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TAB 2



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 11/09/2017

On Monday, 18 September 2017 and Tuesday, 19 September 2017, CHRISTOPHER STEELE, ORBIS Business Intelligence, was interviewed at The Grosvenor Hotel, London, England, by FBI SSA and FBI SIA Brian J.

Auten. The following information was provided by STEELE over the course of the two-day interview. On 18 September 2017, in the initial part of the interview, STEELE was accompanied by his fellow ORBIS executive, CHRISTOPHER BURROWS. After about 45-60 minutes on 18 September 2017, BURROWS departed, and STEELE remained with SSA and SIA Auten for the duration of 18 September 2017 and for the entirety of the interview on 19 September 2017.

On 18 September 2017, BURROWS opened the interview by expressing concern over loose business ends with the FBI. BURROWS explained that he and STEELE were still pretty upset about how the relationship with the FBI concluded because of the time and effort that had been taken to get information to the FBI. BURROWS explained that we had a contract with adding that maybe the contract had been put together with STEELE serving as the "face" of ORBIS, but that there had been a contractual relationship.

STEELE and BURROWS apologized for going to the press back in the fall of 2016, but STEELE explained that as the election season went on, they as the company were "riding two horses" - their client and the FBI -- and after FBI Director James COMEY's reopening of the Hillary Clinton investigation, they had to pick "one horse" and chose the business/client relationship over the relationship with the FBI. They followed what their client wanted, and they spoke to the press. STEELE and BURROWS described the overall situation as being one where it was "your [FBI] fault" and "our fault." STEELE commented that it was not about the money owed, but BURROWS remarked that STEELE might not be that concerned about the money, but BURROWS was.



Investigation on 09/18/2017 at London, United Kingdom (In Person)

File# 372B-SM-2063661

Date drafted 11/09/2017

by AUTEN BRIAN JAMES

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STEELE and BURROWS were confused over whether SSA and SIA Auten represented the FBI or the Office of the Special Counsel. BURROWS made the point, in his former career, he "knew [Robert] Mueller." They wanted to make sure that they were talking to the Office of the Special Counsel.

On 09/18/2017

STEELE and BURROWS indicated frustration by the inclusion of their company's reporting in the United States (US) Intelligence Community's Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) of Russia interference in the 2016 election, particularly the ICA "annex" as reported in the media. STEELE and BURROWS felt that they should have had advance warning that the company's reporting was going to be used in the annex. The inclusion of the company's information and the subsequent public leak of the annex put STEELE's name out there and had a "massive impact on our lives." STEELE and BURROWS wanted to know how the US and GOD governments had worked all of this out, and also wanted to know if the GOD was told that the information was going in the ICA.

STEELE and BURROWS described President TRUMP as their "main opponent" and indicated that they were fearful about how TRUMP's presidency negatively impacted the historical UK-US alliance and the US-UK special relationship.

STEELE said that GLENN SIMPSON of Fusion GPS was knowledgeable that STEELE was sharing reports and information with the FBI.

STEELE explained that, in the run-up to the 2016 US presidential election, they provided material to BRUCE OHR and were pushing OHR to do something about the reports.

STEELE said that he had been unsure to whom, FGI he could provide the election-related reports. He decided against going to his primary who he did not identify by name to interviewers, but described as having just converted to become the FGI

STEELE said that his primary subsource for the election reports - who he would not identify by name for the entirety of the interview - had also provided information used in earlier, non-election related reporting provided to the FBI.

STEELE's primary subsource met with Sergey MILLIAN. The primary subsource had shared a photo with STEELE depicting MILLIAN with TRUMP. STEELE tried to have his primary subsource record a meeting between the primary subsource and Millian, but it was not successful. MILLIAN was allegedly at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in 2013. MILLIAN has lost contact with STEELE's primary subsource. STEELE said that MILLIAN is the

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individual who originally provided the primary subsource with the Ritz Carlton-related information about TRUMP. STEELE's primary subsource followed up MILLIAN's information with three people. ORBIS has the names of the three people with whom the primary subsource followed up.

STEELE said that his primary subsource had drinks with CHARLES DOLAN.

STEELE said that he had never heard of CARTER PAGE or MICHAEL COHEN or GEORGE PAPADOUPOLOS before this whole thing. He had heard of PAUL MANAFORT which STEELE said got the whole thing started. He had heard of REX TILLERSON before this, and told interviewers that he would describe this in greater detail later in the interview.

When asked by interviewers about his vetting and validation of his primary subsource, STEELE said that he knew the primary subsource's background and the current positions of his primary subsource's sub-subsources. STEELE said that his primary subsource's reporting was consistent over multiple projects, which STEELE used as a vetting and validation point of reference. STEELE also confirmed his primary subsource's reporting through other sources.

STEELE said that ORBIS has four discrete, "hermetically-sealed" main agent networks. The biggest of these was the network involved with his primary subsource, which isn't as active now. For one of the older networks, the main agent had died. Another main agent network is up and running and is now starting to get good information. It is based on a new main agent - not the primary subsource for the election reports - and it is being redirected to collect on Russia. STEELE also said that he has a source looking at the Sunny Isles real estate purchase by RYBOLOVLEV. This particular source is someone in public relations/government relations (PR /GR) circles.

STEELE said that his primary subsource feels like it is about time to engage with the Office of the Special Counsel. STEELE spoke with his primary subsource last night, and the primary subsource is coming along with the idea of talking with Special Counsel, but was not there yet. STEELE is still very concerned to protect his primary subsource. The primary subsource has a very special story, especially how he came to work for ORBIS. The primary subsource was introduced to STEELE and ORBIS by FIONA HILL in or around 2011. The primary subsource was with HILL when HILL was at the Brookings Institution. Emphasizing the sensitivity, STEELE explained that HILL now worked for the White House on the National Security Council. HILL has a very high opinion of the primary subsource, and she told STEELE that he and ORBIS should take a look at him. HILL is one of STEELE's close friends - STEELE later described in the interview

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that his wife went to university with HILL, and that HILL's daughter is named after a now-deceased mutual college friend of HILL and his wife.

STEELE said that his primary subsource is a US resident and is a native Russian, adding that there was no way he could have the kind of access he has without being Russian. STEELE added that someone who was Ukrainian could possibly have the type of access his source has. STEELE's primary subsource has a daughter who was born in the United States.

STEELE trained up his primary subsource, and STEELE described him as a prolific asset. The primary subsource's motivations include the fact that he considers the United States to be his home, the fact that his daughter is US-born, and finances. The primary subsource uses his prior university contacts, and his reporting has become better over time. STEELE was asked by interviewers if his primary subsource had anything happen to him while collecting for ORBIS. STEELE indicated that his primary subsource had reported being hauled in front of immigration authorities in Russia. The primary subsource was shaken down for money - he was forced to go to an ATM and withdraw money and paid the bribe. STEELE took this as a good sign for validation purposes, remarking that things haven't gone smoothly for his primary subsource all the time.

STEELE said that his primary subsource took three trips to Russia in 2016 for collecting information for the election-related ORBIS reports. STEELE said that he was working on memory for some of this, as ORBIS destroyed materials for legal reasons. STEELE said that his primary subsource took trips in June, October and one in between. STEELE would debrief his primary subsource after these trips. STEELE also said that STEELE took three trips himself to the United States in 2016 and talked with his primary subsource. STEELE dated his US trips as occurring in July, early-to-mid September, and October - after STEELE had met with FBI representatives in Rome.

STEELE said that his primary subsource uses

communicate like

There was a push to get an audio capture of primary subsource's conversations with one of his own sub-subsources, and they were successful in obtaining audio of a conversation between the primary subsource and his sub-subsource regarding MICHAEL COHEN's meeting in Prague. STEELE told interviewers that he did not have that audio capture in its original form. STEELE explained that he had to be careful regarding legal issues, but they had audio capture and a transcription of the audio capture. There may be an opportunity to obtain more on this because this particular sub-subsource

and in an accessible place. STEELE's primary subsource is having dialogue with that particular subsource, and that individual may be thinking of "coming in."

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STEELE described this particular sub-subsource in greater detail.

part of a pool of journalists and staffers, traveling with

Russian leadership in shared planes and hanging out in offices - akin to

participation in a White House press pool.

individual who reported in election-related reports on IVANOV and COHEN's visit to Prague. On the Prague-related reporting, STEELE said that knew someone in Prague who worked for ROSSOTRUDNICHESTVO. also knows people in the cyber business. Allegedly, ROSSOTRUDNICHESTVO was the crucible for the COHEN meeting in Prague

STEELE said that another, different sub-subsource had provided information on cyber. This particular sub-subsource talked about how the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) was able to turn an individual who had been caught money laundering and get him/her to work cyber operations for the FSB. STEELE commented about how this is a typical operating procedure for the FSB.

In reference to a question posed by interviewers about the primary subsource's reporting on St. Petersburg, STEELE said that his primary subsource had traveled to St. Petersburg. The primary subsource has an apartment in St. Petersburg that he is trying to sell. The primary subsource is neither from Moscow nor St. Petersburg, but the property gives him reason to travel to St. Petersburg. STEELE could not recall exactly which of his primary subsource's 2016 trips to Russia involved a trip to St. Petersburg, but it may have been on the third one.

STEELE said that the primary subsource's third trip involved him being asked, as an expert, to attend events at the Kremlin. The primary subsource gave a talk or a seminar at the event; he was a contributor, which gave him cover for being there. The third trip occurred at the time that STEELE was meeting with FBI representatives in Rome. This was why STEELE couldn't contact the primary subsource during that time — the primary subsource had said not to contact him because he'd be at the Kremlin. This is the event, STEELE added, during which time the primary subsource collected information about EDWARD SNOWDEN and also a senior FSB officer.

STEELE explained that, when collecting information for ORBIS, his primary subsource plays up his overt, academic interests. It is an "in-between" clandestine and overt cover. The primary subsource does favors for people.

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In fact, STEELE explained that STEELE had helped to recommend the best English language school for one of his primary subsource's sub-subsources.

With respect to the election-related reports, STEELE said that it did not take much effort early-on for his primary subsource to collect information because the whole thing was an "open secret" in Moscow. People would start talking in bars, and the primary subsource could easily elicit information. Later, as 2016 progressed, sources of information started shutting down and it became harder to obtain information.

STEELE said that the primary subsource has sub-subsources with serious access to named people in DMITRIY PESKOV's and SERGEY IVANOV's tight circles.

According to STEELE, the primary subsource has traveled to Volgograd as part of research for ORBIS on a litigation/legal matter. The primary subsource has contacts in different cities — for example, the primary subsource is close to, or has sub-subsources close to, YURIY TRUTNEV, Minister of Resources. STEELE commented that his primary subsource has collected information for many of ORBIS' litigation clients in the energy and mining sectors. The primary subsource has been going back and forth to different cities for years for ORBIS' litigation clients. For the election-related reports, the primary subsource had about three trips to Russia in about 4 months.

STEELE explained that ORBIS' initial interest in the US election-related material stemmed from a litigation-related issue. It involved potential litigation with PAUL MANAFORT, and ORBIS' interest started around May 2016. MANAFORT had disappeared for multiple years and appeared to be hiding from creditors. MANAFORT owed money -- \$100 million to oligarchs and more money to Russians (NFI). STEELE explained that FUSION GPS had a different client for whom it was already doing research on MANAFORT. Around June 2016, STEELE met with FUSION GPS and they decided to start swapping notes. Soon thereafter, the decision was made to have FUSION GPS hire ORBIS on the election-related stuff - FUSION GPS would "take [ORBIS] on for the bigger issue." In June 2016, ORBIS took its own crack at the election-related stuff. STEELE said that it wasn't the only politicallysensitive investigation ORBIS was working at the time. For example, ORBIS was handling an English Football Association (FA) matter regarding a competitor for the bid process. STEELE also said - and emphasized the extreme sensitivity of this example -- ORBIS was also involved in doing work regarding the election campaign for the UN Secretary General post - a client wanted them to work up material on possible voting intentions.

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In June 2016, ORBIS got election-related reporting from the primary subsource, as well as from a different subsource. In early July, STEELE indicated that they got a debriefing about RYBOLOVLEV and the sale of property in Florida. STEELE remembered that the material on RYBOLOVLEV was received before STEELE took a holiday trip to Cyprus.

STEELE said that his primary subsource did a bit of work in the United States on election-related collecting. In the United States, the primary subsource talked to SERGEY MILLIAN and one or two others. Regarding MILLIAN, STEELE said that the primary subsource was introduced to MILLIAN through "some émigré" in Washington, DC. MILLIAN and the primary subsource met in New York and perhaps in Charleston, South Carolina. The primary subsource had two or three meetings with MILLIAN. The primary subsource and MILLIAN discussed a possible business project. The business project wasn't notional - it dealt with some sort of warehouse in Moscow. STEELE recalled seeing some documentation about this business project. STEELE described it as a pretty standard Russian type of thing dealing with land registration or land documentation. STEELE emphasized that it was a pretty typical Russian business endeavor.

STEELE described his primary subsource's sub-subsource networks. While doing this, STEELE drew a diagram for interviewers. See attached.

On reporting regarding CARTER PAGE, STEELE said that it stemmed from Page's speech in Moscow in July 2016. The reporting about PAGE's meetings with IGOR SECHIN and IGOR DIVEYKIN all came from the same sub-subsource -

On reporting about OLEG GOVORUN, STEELE identified this stream of reporting as stemming from a different sub-subsource ---

On reporting involving DMITRIY PESKOV's office, this reporting stems from a "friend of a friend" of the primary subsource. Later, STEELE gave the identity of this individual as

On reporting about Prague and ROSSOTRUDNICHESTVO, STEELE said that

STEELE talked in more detail about his decision to talk to the press. STEELE said that after COMEY's letter reopening the HILLARY CLINTON investigation, FUSION GPS felt like the gloves had come off. STEELE said that he had previous discussions earlier with BRUCE OHR about getting the

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election-related material out, but OHR had explained to STEELE about US Department of Justice policy about needing to be hands-off prior to elections. FUSION GPS put pressure on ORBIS to talk to Mother Jones. STEELE initially said that his interview with Mother Jones was supposed to have been off-the-record, but then he added that the interview was a combination of off-the-record and on-the-record. STEELE said that, in the end, he should not have given the interview. STEELE said that, subsequently, with the rift that the interview had caused with the FBI, they had no way of getting this information into the hands of people who they believed needed it. That is when they decided to go the route of Senator JOHN MCCAIN and DAVID KRAMER. In the end, however, STEELE believes that the decision to go the MCCAIN and KRAMER route is how Buzzfeed got the material and is why, now, STEELE has the legal problems he has.

BRUCE OHR is aware that STEELE is currently in touch with the FBI. OHR knows about this meeting. STEELE said that he has reached out to OHR and GLENN SIMPSON about the primary subsource.

STEELE believes that his primary subsource is coming around to the idea of meeting with the Office of the Special Counsel. STEELE only wants that to happen if the primary subsource agrees to it. It needs to be carefully handled. For instance, STEELE said that the primary subsource's parents are still in Russia.

STEELE said that the primary subsource has been doing a bit of work for ORBIS recently. He has been reaching out to some of the same subsubsources. ORBIS has had an interest in the "prophylactic efforts" by the Russian government following the publicity of the dossier.

When asked what type of tradecraft STEELE's primary subsource has used when collecting information for ORBIS, STEELE said that his primary subsource uses

The primary subsource

takes very few written notes. The primary subsource is very thorough when it comes to preparing himself to be debriefed; he takes time before being debriefed to get his thoughts and recollections together. STEELE said that the primary subsource uses

The primary subsource has used this approach in the past - STEELE mentioned trips that the primary subsource has taken to Samara and Volgograd on behalf of ORBIS' due diligence and legal work, including for clients in the potassium industry. The primary subsource has a very good memory.

