republicans and Democrats together. Again, we were politically appointed, but the work of the Department of Justice shouldn't matter. And so, as I mentioned, there were two supervisory AUSAs, senior, our most experienced white collar investigators. One was my FAUSA, a Democrat, and one was my head of white collar, a Republican. My two AUSAs, Democrat, unknown because it didn't matter. You know, what my tasking to them was that we are going to run this to ground, and if we do everything ethically in the right way, then we will never have to worry about what the outcome is. Then we'll do our job. We'll do it professionally, ethically, and then we will pass it off to the other offices that have grand juries.

We can go off the record.

[Recess.]
[1:24 p.m.]

Back on the record.

BY

Q  In the last hour, you were talking about how the original 1023 came to you. So I’m talking about the 1023 from 2017.

A  Yes.

Q  And you said that you asked the FBI to search its files for the word

"Burisma."

A  Yes. I believe that’s how that was identified.

Q  Okay. What led you to ask the FBI to search its files for "Burisma"?

Mr. Lelling.  Well, wait a minute.

Did you ask the FBI to search its files for "Burisma"?

BY

Q  Or somebody in your office. Maybe not you personally.

A  I don’t remember if this was identified because we asked specifically for "Burisma," but "Burisma" appeared in a lot of the material we received from Mr. Giuliani.

So, to try to narrow the scope of --

Q  Okay.

A  -- the universe of information, we thought that would be one of the work streams that we would try to at least wrap our arms around.

Q  Okay. So your request that the FBI look in its files for "Burisma" or whatever the actual search term was, that was because you had gotten information from Giuliani, correct?

A  Yes.

Q  Okay.
And so, in the -- actually, in the first and second hours, you said pretty extensively that your role was to vet information provided from the public, correct?

A  Correct.

Q  And so the 1023, the original 1023, was not information provided from the public, correct?

A  That's correct --

Q  Okay.

A  -- yes.

Q  But it came up because you'd received information from Mr. Giuliani and, in your vetting of that information, you ran a search?

A  Correct.

Q  Okay.

A  And just to clarify, I don't remember if we asked the FBI to search for "Burisma" --

Q  Right.

A  -- or "Zlochevsky."

Q  Understood.

A  But I think it's all equal, to the premise of your question.

Q  Right.

A  And the 1023 itself, which is exhibit 3, this refers over and over again to Zlochevsky, correct?

A  Correct.

Q  And we talked through -- you said in the earlier hour that the FBI deemed the source highly credible. And the source was the confidential human source that actually provided the interview that led to the 1023, right?
A Correct.

Q That's not Zlochevsky, though, right?

Mr. Lelling. Don't answer.

Oh. Understood. Withdrawn.

BY

Q The source discusses conversations with Zlochevsky, correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. It was beyond the scope of what you were able to do to actually assess Zlochevsky's credibility directly, correct?

A Correct. We had no basis of assessing that or tools to --

Q Okay.

A -- determine whether what he claimed was true or not.

Q So this is essentially a report of what a confidential human source told you about his or her conversations with Zlochevsky, correct?

A Correct.

Q And, in this, the source, himself or herself, actually directly says that -- and this is, again, on page 3; we talked through it in my prior hour -- that the "CHS is not able to provide any further opinion as to the veracity of Zlochevsky's aforementioned statements."

A That's correct. And that's why we thought Delaware would be in the best position to take that further or not.

Q Understood.

Okay. Go ahead.

Okay.

BY
Q So let's talk a little bit about Zlochevsky. I understand why you weren't in a position to interview him as far as -- actually, I don't even think anyone knows where he was at that point, but he wasn't in the United States, right?

A Correct.

Q So you were limited in scope and also just as a practical matter. But I think in the first hour or one of our hours you said that you did do some open-source -- or, you or someone on your team did open-source searching to see whether information could be corroborated, right?

A Correct. Yeah. We and the FBI.

Q Sure. I mean your team when I say "you."

A Oh, yes. Yeah.

Q So, with respect to Zlochevsky's statements in particular, like the ones that are memorialized in the 1023, or attributed to him, were you able to find -- or, you or anyone on your team able to find in open-source reporting that Mr. Zlochevsky had made statements inconsistent with those that were attributed to him in the 1023?

A No. We didn't find statements one way or the other relating to that.

Q Okay.

You did interview Rudy Giuliani, correct?

A Correct.

Q Did you ever have occasion to interview a person associated with Mr. Giuliani, Lev Parnas?

Mr. Lelling. I don't want him to get into -- I was going to allow him to identify Rudy Giuliani because it's now so widely known that DOJ interviewed Giuliani, but going past that is problematic.

Okay.
Q  Do you know who Lev Parnas is?
A  I know of him based on the SDNY investigation.
Q  Okay.  He was indicted, correct?
A  Indicted, correct.
Q  Right.  And he was associated with Mr. Giuliani, correct?
A  Correct.  That's my understanding.
Q  Okay.  Did Mr. Giuliani disclose the fact that he had a relationship with Lev Parnas?

Mr. Lelling.  Don't go into that.

Okay.

This is going to be marked as exhibit 12.

[Brady Exhibit No. 12 Was marked for identification.]

Q  This is a document that includes typed questions and answers.  This document was provided by Mr. Parnas to Rudy Giuliani.

Mr. Giuliani directed Mr. Parnas and another person by the name of Vitaly Pruss to directly interview Mr. Zlochevsky, to ask these questions, and these are the answers that they received.

Have you ever -- oh.  Sure.

And just to make it clear for the record, this document, in the form we're producing it to you today, was subsequently produced by Mr. Parnas to Mr. Raskin, and Mr. Raskin has made it available on his website.  That's how it came into our possession.
Mr. Brady. Oh, I see. Okay. Thank you.

Go ahead.

Q I understand it's also available -- it was part of the impeachment inquiry to Trump's first impeachment, and it's part of the HPSCI investigation. I don't know if you've had a chance to look at that or if you did during the assessment.

A Not all of it, no.

Q Okay. But have you seen this document before?

A I don't believe I have.

Q Okay. The -- I'll just give you a second to look at it, actually, then, if you've never seen it before. It's three pages -- two pages. Let me know when you've had a chance to look at it. Take your time too.

A Okay.

Q Have you had a chance to review it?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And just to be clear, I think my colleague has already explained this, but this document was provided to investigators on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in 2019, before your assessment began, in relation to the first impeachment inquiry of President Trump.

But you indicated you were not aware that that evidence was in the record of that investigation?

A Correct.

Q Okay.

A And I'm sorry, could I just clarify?

Q Sure.
A Who's answering the questions?

Q Yeah, let me -- I'll explain.

A Oh, I'm sorry.

Q Sorry. I know it's a little confusing.

Mr. Lelling. Don't jump ahead.

Q That's a good question.

All right. So my understanding, again, from the evidence in the previous impeachment inquiry and our investigation and other ways, is that this interview was conducted in July of 2019. The person who was actually doing the questions directly to Mr. Zlochevsky was a man by the name of Vitaly Pruss, V-i-t-a-l-y, Pruss, P-r-u-s-s. And Mr. Pruss was in direct contact with Lev Parnas, who was also in contact with Giuliani.

So there's a little string here. Mr. Giuliani is asking Mr. Parnas to ask Mr. Pruss to ask these questions directly of Mr. Zlochevsky. Does that make sense?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And that was explained during the HPSCI investigation, as well, in the context of this document being produced in that investigation.

So, on July 7, 2019, Mr. Pruss sent these written summaries -- which is the exhibit, No. 12 -- sent these answers that Mr. Zlochevsky had given to Lev Parnas and to Mr. Giuliani in the form of a Word document. That's why it looks the way it does.

A Sure.

Q Okay. So you indicated you've never seen this document before. May I actually ask you, before we go through it: You, during the course of your investigation, you asked the FBI or directed others to ask the FBI to review their holdings for any information related to Burisma or Zlochevsky, correct?
A  Yes.  We asked them, for certain specific questions, to look in open-source, as we talked about, and then to look in their investigative files to see if they had intersected with these names or, you know, this topic before.

Q  Okay.  And they yielded this 2017 1023 that then led you to interview the CHS, correct?

A  Yes.

Q  Okay.  But you never asked, for example, the House Permanent Select Committee investigators or anyone associated with that investigation to do a similar inquiry for evidence relating to Zlochevsky?

A  No, I don't believe we did.

Q  Okay.  And, like you said, you were not aware that this interview had taken place in 2019.  Is that fair to say?

A  I don't believe I was, no.

Q  Okay.  And anyone on your team, as far as you know, was not aware that Mr. Zlochevsky had been interviewed at the direction of Giuliani before your assessment began?

A  I don't believe so.

Q  Okay.  So let's go through it, then, since this is the first time you've seen it. The first question, for the record, states, quote, "What caused you to hire Devon Archer and Hunter Biden in 2014?"

And the answer from Mr. Zlochevsky is, quote, "We wanted to" -- and there's a typo. It says "uild." I think it means "build" -- "Burisma as international company. It was very important to have strong board. So when we review resumes of Biden and Archer they both had great resumes. We also thought it would help in Ukraine to have strong international board figures with great relationships in the United States and
Europe," end quote.

Let's move to question -- oh, actually, let me ask you about this.  There's nothing in Mr. Zlochevsky's answer to question 1 that says he needed the Bidens in order to, quote, "take care of Shokin," correct?

A  Nothing in that answer, no.

Q  And there's nothing at all with respect to any investigation of Burisma, correct?

A  Oh, in the answer?

Q  In the answer.

A  No.  No.

Q  I'm sorry.  I'm just asking you about his answer.

A  Yeah.  No, no.  No.

Q  So, to that extent, the answer that Mr. Zlochevsky gave to the question of why you hired Hunter Biden and his associate Mr. Archer is inconsistent with this claim that Mr. Zlochevsky is attributed -- or the statement that is attributed to Mr. Zlochevsky in the 1023, correct?

A  I'm sorry.  Could you ask that again?

Q  Yeah.

A  I'm sorry.

Q  That's okay.

To the extent that Mr. Zlochevsky is asked in this interview why he hired Biden, Hunter Biden, to be on his board -- and he answers the way we just described, right? Because he wanted a strong board.  He did not say anything about investigations of Burisma, correct?

A  Not in that answer, no.  Correct.
Q  No. And not in that answer does he say anything about protecting Burisma from investigations, correct?

A  Correct.

Q  Or protecting Burisma from anything, correct?

A  Correct.

Q  So, to that extent, the answer he gave here is inconsistent with the statement attributed to him in the 1023, that he hired Hunter Biden to protect him?

A  Oh, I see. I'm sorry. Yeah -- yes, they seem to be inconsistent.

Q  Okay.

Question number -- let's see -- 8, which is I think on the second page, the question asks, quote, "Did you ever learn why VP Joe Biden asked for Shokin to be fired as PG?"

Do you see that question?

A  Yes.

Q  Okay. And, to be clear, "VP" stands for "Vice President," I believe, and "PG" probably stand for "Prosecutor General."

Are you aware that Mr. Shokin was the Prosecutor General of Ukraine during the time that this allegation arose?

A  Yes, for a discrete period in 2015-2016, I believe.

Q  Okay. But the allegation about bribery and the firing of Shokin --

A  Oh, yes.

Q  -- had to do with his role as Prosecutor General, correct?

A  Correct.

Q  Okay.

The answer that Mr. Zlochevsky gave to that question of why did Biden ask for Shokin to be fired, he responds, quote, "We learned about it from newspapers and
internet. We never had contacts with VP Biden during his visits to Ukraine," end quote.

Do you see that answer?

A    Yes.

Q    Okay. And you had never, before today, learned through your investigation that Mr. Zlochevsky told Giuliani's investigators that?

A    Not that I recall. Correct.

Q    Okay.

Mr. Zlochevsky's answer also includes the statement, quote, "We never had contacts with VP Biden during his visits to Ukraine," end quote. Do you see that answer?

A    Yes.

Q    Okay. Did you ever learn of that part of his statement, that Mr. Zlochevsky had told Rudy Giuliani's investigators in 2019 that he, quote, "never had contacts with Vice President Biden during his visits to Ukraine"?

A    No, not that I recall.

Q    Okay.

All right. Anywhere in Mr. Zlochevsky's statement -- and you can take a minute to review it if you need to review it further -- did Mr. Zlochevsky say that he paid either Hunter Biden or Joe Biden to pressure Poroshenko to fire Shokin?

A    No.

Q    Okay.

Now, the answers that we've discussed here that Zlochevsky gave in this 2019 interview are inconsistent with the statements attributed to Mr. Zlochevsky in the 1023, to some extent, correct?

A    Yes.
Q  Specifically on the key point that Mr. Biden is alleged to have received a bribe to pressure Poroshenko to fire Shokin, correct?

A  Correct.

Q  If you had known during the course of your investigation that Mr. Zlochevsky had made these statements that are inconsistent with what was attributed to him in the 1023, would that have affected your investigation in any way?

A  Had we been aware of this, we would've definitely shared that with Delaware when we shared the 1023 with them and allowed them to reconcile the two, do further investigation or not, based on their discretion and knowledge.

Q  Because that's just a normal thing that an investigator would do, is assess credibility by looking to see whether there were prior inconsistent statements from a witness, right?

A  Correct.

Q  And, in this case, you were not aware of the prior inconsistent statement when you did your investigation, correct?

A  Correct. I can't speak for my team, but I don't believe that we were aware of these.

Q  If someone on your team were aware of this prior inconsistent statement, you would've expected them, as professionals, to bring that to your attention, correct?

A  Yes, absolutely. We would've put that in our report to Mr. Donoghue. We would've absolutely put that in the briefing to Mr. Weiss's team.

Q  And you have no reason to think that anyone on your team was hiding this or trying to keep it from you?

A  No.

Q  Okay.
Then the other question I think that I have to ask about this is: This is a prior inconsistent statement of Mr. Zlochevsky that your investigation did not uncover, but it's a statement that Mr. Giuliani was certainly aware of. Would you agree?

A Yes, if -- based on your representation, yes, absolutely.

Mr. Lelling. Well, wait a minute. Do you have any personal knowledge of whether Rudy Giuliani was aware of that?

Mr. Brady. No, only counsel's representation.

Mr. Lelling. Okay.

Q Okay. Well, right, and the record in the impeachment inquiry, I suppose, and other evidence. But you're not familiar with that evidence, correct?

A I'm not.

Q And you didn't familiarize yourself with that evidence at the time that you conducted your investigation, correct?

A Correct.

Q Okay. But you knew that it had happened though, right? Like, that the investigation that preceded Mr. Trump's first impeachment, that that investigation had happened in Congress before your investigation started, right?

A Yes. And, forgive me, can you remind me of the dates of the first impeachment? I just --

So it would've been Septem- -- well, approximately September 2019. And then I think the impeachment vote was December of 2019, thereabouts.

Mr. Brady. Yes. Thank you.

We were aware --

Sorry. To clarify, that's just the House impeachment vote. And the
Senate trial would've been January and February of 2020.

Mr. Brady. Of 2020.

Yes, we were certainly aware. I was not familiar with the record, and I don't believe that our team looked into the record.

Q I mean, you personally had no role in it as an investigator, correct?

A No, not -- no.

Q But you were the sitting U.S. attorney at that time in Pittsburgh?

A Correct.

Q Okay.

But when you got this assignment to investigate or to receive information from Giuliani and others, was there any kind of a recollection on your part, just from reading news articles or other exposure, that this information associated with Giuliani had just passed through the investigative process in the impeachment?

A I wasn't sure what, of the information that he presented to us, was a part of the impeachment.

I think what General Barr said was that we were to treat any information relating to Ukrainian corruption with skepticism --

Q Right.

A -- because there were a lot of cross-currents and mixed motives. And so we had that view with the information we were receiving from Mr. Giuliani as well.

But, to your specific question, no, as to the information before the House or the Senate for the impeachment inquiry.

Q Okay. And, just to be very clear, Mr. Giuliani himself never gave you a copy of this statement, fair to say?
A Fair to say. Not that I recall. And, as you said, had my team been aware, it would have been elevated.

Q Okay.

A Mr. Giuliani gave a series of podcasts. I don't know if this was a part of his -- if this was a part of his public podcast. I just don't know, as I sit here.

Q Okay. And he never told you that he had interviewed or spoken to Mr. Zlochevsky or anybody had spoken to him on his behalf?

Mr. _Lelling._ Can't answer that.

Mr. _Brady._ And could I clarify one thing?

Of course. Yes.

Mr. _Brady._ So, just to clarify, without going into detail, because Mr. Parnas had been indicted by SDNY, we didn't develop any information relating to Mr. Parnas that either Mr. Giuliani gave us or that we received from the public, and we felt that it was best handled by SDNY, since they had that full investigation.

Okay.

Mr. _Brady._ So I can't speak to whether SDNY has that. I just don't know.

BY Okay.

Q Okay. I guess my question was just more based on your own description of your own investigative efforts. I mean, you went on your own, on your own initiative, to search FBI records that had anything to do with Zlochevsky, correct?

A Correct.

Q Or Burisma, but you don't know what the search term was.

A Correct. There were multiple, but yes. I can't remember the specific one that uncovered the underlying 1023.
Q Okay. But you didn't make a similar effort to search the impeachment investigative files that were released and public at that time and dealing with the same matter. Is that --

A Correct. To my knowledge, yes --

Q Okay.

A -- that's correct.

Q Thank you. Okay.

Okay. Switching gears a little bit --

A Sure.

Q -- do you know who Vitaly Kasko is? Spelled V-i-t-a-l-y, Vitaly, K-a-s-k-o, Kasko.

A I'm not sure. I don't remember.

Q Okay.

I'm going to mark this as exhibit 13.

[Brady Exhibit No. 13 Was marked for identification.]

BY

Q This is a news article from Bloomberg, dated May 7, 2019, entitled, quote, "Ukraine Ex-Official Casts Doubt on Biden Conflict Claim," end quote.

Have you seen this article before?

A I don't believe I have, no.

Q Please just take a minute to review it.

Have you had a chance to review it?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So Vitaly Kasko, as reported in the article, was Viktor Shokin's
deputy when Shokin was the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, correct?

A  Correct, according to this article, yes.

Q  Okay. I mean, in your investigation, did you ever, sort of, look into who Shokin's associates were?

A  I can't remember as I sit here. I think we did. And we knew Mr. Shokin had several roles in the PGO prior to becoming the Prosecutor General as well.

Q  Okay.

Are you aware that Mr. Kasko made public statements about the Burisma investigation that was happening under Shokin's leadership?

A  I may have been aware at the time, but I don't remember as I sit here.

Q  Okay. Would that have been something that your open-source review, you or your team's review, would've looked to look into, just any statements that Shokin or his other prosecutors had made about the Burisma investigation?

A  Yes, both in U.S. reporting and in Ukrainian reporting or European reporting.

Q  Okay. And, I'm sorry, did you indicate you've never seen this article before, though?

A  I don't believe I have, no.

Q  Okay.

Let's look at the statements made by Mr. Kasko that are contained in the reporting on page 2, at the bottom of the first paragraph.

Okay. Mr. Kasko stated that the probe into Burisma had been, quote, "long dormant," end quote, at the time that Vice President Biden made his comments about firing Shokin.

Kasko further stated that "there was no pressure from anyone from the U.S. to close cases against Zlochevsky. It was shelved by Ukrainian prosecutors in 2014 and
through 2015," end quote.

Had you ever discovered in the course of your investigation that Mr. Kasko had made that statement?

A No.

Q On the third page, in the fourth paragraph, the article states that the case against Zlochevsky and Burisma was assigned to Shokin when Shokin was a deputy prosecutor, but, according to the reporting, quote, "Shokin and others weren't pursuing it," end quote, according to internal reports from the Ukrainian prosecutor's office that were reviewed by Bloomberg.

Were you aware of this reporting, that Shokin was not pursuing the case against Burisma when he was the deputy prosecutor?

A Not this specific reporting, but we had seen information that was consistent with that as well.

Q Okay.

Were you aware in your investigation that internal reports from the Ukrainian prosecutor's office documented the fact that Shokin and others were not pursuing the case at this time?

A Could I have a second to ask Andy?

Q Of course.

[Discussion off the record.]
right?

A That's correct.

Q International.

A There's some information regarding the docket and filings that is public --

Q Okay.

A -- and so we were going through the FBI legat in Kyiv to try to secure those.

Q Okay.

Q This statement in the -- turning back to this article, on page 2, the statement from Mr. Kasko that there was no pressure from anyone from the U.S. to close cases against Zlochevsky, that would be inconsistent with some of the statements made in the 1023, correct?

A I'm sorry. Could you just tell me where that is? Generally, or --

Q It's the -- no, it's a direct quote.

Second page, bottom of the first paragraph.

BY

Q Yeah. Second page, right after the first paragraph, there's a little mini standalone paragraph. That first sentence is, "There was no pressure from anyone from the U.S. to close cases against Zlochevsky."

A Yes, that's inconsistent with the 1023.

Q Okay. Do you know if this is the type of information that your team had access to through its open-source investigation research?

A We would've had access to public reporting like this, articles, yes.

Q Do you know if this particular statement was something that was passed along to Delaware?
I don't recall.

Okay. Would it have been potentially relevant to Delaware's investigation?

Yes, if they were looking at Zlochevsky and Burisma, yes.

Because it could potentially go to Zlochevsky's credibility, correct?

Absolutely. Yes.

Okay.

Go ahead.

Can you explain a little bit, though? You indicated before that you were here to vet information from Giuliani and others, correct?

Correct.

But not to investigate with any kind of legal process, correct?

Yes. We didn't have a grand jury, so we couldn't do that. We couldn't compel testimony or documents.

Okay. And you indicated earlier that you did interview witnesses, correct?

Correct. Voluntary interviews.

And you reviewed FBI systems, correct?

Correct.

But now you are also indicating that you contacted foreign countries to ask for documents voluntarily? Like, for them to consensually just turn them over to you?

The legat is FBI personnel. So we would go through the FBI if there was public information or if we had to run something down. And we did that with several things that came to our attention.