STEELE said that only four or five people in ORBIS' office have dealt with the primary subsource. The primary subsource was debriefed the first time

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in the office, but not after that. STEELE said that ORBIS is now very concerned about bugging, so they wouldn't debrief sources in their office.

STEELE has had substantive debriefings with the primary subsource. STEELE explained that the primary subsource was not just working on election-related collection during the primary subsource's 2016 trips to Russia. He was working on multiple projects at the same time. That said, STEELE indicated that the primary subsource definitely collected on election-related materials during his three trips to Russia in 2016.

STEELE said that the primary subsource is currently working through obtaining US work permits and residence permits. The primary subsource hasn't been back to Russia since his 2016 trips.

STEELE said that he is close enough to the primary subsource that the primary subsource would have told him that he'd been interviewed (NFI).

STEELE said FIONA HILL knows that the primary subsource was involved in the dossier. When the primary subsource went to ground in January and February 2017, STEELE contacted HILL and told HILL that he was worried about the primary subsource. STEELE said that she probably guesses that the primary subsource was involved. STEELE remembered seeing HILL in the UK in early 2016, while STEELE's wife was abroad. HILL was still at Brookings. STEELE does not recall the last time he saw HILL.

STEELE said that the primary subsource has a journalist contact in Washington, DC who is the primary subsource's entry into the émigré community.

When asked about STEELE's own validation and/or assessment of hostile control for the primary subsource, STEELE mentioned a number of things which he took to be positive signs. First, there was the incident involving the primary subsource being shaken down for money. Second, the primary subsource exhibits behavior indicative of someone who is scared - the primary subsource would not be talking about coming to the talk to the Special Counsel if there was a problem. STEELE does not believe that the primary subsource exhibits signs or behavior of someone who is under control. STEELE cannot guarantee that the primary subsource's subsubsources aren't under control. STEELE said that it hasn't been easy for the primary subsource to get information - he has had to dig for it.

Moreover, STEELE said that he is not sure why the primary subsource would still be hanging around or be in country if he was under foreign control.

STEELE gave details of a REX TILLERSON-related report from the primary subsource - a report that STEELE is unsure the FBI possesses because

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STEELE didn't provide it to the FBI. STEELE said that in order to explain the report, he has to first talk about earlier ORBIS reporting from approximately 3 years ago, circa 2014. At that time, ORBIS was working on a hydrocarbon project for a client. It became clear from reporting during that project that Exxon-Mobil was well-placed in Russia and that TILLERSON had an atypical type of relationship with SECHIN. It was odd, STEELE said, to the point that STEELE thought that something was going on, particularly with SECHIN. There was more between TILLERSON and SECHIN than just shared hobbies like Harley-Davidsons. STEELE said that the reporting on this subject died down, the client moved on, and the sanctions regime kicked in. Then, circa December 2016, following the election, President-Elect TRUMP was initially flirting with MITT ROMNEY as a possible candidate for US Secretary of State. There was a long hiatus during which time there was general speculation about whether the position would go to ROMNEY or not. STEELE's primary subsource picked up information from sources in Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) that Washington, DC had received messages from Russia indicating that ROMNEY was an unacceptable candidate and that Russia wanted someone who was more acceptable and who might lift sanctions. TILLERSON's name, according to STEELE, isn't in the report from the primary subsource, but what happened in the end was, to STEELE, surprising given the reporting. STEELE said that this report may have been shared with DAVID KRAMER - STEELE sent it to GLENN SIMPSON with the idea of having it shared.

STEELE explained how he shared the election-related reports with . He knew FG from his previous career. STEELE was trying lqure out the best way of sharing this information with his own government, but wasn't completely comfortable . In or around 15 November 2016, he met 's house; at the first meeting, up with He had two meetings at they went through all of the reporting, and then they had a follow-up meeting. in turn talked to STEELE , which STEELE described as knows that not being easy for him. STEELE also said that there have been problems (NFI) between him and his former employer.

STEELE is hesitant about sharing his information with FGI as well as with CIA and NSA. He is concerned about the existence of hostile penetrations and his primary subsource's security. STEELE says that his information needs to be handled in a need-to-know way.

STEELE said that much information regarding the primary subsource's network as he has given to the FBI.

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STEELE was asked about his primary subsource's physical security. STEELE said that the primary subsource recently moved because of security concerns. Someone in the primary subsource's apartment complex, or someone at the gym, said something to him that was odd enough to make him decide to move. The primary subsource has a girlfriend - he has now moved into her house, which STEELE said won't leave a trace for him. STEELE said that while the primary subsource's girlfriend doesn't know all of the ins-andouts of how things have worked between ORBIS and the primary subsource, she does know about the primary subsource's involvement with the dossier and his involvement with ORBIS. STEELE has met the primary subsource's girlfriend a couple of times. She has not traveled to Russia with the primary subsource. STEELE does not believe that the girlfriend goes back to Russia. STEELE said that the girlfriend came to the UK with the primary subsource once, and they stayed at The Grosvenor Hotel.

When asked about STEELE's knowledge of the primary subsource's contact with Russian establishments, STEELE said that the primary subsource had someone over at the Russian Embassy in Washington, DC ask the primary subsource about where they could buy furniture, or something like that (NFI). STEELE said that it was strange, but nothing alarming. The primary subsource bumped into MIKHAIL KALGUIN on the street in Moscow. That was how the primary subsource knew that KALUGIN had been withdrawn from the United States. When the primary subsource asked about KALUGIN's leaving the United States, KALUGIN replied with something like, "It was better that I had left at that point." KALUGIN did not explicitly say that he was withdrawn because of the election controversy.

When asked about STEELE's knowledge of any journalists who have approached the primary subsource, STEELE said that in the January-February 2017 timeframe, a journalist who, he believed, was from AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, reached out to the primary subsource. The journalist told the primary subsource that he had heard on the London circuit that the primary subsource might have some information about the dossier. STEELE said that the primary subsource gave a bland answer, but the entire situation caused the primary subsource some consternation. The primary subsource took it as a warning that he was found out. This is why, explained STEELE, the primary subsource went to ground in the January-February 2017 timeframe and is why STEELE reached out to FIONA HILL to check on the primary subsource's whereabouts and safety.

When asked about STEELE's knowledge of whether any of the primary subsource's sub-subsources knew that their information was used in the dossier, STEELE said that some of the primary subsource's sub-subsources

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have talked to him in a cryptic manner about the reports. In one case, specifically the individual who provided the information to the primary subsource about GUBAREV, a Russian FSB team reportedly showed up asking questions after the dossier came out. STEELE believes that the primary subsource's sub-subsources have an idea that their information was used in the dossier.

STEELE said that the primary subsource's mother and father

STEELE understands that the primary subsource spoke to his parents over the last weekend. They did not indicate that they've had any problems or have experienced any harassment.

STEELE talked about the EROVINKIN situation. EROVINKIN was the former top aide to SECHIN in ROSNEFT who was found dead in December 2016. STEELE said that some people and the press have mistakenly tied EROVINKIN to the dossier - namely as a possible subsource on the SECHIN material. STEELE does not believe that EROVINKIN was one of the primary subsource's subsubsources; nevertheless, STEELE takes this whole situation very seriously and gives him pause. It reminds him of another, recent situation involving TRUBNIKOV, whose reporting is in the dossier. STEELE described TRUBNIKOV as "out there" engaged with Westerners. STEELE believes that there is a general feeling that TRUBNIKOV has been cultivated by Western intelligence. On this note, about three or four months ago, there was a shooting in the restroom of the Moscow restaurant named KOSMOS. The shooting was in broad daylight and an individual named KOSTYA MYASKI or MYANSKIY (sp) was the victim. STEELE believes that this was a warning shot to TRUBNIKOV. The incident occurred in the May 2017 timeframe.

STEELE was asked about ORBIS' business security procedures since the public release of the dossier. STEELE said that they had a situation arise where someone tried to spoof or impersonate the outside contractor who does ORBIS's IT security. There was an attempt to change the password for their internal system, which was detected. The IT security contractor was contacted to determine if the attempt was legitimate. If this had been successful, it could have exposed clients, but not sensitive reporting as that is kept offline.

STEELE was asked if ORBIS has had any situations, post-dossier, where ORBIS thought that it was being offered dangles or was the object of operational games. STEELE said that this question reminded him about the CODY SHEARER situation and the offer of tapes, which STEELE said he would talk about later. STEELE commented that the existence of tapes have been played out of proportion, adding that just the fact that the Russian government has leverage on President TRUMP is a problem. It would be difficult to know if a tape has been doctored. STEELE said that there is a

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concern, following the public release of the dossier, that any situation involving the provision of tapes can be a dangle or a controlled operation. STEELE has heard, and it is his understanding, that the situation involving CODY SHEARER and the tapes parallels something that the US Government has been involved with, but he plans on talking about that in more detail (see below). STEELE added that there are some "dark web" aspects to this, and STEELE asked about who was handling or analyzing "dark web" issues for the FBI.

STEELE did not provide funds to his primary subsource for payment to subsubsources. STEELE said that he provided a monthly retainer to his primary subsources, and said that a primary subsource might, in turn, pay for food or drinks while collecting information from his or her subsubsources, but the sub-subsources are not paid for information. STEELE also advised that he sometimes paid for his primary subsources' trip expenses, save for the primary subsource's third 2016 trip to Moscow (which, STEELE remarked, was paid by an organization funded by the Russian Government -- in effect, STEELE summarized, Russia itself paid for his subsource's third trip to Moscow). The fact that sub-subsources are not paid for their information was, to STEELE, an important point when it came to the issue of reporting quality -- STEELE advised that the lack of payment meant there was no incentive for sources to exaggerate their information. In one situation, STEELE advised that his company and/or FUSION GPS were involved in obtaining for one of his primary subsource's sub-subsources, who was STEELE recalled that ORBIS may have provided money , which were then procured by FUSION GPS. were wiped for prints before being provided to the source (NFI).

STEELE provided some overall comments regarding the election-related dossier reports. The time between ORBIS's receipt of information to report publication was generally quick — the time could vary, but often a report was generated two days to one week after the debriefing of the primary subsource. In some cases, where the difference between the date of information and the date of published report was within a day, the information for the report had most likely been received via electronic means

The time between ORBIS's receipt of information to report was generated two days to one week after the debriefing of the primary subsource.

In the election-related dossier reports, STEELE said that the commentary labeled "Company Comments" was generated by FUSION GPS. The first report from ORBIS to FUSION GPS was sent via direct courier; however, reports were typically encrypted and sent via email.

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SSA SIA Auten and STEELE went over each of the election-related dossler reports, with STEELE providing additional information on each report, as appropriate. STEELE explained that he intentionally left sequential gaps in the numbering of his election-related reports to obscure the actual number of reports being produced on the subject as well as to obscure the timing of the reports:

Company Intelligence Report 2016/80 (dated 20 June 2016)

Under "Detail," STEELE identified the "trusted compatriot" as his unnamed primary subsource. In the same report, Source A was the while Source B was steeld that his primary subsource had a who introduced the primary subsource to and the primary subsource had met personally, and according to STEELE, the two had been speaking for a while (NFI). In the report, Source C was a who was in direct contact with the primary subsource. This subsource for a long time on other matters.

In the report, STEELE identified Source D as SERGEI [SERGEY] MILLIAN, who, according to STEELE, was in direct contact with the primary subsource. Sources E and F, according to STEELE,

STEELE said that his primary subsource personally visited the note: and spoke directly with these individuals.

a "friend of a friend" of his primary subsource. During the primary subsource's trips to Russia, and the primary subsource would meet for drinks. Later in 2016, is the one who advised the primary subsource that because things were heating up, there had been a directive given advising that they (NFI) should not speak to anyone regarding Russia's interest in, or involvement with, the 2016 US Presidential Election.

STEELE indicated that the primary subsource collected the information for this report (2016/80) during a trip to Russia

Company Intelligence Report 2016/94 (dated 19 July 2016)

STEELE indicated that the information in this report was collected by the primary subsource from

In paragraph 3 of the report, according to STEELE, the "compatriot" is a STEELE's primary subsource's sub-

372B-SM-2063661 Interview of Christopher Page 15 of 26 09/18/2017 Continuation of FD-302 of subsource is The information in this report was not collected during an in-country visit by STEELE's primary subsource. travels often, and STEELE said that his primary subsource talked to was traveling. They likely communicated via phone while or via Skype. Company Intelligence Report 2016/100 (dated 5 August 2016) STEELE referred to this reporting as being derived his primary TELLE was not sure about the sub-subsource's identity, adding that he [STEELE] had destroyed all of his notes. STEELE offered to try and find out the identity of the unidentified sub-subsource. Company Intelligence Report 2016/95 (handwritten date 29 August 2016) STEELE said that Source E in paragraphs 1 through 5 in this report was SERGEI [SERGEY] MILLIAN, who was speaking to the primary subsource. It was MILLIAN who told the primary subsource the information in this report about MANAFORT, WIKILEAKS, and Russia's use of diplomatic staff and the emigre pension program as "cover." In paragraph 6 of the report, the "separate source with direct knowledge" was an unidentified individual who was involved in

Company Intelligence Report 2016/97 (dated 30 July 2016)

thought that he was

STEELE could not remember the exact identity of the individual, but

STEELE again noted that the primary subsource has an apartment in St. Petersburg, which made his travel to the city easy.

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STEELE said that the "trusted associate" in the first paragraph was his primary subsource, and the "Russian emigre figure close to the Republican US presidential candidate," was SERGEI [SERGEY] MILLIAN. STEELE said that MILLIAN provided the entirety of this report. MILLIAN provided this information directly to STEELE's primary subsource, including the information in the report about how the "intelligence exchange" between the TRUMP team and the Kremlin went back at least 8 years.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/101 (handwritten date 29 August 2016)

STEELE advised that paragraphs 1-3 of this report involve the primary subsource's obtaining of information

STEELE described this report as dealing with "fallout information" -- that is, information about how the Russian government was dealing internally with the publicity surrounding Russian involvement in the US election.

STEELE indicated that the "Kremlin official involved in US relations" noted in paragraph 4 of the report was possibly MIKHAIL KALUGIN.

STEELE said that his primary subsource bumped into KALUGIN in Moscow in August 2016.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/102 (dated 10 August 2016; handwritten date 29 August 2016)

STEELE believed that the information in paragraphs 1 and 2 in this report -- though he was not 100% sure -- was derived from SERGEI [SERGEY] MILLIAN. Based on the date of the report and on the information in the report, STEELE believes that the report was generated through personal contact between MILLIAN and his primary subsource. It also appears to STEELE that the report was generated in the United States. Because there is only one day between the date of information (9 August 2016) and the date of the report (10 August 2016), STEELE said that it doesn't appear that the report was generated following one of his primary subsource's trips to Russia. Instead, it appears that his primary subsource made contact while he [the primary subsource] was in the United States, and could therefore report the information to STEELE right away.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/105 (dated 22 August 2016)

STEELE advised that this report was based on a unique reporting stream. His primary subsource has a relationship with sub-subsource,

372B-SM-2063661 Interview of Christopher On 09/18/2017 Page 17 of 26 Continuation of FD-302 of who is STEELE ald not know where his primary subsource met the but believed that their original and ongoing interaction was about a different project involving a dispute and litigation matters. STEELE does not know it his primary subsource TEELE also noted that YANUKOVICH had gone to Volgograd. According to STEELE, the "American political figure associated with Donald TRUMP and his campaign" noted in paragraph 3 of this report could be CHARLES DOLAN, speaking directly to STEELE's primary subsource. Company Intelligence Report 2016/111 (dated 14 September 2016) STEELE described this report as another "fallout" piece -- that is, a report about the Russian government was dealing internally with the public accusations and news stories regarding Russian interference in the 2016 election. The information in this report was derived from his primary subsource's direct contact with multiple sub-subsources. These sub-subsources included and, in paragraph 5, a STEELE explained that his primary subsource had STEELE's primary subsource had direct contact with all of these subsubsources -- his contact with them was not brokered. The "former top level Russian intelligence officer and Kremlin insider" referenced in the "Company Comment" for this report was Company Intelligence Report 2016/112 (dated 14 September 2016) This report is derived from the STEELE indicated that he had no doubt that was the source of the reporting for this entire report. Even though this talks to STEELE's primary subsource travels, and STEELE advised that the information for this particular report was obtained during one of his primary subsource's trips to Russia.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/113 (dated 14 September 2016)

Interview of Christopher

On 09/18/2017 Continuation of FD-302 of STEELE advised that the information in this report was derived from

his primary subsource's visit to St. Petersburg in early September 2016. The primary subsource had in St.

Petersburg --

STEELE reiterated that his primary

, Page 18 of 26

subsource traveled to St. Petersburg because of the apartment he has there -- an apartment he inherited from his aunt. The primary subsource visited St. Petersburg, and STEELE explained that he [the primary subsource] had done other work for STEELE in St. Petersburg. Reflecting on the content of this report, STEELE commented that he had never heard of AGALAROV prior to this report, save for EMIN AGALAROV's music. STEELE did not know much about AGALAROV as he had not crossed paths with him professionally.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/130 (dated 12 October 2016)

STEELE believed that the information in this report was derived from his primary subsource's interaction with one of the

-- perhaps the , but STEELE was not completely sure.

STEELE believes that this report was produced after STEELE's meeting with FBI representatives in Rome, which had happened the week prior, and after the Kremlin event attended by his primary subsource. STEELE's primary subsource gave a presentation at the Kremlin event.

During the Kremlin event, the primary subsource also spoke to a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer at a party. One of the topics brought up during the primary subsource's conversation with the FSB officer was EDWARD SNOWDEN. This contact with the FSB officer was direct -- it was not brokered through another individual.

For the final paragraph of the report (paragraph 4), STEELE was unsure if the information was derived from the "SNOWDEN source" but thought it was unlikely to have been the FSB officer.

STEELE advised that his primary subsource had not had official contact with the FSB, though STEELE believes that his primary subsource may have talked to a local FSB officer about mining litigation.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/132 (dated 13 October 2016)

STEELE indicated that was the source of the information in this report. This information was collected during the primary subsource's visit to Russia in October 2016 -- the same trip

372B-SM-2063661 Interview of Christopher 09/18/2017 Continuation of FD-302 of during which the primary subsource collected the information in Company Intelligence Report 2016/130. Company Intelligence Report 2016/134 (dated 18 October 2016) STEELE indicated that this information in paragraphs 1-3 of this report is derived from his primary subsource's communication with about CARTER PAGE. The primary subsource spoke to more individuals than just about this particular subject. STEELE believes that the primary subsource spoke to a male, who STEELE described as a STEELE said that the information about MICHAEL COHEN in the fourth paragraph was derived from his primary subsource's interactions with sub-subsources in the above-mentioned Company Intelligence Report 2016/135 (dated 19 October 2016) STEELE said that the information in this report was derived from the primary subsource's interactions with sub-subsources in the It was through this structure of reporting that the primary subsource was told that MICHAEL COHEN had met with members of the Russian presidential legal team. STEELE believed that his primary subsource had met with a insider. In STEELE's view, this must have continued working inside Company Intelligence Report 2016/136 (dated 20 October 2016) STEELE indicated that his primary subsource received this information who lives in a third country, from his STEELE further advised that this was scared

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Reflecting on the "Company Comment," STEELE emphasized that the information was obtained directly rather than by any of the brokered, reporting chains. STEELE's primary subsource obtained the information directly from his third-country sub-subsource.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/137 (dated 24 October 2016)

STEELE believes that this report was derived from his primary subsource's communication with the but he was not 100% sure. Logically, STEELE said, since is the one who reported on IGOR DIVEYKIN in an earlier report, it would follow that this report's material on DIVEYKIN also came from . STEELE said that SECHIN would have told this sub-subsource about DIVYEKIN. STEELE added that but also a professional in own right . SECHIN originally met through professional interaction. STEELE believed that professional work can be confirmed through open sources.

Company Intelligence Report 2016/139 (dated 27 October 2016)

STEELE indicated that the "senior Russian journalist working in the United States" in this report is

STEELE

said this journalist seemed to know a lot about Russian emigres in the United States.

STEELE noted that, at this point, SERGEI [SERGEY] MILLIAN had disappeared. STEELE believes that MILLIAN is currently in China or somewhere in the Far East. However, STEELE also knows that MILILAN was present at the US Presidential Inauguration in January 2017, possibly as MICHAEL COHEN's guest at the hotel (NFI).

Intelligence Report, Information Dated 29 November 2016

This report was not included in the material STEELE provided to the FBI; he believes that it was provided to the FBI from Senator JOHN MCCAIN. The information in this report was generated through his primary subsource's communication with a senior MFA official. Reflecting on what he said earlier about some of the 2014 background of this particular report (see above), STEELE indicated that the earlier, 2014 information has been obtained from his primary subsource's communications with

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Company Intelligence Report 2016/166, dated 13 December 2016

STEELE advised that this was his "favorite" report, involving MICHAEL COHEN, WEBZILLA, and ALEXEJ GUBAREV. The information on MICHAEL COHEN was obtained by the primary subsource's direct communication

Company Intelligence Report 2016/086, dated 26 July 2015

First, STEELE was asked about the date of this report, specifically the year. Upon reflection, STEELE said that he believes this is a typo, and that the year was actually 2016 versus 2015.

STEELE advised that this cyber-related report in the dossier had been tasked by the FBI. It had been tasked by MICHAEL GAETA and was passed to the FBI.

Company Note, dated 19 October 2016

This is the CODY SHEARER and JON WINER report. STEELE advised that this was not an ORBIS report. STEELE received this report from JON WINER. The report pre-dates the dossier, and was produced circa April 2016. STEELE advised that SHEARER was an associate of SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL. SHEARER is also friends with a Turkish-American businessman with the last name of KHAN (NFI). KHAN was in touch with RUSLAN MANSIMOV, aka ASLAN TURAN, aka ASLAN TURANCI. According to STEELE, MANSIMOV was a "Southern Caucasus mongrel" -- Armenian/Azeri /Russian -- and worked in Turkey and Rome. KHAN brokered contact between SHEARER and MANSIMOV in New York and Istanbul. MANSIMOV worked for the FSB -- STEELE said that MANSIMOV's affiliation with the FSB was not a secret.

STEELE advised that this SHEARER/WINER report was not related to the dossier and was based on long-standing relationships among the identified individuals. STEELE said that the report had pluses and minuses. The "plus" of the reporting was that it chimed with the Miss Universe reporting, the Ritz-Carlton reporting, and the AGALAROVS. The "minus" of the reporting was the fact that MANSIMOV was, according to STEELE, neither the most sophisticated nor impressive person.

MANSIMOV's Russian language skills were not that great, as it was not his first language. STEELE opined that MANSIMOV's first language may be Azeri.

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After the dossier was published, MANSIMOV was not an active contact. MANISMOV had claimed to be part of a faction in Russia, along with some other FSB officials, who were shocked at the attacks on the US election. MANSIMOV thought that the "crazies" (NFI) were out of control, and that it would blow up in their faces (NFI).

Recently, MANSIMOV has recontacted KHAN and was offering to provide tapes of President TRUMP. At least one of those tapes was related to the Miss Universe event and involved urine. KHAN brokered contact between SHEARER and MANSIMOV. SHEARER and MANSIMOV were actively discussing a deal for the tapes. MANSIMOV wanted money and "good standing" (NFI). MANSIMOV also claimed that an FSB technical officer with the rank of colonel was interested in defecting and wished to speak to them. The FSB officer had difficulty traveling; therefore, it was suggested that they meet in Kazakhstan.

SHEARER and MANSIMOV met in Istanbul and are considering an upcoming meeting in Spain within the coming weeks.

STEELE advised that he wished to keep this interaction "at an arm's length," as he does not want to fall into a trap. STEELE opined that this could be genuine, or a fabrication, or a set-up -- suggesting that it could involve a faction of the Democratic Party and he feared a possible FCPA violation. STEELE advised that WINER was aware of the situation, and was the one who informed STEELE about it. STEELE opined that SHEARER was not acting discreetly. STEELE said that the media was "sniffing" around MANSIMOV.

Additionally, STEELE advised he believed it was doubtful that IVANKA TRUMP was collecting large amounts of money. STEELE was complementary of IVANKA TRUMP and considered her a good friend. STEELE further advised that his colleagues believed he was being naive about this, but he was surprised by the reporting on IVANKA. STEELE said he was skeptical about the IVANKA part of the reporting, but he could believe the rest of the report.

STEELE advised that there was a rumor that a video existed of President TRUMP "roughing up" his wife, MELANIA TRUMP, in an elevator. The rumor further insinuated that the Russians had purchased this tape.

STEELE said that another rumor had also surfaced that an unidentified American who had witnessed an argument about prostitutes at a hotel involved in the earlier-mentioned Miss Universe incident. The desk

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clerks wanted the prostitutes to sign in because of health and safety reasons, but the women refused. STEELE advised that the press could be in touch with the American witness.

STEELE discussed in greater detail DMITRIY RYBOLOVLEV and the property sale in Sunny Isles, Florida. STEELE said that RYBOLOVLEV had a client relationship with a Mongolian female who had been educated at MGIMO. This female worked in the United States with a PR/GR [public relations /government relations] firm. STEELE met her approximately 6 years ago and they worked together. She was very close to SERGEY LAVROV and RYBOLOVLEV. This female spoke with RYBOLOVLEV about the sale of the Sunny Isles property and the TRUMP connection with the sale. RYBOLOVLEV told her that he did not know anything about TRUMP, but the female did not believe him. STEELE sent this information as a report to FUSION GPS, but STEELE was not sure if he passed it to DAVID KRAMER, which is why STEELE believes it was not published publicly. STEELE added that there was a new person working for RYBOLOVLEV until very recently. There was information about this indivdual in a LE MONDE article. This individual had been kicked out of Monaco and had been involved in bribing officials. STEELE said there was also current reporting involving art fraud -- specifically, paying too much for art, reporting it lost, and laundering money (NFI)

STEELE talked about his other, newly-up-and-coming main agent network and that network's reporting on PAUL MANAFORT. ORBIS received reporting dated circa March-April 2017 regarding MANAFORT's involvement in the plot to elbow out PETRO POROSHENKO. This reporting also talked about the Ukraine peace plan, provided by a pro-Russian deputy - the material that was provided to MICHAEL COHEN and MICHAEL FLYNN. ORBIS pitched the circa March-April 2017 report about MANAFORT to

STEELE said there are two memos regarding MANAFORT that were received by this newly-up-and-coming primary subsource. This individual understands that two entities, including the FBI, have received a larger amount of information or a bigger memo on MANAFORT based on access to MANAFORT's Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) file. The information in the FBI's possession talks about how MANAFORT has always been a Russian agent, about how he's always been with the FSB and how he's been run by named Russian case officers. STEELE says that this information is written in an exaggerated way (NFI). ORBIS believes the SBU file on MANAFORT itself has been doctored. The source claimed to know that the file had been doctored. STEELE said that the file has been doctored because that way, Kyiv is able to justify why it had MANAFORT under investigation. STEELE commented that, in Ukraine and all over Europe, they feel pressure from the White House to be able to justify any investigations that have been done.

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This information was collected recently - within the last few months - and was post-election. STEELE believes that the new agent network reporting has a mixture of truth and falsehood. The new primary subsource has a good view into things and has reported on things with which he has directly been involved - in the actual room at the time. The new primary subsource is good when being interviewed to state whether he thinks something is right or something sounds wrong. STEELE said that the source is critically assessing another memo regarding MANAFORT -- a memo which is approximately three paragraphs long. STEELE said that ORBIS is receiving more information about this next week. STEELE planned to sit down with his source soon to go over all of the information and the source's assessment of the bigger SBU memo (NFI). When the assessment is complete, STEELE advised he would like to share it with the FBI. STEELE described his source in Ukraine as "top-notch" and advised he has a significant, 3-4 year reporting record. STEELE advised that MANAFORT was still active in Ukraine after the 2017 US Presidential Inauguration.

STEELE has heard separately that two US agencies (NFI) were working together in Germany and that it involved the offer of tapes and other documents. STEELE advised that a Volga German by the name of BITNER (NFI) was an FSB agent under busines cover. A US agency was involved in an exchange involving BITNER, but CIA Director MIKE POMPEO pulled the plug at the end of last year. It was unclear to STEELE if this Germany-related information was connected to the earlier-referenced SHEARER-MANSIMOV information. STEELE also said that this was related to information in the "dark web" where, STEELE added, there has been talk that STEELE and the NSA are competing for the same materials (NFI). As with the MANSIMOV information, the media is also "sniffing" around the Germany situation. It is not the same media outlets who are "sniffing" around both stories, however. STEELE said that the media was not asking questions per se, but facilitating (NFI).

STEELE discussed two significant robberies that occurred in villas in the south of France. A total of up to two billion dollars in cash had been stolen from Ukrainian oligarch PINCHUK. PINCHUK's son-in-law had been using a villa. Part of the stolen money originated from a defrauding of Delta, a Ukrainian bank. PINCHUK's son-in-law embezzled hundreds of millions of dollars from Delta. The Chechens (NFI) subsequently stole that money, which went back into Russia. STEELE noted that the Chechens are often used by the Russians for such activity. If true, STEELE opined, this whole situation could create a huge slush fund for Russia.

ORBIS has also been getting reporting regarding Russian influence in the French and German elections. Regarding the 2017 French election, STEELE

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said that things got perilously close to working for the Russians. STEELE said that it wasn't just about LE PEN, but that there was only one candidate who wasn't untainted by the Russians, and that was MACRON - the person who actually won. All three right-leaning candidates in France were held by the Russians. FILLON was compromised by Russia. One of the candidiates was non-competitive. STEELE said the Russians attempted to change their support back to LE PEN at the end of the campaign period. STEELE advised that the Russians were now working on her niece.

Regarding the 2017 German election, STEELE said that the Russians were working on many influence campaigns, but had scaled back. The plan included propaganda about ANGELA MERKEL's health, but reportedly, MERKEL pushed back and spoke to PUTIN personally, warning him not to interfere with the election. PUTIN reportedly scaled back Russia's efforts.

STEELE advised that NIGEL FARAGE had been observed entering the Ecuadorian Embassy in London -- presumably to speak with JULIAN ASSANGE. STEELE believed that Russian funding had been funneling through the United Kingdom to promote Brexit. STEELE said that a young American -- possibly with the name of COTTRELL (NFI) -- had been caught laundering money. STEELE also said that EKATERINA PADERINA and her husband, AARON BANKS were two individuals involved in Russian influence and Brexit. FARAGE, TRUMP, and BANKS go back approximately four years. STEELE further advised that there was a Belize link with this, and that money was being laundered through Belize.

STEELE said that ORBIS was involved in some Kazakhstan-related and Cyprus-related business work, and some of the material from that work obviously falls within the bounds of the Special Counsel. STEELE was working on a Kazakh-related project involving an indivdual by the name of ABLYAZOV, embezzlement from BTA BANK, pyramid schemes, and connections to FELIX SATER and TRUMP SOHO. STEELE said that they want RICO up and running in the United States (NFI). STEELE brought along a Power Point presentation from the company ARCANUM explaning the SATER connection. STEELE provided a copy of this Power Point presentation to SSA and SIA Auten (see attached). This information was slated to be provided to the US Department of Justice and the FBI as it involves a corrupt American official (NFI). SATER is also involved with the daughter of ABLYAZOV (NFI).