Oh, I misunderstood. So you were just asking the legat if the legat had FBI documents? You weren't asking the legat to then reach out to Ukrainian counterparts?
A: No, we were asking the legat to reach out to counterparts to see what was publicly available on dockets, for example, or pleadings and to, if possible, pull that information and provide it to us.

Q: Okay. So you were looking at, like, Ukrainian foreign government documents, essentially.

A: We were trying to.

Q: Okay.

Mr. Lelling: Publicly available information, correct? Meaning publicly available in Ukraine.

Mr. Brady: Yes. That's correct.

Okay. We're marking for the record exhibit No. 14.

[Brady Exhibit No. 14 Was marked for identification.]

Q: This is a Washington Post article dated September 25, 2023. The title is, quote, "The Republican Case Against Biden Takes a Body Blow...from Fox News," end quote.

Have you seen this article before?

A: I don't believe I have.

Q: Okay. This was a more recent article. As I indicated, it's from 2023, so this was after you left the Department and after your assessment was completed. So -- and also after the release of the 1023 that we've discussed here today.

Were you following the fact that Chairman Comer had released the 1023 to the public?
A: Yes. Yeah.

Q: Okay. And when did you become aware of that?

A: I was aware of, broadly speaking, the conversation between the House and the FBI about that and the briefings. Followed just the public reporting about the FBI briefings. And then followed General Barr's statements and some of Representative Raskin's statements.

Q: Okay. But you knew that the actual document had been released to the public?

A: Oh, yes. I'm sorry. Yes, I did.

Q: Okay.

Now, let's -- focusing on the reporting here in exhibit 14, this is referring to a television interview on Fox News. One of the reporters had interviewed Mr. Poroshenko.

Q: Do you know who Mr. Poroshenko is?

A: Yes.

Q: And who is he?

A: He was the President -- the then-President of Ukraine.

Q: Okay. And Mr. Poroshenko, would you agree, is relevant to your investigation to the extent that the accusation that was made in the 1023 was that Biden had put pressure on Poroshenko to fire Shokin, correct?

A: Broadly speaking, yes.

Q: Okay.

So, when Poroshenko was interviewed by the Fox News host, he was asked about the claim that Shokin was fired from his position as Prosecutor General due to pressure from Biden to interfere with the investigation of Burisma, which is the allegation that is
central -- or one of the allegations that’s central to the 1023, correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

And, in response, Poroshenko said in this televised interview, quote, "First of all, this is the completely crazy person," referring to Shokin. Poroshenko continued, quote, "This is something wrong with him. Second, there is no single word of truth," end quote. And here, he’s referring to Shokin basically repeating the claim that he had been fired because of the Burisma investigation.

Were you familiar with that interview and the statement that Poroshenko made during that televised interview?

Mr. Lelling. When was --

Mr. Brady. I’m sorry. Yeah. When was it?

Q Just ever. Did you know it happened, as you sit here today? And then we can --

A I apolo- -- I’m not trying to be obtuse.

Q Yeah.

A What --

Q Did you know that Mr. Poroshenko was interviewed on Fox News in 2023?

A No, I did not.

Q Okay. On the subject of Shokin's firing.

A No. No, I didn’t.

Q Okay. So this is the first time, today, that you've learned that Mr. Poroshenko made these comments about why Shokin was fired?

A In this interview, correct, yeah.
Q: Okay.

A: I can't remember if -- there may have been contemporaneous reporting that we looked at during our vetting process, but, yeah, this is all new to me.

Q: Okay.

BY [REDACTED]

Q: In the course of your investigation in 2020, did you look at other statements that Mr. Poroshenko had made to see if they might be inconsistent with information in the 1023?

A: We may have. And the problem was, as we got further attenuated from, kind of, the actionable information, as it were, then it seemed less the best use of our limited resources and --

Q: Why is that?

A: Well, because if we didn't have any ability to interview Mr. Shokin, President Poroshenko, Mr. Zlochevsky, we thought it best to pass that to, you know, in this case, the office with the grand jury.

And, also, recognizing that it was an election year, particular sensitivities about possibly interviewing people in Ukraine, we thought that was best handled by someone that had the full view of that investigation, like Mr. Weiss and his team.

Q: So can you explain to me, you -- it was not beyond the scope of what you could do to reach out to the legat in Kyiv to try and get information, but interviewing actual witnesses was a step too far? Is that what you're saying?

A: So let's differentiate between U.S.-based witnesses and Ukrainian-based witnesses. And then within the Ukrainian-based witnesses, you could have individual witnesses who may have been former employees of Burisma and then people like the former Prosecutor General, the former President of the country.
We made the tactical decision to, where possible, interview U.S.-based fact witnesses and then memorialize that and send that to the appropriate offices.

Given the sensitivity in an election year, the possibility of manipulation of what we were doing and why we were doing it, we felt it best not to go to Ukraine, you know, 2 months before the election and try to interview these folks. Because, again, if Weiss and his team were looking at bank records, emails --

Q  Uh-huh.

A  -- you know, texts, things like that, they would be in a much better position to understand what was --

Q  Right. But you didn't have the same concern when it came to documents from the Prosecutor General's Office which could've potentially been produced by some of these Ukrainian-based witnesses?

Mr. Lelling  That's not what he said.

Mr. Brady  Yeah.

Q  So what I'm not understanding is, why did you, given the sensitivities, the election-year sensitivities that you described, why didn't you have any hesitancy when it came to reaching out to the legat in Kyiv to try and get, you know, documents from the Prosecutor General's Office?

A  So we --

Mr. Lelling  Well -- are you concerned about whether you can give the answer?

I was drawing a distinction between publicly available documents and not publicly available documents. Anybody can walk in and get documents off a court docket. Are you concerned about --

Mr. Brady  No. I can --
Mr. Lelling. -- this issue?

Mr. Brady. No. I think I can explain broadly.

Q Okay.

A We were concerned about interfacing with NABU or the PGO --

Q Uh-huh.

A -- because of just a lack of confidence in, again, motivation. As General Barr said, treat all this information with extreme skepticism. Be worried about different motivations, cross-currents.

And so, when we would reach out to the legat, it was FBI-to-FBI. And is there a discreet, non-public way of securing information about these cases, including from publicly available documents or dockets, in a way that then wouldn't, you know --

Q Uh-huh.

A -- raise a flag and make the Ukrainian media, the national media aware? Because we were very concerned --

Q So "discreet" here means quietly, basically. You could do that quietly. Is that fair to say?

A Yes, quietly, as an investigation is --

Q Okay.

A -- usually conducted.

Q Okay. So you were looking for things that you could find without making a lot of noise, correct?

A Correct.

Q All right. But you would be interested to know that Mr. Poroshenko had
made prior inconsistent statements if you could find that out through open-source, right?

A Yes, but, again -- and I'm not disputing the premise of your question -- I think those credibility determinations would be best done by Weiss and his team based on their full view of all the evidence that they had compiled.

Q Sure.

A So we were less worried -- if we could find these things, we would try to memorialize those in our reports. That wasn't most specifically what we were looking for.

Q Okay.

I'm going to mark for the record exhibit 15.

[Brady Exhibit No. 15 Was marked for identification.]

Q This is a Politico article dated June 21, 2020, and the title is, quote, "Former Ukrainian president says Biden never pressed him on Burisma," end quote. Have you seen this article before?

A I have not. I don't know if my team has.

Q Okay. Just take a quick second to look at it.

A Uh-huh.

Q And note the date is June 21, 2020, and the interview that's reported in it happened the day before, which would be June 20, 2020.

This is a brief article, so it shouldn't take too long to look at.

And just for time purposes, if you could focus on the first paragraph, I'll just ask you about that.

A Sure. Sorry. Just have a couple more paragraphs.
Q  Yeah, no worries.
A  Sure.  Okay.

Q  Okay.  So this article discusses a CNN televised interview of Petro

Poroshenko that occurred on June 20, 2022, when he was interviewed by Fareed Zakaria.

According to the first --

You misstated the date.  June 20, 2020.

Q  I'm sorry.  June 20, 2020.  Yeah.  That is important.

So this interview happened during the course of your assessment, correct?

A  Yes.

Q  And it would've been available to anybody looking in open sources to learn

that this statement had been made on television, correct?

A  Correct.

Q  And so, according to this reporting, in the first paragraph, the article reports

that Poroshenko was asked whether Joe Biden ever approached him about Burisma, and

he responded, quote, "My absolutely clear answer:  no, never," end quote.

Had you ever heard that Mr. Poroshenko had made that statement before today?

A  Not this specific statement.

But just one thing that our team was doing is they were looking at open-source

information and then summarizing those statements, even inconsistent statements.  We

summarized those in the report to Mr. Donoghue and said that, you know, there's a lack

of clarity about several of the key aspects, you know, relating to Mr. Shokin, the existence

or nonexistence of PGO investigations relating to Burisma and Mr. Zlochevsky, you know,

what happened with the U.K. case and how that was resolved and then how the fine was

paid downstream from that in the Ukraine.
So some of this type of information -- I don't know if it's this specifically -- you know, our team did put together. We didn't -- you know, we focused -- strike that. If there were inconsistent statements that they were aware of, they'd put that in there and summarize that in a memo to Rich Donoghue.

Q  Was that also passed along to Mr. Weiss and Mr. Weiss's team?
A  I don't remember as I sit here. They did not receive the report that was sent to Mr. Donoghue unless Mr. Donoghue shared it.

Q  Okay. So it's possible that there were, kind of, inconsistent statements from Mr. Poroshenko that were not passed along to Weiss's team then?
A  There certainly could be, yes.

Q  Okay.
A  Yeah, there certainly could be.

Q  Okay.
A  And as I mentioned, I have no knowledge of what they knew relating to those.

Q  Yep.
A  So that might've been part of their investigation.

Q  Okay. I'm marking for the record exhibit 16.

This is a Reuters news report dated June 4, 2020. The title is "Ukraine found no evidence against Hunter Biden in case audit: former top prosecutor."
Have you seen this article before?

A  I don't remember it, but --

Q  Okay. This is very brief, so you can review that, if you would, please.

A  Okay.

Q  Okay. So do you know who Ruslan Ryaboshapka is?

A  Forgive me. I knew in 2020. I don't remember if he was a subsequent
Prosecutor General or if he was the head of NABU.

Q  Okay.

A  I assume he was the Prosecutor General.

Q  Okay. So, according to the article, he was the Prosecutor General of
Ukraine in 2020. Is that fair to say?

A  Yes.

Q  Okay. And, according to the article, Mr. -- I'm just going to call him
"Mr. R" -- conducted an audit. During the time that you were leading your assessment,
he conducted an audit of cases involving Hunter Biden. And that was because of the
controversy that was brewing all over the world after the impeachment inquiry and other
matters.

Were you aware that this Prosecutor General, who was sitting at the time of your
assessment in Ukraine, had done an audit of Burisma, Hunter Biden, and Biden-related
matters that were in his office?

A  As I sit here, I don't remember. I believe we did, and I believe my team was
aware.

Q  Okay.