Regarding Cyprus, STEELE discussed a casino and golf complex. The GOLDEN LADY CONSORTIUM was attempting to put a casino in Cyprus circa 2015-2016. TRUMP, NAVIGANTE and SCENOPLUS (sp) were all involved, but the project failed. TRUMP tried to get a resort deal worth 450 million through RCB, a subsidiary of VNESHTORGBANK (VTB). The deal was submitted to regulators. STEELE said that there were some references to this deal in the Cypriot

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press. STEELE himself received this information from an American journalist.

STEELE was available for recontact, and advised that he wished to remain in contact with the FBI. Although STEELE believed the FBI owed money to STEELE and ORBIS for services and travel provided, STEELE believed it was more important that the United States government receive the information. STEELE was willing to provide the information to the FBI regardless of payment. STEELE advised that he would keep the same communication line open for future contact with SSA as necessary.

From:	MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent:	Wednesday, December 14, 2016 10:10 AM
To:	STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Subject:	RE: Latest CROWN
SentinelCaseId:	NON-RECORD
Classification:	
They do. They were highli	ghted when he received them by someone on the McCain side of things presumably.
From CTD7OV DETER D	(CD) (ERI)
From: STRZOK, PETER P. Sent: Wednesday, Decem	
To: MOFFA, JONATHAN C.	
Subject: RE: Latest CROV	
Classification:	
Classified By:	
Derived From:	
Declassify On:	
D said they had highlightin	g on them?
From: MOFFA, JONATHAN	C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, Decem	
	BI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)
	O) (FBI); MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); CLINESMITH, KEVIN E. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Latest CROV	/N
Live of Later Colonia 14	
Classification:	
Classified By:	
Derived From:	
Declassify On:	

I should add that none of them are new and all of them are duplicative of reports on your chart below...

From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 6:25 AM
To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); CLINESMITH, KEVIN E. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Latest CROWN -
Classification:

Classified By:
Derived From:
Declassify On:

I have an envelope of crown reports that the D received from John McCain as well that can be added to the chart below.
Brian/Joe, swing by this morning and I'll give them to you to put into the file...

Thanks,

From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)

Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 4:19 PM

To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); GESSFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI); SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI); HEIDE, CURTIS A.

(CG) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI) (CD) (FBI) (CD) (FBI) (CD) (FBI) (CD) (FBI) (CD) (FBI)

Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); CLINESMITH,

KEVIN E. (OGC) (FBI)

Subject: RE: Latest CROWN --


Classification:

Classified By:
Derived From:
Declassify On:

Following up on the new information on the thumb drive please see this tracking matrix which is also saved on the share drive:


Comm	Simpson to Ohr	Corn to Baker	CROWN to	CROSSFIRE received	Simpson file date *	Report Dated	Report Number
It appears file mod				9/19/2016	11/1/2016 ?	6/20/2016	80
Obtained from Si				12/12/2016	7/28/2016	7/26/2016	86
				9/19/2016	7/19/2016	7/19/2016	94

Simpson thumb (7/28/	9/19/2016	7/28/2016	Not dated	95
Obtained from C	10/26/2016	7/30/2016	7/30/2016	97*
	9/19/2016	8/5/2016	8/5/2016	100
	9/19/2016	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	101
	9/19/2016	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	102
Obtained from (10/26/2016	8/22/2016	8/22/2016	105
Obtained from (10/26/2016	9/22/2016	9/14/2016	111
Obtained from (10/26/2016	9/22/2016	9/14/2016	112*
Obtained from Si	12/12/2016	9/22/2016	9/14/2016	113
	10/19/2016		10/12/2016	130
	10/19/2016		10/13/2016	132
	10/19/2016	10/18/2016	10/18/2016	134
	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	135
	10/21/2016	10/20/2016	10/20/2016	136
	10/24/2016		10/14/2016	137
	10/28/2016		10/27/2016	139
	10/19/2016		10/19/2016	Winer
Obtained from Si	12/12/2016	11/29/2016	11/29/2016	Intel Snippet



Simpson file date * = the date indicated on the Simpson thumb drive file directory as "date modified"

97* and 112* - prior to receiving the Simpson version, the FBI only had redacted versions provided to Corn.



Folks,

As many of you know we obtained a USB drive from Glenn Simpson via a DOJ colleague. We are handling as evidence and a working copy is in the share drive where we have historically kept CROWN reporting, the folder labeled Rome Reporting, sub folder Simpson 121216. A cursory look at the files appears they are indeed CROWN reports. Please review and lets discuss tomorrow morning.

In addition, we will resume 0900 meetings every Wednesday until we no longer need to meet. Lets start up again tomorrow.

Thanks,

SSA log Digntka III

Joe

33A JUE PIEIILKU III
CI-1 Washington Field Office
(NIPR) - (Unavail during work hours)
(SIPR)
(SCION)
Cell - (Unavail during work hours)
Desk
STE
- ((call desk first))

	 ==========	
Classification:		
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======================================	 :=====================================	:======
======================================	 ======================================	

CROWN report tracking Matrix

	Comment	It appears file modified on 11/1/16	Obtained from Simpson via Ohr		Simpson thumb drive indicates 7/28/16	Obtained from Corn via Baker				Obtained from Corn via Baker	Obtained from Corn via Baker	Obtained from Corn via Baker	Obtained from Simpson via Ohr									Obtained from Simpson via Ohr	
Buzzfeed	Published																						
5																							
McCain to	Comey	12/9/2016																					
Simpson to	Ohr																						
Corn to	Baker																						
CROWN to	FBI																						
CROSSFIRE	received	9/19/2016	12/12/2016	9/19/2016	9/19/2016	10/26/2016	9/19/2016	9/19/2016	9/19/2016	10/26/2016	10/26/2016	10/26/2016	12/12/2016	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	10/21/2016	10/24/2016	10/28/2016	10/19/2016	12/12/2016	
Simpson file	date *	11/1/2016 ?	7/28/2016	7/19/2016	7/28/2016	7/30/2016	8/5/2016	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	8/22/2016	9/22/2016	9/22/2016	9/22/2016			10/18/2016	10/19/2016	10/20/2016				11/29/2016	
Report	Dated	6/20/2016	7/26/2016	7/19/2016	Not dated	7/30/2016	8/5/2016	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	8/22/2016	9/14/2016	9/14/2016	9/14/2016	10/12/2016	10/13/2016	10/18/2016	10/19/2016	10/20/2016	10/14/2016	10/27/2016	10/19/2016	11/29/2016	12/13/2016
Report	Number	80	98	94	92	*46	100	101	102	105	111	112*	113	130	132	134	135	136	137	139	Winer	Intel Snippet	166

Indicates FBI did not receive from CROWN

FBI received from CROWN

FBI received CROWN report from another source

97* and 112* - prior to receiving the Simpson version, the FBI only had redacted versions provided to Corn. Simpson file date * = the date indicated on the Simpson thumb drive file directory as "date modified"

From:	AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)
Sent:	Thursday, December 15, 2016 7:35 AM
To:	MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject:	RE: Latest CROWN
SentinelCaseId:	NON-RECORD
Classification:	
Classified By:	
Derived From:	
Declassify On:	
1729112016 - 36_ProjectS Intel Snippet	iNAK 24_CompletRep
I have not seen the ne	GAT . Pete had copies of tw OGAT on Monday, read them to Joe and to me, but kept them.
B-	
From: MOFFA, JONATHAN Sent: Thursday, December To: AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) Subject: FW: Latest CRO	er 15, 2016 6:18 AM) (FBI)
Classification:	
Classified By: Derived From: Declassify On:	
Can you please help me ou snippet). Electronic on em	ut this morning and get me copies of the three new CROWN reports (86, 113, and the intelnal is fine.
	he ne OGA that came in. Nobody seems to know where they are and I assume that means uys (hopefully). Any ideas who might have them?
Thanks,	
1	

From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)			
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 2:52 F	PM		
To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); GESSFORD, BE	ENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI);	SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (F	BI); HEIDE, CURTIS A.
(CG) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)	(CD) (FBI)	(CD) (FBI)
(FBI) (CD) (FBI)	(WF) (FBI)	(CD) (FBI)	(CD)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JC KEVIN E. (OGC) (FBI)	ONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)); MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC)	(FBI); CLINESMITH,
Subject: RE: Latest CROWN			
Classification:			
Classified By:			
Derived From:			
Declassify On:			

Please see latest to include a column regarding what the Director received from Senator Mccain. A pattern also appears to be forming as some reports were only provided to the FBI... or we just haven't received from outside parties...unclear. See 132, 137, 139 and Winer.

Cor	McCain to Comey	Simpson to Ohr	Corn to Baker	CROWN to FBI	CROSSFIRE received	Simpson file date *	Report Dated	Report Number
It appears file m	12/9/2016				9/19/2016	11/1/2016 ?	6/20/2016	80
Obtained from					12/12/2016	7/28/2016	7/26/2016	86
					9/19/2016	7/19/2016	7/19/2016	94
Simpson thur 7/					9/19/2016	7/28/2016	Not dated	95
Obtained fro		·			10/26/2016	7/30/2016	7/30/2016	97*
	T				9/19/2016	8/5/2016	8/5/2016	100
					9/19/2016	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	101
					9/19/2016	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	102
Obtained fro					10/26/2016	8/22/2016	8/22/2016	105
Obtained fro					10/26/2016	9/22/2016	9/14/2016	111
Obtained fro					10/26/2016	9/22/2016	9/14/2016	112*
Obtained from					12/12/2016	9/22/2016	9/14/2016	113
					10/19/2016		10/12/2016	130
					10/19/2016		10/13/2016	132
					10/19/2016	10/18/2016	10/18/2016	134
			H = H		10/19/2016	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	135
					10/21/2016	10/20/2016	10/20/2016	136
					10/24/2016		10/14/2016	137
					10/28/2016		10/27/2016	139
					10/19/2016		10/19/2016	Winer
Obtained from					12/12/2016	11/29/2016	11/29/2016	Intel Snippet

Indicates FBI did not receive from CROWN
FBI received from CROWN
FBI received CROWN report from another source

Simpson file date * = the date indicated on the Simpson thumb drive file directory as "date modified" 97* and 112* - prior to receiving the Simpson version, the FBI only had redacted versions provided to Corn.

From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI) Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 4:19 P	М		
To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); GESSFORD,	BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI);		
(CG) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI) (CD) (FBI) (FBI)	(WF) (FBI)	(CD) (FBI)	(CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, KEVIN E. (OGC) (FBI)	JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)	; MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OG	SC) (FBI); CLINESMITH,
Subject: RE: Latest CROWN	1		
Classification:			
Classified By: Derived From: Declassify On:			

Following up on the new information on the thumb drive please see this tracking matrix which is also saved on the share drive:

Comm	Simpson to Ohr	Corn to Baker	CROWN to FBI	CROSSFIRE received	Simpson file date *	Report Dated	Report Number
It appears file mod				9/19/2016	11/1/2016 ?	6/20/2016	80
Obtained from Si				12/12/2016	7/28/2016	7/26/2016	86
				9/19/2016	7/19/2016	7/19/2016	94
Simpson thumb (7/28/				9/19/2016	7/28/2016	Not dated	95
Obtained from O				10/26/2016	7/30/2016	7/30/2016	97*
				9/19/2016	8/5/2016	8/5/2016	100
				9/19/2016	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	101
				9/19/2016	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	102
Obtained from O	1			10/26/2016	8/22/2016	8/22/2016	105
Obtained from O	j i			10/26/2016	9/22/2016	9/14/2016	111
Obtained from O	1			10/26/2016	9/22/2016	9/14/2016	112*
Obtained from Si				12/12/2016	9/22/2016	9/14/2016	113

130	10/12/2016		10/19/2016	/F		
132	10/13/2016		10/19/2016		_1()	
134	10/18/2016	10/18/2016	10/19/2016			
135	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	10/19/2016			
136	10/20/2016	10/20/2016	10/21/2016			
137	10/14/2016		10/24/2016			
139	10/27/2016		10/28/2016		2.00	
Winer	10/19/2016		10/19/2016			
Intel Snippet	11/29/2016	11/29/2016	12/12/2016	-		Obtained from Si

Indicates FBI did not receive from CROWN
FBI received from CROWN
FBI received CROWN report from another source

Simpson file date * = the date indicated on the Simpson thumb drive file directory as "date modified" 97* and 112* - prior to receiving the Simpson version, the FBI only had redacted versions provided to Corn.

From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI) Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 2:04 F To: GESSFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI);		I): HEIDE, CURTIS A. (CG) (FBI): AU	ITEN.
BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)	(CD) (FBI)	(CD) (FBI)	CD) (FBI);
(WF) (FBI) Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA KEVIN E. (OGC) (FBI) Subject: Latest CROWN	(CD) (FBI) , JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); MC	(CD) (FBI) OYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); CLII	NESMITH,
Classification:			
Classified By: Derived From: Declassify On:			

Folks,

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In addition, we will resume 0900 meetings every Wednesday until we no longer need to meet. Lets start up again tomorrow.

Thanks,

SSA Joe Pientka III CI-1 Washington Field Office (NIPR) - (Unavail during work hours) (SIPR) (SCION) Cell - (Unavail during work hours) Desk STE

NSTS - ((call desk first))

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COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/113

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION- REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE TRUMP'S PRIOR ACTIVITIES IN ST PETERSBURG

Summary

- Two knowledgeable St Petersburg sources claim Republican candidate TRUMP has paid bribes and engaged in sexual activities there but key witnesses silenced and evidence hard to obtain
- Both believe Azeri business associate of TRUMP, Araz AGALAROV will know the details

Detail

- Speaking to a trusted compatriot in September 2016, two well-placed sources based in St Petersburg, one in the political/business elite and the other involved in the local services and tourist industry, commented on Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP's prior activities in the city.
- 2. Both knew TRUMP had visited St Petersburg on several occasions in the past and had been interested in doing business deals there involving real estate. The local business/political elite figure reported that TRUMP had paid bribes there to further his interests but very discreetly and only through affiliated companies, making it very hard to prove. The local services industry source reported that TRUMP had participated in sex parties in the city too, but that all direct witnesses to this recently had been "silenced" i.e. bribed or coerced to disappear.
- 3. The two St Petersburg figures cited believed an Azeri business figure, Araz AGALAROV (with offices in Baku and London) had been closely involved with TRUMP in Russia and would know most of the details of what the Republican presidential candidate had got up to there.

14 September 2016

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/086

RUSSIA/CYBER CRIME: A SYNOPSIS OF RUSSIAN STATE SPONSORED AND OTHER CYBER OFFENSIVE (CRIMINAL) OPERATIONS

Summary

- Russia has extensive programme of state-sponsored offensive cyber operations. External targets include foreign governments and big corporations, especially banks. FSB leads on cyber within Russian apparatus. Limited success in attacking top foreign targets like G7 governments, security services and IFIs but much more on second tier ones through IT back doors, using corporate and other visitors to Russia
- FSB often uses coercion and blackmail to recruit most capable cyber operatives in Russia into its state-sponsored programmes. Heavy use also, both wittingly and unwittingly, of CIS emigres working in western corporations and ethnic Russians employed by neighbouring governments e.g. Latvia
- Example cited of successful Russian cyber operation targeting senior Western business visitor. Provided back door into important Western institutions.
- Example given of US citizen of Russian origin approached by FSB and offered incentive of "investment" in his business when visiting Moscow.
- Problems however for Russian authorities themselves in countering local hackers and cyber criminals, operating outside state control. Central Bank claims there were over 20 serious attacks on correspondent accounts held by CBR in 2015, comprising Roubles several billion in fraud
- Some details given of leading non-state Russian cyber criminal groups

Details

1. Speaking in June 2016, a number of Russian figures with a detailed knowledge of national cyber crime, both state-sponsored and otherwise, outlined the current situation in this area. A former senior intelligence officer divided Russian state-sponsored offensive cyber operations into four categories (in order of priority):- targeting foreign, especially

western governments; penetrating leading foreign business corporations, especially banks; domestic monitoring of the elite; and attacking political opponents both at home and abroad. The former intelligence officer reported that the Federal Security Service (FSB) was the lead organization within the Russian state apparatus for cyber operations.

- 2. In terms of the success of Russian offensive cyber operations to date, a senior government figure reported that there had been only limited success in penetrating the "first tier" foreign targets. These comprised western (especially G7 and NATO) governments, security and intelligence services and central banks, and the IFIs. To compensate for this shortfall, massive effort had been invested, with much greater success, in attacking the "secondary targets", particularly western private banks and the governments of smaller states allied to the West. S/he mentioned Latvia in this regard. Hundreds of agents, either consciously cooperating with the FSB or whose personal and professional IT systems had been unwittingly compromised, were recruited. Many were people who had ethnic and family ties to Russia and/or had been incentivized financially to cooperate. Such people often would receive monetary inducements or contractual favours from the Russian state or its agents in return. This had created difficulties for parts of the Russian state apparatus in obliging/indulging them e.g. the Central Bank of Russia knowingly having to cover up for such agents' money laundering operations through the Russian financial system.
- 3. In terms of the FSB's recruitment of capable cyber operatives to carry out its, ideally deniable, offensive cyber operations, a Russian IT specialist with direct knowledge reported in June 2016 that this was often done using coercion and blackmail. In terms of 'foreign' agents, the FSB was approaching US citizens of Russian (Jewish) origin on business trips to Russia. In one case a US citizen of Russian ethnicity had been visiting Moscow to attract investors in his new information technology program. The FSB clearly knew this and had offered to provide seed capital to this person in return for them being able to access and modify his IP, with a view to targeting priority foreign targets by planting a Trojan virus in the software. The US visitor was told this was common practice. The FSB also had implied significant operational success as a result of installing cheap Russian IT games containing their own malware unwittingly by targets on their PCs and other platforms.
- 4. In a more advanced and successful FSB operation, an IT operator inside a leading Russian SOE, who previously had been employed on conventional (defensive) IT work there, had been under instruction for the last year to conduct an offensive cyber operation against a foreign director of the company. Although the latter was apparently an infrequent visitor to Russia, the FSB now successfully had penetrated his personal IT and through this had managed to access various important institutions in the West through the back door.

- 5. In terms of other technical IT platforms, an FSB cyber operative flagged up the 'Telegram' enciphered commercial system as having been of especial concern and therefore heavily targeted by the FSB, not least because it was used frequently by Russian internal political activists and oppositionists. His/her understanding was that the FSB now successfully had cracked this communications software and therefore it was no longer secure to use.
- 6. The senior Russian government figure cited above also reported that non-state sponsored cyber crime was becoming an increasing problem inside Russia for the government and authorities there. The Central Bank of Russia claimed that in 2015 alone there had been more than 20 attempts at serious cyber embezzlement of money from corresponding accounts held there, comprising several billions Roubles. More generally, s/he understood there were circa 15 major organised crime groups in the country involved in cyber crime, all of which continued to operate largely outside state and FSB control. These included the so-called 'Anunak', 'Buktrap' and 'Metel' organisations.

26 July 2015

AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI) From: Thursday, December 15, 2016 8:20 AM Sent: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) To: Subject: RE: Latest CROWN --SentinelCaseId: NON-RECORD Classification: Classified By: Derived From: Declassify On: Use this version 16 29112016 -Intel Snippet.do... From: AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI) Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2016 7:35 AM To: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) Subject: RE: Latest CROWN -- | Classification: Classified By: Derived From: Declassify On: << File: 17__29112016 - Intel Snippet.docx >> << File: 36_ProjectSNAKE,RussianCyberReport,July2016.pdf >> << File: 24 ComplntReport, SNAKE, BS3, Sept2016.pdf >> I have not seen the ne OGA. Pete had copies of tw OGA on Monday, read them to Joe and to me, but kept them. B-From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2016 6:18 AM To: AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI) Subject: FW: Latest CROWN --

Classification:
Classified By: Derived From: Declassify On: Declass
Can you please help me out this morning and get me copies of the three new CROWN reports (86, 113, and the intel snippet). Electronic on email is fine.
also need to see any of the ne OGA that came in. Nobody seems to know where they are and I assume that means they ended up with you guys (hopefully). Any ideas who might have them?
Γhanks,
From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI) Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 2:52 PM To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); GESSFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI); SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI); HEIDE, CURTIS A. (CG) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)
Classification:
Classified By: Derived From: Declassify On: Declassify On:

Please see latest to include a column regarding what the Director received from Senator Mccain. A pattern also appears to be forming as some reports were only provided to the FBI... or we just haven't received from outside parties...unclear. See 132, 137, 139 and Winer.

Cor	McCain to Comey	Simpson to Ohr	Corn to Baker	CROWN to FBI	CROSSFIRE received	Simpson file date *	Report Dated	Report Number
It appears file m	12/9/2016				9/19/2016	11/1/2016 ?	6/20/2016	80
Obtained from			7		12/12/2016	7/28/2016	7/26/2016	86
		-			9/19/2016	7/19/2016	7/19/2016	94
Simpson thur 7/	L U				9/19/2016	7/28/2016	Not dated	95
Obtained from					10/26/2016	7/30/2016	7/30/2016	97*
					9/19/2016	8/5/2016	8/5/2016	100

3			9/19/2016	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	101
			9/19/2016	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	102
Obtaine			10/26/2016	8/22/2016	8/22/2016	105
Obtained			10/26/2016	9/22/2016	9/14/2016	111
Obtaine			10/26/2016	9/22/2016	9/14/2016	112*
Obtained	- 1		12/12/2016	9/22/2016	9/14/2016	113
			10/19/2016		10/12/2016	130
			10/19/2016		10/13/2016	132
			10/19/2016	10/18/2016	10/18/2016	134
			10/19/2016	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	135
			10/21/2016	10/20/2016	10/20/2016	136
			10/24/2016		10/14/2016	137
			10/28/2016		10/27/2016	139
			10/19/2016		10/19/2016	Winer
Obtained			12/12/2016	11/29/2016	11/29/2016	Intel Snippet

Indicates FBI did not receive from CROWN

FBI received from CROWN


FBI received CROWN report from another source

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
(WF) (FBI)	(CD) (FBI)	CD) (FBI) (CD)
FFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FE	SI); MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); CLINESMITH,
	ORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI I) (WF) (FBI)	ORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI); SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI) (CD) (FBI)

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It appears file mod	Ç.			9/19/2016	11/1/2016 ?	6/20/2016	80
Obtained from Si				12/12/2016	7/28/2016	7/26/2016	86
				9/19/2016	7/19/2016	7/19/2016	94
Simpson thumb 7/28/	-			9/19/2016	7/28/2016	Not dated	95
Obtained from (10/26/2016	7/30/2016	7/30/2016	97*
				9/19/2016	8/5/2016	8/5/2016	100
				9/19/2016	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	101
				9/19/2016	8/10/2016	8/10/2016	102
Obtained from 0				10/26/2016	8/22/2016	8/22/2016	105
Obtained from (10/26/2016	9/22/2016	9/14/2016	111
Obtained from (1		1,	10/26/2016	9/22/2016	9/14/2016	112*
Obtained from Si				12/12/2016	9/22/2016	9/14/2016	113
				10/19/2016		10/12/2016	130
				10/19/2016		10/13/2016	132
				10/19/2016	10/18/2016	10/18/2016	134
				10/19/2016	10/19/2016	10/19/2016	135
				10/21/2016	10/20/2016	10/20/2016	136
				10/24/2016		10/14/2016	137
				10/28/2016		10/27/2016	139
		6		10/19/2016		10/19/2016	Winer
Obtained from Si	(1)			12/12/2016	11/29/2016	11/29/2016	ntel Snippet



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In addition, we will resume 0900 meetings every Wednesday until we no longer need to meet. Lets start up again tomorrow.

Thanks,

Joe

SSA Joe Pientka III

CI-1 Washington Field Office



Classification:		
======================================		
======================================	 	:======
	 	:======
======== Classification:	 	
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Please pass the following - received today - to David Kramer.

BEGINS

Speaking on November 29 2016, a senior official working at the Russian MFA reported that a rumour is currently circulating there that US President-elect TRUMP's delay in appointing a new Secretary of State is the result of an intervention by President PUTIN/the Kremlin. The latter reportedly have asked that TRUMP appoint a Russia-friendly figure to this position, who was prepared to move quickly on lifting Ukraine-related sanctions and cooperation ("security") in Syria.

The source assumes the Kremlin's reported intervention was in response to the possibility that Mitt ROMNEY, viewed as hostile to Russia, might be appointed Secretary of State.

ENDS

From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:	Tuesday, December 13, 2016 2:05 PM PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI) (CD) (FBI (CD) (FBI) RE: Latest CROWN
Classifica	tion:
Classified Derived Fr Declassify	om:
Thanks! I will ta	ke a look today. FYI I have a doctor's appointment tomorrow morning and will be in later around 11.
Intelligence Analy	JEH 5045
Sent: Tuesday, To: GESSFORD, BRIAN J. (CD) (I	(CD) (FBI) (CD) (FBI) (CD) (FBI) (CD) (FBI) (CD) (FBI) (CD) (FBI); TER P. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); CLINESMITH, (FBI)
Classifica	tion:
Classified Derived Fr Declassify	om:


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Thanks,

Joe



Classification:

From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)

Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2016 8:16 AM

To: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)

Cc: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)

Subject: RE: Mikhail Fridman ??? UNCLASSIFIED

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Brian will have more background, but I got this from Bruce Ohr on Monday following his breakfast on Saturday with Simpson:

The New York Times story from October 3, 2016, that downplayed the connection between Alfa Bank servers and the Trump campaign was incorrect. There was communication and it wasn't spam. Mikhail Fridman lied in the written statement that he gave to the New York Times and Washington Post. Fridman claimed he never met Trump, however there are pictures to the contrary.

I'll get with Brian and check the story to see relevance to us.

Joe

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)

Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2016 6:34 PM

To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)

Cc: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI)

Subject: FW: Mikhail Fridman - ??? --- UNCLASSIFIED

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

From: LAYCOCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FBI) Sent: Tuesday, December 06, 2016 1:34 PM

To: BOONE, JENNIFER C. (CD) (FBI); VARACALLI, MICHAEL F. (CD) (FBI); DENNEHY, JAMES E. (CD) (FBI)

Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)

Subject: RE: Mikhail Fridman - ??? --- UNCLASSIFIED

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

We can check but sounds like an oligarch.

From: BOONE, JENNIFER C. (CD) (FBI) **Sent:** Monday, December 05, 2016 5:47 PM

To: LAYCOCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FBI); VARACALLI, MICHAEL F. (CD) (FBI); DEN	INEHY, JAMES E. (CD) (FBI)
Cc: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)	
Subject: FW: Mikhail Fridman - ??? UNCLASSIFIED	
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED	
Folks	
See below. Anyone?	
Thanks.	
Jen	
From: PAARMANN, C. B. (OIO) (FBI) Sent: Monday, December 05, 2016 5:37 PM	
T >; BOONE, JENNIFER C.	CD) (FB
c	
Subject: Mikhail Fridman - ??? UNCLASSIFIED	
are the transfer of the same o	
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED	
Jennifer - BLUF A guy that is like my brother owns an oil and gas comp	
individual (who according to Open Source is supposedly the second wealthiest g	
cash offer to buy his company. I figure that a guy with that much money from f Any interest in this guy?	Russia may very well be a target of yours
C. Bryan Paarmann	
Deputy Assistant Director International Operations Division, FBI	
The material operations ovision, 151	
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED	
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED	1
	ialia i
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED	
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED	

Senate HSGAC_TransitionReq_Fusion GPS Docs - FBI000035 - DOJ Review DOJ REVIEW ONLY. DO NOT DISSEMINATE FURTHER WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF FBI OGC

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

From:	(CD) (FBI)
Sent:	Tuesday, December 20, 2016 4:15 PM
To:	PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Subject:	RE: Fusion GPS thumb drive
Judjece.	IKE. I dolon dio ciumb dilic
Classifi	cation:
Classifi	
Derived	
Declassi	fy On:
Got it we'll	take a look now, Joe.
dotti well	take a look flow, foe.
	KA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
	ay, December 20, 2016 4:14 PM
	, JOE (WF) (FBI); GESSFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI); SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI); HEIDE, CURTIS A. UTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI)
(CC) (1 DI)) (C	
(FBI)	
	IONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); CLINESMITH,
KEVIN E. (OG	sion GPS thumb drive
Classifi	cation:
Classifi	ed By:
Derived	From:
Declassi	fy On:
	==========
I just uploade	ed to our share drive the documents and files that Bruce Ohr's wife (through Bruce) voluntarily provided to
the FBI this n	norning. They are reports/work she completed for Fusion GPS/ Glenn Simpson (similar to the one she gave
	ort last week). They are under the Fusion GPS file on the share drive. Please review (there are approx 85
docs) and o	nce we have a grasp of whats on there I can submit to the appropriate case files.
Joe	
SSA Joe Pier	ntka III
CI-1 Washing	ton Field Office
	(NIPR) - (Unavail during work hours)
	(SIPR)
	Cell - (Unavail during work hours)
	Desk
	STE
NST.	S ~ ((call desk first))

==========		========	
Classification:			
=========	.========	========	========
Classification:			

FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 08/02/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact: 07/19/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

NΑ

Type of Contact: Telephonic

Date of Report: 08/02/2016

Substantive Case File Number

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

CHS revised CHS' original reporting (provided 07/05/2016) CHS report dated 07/07/2016 regarding Russian cuber efforts. Guillermo QUINTERO, a member of the ROSNEFT board of directors, is not Italian. He is from South America and is believed to be Argentinian.

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By

FD-1023	Page 1 of 1	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 07/29/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact: 07/19/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

NA

Type of Contact: e-Mail

Date of Report: 07/29/2016

Substantive Case File Number

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

CHS STEE provided the following information, obtained from sub-sources, regarding the murder of former Russian Media Minister, Mikhail LESIN: Prior to his death in Washington DC in November 2015, LESIN had been in a dispute with relatives and associates of Yuri KOVALCHUK, a Russian oligarch close to Vladimir PUTIN, regarding the control of Russian media company, NATIONAL MEDIA GROUP (NMG). LESIN had succeeded in having KOVALCHUK's nephew, Kirill KOVALCHUK, removed from the NMG board of directors. LESIN was asserting power and influence and attempting to blackmail Alina KABAEVA, an associate of Kirill KOVALCHUK at NMG and former PUTIN mistress. KABAEVA went to Yuri KOVALCHUK, who decided to "move against" LESIN. LESIN "fled" to the U.S., staying at a hotel in the Dupont Circle area of Washington D.C. LESIN tried to reach out to various Russian business associates and U.S. authorities without success. LESIN was approached by a "representative" of Yuri KOVALCHUK on the evening of November 4, 2015. The two agreed to meet privately in LESIN's room on the 9th floor, where LESIN was later found dead.

SIGNATURE

Submitted By First Level Approved By

FD-1023	Page 1 of 1	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 11/17/2016

Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact: 11/01/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: Telephonic

Date of Report: 11/17/2016

Substantive Case File Number

97F-HQ-2063661

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

On October 31, 2016, the online magazine Mother Jones published the following article written by David Corn: "A Veteran Spy Has Given the FBI Information Alleging a Russian Operation to Cultivate Donald Trump." The article sources a "former Western Intelligence officer" as providing memos to the FBI regarding Donald Trump's interactions with Russia. On November 1, 2016, the handling agent directly asked the CHS if the CHS spoke to the reporter in question. The CHS responded "yes I did." The CHS added that the CHS was "concerned about the behavior of [the FBI]" and was "troubled by the actions of [the FBI] last Friday." The CHS stated that the FBI owed the CHS a payment for services, however, the CHS stated "the payment was a secondary issue."