And, in the article, Mr. R says specifically, quote, "I specifically asked prosecutors
to check especially carefully those facts about Biden's alleged involvement. They
answered that there was nothing of the kind," end quote.

Were you aware that the Prosecutor General of Ukraine had made this request of his prosecutors during his audit in 2020?

A   I don't remember, as I sit here, if I knew that at the time.

Q   Okay. And were you aware that his prosecutors had found no evidence of any involvement by the Bidens in the cases that they were prosecuting?

A   I don't remember. My team may have been.

Q   Okay.

BY

Q   Do you know if that information was passed -- if your team had been aware of it, if it was passed along to Mr. Weiss?

A   It may have been summarized in the report to Mr. Donoghue --

Q   Uh-huh.

A   -- which talked about some of these broader issues. Our readouts and briefings to the specific U.S. attorney's offices related to specific investigatory leads, so it may not have been part of the Delaware briefing.

Q   Okay.

Q   I want to turn to the discussion earlier about the FBI and your interactions with the FBI.

A   Sure.

Q   There was a reference a number of times to, I think, 17 steps or 17 layers of approval. Was that an actual number, or was that just hyperbole? Were there 17 boxes to check? Can you explain that?

A   Yeah. So it was our understanding, related by someone on the FBI team in Pittsburgh, that that was an actual number, that there were 17 approvals that were
required to extend the assessment an additional 30 days.

Q Okay.

I want to introduce as exhibit 17 a February 5, 2020, memorandum from the Attorney General entitled "Additional Requirements for the Opening of Certain Sensitive Investigations." [Brady Exhibit No. 17 Was marked for identification.]

BY

Q Have you seen this before?

A Yes.

Q I want to look -- and this came out -- you were tasked with your "discreet assignment" approximately January 3, 2020, correct?

A Correct.

Q And so this would've come out a little over a month afterwards.

A Correct.

Q Were you aware of it when it was released?

A This? Yes, uh-huh.

Q And it was sent to all United States attorneys, of which you were, correct?

A Correct.

Q All Department component heads, so that would've been, like, DOJ Criminal or DOJ Tax, right?

A Yes.

Q And then all law enforcement agency heads, correct?

A I believe so, yes.

Q So that would include the FBI.
A Yes.

Q Okay.

So the second and third sentences of the very first paragraph here read, "While the Department must respond swiftly and decisively when faced with credible threats to our democratic processes, we also must be sensitive to safeguarding the Department's reputation for fairness, neutrality, and nonpartisanship. In certain cases, the existence of a federal criminal or counter-intelligence investigation, if it becomes known to the public, may have unintended effects on our elections."

Correct?

A Yes.

Q And so this was actually an advisory of sorts sent out by the Attorney General at the time, Attorney General Barr, correct?

A Correct, and, I believe, a process for opening these types of investigations.

Q Right. And it specifically laid out concerns about the potential impact that a sensitive investigation might have on the 2020 election, correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay.

The paragraph continues, "For this reason, the Department has long recognized that it must exercise particular care regarding sensitive investigations and prosecutions that relate to political candidates, campaigns, and other politically sensitive individuals and organizations -- especially in an election year."

Correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. And so, realizing that this pertains to the opening of investigations, would you agree that these types of concerns also pertain to investigations while they're
ongoing in an election year?

A Yes. Absolutely.

Q And what's your understanding of what a politically sensitive investigative matter is?

A It's, especially during a Presidential year, as described in detail on page 2, that, broadly speaking, any investigation, any investigatory steps, especially grand jury steps, which could include subpoenas or compelled testimony of anyone, relating to a political candidate at certain levels or members of their staff or family should be deemed sensitive. And, in an election year, there are different requirements and processes and approvals that are triggered once that takes place.

Q And do you know if FBI, in particular, has specific guidelines for the processing of politically sensitive matters in an election year?

A I believe they do. I don't know what specifically is in the DIOG relating to that. Certainly, anything that the Attorney General requires would be required of the FBI as well.

Q Okay.

And you reference the DIOG earlier, and you said that you weren't able to get a copy of, I guess, the law enforcement sensitive version of the DIOG, but you did receive an unclassified version or a publicly available version. Is that correct?

A Right. I found it. But yes, uh-huh.

Q Okay. You found it.

A Yes.

Q And did you ever look in that copy to see if there were guidelines on politically sensitive investigations in that DIOG?

A I don't remember that I did. You know, our guidance that applied to me
and our team of AUSAs was certainly DOJ policy, which is very explicit, and then this additional guidance from the Attorney General.

Q Okay. And what's your understanding of the DOJ policy?

A Well, that, before cases are opened, before certain investigatory steps are taken, there must be, kind of, a consultation or a notification with usually the DAG's office. And then they will either weigh in on that, approve, disapprove; that'll be a part of a conversation. But they need to be notified -- again, their, kind of, "no surprise" rule -- but especially of sensitive investigations during a Presidential year.

Q And that's laid out in the Justice Manual, correct?

A Yes.

Q And what is the Justice Manual, for the record?

A The Justice Manual used to be called -- what did it used to be called?

Mr. Lelling. The U.S. Attorneys' Manual.


The U.S. Attorneys' Manual/the Justice Manual provides the guidelines but also specific processes for everything from identifying subjects and targets, to notification, to how certain investigations and certain subject matter areas are to be taken; if approvals are required within the DOJ, what those are, what those steps are.

But it was also just kind of a practical handbook for AUSAs, as well, to understand how they are to conduct themselves, conduct investigations, interface with Federal agencies and defense counsel.

[Discussion off the record.]

Q You mentioned earlier that you had briefings -- that you passed along information via briefings to Mr. Weiss in Delaware. But you also referenced the Eastern

A Correct.

Q Very briefly, who was your contact at the Eastern District of New York?

A Eastern District was, at the time, Rich Donoghue until late summer, and then he and Mr. DuCharme changed places. Rich became the PADAG; Mr. DuCharme became the U.S. attorney in EDNY.

It was Geoff Berman through, I believe, most of that, Audrey Strauss, maybe, at the end, when she was acting U.S. attorney, in SDNY.

Q Okay.

With respect to the Eastern District of New York, in particular, Mr. Donoghue and then Mr. DuCharme, can you talk broadly to what their investigation concerned?

A Could I have a minute? I don't --

Q Yeah.

Mr. Lelling. I don't know that he can go into that.

Okay.

Q With respect to the Southern District of New York, can you talk broadly as to what their investigation concerned?

Mr. Lelling. I don't think you want to do that.

Mr. Brady. I think it's public.

Mr. Lelling. Oh, it's public?

Mr. Brady. In Geoff's book.

Mr. Lelling. Oh, yeah. Well --

Mr. Brady. Per publicly available sources, including Mr. Berman's book, he was looking at Mr. Parnas, Mr. Fruman, and Mr. Giuliani for potential FARA violations, among
BY [REDACTED]

Q  Okay. And so your office did develop information which you deemed either credible or that had sufficient indicia of credibility to pass along to the Southern District of New York in that investigation into Mr. Giuliani and others, correct?

A  Yes.

Q  Okay.

Go ahead.

BY [REDACTED]

Q  Quick question on the closing of the matter. It sounds like, and I think you clarified in the previous hour, that there is some difference in nomenclature between the DOJ and the FBI. Is that right?

A  That's right.

Q  So, when they talk about "assessments," that's an FBI word, not a DOJ word?

A  Correct.

Q  And DOJ talks about "matters," among other things?

A  "Matters," "cases," yes, uh-huh.

Q  Okay.

So you indicated in your testimony that you spoke with the SAC in Pittsburgh and discussed your concurrence or permission for him to close an assessment because there was no further investigative activity to undertake. Is that right?

A  That's right.

Q  Okay. So that language that appeared in Mr. Raskin's letter about closing an assessment may very well have come from that experience, like, the closing of the FBI assessment? Is that fair to say?
A Yes as to the administrative closing. No as to the basis for why it was closed. It wasn't because we deemed it not credible or felt that it didn't merit, you know, continuing into a preliminary or full investigation.

Q Right. Because you weren't even in a position to really opine on that, right?

A It wasn't our tasking. It was never going to become a full investigation or grand jury investigation.

Q Right. That wasn't your role, right?

A Correct.

Q Okay.

And the FBI, they were being tasked by you and they have language about assessments, and they just wanted to administratively close that assessment because there was no further investigative work for them to do under that tasking. Is that right?

A That's right.

Q Okay. And do you know, did that happen in August of 2020?

A I don't remember specifically. I believe it would have happened in August, because our report to Rich was in mid-September. So we wouldn't -- I believe that's right. I believe our conversation with the SAC, yes, I signed off on closing, and then we write the reports to Rich and do the briefings.

Q Okay.

And, from your perspective, when you passed on the 1023, in particular, to those other U.S. attorney's offices, it was, in your judgment, their providence to then look into whether that was credible and to do further investigation if they deemed it appropriate, correct?

A That's absolutely right. Just a --
Q  Uh-huh?
A  -- small clarification:  The only office that received a 1023 was Delaware.
Q  Oh.
A  Neither SDNY nor EDNY did.
Q  Were they briefed on it, or just --
A  No.
Q  Not at all.  Okay.  So we're just talking about Delaware?
A  Could I talk to him for one second?
Q  Oh, sure.
A  Sorry.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Brady.  Okay.  Sorry.  Not with SDNY.

Mr. Brady.  We did with EDNY.  As I testified previously and as Mr. Barr stated publicly, the 1023, the CHS, was vetted against known sources of Russian disinformation.  It was found that it was not sourced from Russian disinformation.  To do analysis, we interacted with EDNY.

Mr. Brady.  Okay.

Mr. Brady.  So they were aware, but it wasn't part of their investigation.

Q  Okay.

You're aware that the 1023 was publicly released, correct?
A  By Senator Grassley?
Q  Or, well, Comer.
A  Yes.
Q  Right.
A  Oh, yes.
Q  I don't know, maybe Grassley too.
Okay. And you indicated that the FBI, at certain points when they were working
with you, was reluctant to do certain things and seemed to be protective of their CHS. Is
that fair to say?
A  Yes. Kind of two different buckets. They were very protective of their
CHS --
Q  Let's talk about that for a minute. Did you get the impression that the FBI
was trying to protect him as a source so that they could continue to use him or her?
A  Yes.
Q  Okay. And do you think that's a valid concern of the FBI?
A  Yes, absolutely.
Q  Okay. And now that the 1023 has been released after, you know, being
exposed to this kind of politicized process, do you think that some of their fears kind of
came to pass, in the sense that now it's more difficult to use that CHS?
A  I do. I think they would say that. And, yeah, it's a concern.
Q  Okay. Could the FBI and the DOJ -- even though they work together, they
do have different interests at different times. Is that fair to say, in your experience?
A  Yes, I think that's fair.
Q  Okay.
And another one might be between U.S. attorney's offices. You also discuss
some, kind of, differences or frustrations about communications and other matters,
information flowing between you and particularly the Delaware office. Is that right?
A  That's right.
Q. And I think you said that the fear that they expressed was not wanting to kind of give out information about their case. They were keeping it close hold. Is that right?
A. That's right.
Q. Can you imagine reasons why they might have wanted to do that for legitimate reasons for the protection of their own cases?
A. Sure, one is an ethical and statutory obligation of under 60, any grand jury information should not be even shared unless there's a legitimate investigatory purpose, you know, that other members, that somehow it might be exposed to the public. And with respect to your question about CHSs. The recruitment of CHSs, that's a valid concern of the FBI. That's within their domain. And I think if the FBI is saying it would become more difficult to recruit CHSs and utilize them in investigations if their identities, even reverse engineered, would be made public, that's a valid concern.
Q. It's bad for the FBI, right?
A. Bad for the FBI.
Q. And it's also bad for the CHS who might be harmed or killed, correct?
A. It could be, yes. Absolutely.
Q. We're out of time. Let's go off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]
Back on the record.
Chairman Jordan. Mr. Brady, when did you learn about the laptop?
Mr. Brady. When it was -- there was public reporting about its existence.
Chairman Jordan. So you didn't learn about it until the story in the Post on
October 14th or thereabouts?