SIGNATURE

Submitted By First Level Approved By

FD-1023	Page 1 of 1	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FD-794b FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PAYMENT REQUEST

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 05/04/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

PAYMENT REQUEST

Payment Request Form Type: General

Official Bureau Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID:

Phone Number:

Payee Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID:

Payment Name: Crown

Enclosures:

Include if payment is for reimbursement of case-related expenditures made by the CHS.

Enclosed are receipts for expenses incurred by the Confidential Human Source (CHS) at the behest of the FBI, which are being reimbursed as expenses. (or) Enclosed is a statement documenting the amount spent by the CHS, the date(s) and the reason(s) why a receipt could not be obtained.

CHS was opened/re-opened on: 10/30/2013 Aggregate Total Paid: \$74,000.00

Total Paid since re-open (if needed): \$0.00 **Total Paid in Current FY:** \$0.00

Is this payment for medical expenses?

Is the CHS expected to testify?

Financial Justification

Agents should utilize this block to document the operational necessity for expenditures (i.e. costs associated with a CHS debrief; utilization of Undercover Credit Card for CHS expenses; agent exceeding per diem allowance; alcohol consumption by agent) which normally would require separate SAC/ASAC approval. See Confidential Funding Guide for other expenditures. Specific operational details should not be entered here.

Operationally justified. Expense payment for CHS for costs associated with sub-source endeavoring to set up meetings between WMDD and individual with information. Per IOD, original request for 5500 was cancelled and the instant request is being submitted.

The total aggregate amount paid is automatically and incorrectly filled in the form. To date, since 2013, the CHS has been paid \$74,000 in service payments. Another request for \$15,000 in service payments is in the system.

|--|

No

FD-794b	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
	PAYMENT REQUEST

The Attorney General's Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a CHS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official. However, in extraordinary circumstances, the SAC is authorized to approve an exemption to this requirement. This allows the FBI Agent to be the payer and only witness.

Is SAC approval for an exemption to the second witness requirement requested for this payment?

No

Period covered for this payment:

Begin: 06/30/2015 **End:** 11/30/2016

\$0.00

	Payment Request Amount	
Substantive Case File Number	Financial Program	Financial Subprogram
Payment Description	Expense Incurred By	Payment Amount
Other Miscellaneous	CHS Expense	\$1,500.00

Operational Payment justification narrative:

The total aggregate payment threshold HAS NOT been met NOR exceeded. The CHS has not been paid any payments in this fiscal year. Moreover, the CHS has received a total of \$74000 since being opened in 2013. This DOES NOT reach the threshold. As such this is incorrectly noted above and no additional authority is required.

Warning: You have exceeded the aggregate threshold. It is recommended that you submit your request for additional authority to your appropriate FIMU.

Total CHS Services: \$0.00

Total CHS Expenses: \$1,500.00

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By

Second Level Approved By

Total Agent Expenses:

FD-794b Page 2 of 2 FEDERAL BUREAU OF I

FD-794b FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PAYMENT REQUEST **DRAFT TYPE** Request Type: General Payment Type: Confidential Forfeiture or Drug Related: No INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTING EMPLOYEE Official Bureau Name UEID **Date of Request** Gaeta, Michael 05/04/2016 **Field Office User Dimension 4 Telephone Number** Squad International Operations Legat Rome INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTED PAYEE UEID Payee Name Gaeta, Michael Is this a one-time non-symbol source payment? No Source Number Date of Approved Waiver Request Period Period Serial Number **Payment Name** Covered From Covered To STEELE CE-015 Crown 06/30/2015 11/30/2016 Operationally justified. Expense payment for CHS for costs associated with sub-source endeavoring to set up meetings between WMDD and individual with information. Per IOD, Financial Justification: original request for 5500 was cancelled and the instant request is being submitted. The total aggregate amount paid is automatically and incorrectly filled in the form. To date, 2013, the CHS has been paid \$74,000 in service payments. Another request for \$15,000 in service payments is in the system. DETAILS ABOUT THE REQUESTED DRAFT Attributable to Agent Financial Program/Subprogram Catalog File No. Amount or CHS Other Miscellaneous **CHS** Expense \$1,500.00 Description: **Total For** \$1,500.00 \$1,500.00 Total **ACCOUNTING DETAILS** Org Level 2 Fund SOC Sub SOC **BBFY EBFY** Partition **User Dimension 5 FBI**

FD	-79	4b
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PAYMENT REQUEST

	FINANCE OFFICE O	NLY - SETTLEMENT	OF ADVANCE		
Document No.:	Creator Date	Creator Initials	FOS Approver Date	FOS Approver Initials	
Commitment:	_				
Obligation:					
Advance:		4	-		
Expense:					
Cash Receipt:					
Cash Receipt – OTCnet (CRO):	-16				
OTCnet Deposit Ticket #:					
Debit/Draft/EFT No.:					
Prior Month	Advance Balance:			_	
	This Advance:				
	Less Receipts:				
Qui a Zeli				_	
Funds Returned and	or Cash on Hand:			_	
Amount	to be Reimbursed:				
		APPROVAL			
1874-0 198	Nan	ne	Dat	te/Time	
Approved By SSA:			5/5/2016 8:1	0:21 AM	
Certified by ASAC:			5/5/2016 9:1	9:14 AM	
Draft Approval Officer:				-	

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PAYMENT RECEIPT

Received from Gaeta, Michael J the total amount of \$15,000.00 representing \$15,000.00 for services rendered and/or \$0.00 for expenses for the period 07/11/2015 from to 02/29/2016. 10 350 6 8

Date

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY:

Payment Name: Crown

Page 1 of 1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Witness (Printed)

FD-794b FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PAYMENT REQUEST

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 07/21/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

PAYMENT REQUEST

Payment Request Form Type: General

Official Bureau Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID:

Phone Number:

Payee Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID:

Payment Name: Crown

Enclosures:

Include if payment is for reimbursement of case-related expenditures made by the CHS.

Enclosed are receipts for expenses incurred by the Confidential Human Source (CHS) at the behest of the FBI, which are being reimbursed as expenses. (or) Enclosed is a statement documenting the amount spent by the CHS, the date(s) and the reason(s) why a receipt could not be obtained.

CHS was opened/re-opened on: 10/30/2013 Aggregate Total Paid: \$74,000.00

Total Paid since re-open (if needed): \$0.00

Total Paid in Current FY: \$0.00

Is this payment for medical expenses?

No

Is the CHS expected to testify?

No

Financial Justification

Agents should utilize this block to document the operational necessity for expenditures (i.e. costs associated with a CHS debrief; utilization of Undercover Credit Card for CHS expenses; agent exceeding per diem allowance; alcohol consumption by agent) which normally would require separate SAC/ASAC approval. See Confidential Funding Guide for other expenditures. Specific operational details should not be entered here.

Operationally justified. Service payment for CHS endeavoring with sub source(s) to respond to significant taskings from CyD and CID. As has been the case for all prior requests, despite efforts to rectify within DELTA, the total aggregate amount paid is automatically and incorrectly filled in the form. To date, since 2013, the CHS has been paid \$89,000 in service payments. Additionally, as incorrectly noted in the form the "aggregate threshold" HAS NOT been exceed. Despite numerous efforts to change this within DELTA, it incorrectly remains.

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FD-794b	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FD-794D	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
	PAYMENT REQUEST

The Attorney General's Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a CHS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official. However, in extraordinary circumstances, the SAC is authorized to approve an exemption to this requirement. This allows the FBI Agent to be the payer and only witness.

Is SAC approval for an exemption to the second witness requirement requested for this payment?

Period covered for this payment:

Begin: 03/01/2016 End: 05/31/2016

	Almohi Ammoni Ammoni	
	Payment Request Amount	
Substantive Case File Number	Financial Program	Financial Subprogram
	E6	RQ
Payment Description	Expense Incurred By	Payment Amount
CHS Services	CHS Service	\$6,000.00

Operational Payment justification narrative:

Operationally justified. Service payment for CHS endeavoring with sub source(s) to respond to significant taskings from CyD and CID. As has been the case for all prior requests, despite efforts to rectify within DELTA, the total aggregate amount paid is automatically and incorrectly filled in the form. To date, since 2013, the CHS has been paid \$89,000 in service payments. Additionally, as incorrectly noted in the form the "aggregate threshold" HAS NOT been exceed. Despite numerous efforts to change this within DELTA, it incorrectly remains.

Warning: You have exceeded the aggregate threshold. It is recommended that you submit your request for additional authority to your appropriate FIMU.

Total CHS Services: \$6,000.00

Total CHS Expenses: \$0.00

Total Agent Expenses: \$0.00

SIGNATURE

Submitted By First Level Approved By Second Level Approved By

FD-794b	Page 2 of 2	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FD-794b FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PAYMENT REQUEST **DRAFT TYPE** Request Type: General Payment Type: Confidential Forfeiture or Drug Related: No INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTING EMPLOYEE Official Bureau Name UEID **Date of Request** Gaeta, Michael 07/21/2016 **Field Office User Dimension 4 Telephone Number** Squad International Operations Legat Rome INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTED PAYEE UEID Payee Name Gaeta, Michael Is this a one-time non-symbol source payment? No Source Number Period Period Serial Number **Payment Name Date of Approved** Waiver Request **Covered From** Covered To STEELE CE-017 Crown 03/01/2016 05/31/2016 Operationally justified. Service payment for CHS endeavoring with sub source(s) to respond to significant taskings from CyD and CID. As has been the case for all prior requests, despite efforts to rectify within DELTA, the total aggregate amount paid is automatically and Financial Justification: incorrectly filled in the form. To date, since 2013, the CHS has been paid \$89,000 in service payments. Additionally, as incorrectly noted in the form the "aggregate threshold" HAS NOT been exceed. Despite numerous efforts to change this within DELTA, it incorrectly remains. **DETAILS ABOUT THE REQUESTED DRAFT** Attributable to Agent Catalog File No. Financial Program/Subprogram Amount or CHS **CHS Service** Description: **CHS Services** \$6,000.00 \$6,000.00 Total Fo \$6,000.00 Total **ACCOUNTING DETAILS** Org Level 2 Fund SOC Sub SOC **BBFY EBFY** Partition **User Dimension 5 FBI**

FD-794b

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PAYMENT REQUEST

	FINANCE OFFICE OF	NLY - SETTLEMENT	OF ADVANCE		
ocument No.:	Creator Date	Creator Initials	FOS Approver Date	FOS Approver Initials	
Commitment:	_				
Obligation:					
Advance:					
Expense:	_	_		_	
Cash Receipt:			_		
Cash Receipt – OTCnet (CRO):					
OTCnet Deposit Ticket #:					
Debit/Draft/EFT No.:					
Prior Month	Advance Balance:			_	
	This Advance:				
	Less Receipts:				
E 1 B 1	A STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR				
Funds Returned and					
Amount	to be Reimbursed:			_	
		APPROVAL			
100-40-00	Nan	ne	Dat	te/Time	
Approved By SSA:			7/21/2016 5	31:17 AM	
Certified by ASAC:			7/21/2016 9:	58:02 AM	
Draft Approval Officer:	-			4	

CHS	PAYMENT RECEIPT
RECEIVED FROM PRINT NAM	FOR THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF \$ 6000 FOR 4584 638
SERVICES RENDERED AND/OR \$	FOR THE EXPENSES FOR THE PERIOD FROM
TO	ν
	O THAT MONIES PAID FOR SERVICES ARE CONSIDERED UST REPORTED TO THE APPROPRIATE TAX AUTHORITIES.
(Markey)	CROWN
	CHS PAYMENT NAME (PRINTED)
	DATE PAYING AGENT (PRINTED)
	DATE WITNESS (PRINTED)

FD-794b FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PAYMENT REQUEST

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 09/29/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

PAYMENT REQUEST

Payment Request Form Type: General

Official Bureau Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID:

hone Number

Phone Number:

Payee Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID:

Payment Name: Crown

Enclosures:

Include if payment is for reimbursement of case-related expenditures made by the CHS.

Enclosed are receipts for expenses incurred by the Confidential Human Source (CHS) at the behest of the FBI, which are being reimbursed as expenses. (or) Enclosed is a statement documenting the amount spent by the CHS, the date(s) and the reason(s) why a receipt could not be obtained.

CHS was opened/re-opened on: 10/30/2013 Aggregate Total Paid: \$74,000.00

Total Paid since re-open (if needed): \$0.00

Total Paid in Current FY: \$0.00

Is this payment for medical expenses?

No

Is the CHS expected to testify?

No

Financial Justification

Agents should utilize this block to document the operational necessity for expenditures (i.e. costs associated with a CHS debrief; utilization of Undercover Credit Card for CHS expenses; agent exceeding per diem allowance; alcohol consumption by agent) which normally would require separate SAC/ASAC approval. See Confidential Funding Guide for other expenditures. Specific operational details should not be entered here.

NΑ

The Attorney General's Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a CHS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official. However, in extraordinary circumstances, the SAC is authorized to approve an exemption to this requirement. This allows the FBI Agent to be the payer and only witness.

FD-794b FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PAYMENT REQUEST

Is SAC approval for an exemption to the second witness requirement requested for this payment?

No

Period covered for this payment:

Begin: 06/02/2016 **End:** 07/30/2016

	Payment Request Amount	
Substantive Case File Number	Financial Program	Financial Subprogram
Payment Description	Expense Incurred By	Payment Amount
CHS Services	CHS Service	\$7,500.00

Operational Payment justification narrative:

Source has provided intelligence regarding the murder of a Russian citizen in Washington DC that ties back to Russian OC members close to government officials in Russia. CHS has also provided significant cyber intrusion efforts by Russian government officials and private sector (energy) principals against western entities. CHS has also provided significant intelligence regarding criminal espionage efforts between entities in the US and Russia. This intelligence will be the subject of an additional request prepared by CD elements at a later date.

Total CHS Services: \$7,500.00

Total CHS Expenses: \$0.00

Total Agent Expenses: \$0.00

SIGNATURE

Submitted By First Level Approved By Second Level Approved By

FD-794b Page 2 of 2 FEDERAL BUREAU OF I

FD-794b FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PAYMENT REQUEST **DRAFT TYPE** Request Type: General Payment Type: Confidential Forfeiture or Drug Related: No INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTING EMPLOYEE UEID Official Bureau Name **Date of Request** Gaeta, Michael 09/29/2016 Field Office **Telephone Number** Squad **User Dimension 4** International Operations Legat Rome INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTED PAYEE UEID **Payee Name** Gaeta, Michael Is this a one-time non-symbol source payment? No Date of Approved Waiver Request Source Number Serial Number **Payment Name** Period Period **Covered From** Covered To STEELE CE-019 Crown 06/02/2016 07/30/2016 Financial Justification: DETAILS ABOUT THE REQUESTED DRAFT Catalog Attributable to Agent File No. Financial Program/Subprogram Amount or CHS **CHS Service** Description: **CHS Services** \$7,500.00 \$7,500.00 **Total For** Total \$7,500.00 **ACCOUNTING DETAILS** SOC Org Level 2 Fund Sub SOC BBFY **EBFY** Partition **User Dimension 5** FBI

FD-794b

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PAYMENT REQUEST

	FINANCE OFFICE O	NLY - SETTLEMENT	OF ADVANCE		
ocument No.:	Creator Date	Creator Initials	FOS Approver Date	FOS Approver Initials	
Commitment:					
Obligation:					
Advance:					
Expense:	_	_		1	
Cash Receipt:			_		
Cash Receipt – OTCnet (CRO):					
OTCnet Deposit Ticket #:					
Debit/Draft/EFT No.:					
Prior Mont	Advance Balance:				
	This Advance:				
	WANTED STATE OF				
	Less Receipts:				
Funds Returned an	d/or Cash on Hand:			_	
Amoun	t to be Reimbursed:			_	
		APPROVAL			
100-00-00	Nan	ne	Dat	e/Time	
Approved By SSA:			9/29/2016 10):47:26 AM	
Certified by ASAC:	0		10/13/2016	6:39:40 PM	
Draft Approval Officer:	1		- (0	-	

FD-794b FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PAYMENT REQUEST

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 10/18/2016

Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

PAYMENT REQUEST

Payment Request Form Type: General

Official Bureau Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID:

Phone Number:

Payee Name: Gaeta, Michael

UEID:

Payment Name:

Enclosures:

Include if payment is for reimbursement of case-related expenditures made by the CHS.

Crown

Enclosed are receipts for expenses incurred by the Confidential Human Source (CHS) at the behest of the FBI, which are being reimbursed as expenses. (or) Enclosed is a statement documenting the amount spent by the CHS, the date(s) and the reason(s) why a receipt could not be obtained.

CHS was opened/re-opened on: 10/30/2013
Aggregate Total Paid: \$74,000.00

Total Paid since re-open (if needed): \$0.00

Total Paid in Current FY: \$0.00

Is this payment for medical expenses?

Is the CHS expected to testify?

Financial Justification

Agents should utilize this block to document the operational necessity for expenditures (i.e. costs associated with a CHS debrief; utilization of Undercover Credit Card for CHS expenses; agent exceeding per diem allowance; alcohol consumption by agent) which normally would require separate SAC/ASAC approval. See Confidential Funding Guide for other expenditures. Specific operational details should not be entered here.

\$15,000 service payment initiated by Counterintelligence Division for information from July 5, 2016 to October 3, 2016, to include CHS meeting with CD representatives in Rome on October 3, 2016.

The Attorney General's Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a CHS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official. However, in extraordinary circumstances, the SAC is authorized to approve an exemption to this requirement. This allows the FBI Agent to be the payer and only witness.

FD-794b	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	
	PAYMENT REQUEST	

Is SAC approval for an exemption to the second witness requirement requested for this payment?

No

Period covered for this payment:

Begin: 07/05/2016 End: 10/03/2016

Manager and the second	Payment Request Amount	
Substantive Case File Number	Financial Program	Financial Subprogram
97F-HQ-2063661		
Payment Description	Expense Incurred By	Payment Amount
CHS Services	CHS Service	\$15,000.00

Operational Payment justification narrative:

This payment was initiated by SA Brian Gessford and approved by the CD chain of command who are assigned to the captioned 97F investigation. The funds have been transferred to IOD from CD in advance of payment to the CHS. The following statement is from UC Joe Pientka of CD. Team investigators met with CHS in Rome on October 3, 2016.

CHS STEE provides very interesting and unique reporting specific to the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE investigation. His/her reporting is corroborative of Intel we received from a FGI that predicated our investigation. To date, we have not received Intel from other sources that so closely tracks to the predicate. In addition, the CHS reporting provided PC for a FISA (currently in coordination, but an expedite is expected this week)on a subject of CROSSFIRE HURRICANE – CROSSFIRE DRAGON. The CROSSFIRE HURRICANE Team would like to continue working with you to possibly task your source to provide the FBI with intelligence and evidence in support of our investigation.

Total CHS Services: \$15,000.00

Total CHS Expenses: \$0.00

Total Agent Expenses: \$0.00

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By

Second Level Approved By

FD-794b	Page 2 of 2	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FD-794b FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PAYMENT REQUEST **DRAFT TYPE** Request Type: General Payment Type: Confidential Forfeiture or Drug Related: No INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTING EMPLOYEE UEID Official Bureau Name **Date of Request** Gaeta, Michael 10/18/2016 Telephone Number Field Office Squad **User Dimension 4** International Operations Legat Rome INFORMATION ABOUT THE REQUESTED PAYEE UEID **Payee Name** Gaeta, Michael Is this a one-time non-symbol source payment? No Date of Approved Waiver Request Period Source Number Serial Number **Payment Name** Period **Covered From** Covered To STEELE CE-020 Crown 07/05/2016 10/03/2016 \$15,000 service payment initiated by Counterintelligence Division for information from July 5, 2016 to October 3, 2016, to include CHS meeting with CD representatives in Rome on October 3, 2016. Financial Justification: DETAILS ABOUT THE REQUESTED DRAFT Attributable to Agent Financial Program/Subprogram Catalog File No. **Amount** or CHS

CHS Services

EBFY

ACCOUNTING DETAILS

BBFY

Total For 97F-HQ-2063661

Partition

FBI

97F-HQ-2063661

Sub SOC

SOC

Fund

Description:

CHS Service

Org Level 2

Contraction with	
STEEL	~E_020

\$15,000.00

\$15,000.00 \$15,000.00

User Dimension 5

FD-794b

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PAYMENT REQUEST

F	INANCE OFFICE O	NLY - SETTLEMENT	OF ADVANCE		
Document No.:	Creator Date	Creator Initials	FOS Approver Date	FOS Approver Initials	
Commitment:			_		
Obligation:				-	
Advance:			-	-	
Expense:					
Cash Receipt:	J. y				
Cash Receipt – OTCnet (CRO):	-		·		
OTCnet Deposit Ticket #:					
Debit/Draft/EFT No.:	il a				
Prior Month Adv	ance Balance:				
	This Advance:				
	ANGUARD CONTRACTOR				
	Less Receipts:				
Funds Returned and/or (Cash on Hand:			_	
Amount to b	e Reimbursed:	S. PHE		_	
		APPROVAL			
100-000	Nan	ne	Dat	te/Time	
Approved By SSA:			10/19/2016	1	
	Certified by ASAC:		10/19/2016	10:24:49 AM	
Draft Approval Officer:				4	

FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



HEADER

Source ID:

Date: 07/07/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact: 07/05/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: In Person

Country: UNITED KINGDOM

City: London

Date of Report: 07/07/2016

Substantive Case File Number

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

Nο

Source Reporting:

On July 5, 2016, CHS provided the following information:

Insiders at the Kremlin are very concerned about the current FBI criminal investigation into the Russian athletics doping scandal. Head of the Presidental Administration, Sergei IVANOV, referred to whistleblower, Grigoriy RODCHINKOV, as a "perebezhchik" (defector), who had access to highly sensitive information on Russian doping activities. A Kremlin lawyer stated that the IVANOV and PUTIN were very concerned about the investigation. A Russian public relations consultant with close ties to U.S. firm, KETCHUM, was instructed by the Kremlin to launch a discreet PR counter offensive against RODCHINKOV, the USG, IAAF and IOC, to discredit each.

In June 2016, Russian oligarch and close PUTIN associate, Gennady TIMCHENKO, discussed rumors surrounding the recent deaths of former heads of the Russian Anti-Doping Agency, Vyachslav SINYEV and FNU KAMAYEV. TIMCHENKO is also worried about the criminal investigation. He stated that SINYEV died of natural causes in February 2016. However, TIMCHENKO stated that KAMAYEV had died "like Paul I (Tsar)," who was brutally murdered but presented as having had a sudden medical problem. TIMCHENKO implied that KAMAYEV had been murdered on the Kremlin's orders in order to prevent him from speaking about the Russian state sponsored doping efforts. This also served to terrify Russian sport insiders.

In June 2016, Russian olympian, Yelena ISINBAYEVA, stated that she had been paid \$100,000 by the Kremlin to lobby against the ban on Russian atheletes at the Rio Olympics. ISINBAYEVA put her name to an op-ed piece published in the New York Times on June 15, 2016. Former Russian Athletics Federation head, Valentin BLAKNICHEV, stated that he had been bribed by the Russian Ministry of Sport to cover up various doping cases, to include the one against Olympic gymnast, Alina KABAEVA. KABAEVA, who became Putin's mistress, had been trained by Irina Viner, Alishir's USMANOV's wife. The bribe to KABAEVA allowed her to "lie low" and then return to compete internationally at the highest levels.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



SIGNATURE

Submitted By First Level Approved By Second Level Approved By

FD-1023	Page 2 of 2	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



HEADER

Source ID:

STEELE

Date:

07/07/2016

Case Agent Name:

Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division:

International Operations

Squad:

Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact:

07/05/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact:

In Person

Country:

UNITED KINGDOM

City:

London

Date of Report:

07/07/2016

FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

On July 5, 2016, CHS provided the following information:

A former top level intelligence officer divided Government of Russia (GOR) state-sponsored offensive cyber operations into the following four categories (in priority order): 1) Targeting foreign (western) governments; 2) penetrating leading foreign business corporations, especially banks; 3) domestic monitoring of Russian elite, and; 4) attacking political opponents at home and abroad. The FSB is the lead organization within the GOR for cyber operations.

A senior banking official within the GOR who receives cyber generated intelligence, stated the following: there had been only "liimited success" in penetrating "first tier" foreign targets. These comprised western (especially G7 and NATO) governments, security and intelligence services and central banks. To compensate, massive effort had been made to penetrate with greater success, "secondary targets," particularly western private banks and governments of smaller states allied to the West. Latvia was mentioned in this context. Hundreds of agents, consciously cooperating with the FSB or whose personal and professional IT systems had been compromised, were recruited in this effort. Many such agents had/have ethnic or family ties to Russia or were incentivized financially (money or contractual favors) to cooperate. The Russian Central Bank is complicit in the funding of this program and aiding in the laundering of these funds. This individual also stated that non-state sponsored cyber crime is becoming an increasing problem inside of Russia for GOR authorities. In 2015, there had been more than twenty attempts at serious cyber efforts to steal funds from corresponding bank accounts held in Russia, comprising several billion Roubles. Additionally, there are over 15 major organized crime groups inside of Russia operating in the cyber "space" which are largely outside of FSB control. Some of these groups are called ANUNAK, BUKTRAP and METEL. No further information was provided.

A Russian IT specialist reported in June 2016 that the FSB used coercion and blackmail to carry out its "deniable" offensive cyber operations. The individual had been caught laundering money for private Russian banks through Latvia by FSB Department K. The FSB threatened the individual with prosecution and prison if he/she did not cooperate with the FSB. Another individual began to cooperate with the FSB after being caught running an illegal pornographic website. The Russian IT specialist stated that Ilya OSSIPOV, a U.S. citizen of Russian/Jewish origin, had been knowingly approached and propositioned by the FSB while on a business trip to Russia. OSSIPOV was originally from Nizhniy Novogrod and developed the IT platform known as "I21." OSSIPOV was in Russia to attract investors for his new platform to upgrade it onto mobile platforms. The FSB was aware of this and offered to provide capital to OSSIPOV in return for being able to access and modify "I21" with a view towards targeting priority Turkish and Arab targets. The FSB intended to plant Trojans in the software, OSSIPOV initially refused the offer. The FSB also implied they had had success installing cheap Russian IT games containing their own malware on targets' PC's and other platforms. It was unknown if there was any further interaction with OSSIPOV. This IT specialist also stated that the "TELEGRAM" enciphered commercial system had been heavily targeted and likely compromised by the FSB because it was used frequently by Russian political activists.

An IT operator inside Russian energy giant ROSNEFT, who had been employed on conventional defensive IT work for ROSNEFT, advised of the following: this IT operator had been under instruction for the last year to conduct an offensive cyber operation against a former foreign director of ROSNEFT, Italian citizen, Guillermo QUINTERO. The FSB has successfully penetrated QUINTERO's personal IT and through this had accessed various important institutions in Italy and other countries through the back door, in particular, BANK INTESSA. Former GOR intelligence official and ROSNEFT CEO, Igor SECHIN, wanted QUINTERO's movements and meetings monitored to confirm/corroborate what QUINTERO was advising SECHIN and the ROSNEFT board. This operation has also provided ROSNEFT and the FSB with access to ex-Italian prime minister BERLUSCONI's IT, communications and network of international contacts. According to the IT operator, the technical expectations of this operation by the FSB had already been exceeded. This individual also stated that it was highly likely that a similar FSB cyber operation was conducted against an ExxonMobil member of the ROSNEFT Board (possibly Donald HUMPHREYS).

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



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FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 10/19/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact: 10/19/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: e-Mail

Date of Report: 10/19/2016

Substantive Case File Number

97F-HQ-2063661

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

The attached documetn is a memo from the CHS describing intelligence that CHS received from Jon WINER, US Department of State on October 18, 2016. CHS has stated that CHS has a business association with WINER. The memo describes how WINER obtained the intelligence and that it is apparently from a FSB sub-source. The information describes the FSB efforts at successfully compromising Donald TRUMP.

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Submitted By

First Level Approved By

Second Level Approved By

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FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 10/18/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact: 10/18/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: Other
Other Contact Type: Skype

Date of Report: 10/18/2016

Substantive Case File Number

97F-HQ-2063661

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

On October 18, 2016, in response to specific tasking from FBI HQ CI representatives investigating the subject matter at hand, CHS STEE provided handling agent with the following information which was generated by three different sub-sources:

Sub-Source 1:

On July 7, 2016, Carter PAGE gave a high profile lecture in Moscow. On July 8, 2016, PAGE met personally and alone with Rosneft CEO, Igor SECHIN. The meeting may have occured in the same building as the lecture. During this meeting, SECHIN offered the following deal to PAGE, as a representative of the Donald TRUMP campaign: if TRUMP were to become President, SECHIN/ROSNEFT would offer 19% of ROSNEFT stock to TRUMP's administration to be "brokered" for sale to U.S. investors, as the TRUMP administration would see fit, in exchange for TRUMP lifting U.S. (Ukrainian-based) sanctions against Russia. PAGE's response was, "if my guy gets in, then he will lift sanctions."

Sub Source 2:

Michael COHEN is a private attorney for Donald TRUMP. COHEN is described as a "pivotal figure" in the chain of communication between the TRUMP campaign and the Kremlin. COHEN's wife is Russian. Her father, Yefin Fima SHUSTERMAN, is a successful Moscow-based property developer in Russia. SHUSTERMAN owns a Dacha in Barvikha, Russia outside of Moscow. This area is reserved only for the political and business elite. The Russian political leadership own their Dacha's in Barvikha.

Sub-Source 3:

Within the last few days, Igor SECHIN acknowledged that TRUMP would not win the presidential campaign. Additionally, PUTIN has admitted to senior intelligence officers that the FSB efforts to influence the US Presidential campaign failed and were "fucked up." Those involved were dismayed at the lack of traction of material leaked against Hillary CLINTON. They advised that the most compromising material has been put out but that they will "drip-feed" the remaining material through WIKILEAKS. The communication chain between the Kremlin and TRUMP's campaign is aware of this plan.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



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FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 10/21/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact: 10/20/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: Other

Other Contact Type: Skype/email

Date of Report: 10/21/2016

Substantive Case File Number

97F-HQ-2063661

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

On October 20, 2016, CHS TEE provided the following information, the body of which is contained in the attached report prepared by the CHS:

Donald TRUMP's personal attorney, Michael COHEN, met with Kremlin officials in August 2016 in the Czech capital of Prague under the cover of a Russian organization called ROSSOTRUDNICHESTEVO. Pro-PUTIN Russian Duma member, Konstantin KOSACHEV, Head of the Foreign Relations Committee, is reported as the facilitator and a participant of this meeting.

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FD-1040a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

HEADER

 Source ID:
 STEELE

 Date:
 07/07/2016

Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Substantive Case File

Number:

Stat Count: 4

Category: Countries
Sub Category: Russia

Stat Type: Activities Observed/Detected by CHS

Sub Stat Type: Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) Activity

Agency: N/A

Stat: FIS ACTIVITY OBSERVED/DETECTED BY SOURCE

Other Comments:

Total stat count claimed on this form: 4

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By Second Level Approved By

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UNCLASSIFIED

FD-1023

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 10/24/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact: 10/24/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

NA

Type of Contact: e-Mail

Date of Report: 10/24/2016

Substantive Case File Number

97F-HQ-2063661

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

On October 24, 2016, CHS STEE provided the following information, summarized below but contained in the attached report:

Igor DIVYEKIN, the main interlocutor between TRUMP CAMPAIGN advisor, Carter PAGE, and the Kremlin, was moved from the Presidential Administration Internal Affairs department to Charge d'Affaires at the State Duma to give DIVYEKIN cover and "diplomatic immunity" as protection from the USG and other foreign governments.