Mr. Brady. Yes, sir.

Chairman Jordan. Okay. Did you raise that on the 23rd when you did the final briefing with Delaware U.S. Attorney's Office; did you bring up the laptop?

Mr. Brady. We did not because our purpose during that briefing was a one-way flow of information to them.

Chairman Jordan. Okay. Okay. Let me just go back. I just want to make sure I got the story line down. So you get the job, the task coming to the clearinghouse on February 18, 2020. Is that right?


Chairman Jordan. January 3rd. That's when it was official?

Mr. Brady. That's when internally PADAG Seth DuCharme told me that I had been assigned this task.

Chairman Jordan. Okay. January 3rd, 2020. And then what I am understanding is, right, throughout the winter and spring, you're asking the FBI for information they have regarding Ukraine and Hunter Biden, you're requesting that you get information they may have?

Mr. Brady. We're trying to identify investigative leads, and from the information we had received from the public, including information about Hunter Biden and Burisma, and then asking the FBI -- and we were also tasked with coordinating this is public from Attorney General, Attorney General Barr, how to coordinate also with intelligence services. And so we were interfacing with them relating to that tasking. It wasn't everything that they had because certainly Delaware with the grand jury investigation would have had a lot of information relating since it began in 2019.

Chairman Jordan. Okay. But there's communication back and forth with the
FBI and other agencies on what your task involves, information they may have that's relevant to the task you have been assigned by the Attorney General?

Mr. Brady. That's correct.

Chairman Jordan. Okay. And every 30 days, there has to be a new, kind of a re-up and a signoff on how your task as the clearinghouse, how that continues. Is that right?

Mr. Brady. Not from the DOJ side. Administratively from the FBI side for the assessment?

Chairman Jordan. Right. And you said, I think, earlier, maybe the first hour before I was here, but then subsequently talked about there was 17 individuals involved in signing off on this every 30 days. Is that right?

Mr. Brady. That's what we were told by the Pittsburgh FBI agents.

Chairman Jordan. Seventeen people had to sign off on you to continue your task?

Mr. Brady. For the FBI to continue. Our guys kept running. It was the FBI -- for any FBI agents to continue to do any functions that we requested of them.

Chairman Jordan. And I think you said in your experience, that was unusual?

Mr. Brady. Yes, sir.

Chairman Jordan. You had never seen that before?

Mr. Brady. Never.

Chairman Jordan. And then you also asked, I think specifically of the FBI to get the DIOG, which is like this sort of manual on how things are done, what are the process and steps involved in the investigation, and you were not permitted to have access to that. Is that right?

Mr. Brady. That's correct. Because at the beginning, we were trying to just talk
through -- they said we want to open an assessment. We said, Well, let's talk about that. What does that mean? What does that require under your processes under the DIOG? So the best way to do that is let's just look at the book and understand that. And they said we can't share that with you.

Chairman Jordan. Did the book follow the book, and they said, No, we're not even going to look at the book?

Mr. Brady. They were. We were not permitted to look at it. Yes, sir.

Chairman Jordan. Right. They weren't going to let you. Okay. Then you had communications with the PADAG and the FBI over this fact that there seemed to be a reluctance -- I think is the term you used -- reluctance of the FBI to work with you and give you the information that you thought was pertinent to your investigation. Is that fair?

Mr. Brady. Yes, we had multiple conversations about specific issues that would arise.

Chairman Jordan. And throughout this time when you're doing this back and forth, have to go to the PADAG, all this going on, you finally get -- and let me make sure I'm characterizing this right -- you finally get the original 1023 in early June of 2020. Is that right?

Mr. Brady. That's correct.

Chairman Jordan. And did you feel like you should have had that information sooner?

Mr. Brady. I don't --

Chairman Jordan. From January -- it took you 6 months, you've been asking for it. You had to go to PADAG. They don't show you the DIOG. You finally get this information in 6 months later.
Mr. Lelling. Well, was that initial reluctance from the FBI tied to the 1023, or it was more generally?

Mr. Brady. Yeah, I think there were two different things at play here. I think one was the general resistance, perhaps bureaucratic inertia of characterizing how we were going to, you know, start our task, the steps, how that was going to work, the approval process. When the 1023 was identified, the underlying 1023 in early June, we were moving a little better. We were working together better. So I think that was a function of just identifying that Washington Field Office, the WFO file that it contains, and having that as a part of the search of what they were looking for. So I am not trying to confuse, but just to kind of clarify there were issues throughout.

Chairman Jordan. Well, let me ask it this way: Were you a little surprised you hadn't gotten that underlying kind of original 1023 sooner?

Mr. Wilkerson. Given the stops and starts and the issues that we had, I don't know that I was surprised. We had a lot of issues with just having them follow our requests.

Chairman Jordan. Okay. So you weren't surprised because it had been a -- there had been a reluctance to accommodate a reluctance to work a slow walking from the get-go. So it wasn't like, Oh, well, we got this information, we should have had it sooner, but we finally got it now.

Mr. Brady. It was an ongoing issue.

Chairman Jordan. Got it. Got it. Now, also, based on what you said, throughout the process, you said that the Delaware U.S. Attorney's Office wasn't willing to cooperate, so much so that you had to send interrogatories?

Mr. Brady. Yes, we had conversations, asked for communication and a flow of information, mostly one way from us to them, but also, as I testified, we wanted to make
sure we weren't duplicating what they were doing. They would not engage. And so finally, after me calling Mr. Weiss and saying can you please talk to your team, this is important, this is why we want to interact with them, the response that we got back is you can submit your questions to our team in written form, which we did.

Chairman Jordan. And that was unusual?

Mr. Brady. I had never seen it before.

Chairman Jordan. Did the conversation go like you called up and say, Hey, David, we're working together here. Can you start working with us? And then you get back, send us the questions in writing. Is that how it went?

Mr. Brady. Yes, perhaps a little more colorful language. And then he said, I will talk with my team, and then he got back to us.

Chairman Jordan. Can you give me any idea how colorful that language was?

Mr. Brady. I don't remember, sir.

Chairman Jordan. But it was colorful?

Mr. Brady. We're peers and friends, and we can speak frankly with each other.

Chairman Jordan. Okay. But that is -- in your time as an assistant U.S. attorney, U.S. attorney, you ever seen anything like that?

Mr. Brady. Not where an office had to submit written interrogatories to another office for permission.

Chairman Jordan. Okay. Now on the 14th, so just days before you're going to have this final briefing with Delaware, on the 14th the story broke, that's when it went public. Were you surprised that you didn't know about the existence of this laptop?

Mr. Brady. Yes.

Chairman Jordan. All right. I think anyone would be surprised. How about on the 19th when 51 former intel officials signed a letter that -- you know, again, the context,
of course, is we're just weeks before the most important election we have, the election of
the President, 51 former intel officials signed this letter that then goes public. And then
that letter is cited in the final debate and the Presidential campaign. Did that also
surprise you as well?

Mr. Brady. I really didn't have a basis to know why they signed or did not sign to
that letter given my purview of it.

Chairman Jordan. But the fact that the story broke on the 14th, that there was
this laptop that the FBI had since prior to you even being assigned this task, had the
laptop in the late fall of 2019, the fact that you didn't know about it, was -- is it fair to say,
shocking?

Mr. Brady. It was surprising, yes, sir.

Chairman Jordan. Okay. And then finally on the 23rd when you had this
briefing, the laptop didn't come up in the briefing from Delaware talking to you or you
talking to Delaware; it didn't come up at all in that briefing.

Mr. Brady. Our briefing was us to them. They were in pure receipt mode. I
don't know that they were offering anything about what they were doing. So we didn't
bring it up in our briefing, no.

Chairman Jordan. Okay.

Mr. Brady. And again, our briefing was, here are specific actionable items and
recommendations for your investigation.

Chairman Jordan. Did it come up in the briefing with the Eastern District of New
York and the Southern District Of New York?

Mr. Brady. No, sir.

Chairman Jordan. Okay. Go ahead,
Q: And you said you were surprised about -- that you didn't know about the laptop. Did you share that surprise with anyone, or did you get any other reactions from individuals within your office?

A: Just perhaps our team. We discussed it internally and --

Q: So no one on your team knew about the laptop. Is that correct?

A: No.

Q: Did you get a sense of whether anyone in the Eastern District of New York or Southern District of New York knew about the laptop prior to the October 14th story?

A: I don't know. I have no knowledge.

Chairman Jordan. Let me ask you this: When you talked with your team, how was that, if you can kind of characterize those conversations, was it like, can you believe they didn't -- give me the tone. I don't know how I would -- I can't believe they wouldn't share this with us. The Attorney General of the United States tasked us with coming to the clearinghouse for this information on this very subject, and there's an important piece of evidence they don't share with us? Was that the tone?

Mr. Lelling. Was your team surprised, too?

Mr. Brady. We were all surprised we would share that surprise. Yes.

Chairman Jordan. Okay. Thank you.

Q: During one of our hours of questioning, you stated that there was false representation, I believe, by the FBI, about what the work that you were doing. Do you remember that conversation we were having?

A: Yes.

Q: And can you provide a little bit more context about who was making those
representations? Was it headquarters? A field office?

A I don't know. Could I talk to Andy for one second?

Q Sure. We'll go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Lelling. I'm sorry. I will instruct him not to answer that.

BY

Q Okay. Is there anything else you can go into detail about regarding those representations that were made?

A We resolved them.

Q You resolved them. And did you have to reach out to anyone in order to resolve those? We'll go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY

Q Back on the record.

A We resolved it through direct communications with senior members of the Department of Justice and senior members of the FBI.

Q Okay. And at the end of the last hour, you were discussing regarding the publication of the FD-1023. So there were two buckets. The protection of the CHS that there was FBI concern of the protection of the CHS, and then you also -- I think the second one was about reluctance. And I know you had an opportunity to talk about the first CHS protection, but can you expand upon the reluctance regarding the 1023 the FBI giving you?

A I'm sorry. I don't fully understand your question. So.

Q Yeah, at the end of the last hour, you described two buckets, and I just wanted to get a sense of the second bucket that you were talking about. You said CHS
protection and then reluctance. And the topic was the publication of the FD-1023 by Senator Grassley and Representative Kilmer.

A So reluctance by the FBI? I am sorry, I don't --

Q I believe that's what you were saying, but I just wanted to give you an opportunity if you wanted to talk about the second bucket of worry regarding the publication of FD-1023.

A I could be misremembering this. I think what I was trying to differentiate was that there was general reluctance with the tasking and issues that we had with the FBI as bucket one. And then there was the 1023, specifically, in our interaction with the FBI on that. So --

Q Okay.

A So I think the first bucket we kind of unpacked a good deal.

Chairman Jordan. Go to that second bucket. Tell me about -- so you learned in early June about the original 1023. You want to talk to the confidential human source, which you do, I think, on June 26th. What happened in that interim? Was there pushback from the FBI there in those 20-some days?

Mr. Brady. There was. They were concerned with the protection of the source. This was a valued CHS. Again, as we discussed in the previous hours, this was someone known to them, was credible, they had -- he or she had given information in previous investigations. And so, reengaging and having a follow-up interview, there was general concern.

Chairman Jordan. Okay. There were concerns. This was the valued source, and they had used this source before. And there's always those concerns when they are going to be interviewed. But you felt it was important to do this interview nonetheless?

Mr. Brady. Correct, yes.
Chairman Jordan. And when you did the interview, you determined, you reached the same conclusion that the FBI did that this individual was credible and what he was saying -- you made the same determination that he was credible?

Mr. Lelling. I don't think you can answer that.

Well, you have discussed indicia of credibility.

Mr. Brady. Yeah, I think there's two different things, sir.

Chairman Jordan. Okay.

Mr. Brady. And perhaps parsing it this way might be helpful. I relied on the FBI's assessment of the credibility of the CHS as a trusted source. I didn't have any independent knowledge of that.

Chairman Jordan. Okay.

Mr. Brady. With respect to what's contained in the 1023, the indicia of credibility were things that we were able to run to ground without a grand jury, and then felt that it was sufficient, had sufficient indicia of credibility to then pass on to Delaware.

Chairman Jordan. Fair enough. Okay.

Q In the last hour, there was a discussion of some of the substance of the FD-1023 and Mr. Shokin. And you discussed how in the final report, you noted a lack of clarity. Can you describe that a little bit more? Was that based on publicly available information?

A Yes, most of it was -- there was information we received from Mr. Giuliani on a broad range of topics. But then we, our team, the FBI, in coordination with the intelligence community, aggregated information, including inconsistent statements. We're examining that. Again, our tasking was not to determine the basis and validity of Mr. Shokin's firing and why that took place. We were running to ground investigatory
leads, and then passing that off to an office that had a broader purview of all of that and
the tools to run some of the specific allegations to ground.

So in our report to Mr. Donoghue in September, we summarized some of the
allegations that had been brought or alleged by Mr. Giuliani and noted where there
was -- either we had no basis of opining, or there was conflicting information. To the
best of our ability, again, we weren't going to draft a, you know, a comprehensive memo
just on that specific issue. But we tried to aggregate what we could.

Q Okay. And I know last hour there was also discussion about the DOJ policy
regarding elections and stopping, you know, DOJ actions prior to an election. Are you
familiar with Mr. Shapley's testimony that Delaware delayed, you know, some of its
investigative work to get into that 60- or 90-day window that the FBI would have to stop
overt actions?

A Generally aware, yes.

Q Did it concern you that the fact that the FBI had to go pin down several times
and stop their investigative activity that it would get closer and closer to the 2020
election?

A I viewed our entire tasking once Vice President Biden declared and was a
candidate for President. Even though there's that 60- or 90-day window in the policy, I
viewed that as incredibly sensitive from the very beginning and was to be treated as such
from January 3rd forward. So that was how our team kind of viewed that and dealt with
that. And then only later does that intersect with the specific date ranges in the DOJ
policy.

Q We can go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]
Q: It is 2:46. We can go back on the record. Mr. Brady, you made some references earlier to Pittsburgh FBI field office having an acting SAC, that's an acting special agent in charge, right?

A: Correct.

Q: I want to talk through the timeline on that.

A: Okay.

Q: So when you were -- first received the tasking on January 3rd, 2020, did FBI Pittsburgh field office have an acting SAC at that time?

A: No, not an acting. They had a regular SAC.

Q: And then how long was that SAC there?

A: I think he retired at the end of March of that year.

Q: Okay. And on March 13th of that year, it was 2020, so that would have been when the first COVID work-remote directives came into place, correct?

A: I believe, yes. In the middle of March, correct.

Q: So there's a permanent SAC, but at some point in mid-March, things kind of get turned upside down. Is that fair to say?

A: Yes.

Q: So he retired at the end of March, and then there was -- and he was, I guess, in January, or February, March, until he retired, he was kind of in the last, the end of his career, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: He retired -- or she retired, they retired, and then there was some period of time there was an acting SAC?

A: Right. That's right.

Q: How long was that?
Q: Okay.
A: And then, I could have my dates wrong. I believe there was a replacement that was either the end of May or the beginning of June.
Q: Okay. So for approximately, probably all of April, maybe all of May into early June, there was an acting SAC?
A: That's right.
Q: Okay. And during that time, it's still COVID, so there was still, you know, everyone was still working remotely. There were the separation orders and everything else in effect, right?
A: Absolutely, yes.
Q: Would you say that that impacted your office?
A: Yes, it impacted every office, DOJ and FBI.
Q: And could you briefly describe the impacts it had?
A: We had to quickly move to an all-remote working environment, which was certainly new to the Department. All the agencies had IT issues with that quick change. It impacted our investigations, big and small. There was difficulty in traveling, in meeting with witnesses in person. We had to have briefings and meetings that were mostly remote and through video conference. So there was definitely an impact.
Q: And this was across all of your investigations, right?
A: Yes. Absolutely.
Q: So not just this investigation but every investigation your staff worked on was impacted by the COVID, the shutdowns, and the remote work requirements, correct?
A: Yes, absolutely.
Q: And FBI was also dealing with similar requirements, correct?
A They were, yes.

Q So FBI, again, looking at April, May, mid-March on, then had some combination of an acting special agent in charge and also the office was dealing with shutdowns and remote work situations, correct?

A Yes, absolutely.

Q Okay. And then you said that once there was a permanent SAC put in place, that would have been early June-ish?

A Yes.

Q Things improved?

A Yes, this did.

Q And do you think that the assignment of a permanent SAC helped in that process?

A I believe so. It was SAC who was experienced who had worked previously in the Pittsburgh office, in the Pittsburgh field office and knew our office. I think he was either vested with, or assumed more authority for decisionmaking. And so -- and also understood that, you know, these were taskings that we needed to complete. They were assigned by the Attorney General, so we needed to get them moving and complete them, especially as we got further in the election season.

Q And you just said that he assumed more responsibility for decisionmaking. Is it your experience that individuals in acting roles are sometimes reluctant to make decisions?

A Yes.

Q And is that true in your experience with the prosecutor's offices as well?

A Yes, absolutely.

Q The Western District of Pennsylvania, specifically.
Yes.

And why do you think that is?

I think the authority granted to someone in an acting position, whether real or perceived, is just more limited than someone who was either presidentially appointed, or in the case of the FBI has, you know, been given the position of SAC by the director and deputy director. I think the people who were acting are usually, in the near-term, after we departed, there's turnover. First assistants. The first assistants are among the most experienced prosecutors in the office. However, there's still a bit of reluctance to make those decisions without, on either side, going up the chain for review and approval in a different way than U.S. attorneys or SACs would.

And, again, that's kind of across the board in your experience in all investigations, not this particular investigation, right?

Yes, I think smaller ones. Certainly if it's, you know, drug, gun cases, they have more confidence in making those kind of decisions locally. And sensitive investigations are ones that impact the election year policy, they're certainly going to treat that differently.

And it may be the case that an acting official hasn't handled many sensitive investigative matters, correct?

That could be yes, not in that position.

And so they may not feel confident in making those decisions for that reason as well?

Yes, that's fair.

With regard to the FBI, you referenced the deputy director a couple times. That was David Bowdich. Is that right?

Yes.
Q  Okay. And it was the case that when you -- when David Bowdich got
involved, that kind of cleared up the blockages, correct?
A  Yes, absolutely.
Q  It made things move through more quickly?
A  Yes, so it resolved issues that required his opinion and intervention, yes.
Q  So it's fair to say that the senior executives at the FBI, you know, had an
interest in making sure that this matter could proceed, right?
A  Yeah, whether the deputy director or the director, we never had any issues
with them, and they were fully supportive of what we were doing.
Q  Okay. Sorry for the pause.
A  No, that's okay.
[Brady Exhibit No. 18
Was marked for identification.]
Q  We want to introduce as exhibit No. 18 an October 17, 2020, article from the
Daily Beast. This is entitled: "Rudy: Only 50/50 Chance I Worked with a Russian Spy
to Dig Dirt on Bidens and Ukraine." Have you seen this before?
A  If I could just have a minute to review it.
Q  Absolutely. And I can tell you we have highlighted a sentence on page 5
that we're going to focus on, but feel free to take as long as you need to review it.
A  Sure. Okay.
Q  Have you had a chance to, a minute to review?
A  Yes.
Q  Okay. And this article, I want to note for the record, it is a Daily Beast
article, but it reports on an hour-long interview that the Daily Beast journalist had directly
with Mr. Giuliani, right?  That's the text of the article.

A  Yes.

Q  So according to this article, Mr. Giuliani had a copy of the laptop, correct?

A  I believe that's what it says, yes.

Q  And you said in the prior hour that Mr. Giuliani passed along a lot of

information to you, right?

A  Correct.

Q  Can you describe the volume of information Mr. Giuliani passed along to

you?

A  There were a lot of names, which included details allegedly derived from

those people, including, as I mentioned before, possible bank account records -- or I'm

sorry, bank account numbers, email addresses, cell phones that would purportedly point

towards evidence.  There were a lot of -- there was information about a variety of

schemes and accusations not limited to Burisma and Mr. Biden.  Some of it has been

part of a FOIA production, I believe.

Q  So, but Mr. Giuliani had a copy of the laptop, he claimed.  Did he provide

that to you?

A  He did not.

Q  So when you said earlier that you were surprised you hadn't seen the laptop,

were you surprised that Mr. Giuliani didn't produce it to you?

A  Yes.

Q  And why is that.

Mr. Lelling.  I don't think you can go into that.  You can say you were surprised.

Q  You can't tell us why you were surprised?
Mr. Lelling. He can't characterize his rationale for his surprise. That's correct.

Why is that? Just for the record, what is the reason?

Mr. Lelling. Because it gets too close to deliberative process concerns that the Department has.

It's deliberative process to explain why he was surprised that Giuliani didn't give him something that Giuliani said he had public access to?

Mr. Lelling. Correct.

Or publicly say he had access to.

Mr. Lelling. Well, if you want to fill in the answer to your question, that's fine. I'm just telling you, you can't ask him.

Okay. I am just noting the objection for the record. I understand where you're coming from.

Mr. Brady. I was surprised.

Q Mr. Giuliani, in this article, says that he was the person who obtained the laptop, correct?

A I'm sorry, I'm not trying to be obtrusive. Where does it say that?

Q So he said that he -- I'm sorry, that you were asked in the earlier hour about The New York Post article regarding the laptop. And Mr. Giuliani says he was the source of the leak to The New York Post?

A Oh, I see. Yes.

Q Okay. And Mr. Giuliani actually said that he -- and this is on page 5, this is a quote from the article. And he gets paraphrasing Mr. Giuliani, but it's not a direct quote from him -- but Giuliani said he viewed his latest leak to The New York Post as an extension of his years'-long efforts to work with Ukrainians to dig up dirt on the Bidens,
Correct.

So Mr. Giuliani is saying that the laptop that he had a copy of, he had obtained from -- through his years' long work, or as an extension of his years' long work to dig up dirt on the Bidens with the Ukrainians, right?

That's a fair assumption. I don't know how we got there.

And turning back to page 3, we've had like -- and these highlightings, we did add to that article. It's not highlighted in the article on the website.

Sure.

Halfway down it says, Asked, for instance, whether he was concerned if the material he may have obtained, in reference to the laptop, might be, in some way, be linked to the hacking of Burisma last year, an act attributed to Russian intelligence. Giuliani said, wouldn't matter, what's the difference. I read that correctly, right?

You did, yes.

Would it have mattered to you as somebody reviewing evidence, vetting evidence for, you know, indicia of credibility if it was possibly Russian sources, possibly Russian intelligence?

Mr. Lelling. Don't answer that. They're essentially asking him for an expert opinion on something Giuliani might have said.

Q Well, I'm just saying that -- would it have been -- as you were vetting the information that you received, was it something -- would it have been of concern to you -- let me rephrase that.

Was something that you were looking out for was whether the information could be disinformation?
Yes. That was a concern. That was an act of an ongoing concern with the information that we received, including from Mr. Giuliani.

And that's actually a concern that Mr. Barr had said publicly as well, correct?

Yes, I don't know if he said that specifically, but it was definitely a concern. And he may have said that publicly.

And here Giuliani himself was saying, It might be Russian intelligence, it might not, what's the difference. That's what Giuliani said here.

That is, yes.

Okay.

I'll turn it over to you.

Q Okay. You indicated during previous questioning a distinction between information that you received during your assessment from Giuliani and information that was not received or sourced from Giuliani. Is that a distinction that you wanted to emphasize?

I'm not sure if I am -- forgive me, I might be misremembering my testimony. The distinction I made was that the 1023 wasn't derived from information we received from Mr. Giuliani. We had the information from Mr. Giuliani, and then we had developed work streams through discussions with other, either components within DOJ or other Federal agencies to run certain things to ground. But it wasn't limited to just Mr. Giuliani's information, yes.

Okay. Well, I think you indicated, and maybe this was in discussion of the reluctance on the part of the -- some other DOJ officials in Delaware to receive information from Giuliani. Did they express that kind of reluctance that was related to Giuliani originating information?
I saw what Mr. Shapley said. I don't remember those concerns being expressed in that way. I think there was a general concern, a skepticism by everyone involved relating to Mr. Giuliani's information. I think some of the concerns that Delaware may have dealt with, not just keeping a close hold on very sensitive information and what they're doing in their investigation, but making sure there are no leaks outside of that, but it doesn't become public, and especially in an election year, which are absolutely valid concerns.

Q Okay. But I thought you said something, specifically, when you were talking about AUSA Wolf, that maybe she had expressed concerns about the credibility of information that had come from Giuliani. Did you say something about that, or did I misunderstand?

A I think the question was asked based on Mr. Shapley's testimony, and I said I wasn't personally aware.

Q Oh, okay.

A I wasn't personally aware.

Q Got it. Okay. Let's talk a little bit more. We just went through the article that discussed, you know, some people's concerns about information originating from Mr. Giuliani.

A Yes.

[Brady Exhibit No. 19 Was marked for identification.]

Q I want to mark as exhibit 19, another article. This is an October 24th, 2020, article from Politico, entitled: Former Giuliani Associate Raises Questions About Hunter Biden's, quote, "Hard Drive from Hell," end quote. Have you seen this article before?
I'm not sure.

Okay.

I may have.

Just take a minute to look at it, if you wouldn't mind. And as you look at it, just kind of on the reporting that talks about the May 30th, 2019, meeting that Lev Parnas described involving Giuliani and others.

I don't want to stop you reading the whole article, especially if you want the context, but I am going to ask you about paragraph -- I guess it's the third full paragraph on page 3, just so you understand where I am going.

Okay. Oh, page 3?

Yeah, and it's the May 30th, 2019, there's reference to that, on the second page also, so I just wanted you to be aware of that.

Okay.

And then it kind of just goes into the middle of page 3.

Okay. I'm almost done.

No worries. Take your time.

Okay. Thank you. All right. Thanks. I am going to direct your attention, first, to briefly to the second page and the third paragraph. There's just one line. In this portion of the article, Mr. Lev Parnas is being quoted, and he is discussing a May 30th, 2019, meeting that he had involving Mr. Giuliani, Vitaly Pruss, who you mentioned earlier, and himself. Did you glean that from your reading of the article?

Yes.

And according to Mr. Parnas in this reporting, the first time that he and Giuliani and the associates learned of this derogatory information that was on the hard drive that people sometimes referred to as a laptop of Hunter Biden's was May 30th,
2019. So Mr. Parnas is identifying that date as the date that Giuliani and his associates learned of this derogatory information, correct?

A Yes.

Q According to the article?

A Yes.

Q Okay. During the course of your investigation, had you ever received any information that -- to that effect, that Mr. Giuliani was aware of this -- I keep calling it the laptop because that's what people call it, but actually are you aware that it's just some hard drives?

A Yes, but --

Q Okay.

A No, I was not aware.

Q Okay.

A I'm sorry, maybe I cut your question off.

Q No, no, no. So Mr. Giuliani first learned of the -- I am going to call it the hard drive, because that's what it was, the hard drives, multiple. He learned of the existence of those hard drives that were circulating around the world on May 30th, 2019, according to the article, correct?

A Yes, that's correct.

Q Okay. And what I am asking you is, have you ever heard that during the course of your investigation that Mr. Giuliani actually learned of the hard drive material on May 30th, 2019?

A No, not during our 2020 vetting process, no.

Q Mr. Giuliani never shared anything about the hard drives or the laptop or any of that in his material with you?
Mr. **Lelling.** Don't answer that.

**Q** Oh, you are not going to answer?

Mr. **Lelling.** I instruct him not to answer.

Mr. **Lelling.** He did answer earlier that the hard drive. That Mr. Giuliani did not provide a hard drive.

Mr. **Lelling.** Okay.

Mr. **Brady.** He did not provide it. We were unaware of it.

**Q** All right. So moving on. To the third page in the article, this is, I guess, the third full paragraph again. In here there's a description of this May 30th, 2019, meeting involving Mr. Parnas, Vitaly Pruss, and Giuliani, and according to Mr. Parnas' telling, there were some statements of Mr. Zlochevsky that were discussed, correct?

A Correct.

Q And these statements that are attributed to Mr. Zlochevsky here were again about the Bidens, correct?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And according to the article Press told Giuliani at the May 30th, 2019, meeting that Mr. Zlochevsky had stated that he had, quote, "derogatory information about Biden, and he was willing to share it with Giuliani if Giuliani would help Zlochevsky, 'curry favor with the Department of Justice and help him with an extradition request or other efforts by DOJ to investigate or prosecute Zlochevsky.'" Do you see that allegation in the report?

A I see the first part, I'm sorry. I don't see the extradition.

Q Okay. So what it says in the article is that Zlochevsky was interested in
currying favor with the Department of Justice, correct?

A  Yes.

Q  Are you aware that Mr. Zlochevsky was accused of money laundering among other financial crimes?

A  I'm sorry, by which jurisdiction?  I'm aware that there were allegations regarding potential money laundering and Mr. Zlochevsky that were investigated by the U.K. and by Ukrainian prosecutors.  Could I just have one second?

Q  Sure.

Mr. Lelling.  I don't think he can give you further detail.

BY

Q  Okay.  The allegation in this article is that Zlochevsky asked Giuliani to help curry favor with the Department of Justice in exchange for derogatory information on the Bidens, correct?

A  Correct.

Q  And regardless of what the favor was or what the curry favor was about, had you ever heard that allegation that there was a proposal from Zlochevsky to Giuliani that an exchange for some kind of favor with the Department of Justice, Mr. Zlochevsky would offer Giuliani dirt on the Bidens?

A  I don't believe I did at the time.

Q  Okay.

A  In 2020, I don't believe I was aware of that.

Q  Of the allegation?

A  Of that allegation, yes.

Q  You're aware of it now as you sit here today?

A  I am now.
Q: Because of this article or something else?
A: I believe because of this article.
Q: Okay.
A: There were a lot of statements made about that intersection among those people and Mr. Zlochevsky. So I don't remember that specific allegation, but I am now aware of it.
Q: Okay. And in the course of your investigation, though, you had not uncovered any reports of Zlochevsky making statements or asking Giuliani for favors. Is that fair to say?
A: Yes, I believe that's fair to say.
Q: Okay.
A: And just to be clear, there were other allegations relating to Mr. Zlochevsky and actions he may or may not have taken allegedly in Ukraine and with respect to certain prosecutions, but I don't remember that one specifically.
Q: Okay. Did you remember any allegations that you came across involving Zlochevsky and Giuliani, like, together, like their relationship?
A: I don't remember, as I sit here.
Q: Okay. When -- now Mr. Parnas --
A: Oh, I'm sorry, could I clarify one thing? I know that as we talked about earlier, Mr. Giuliani has had a number of podcasts, and has interviewed Shokin and a number of people in Ukraine, that may have included Mr. Zlochevsky, I can't remember. But as to your specific question, this allegation, I don't recall that.
Q: Okay. Mr. Parnas, we talked about him a little bit earlier. You indicated that you did not speak to Mr. Parnas during the course of your investigation?
A: That's correct.
But you were aware that he was an associate of Mr. Giuliani, correct?

A: Yes.

And you were aware that he had made statements regarding the matters that were kind of at the subject of your investigation, the Ukraine, Bidens, and other matters?

A: Yes.

Okay. Were you also aware that he had provided evidence and information to investigators during the impeachment?

A: I don't believe I was.

Okay. And you already indicated that you didn't know about that statement, that Mr. Giuliani had directed his associates to obtain for Mr. Zlochevsky, correct?

A: Correct.

Okay. And nothing else that Mr. Parnas had been involved in with respect to that?

A: That's correct. And as I said, you know, we cordoned that off as an SDNY matter. So, any information that we received from Mr. Giuliani, for example, relating to Mr. Parnas, we relayed to SDNY.

Okay. And I think that you had have made this clear, but I just want to be very, very clear here. You've talked about indicia of reliability, or credibility, as you put it, that were in the 1023. But you did not make an effort to, during the course of your investigation, to determine whether Mr. Zlochevsky himself was a credible witness, correct?

A: Yes, that's fair. Yes, that's correct.

You were focused on the CHS when you talk about credibility as a source.
You said that the FBI had deemed him credible, correct?

A Yes.

Q And you understood that he had indicia of credibility, correct?

A Correct, from the FBI, yes.

Q But you didn't make an effort to determine whether Zlochevsky was a reliable narrator, for example?

A That's correct, because of those conflicting statements that were in the public.

And along the same lines, you didn't make any effort to determine what Zlochevsky's motivation might have been for providing information either to the confidential human source or to Giuliani, correct?

Mr. Brady. That's correct.

Q I think this is going to be a brief line of questions. But in the previous hour, you were asked some questions about the Auten assessment. It might have been the first hour. Do you recall that?

A Yes.

Q And you said that you had no exposure to that or knowledge of whatever that is from a professional standpoint within the DOJ. Is that right?

A Yes, I was not aware of that in 2020.

Q Okay. And the term "Auten assessment," as far as you know, you heard that from public sources, news articles, or even this investigation. Is that fair?

A Public sources. I couldn't pick Brian Auten out of a lineup. I had no knowledge of who he was or what he was doing.

Q Okay. So you don't even know if there was a quote, "Auten assessment."
Is that fair to say?

A That's correct. I have no knowledge of that.

Q No more than any other person in the public would have, right?

A That's correct.

Q And you don't know who Brian Auten is?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. Can we just talk a little bit too. I have tried this once before. I just want to be more precise when I'm asking these questions. You talk about, or you talked about reluctance that you perceived on the part of the Delaware office to engage with you. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And you kind of parsed that out a little bit in the other hour. I want to ask you about reasons that one might be reluctant in that position. And this is, you know, I am going to try to be specific here. Do you understand, as a United States Attorney, the sensitivities and the legal requirements of protecting 6(e) material, correct?

A Yes.

Q And I know that you're an expert, so can you explain for the record. What is rule 6(e)?

A 6(e) governs grand jury secrecy, and that any information that appears before the grand jury that's derived as a part of the grand jury investigation -- and, in fact, the existence or nonexistence of a grand jury investigation, and also including targets, subjects, witnesses, is all covered by Rule 6(e) which is a rule that applies to all prosecutors that that shall not be made public in any way.

Q And --

A -- with the exception of identifying a witness, I'm sorry. Strike that.
With the exception of identifying a subject or a target of the investigation at the appropriate time in an investigation.

Q  Okay.  Rule 6(e) carries criminal penalties for violation in some instances, correct?
A  That's correct.
Q  So it's a very serious matter for prosecutors to follow the rules under rule 6(e), correct?
A  Absolutely, yes.
Q  And at the time that your office was interacting with Lesley Wolf and other members of the Delaware office, they had an open grand jury investigation, correct?
A  Correct.
Q  And so rule 6(e) applied to them with respect to any information that they were sharing, correct?
A  Yes, correct.
Q  Okay.  Do you think that it's a valid concern on the part of those AUSAs to be very careful about the information that they're sharing when they have an open grand jury investigation?
A  Yes, absolutely.
Q  Okay.  Could that be one of the reasons that they chose to communicate in writing versus in a less formal way?
A  Possibly.  Typically, U.S. attorney to U.S. attorney and AUSA to AUSA communication is a little more open, but I don't want to opine as to, you know, what Lesley Wolf or, you know, Mr. Weiss' motivations were.  But 6(e) is always a concern, and that is always one of the primary concerns in any investigation.
Q  I just want to get down to something.  With respect to this relationship, in
particular, that you had at this time between the district in Delaware and yourself, it was
sort of unusual, would you agree, to be in a position where you're in one U.S. attorney's
office district, and you're being asked to communicate with another district who has an
open grand jury investigation about their matter, right? That doesn't happen every day
when you don't have joint venue issues, or you're not prosecuting something that just
happens to be in your district that's related to their case, right?
A It was unique. I mean, as you identify sometimes, there are dual
investigations going on among U.S. attorney's offices. Sometimes the U.S. attorney's
office will, as a part of a separate investigation, identify and develop information and
evidence that they will share with a different office if they have an investigation into that
subject or target or matter.
Q Right.
A Again, that's kind of a one-way, one-way sharing. So, yes, this was a unique
arrangement in my experience.
Q And it was unique, in particular, because you didn't have an investigation.
You had this kind of unique assignment about vetting information that might relate to
other investigations, correct?
A Yes.
Q So you're being asked by a U.S. attorney who has an active grand jury
investigation and a full investigation that they're handling, you're being asked by them,
you know, to share information back and forth. Can you think of another time when
you were in that position where you didn't have a related investigation, but you had
information that might be relevant to their investigation, and you had to have a
relationship developed that would involve two-way sharing of information?
A That has happened.
[3:26 p.m.]

BY

Q Okay.

A Not looking the same as this relationship, but I have had that, certainly where we have to coordinate activities and make sure there's no conflict, there's no overlap.

Q But I mean, vetting information, where your role is simply to vet information and not, you know, conduct your own investigation. You're just vetting information, right, in this case?

A Correct. Yes.

Q And the Delaware office is actually conducting a grand jury investigation, right?

A Correct.

Q Okay. So have you ever had that situation before, where you're over here vetting and then you're asked to interact with somebody who is actually conducting a grand jury investigation?

A No.

Q Okay. So when Delaware is receiving information from you, there's no 6(e) concern, right?

A Receiving from us --

Q From you. When it's going from you to them, there's no 6(e) concern because you don't have a grand jury open, right?

A That's true. There's law enforcement information. There's high side or classified or top secret information which we have to transmit in a SCIF.

Q Sure.
But 6(e) is not a concern from our information unless it's information derived from a grand jury investigation.

Okay. But in this case, you didn't have a grand jury, right?

Correct. We did not, yes.

Okay. So you're not worried about 6(e) when you're sending information to other offices, right?

Not 6(e) specifically. That's fair. Yes.

But Delaware is potentially worried about 6(e) when they're sending information your way. Is that right?

6(e) is always a concern, but typically prosecutors because we have the same ethical obligations, if we receive 6(e) information, we have to treat it the same as if we generated it.

Right.

So typically, I have not seen that type of reluctance before. We always are careful in sharing information back and forth, and make sure that only people who absolutely need to know that will receive it.

Okay.

But that was also a little unique in my experience. Both things were unique.

I just want to drill down, when you say "reluctance," you're talking about reluctance on the part of the Delaware Office to share information about their case with you, right?

That's correct. Yes.

And one of the reasons could be that they have concerns over 6(e) material; fair to say?
Q  Among other reasons, right?
A  Yes.  Uh-huh.
Q  Okay.  You also said that you wanted to give information to them, and you
did, in fact, brief them on the 1023 and other matters, correct?
A  That's correct.
Q  And they received that information, right?
A  That's right.
Q  Okay.  They didn't tell you, no, keep it to yourself.  Eventually, they
received the information that you wanted them to have, correct?
A  Yes.  Just going back to the public testimony relating to DAG Donoghue
ordering the Delaware Office to meet with us and receive that briefing, but I can't agree
with the premise, but eventually, we did the briefing, yes.
Q  Okay.  So you're saying that there was some reluctance, but eventually
they received the information that you wanted them to have?
A  That's correct.
Q  Okay.  And that they did with it, you don't know because you weren't in a
position to be part of the investigation any longer?
A  That's correct.  Our tasking was complete.
Q  Okay.  And throughout this whole time when you're interacting with the
Delaware office and they're acting however they act, the person who is in charge of the
DOJ is who?
A  Oh, General Barr.
Q  Okay.
A  Attorney General Barr.
Q And who is in charge of that investigation of Hunter Biden, Mr. Weiss, correct?

A Mr. Weiss, correct.

Q And Mr. Weiss was an appointee of President Trump, correct?

A That's correct.

Q Do you have any reason to believe that Mr. Weiss was uninterested in fairly and honestly prosecuting the case that he had in front of him?

A No.

Q Okay. You also mentioned that there was some friction or -- I don't know, "friction" is the word I'm going use. But you can choose the word you want -- between yourself, or your team, and some of the FBI officials when you were asking them to perform specific tasks.

Is that fair to say?

A Yeah. So it wasn't friction as much as they weren't able to perform them perhaps in the timing that we wanted because of the approval process the FBI had set up.

Q Okay. We talked about that quite a bit before. Would you attribute most of that delay to the formal layers of approval that they now needed to deal with sensitive matters like this?

A Yes. Yes. The layers of approval were unique, in my experience, but that was a part of the reason for the delay, yes.

Q Okay. Did you have any reason to believe that the FBI agents and officials you were working with were unprofessional, biased, or, in any way, unwilling to do their jobs?

A The FBI agents that I had direct contact with, including SAC down in the Pittsburgh field office, deputy director, and Director Wray, no, not at all. Very
professional, outstanding agents.

Q  Okay. And ultimately, they did perform the tasks that you asked them to perform, correct?

A  That's correct.

Q  Was there ever anything that you wanted to do in your investigation or assessment that DOJ officials refused to let you do or FBI officials?

A  No.

Q  Okay. So you're satisfied that you did your job thoroughly when you were asked to make this assessment?

A  I am.

Q  Mr. Weiss has told Congress that as of July 11 or July 10, 2023, as of mid-July 2023, he had not requested special counsel status. Obviously, he later did in August.

But do you have any information that would contradict that statement that prior to July of this year, Mr. Weiss had never requested special counsel status?

A  I have no information or knowledge about that topic at all.

Q  Okay. Do you have any information or knowledge about the Central District of California preventing Mr. Weiss from bringing any type of case?

A  I do not.

Q  Do you have any information or knowledge about the District of Columbia preventing Mr. Weiss from bringing any type of case?

A  Personal knowledge, no. I do not.

Q  In fact, Mr. Weiss has said that nobody has ever stopped him or blocked him from bringing charges in any judicial district in the country.
Do you have any information to contradict what Mr. Weiss has said?

A  I do not.

Q  Okay.  Couple of quick wrap-up questions.

The name, Vitaly Pruss, has come up a couple of times.

Can you tell us if you were able to interview Mr. Pruss?

Mr. Lelling.  No, he can't say that.

Q  He was in the United States at that time, correct?

Do you know?

A  I don't remember if he was or not.

Q  Okay.  All right.  I think we're almost done.

You were U.S. attorney in Pittsburgh through, I think, you said the end of February 2021, correct?

A  Correct.

Q  So you were there during the 2020 election, correct?

A  Yes.

Q  Are you aware of allegations that there was widespread voter fraud in 2020?

Mr. Lelling.  You're a little outside the scope.

All right.  So he's declining.  It's fine.  I'm just making a record.

You're declining to answer?

Mr. Lelling.  He's declining to answer.

Q  Are you aware of allegations that President Biden was not fairly elected in 2020?

Mr. Lelling.  Same.  He's not going to answer questions on that subject.
Okay.

BY

Q  And do you believe that President Biden was fairly elected in 2020?

Mr. Lelling.  He's not going to answer that question.

No more questions.

All right.  So we can go off the record.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 3:33 p.m., the interview was concluded.]
Certificate of Deponent/Interviewee

I have read the foregoing _____ pages, which contain the correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded.

_______________________________
Witness Name

_______________________________
Date