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By

Second Level Approved By

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FD-209a FEDERAL BUREAU

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS CONTACT REPORT

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 07/07/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 07/05/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: In Person

Country: UNITED KINGDOM

Address Line 1: London

Address Line 2:

City: London

ZIP/Postal Code:

Anomalies:

NA

Life Changes:

NA

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

NA

Other:

NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

HQ Division: Criminal Investigative Division

Program: TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROGRAM

Subprogram: EURASIAN CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES

This document requires final approval by an ASAC. Upon final approval, this document will be serialized in the Restricted Reporting subfile (Sub R) and uploaded to Sentinel.



FD-209a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHS CONTACT REPORT

HEADER

Source ID: Date:

Case Agent Name:

07/07/2016 Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 07/05/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: In Person

Country: UNITED KINGDOM

Address Line 1: London

Address Line 2:

City: London

ZIP/Postal Code:

Anomalies:

NA

Life Changes:

NA

NA

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

None Other:


PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

HQ Division: Criminal Investigative Division

Program: TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROGRAM

Subprogram: EURASIAN CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES

This document requires final approval by an ASAC. Upon final approval, this document will be serialized in the Restricted Reporting subfile (Sub R) and uploaded to Sentinel.



FD-209a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CHS CONTACT REPORT

HEADER

 Source ID:
 STEELE

 Date:
 08/02/2016

Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J
Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 07/19/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

NA

Type of Contact: Telephonic

Anomalies:

NA

Life Changes:

NA

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:


None
Other:
NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

HQ Division: Criminal Investigative Division

Program: TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROGRAM

Subprogram: EURASIAN CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES



FD-209a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS CONTACT REPORT

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 07/29/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 07/19/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

NA

Type of Contact: e-Mail

Anomalies:

NA

Life Changes:

NΑ

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

NA

Other:

NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

HQ Division: Criminal Investigative Division

Program: TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROGRAM

Subprogram: EURASIAN CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES



FD-209a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS CONTACT REPORT

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 10/19/2016

Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 10/19/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: e-Mail

Anomalies:

NA

Life Changes:

NA

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

After discussion with SA Steve Somma (CD), CHS was made aware that a target of the 97F-HQ-2063661 investigation is aware that two private investigators have been hired to find information on the target. No other information was provided.

Other:

NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

This document requires final approval by an ASAC. Upon final approval, this document will be serialized in the Restricted Reporting subfile (Sub R) and uploaded to Sentinel.

Substantive Case File Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

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FD-209a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS CONTACT REPORT

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 10/18/2016

Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 10/18/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: Other
Other Contact Type: Skype

Anomalies:

NA

Life Changes:

NA

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

None

Other:

NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

This document requires final approval by an ASAC. Upon final approval, this document will be serialized in the Restricted Reporting subfile (Sub R) and uploaded to Sentinel.

Substantive Case File Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

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FD-209a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS CONTACT REPORT

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 10/21/2016

Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 10/20/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: Other

Other Contact Type: Skype/email

Anomalies:

NΑ

Life Changes:

NA

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

NA

Other:

NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

This document requires final approval by an ASAC. Upon final approval, this document will be serialized in the Restricted Reporting subfile (Sub R) and uploaded to Sentinel.

Substantive Case File Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

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FD-209a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS CONTACT REPORT

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 10/24/2016

Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 10/24/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

NΑ

Type of Contact: e-Mail

Anomalies:

NA

Life Changes:

NA

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

NA

Other:

NA

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

This document requires final approval by an ASAC. Upon final approval, this document will be serialized in the Restricted Reporting subfile (Sub R) and uploaded to Sentinel.

Substantive Case File Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

FD-209a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS CONTACT REPORT

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 11/17/2016

Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 11/01/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

ALAT Mike Gaeta

Type of Contact: Telephonic

Anomalies:

CHS confirmed to an outside third party that CHS has a confidential relationship with the FBI.

Life Changes:

NA

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

NA

Other:

CHS confirmed to an outside third party that CHS has a confidential relationship with the FBI.

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

Substantive Case File Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

For documentation into the CHS file # STEELE code name "CROWN":

As stated by the CHS numerous times and as observed and noted by ALAT Mike Gaeta throughout the course of the relationship with the Bureau, the CHS' original and continuing motivation to engage the Bureau as a CHS was twofold: 1) to provide intelligence to the Bureau regarding high level criminal activity engaged in by Eurasian actors, and 2) to receive compensation for intelligence deemed valuable.

ALAT Mike Gaeta

For documentation into the CHS file # STEELE code name "CROWN":

As documented in a FD-1023 dated 11/17/16 and in the source closing document (FD-1040a) dated 11/17/16:

On October 31, 2016, the online magazine Mother Jones published the following article written by David Corn: "A Veteran Spy Has Given the FBI Information Alleging a Russian Operation to Cultivate Donald Trump." The article sources a "former Western Intelligence officer" as providing memos to the FBI regarding Donald Trump's interactions with Russia. On November 1, 2016, the handling agent directly asked the CHS if the CHS spoke to the reporter in question. The CHS responded "yes I did." The CHS added that the CHS was "concerned about the behavior of [the FBI]" and was "troubled by the actions of [the FBI] last Friday." The CHS stated that the FBI owed the CHS a payment for services however the CHS stated "the payment was a secondary issue." At that time, the handling agent advised CHS that the nature of the relationship between the FBI and CHS would change completely and that it was unlikely that the FBI would continue a relationship with the CHS. Additionally, handling agent advised that CHS was not to operate to obtain any intelligence whatsoever on behalf of the FBI. There was no further contact with the CHS and the CHS was closed on November 17, 2016.

The November 1, 2016 conversation was the first and only instance that the CHS indicated to the handling agent a motivation for CHS' actions and engagement with the Bureau other than originally described. This was the first and only instance that the handling agent observed a motivation by the CHS other than originally described.

ALAT Mike Gaeta



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U//FOUO) CHS STEELE Admonishments Date: 02/02/2016

From: ROME

Case ID #:

Contact: GAETA MICHAEL JOSEPH,

Approved By:

Drafted By: GAETA MICHAEL JOSEPH

Synopsis: (U//FOUO) A/Legat Mike Gaeta met in person with CHS

on January 25, 2016 and verbally admonished the CHS.

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. (U//FOUO) AGG

Details:

On January 25, 2016, A/Legat Mike Gaeta met with STELLE to debrief the CHS. After the debriefing was completed, A/Legat Gaeta verbally admonished the CHS with CHS admonishments, which the CHS fully acknowledged, signed and dated. The signed CHS AGG admonishments form is attached to this EC as a 1A.

**

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CHS Admonishments

Filing and Security*

Administrative*

Witness Information*

Synopsis

Approval Routing*



GAFTA MICHAEL T International Operations Legat Rome

- 1. The CHS's assistance and the information provided to the FBI are entirely voluntary.
- 2. The CHS must provide truthful information to the FBI.
- 3. The CHS must abide by the instructions of the FBI and must not take or seek to take any independent actions on behalf of the US Government.
- 4. The US Government will strive to protect the CHS's identity but cannot guarantee it will not be divulged.

If applicable to the particular circumstances of the CHS, or as they become applicable, the following admonishments must be completed. They need not be given if they have no relevance to the CHS's situation. (For example, the immunity instruction need not be given unless there is an issue of apparent criminal liability or penalties relating to the CHS. The Attorney General's Guidelines emphasize, however, that whether or not these instructions are given, the FEI has no authority to confer immunity and that agencs must avoid giving any person the erroneous impression that they have any such authority.) Indicate whether the following instructions were given:

1. The FBI on its own cannot promise or agree to any immunity from prosecution or other consideration by an FPO, a state or local prosecutor, or a court in exchange for the CHS's cooperation because the decision to confer any such benefit lies within the exclusive discretion of the prosecutor or court. However, the FBI will consider (but not necessarily act upon) advising the appropriate prosecutor of the nature and extent of the CHS's essistance. to the FBI. (This instruction should be given if there is any apparent issue of criminal liability or penalty.)*

(*Yes* No ** The Admonishment #1 field is required.

2. The CHS is not authorized to engage in any criminal activity and has no immunity from prosecution for any unauthorized criminal activity. (This instruction is not necessary for CHSs who have such authorization. This instruction should be repeated if the CHS is suspected of committing unauthorized illegal activity.) **

Yes ** No ** The Adminishment #2 seld is provided.**

Yes No. 10 The Admonishment #2 field is required.

3. The CHS is not an employee of the US Government and may not represent himself/herself as such. (This instruction should be given to all CHSs except under those circumstances where the CHS previously has been or continues to be otherwise employed by the US Government.)* YesC No @ The Admonishment #3 field is required.

4. The CHS may not enter into any contract or incur any obligation on behalf of the US Government, except as specifically instructed or approved by the FBI. (This instruction should be given to all CHSs except to those CHSs who are otherwise authorized to enter into a contract or incur an obligation on the US.)*

Tyes No The Admonishment #4 field is required.

5. No promises or commitments can be made, except by the Department of Homeland Security, regarding the alien status of any person or the right of any person to enter or remain in the U.S. (This instruction should be provided if there is any apparent issue of immigration status that relates to the CHS.)**

Yes? No The Admonishment #5 field is required.

The FBI cannot guarantee any rewards, payments, or other compensation to the CHS.*

Yes No The Admonishment #6 field is required.

7. Each time a CHS subject to the AGGs receives any awards, payments, or other compensation from the FBI, the CHS shall be advised at the time of the payment that ha/she is liable for any taxes that may be owed on that compensation.**

Yes No 1 The Admonishment #7 field is required.

8. Whenever it becomes apparent that the CHS may have to testify in a court or other proceeding, the CHS must be advised of that possibility.* Yes No The Admonishment #8 field is required.

Additional Instructions Based on Employment or Position

I. If a CHS is in a position to obtain information from a subject who is facing pending criminal charges for whom his/her Sixth Amendment right to counserns attached, the CHS must be advised not to solicit such information from the subject regarding the pending charges.* The Additional Instructions #1 field is required.

2. For CHSs in a position to obtain information from a subject who is represented by counsel or planning a legal defense, the CHS must be advised not to interfere with an attorney/client relationship.** Frest No The Additional Instructions #2 field is required.

3. If the CHS is an employee of a financial institution, the CHS must be advised that he/she remains subject to the provisions of the Right to Financial Privacy Act and that the FBI will not knowingly accept information which violates the provisions of the Act.* resc No The Additional Instructions #3 field is required.

4. If the CHS is an employee of an educational institution, the CHS must be advised that he/she remains subject to the provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (20 USC Sec. 1232g) known as the Buckley Amendment. C YesC No I The Additional Instructions #4 field is required.

5. If the CHS is a union official of any rank charged with the duties and obligations under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 (29 USC) (i.e., having responsibilities related to retirement, benefits, or other acome benefits of union members) he/she must be advised that he/she remains subject to reporting provisions of the ERISA. The CHS must not operate in a manner which adversely affects the operation of union affiliated pension, welfare, and benefit plans.*

C YesC No The Additional Instructions #5 field is required.

CHS Admonishments

Filing and Security*

Previous

Administrative*


Admonishments*

Witness Information*

Synopsis

Approval Routing*

Review



Provided verbally un person by ALAT Mike Gaeta on 1/25/16.





Human Source Validation Report

HUMINT Operations Section, Validation Management Unit

Classified by:	
Derived from:	
Declassify on:	3

(U//FOUO) Human Source Validation Report:

STEELE

(U) Summary

(S//NF) Validation Management Unit (VMU) concurs with the closing of STEELE VMU assesses it is likely^a

NMU assesses it is likely^a

NMU makes this assessment with medium confidence,^b based on the fact that STEELE is reporting has been minimally corroborated; his or her access and placement is commensurate with his or her reporting; and on the presence of one major control issue noted in STEELE is Delta file.

He or she provided information regarding various issues of value to the US Intelligence Community (USIC). However, STEELE exposed his or her relationship with the FBI. As a result, he or she was closed. VMU has provided a list of recommendations should he or she be re-opened.

(U) Details

This Human Source Validation Report (HSVR) conveys VMU's validation review and assessment of STEELE for the period of 30 October 2013 to 01 November 2016.

(Resides outside US and extra-territorial

traveler)

Purpose of Review: Special Request

Primary Reporting Program: Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Secondary Reporting Program: Counterintelligence Division (CD)

Field Office: Legal Attaché (LEGAT) Rome (RO)

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(U) Administrative

(U//FOUO) Validation is a multilayered process that may begin before meeting a potential CHS and may not end until sometime after the CHS relationship is terminated. As such, the collection of complete and current biographical data is critical to the accurate validation of the CHS. The Quarterly SSA Source Report (QSSR) ensures the CHS is properly managed; the Field Office Annual Source Report (FOASR) is designed to be the annual review of the CHS by the Special Agent and the Field Office. The FBIHQ VMU CHS validation reviews are prioritized using high-risk characteristics outlined in the Confidential Human Source Policy Guide (CHSPG) and the

^b (U) See Appendix B (Confidence in Assessments and Judgments Based on a Body of Information).

^a (U) See Appendix A (Expressions of Likelihood).

c (U) This validation review includes a check of the following databases: Delta, Sentinel, TECS, Automated Case Support (ACS), OGA and Data Integration and Visualization System (DIVS), Counterintelligence and HUMINT Requirements Reporting Operations Management Environment (CHROME), and OGA

VMU conducted database checks on 09 February 2017.



FBI INTERNAL USE ONLY
Confidential Human Source Coordinator (CHSC); Handling Agent: Michael J. Gaeta Date CHS was Opened/Closed: 30 October 2013; Closed 01 November 2016
(U) Background
He or she came to the attention of the FBI after being referred by the Department of Justice (DOJ). In the course of being operated, he or she provided information concerning the bribery scandal for the upcoming 2018 Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and its proposed location in Russia, the pending United States (US) election concerning Donald Trump, potential Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) issues, and a cyber-attack from the People's Republic of China (PRC) on a foreign pharmaceutical company. STEELE was closed on 01 November 2016 due to disclosing his or her relationship to an online publication website. This is the first HSVR completed on
(U) Suitability
VMU assesses it was likely STEELE was suitable for continued operation at the time based on his or her authenticity and reliability. However, due to the disclosure of his or her relationship with the FBI to an online publication, STEELE was subsequently closed.
(U) Authenticity
According to information contained in the Delta file, there are no reasons to doubt his or her identity. The ALAT has sufficiently verified sidentity through background investigations and updated criminal history checks during the operation.
• VMU conducted a on 09 February 2017 and verified the existence of STEELE states privately owned company.
• According to the FOASR. STEELE s access is listed as indirect.
VMU notes The identity of the sub-sources are not fully identified in the reporting. VMU notes should he or she be re-opened in the future, VMU recommends documenting all of the sub-sources' identities in the Delta file. The FOASR also mentions the sub-sources being motivated by money. VMU notes there is no mention if spaying these sub-sources. VMU recommends the ALAT follow-up regarding this matter.

 VMU was able to verify STEELE s information on the selectors for the Russian doctor Mikhail KORIAGIN who is attempting to weaponize the Ebola virus.

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VMU notes no motivation is documented in the FOASRs from the Delta file. However, the FO has updated the Delta file to include his or her motivation. VMU assesses monetary compensation to be a potential motivation for the time of being operated, VMU notes \$127,500.00 in payments. However, the closing EC documents paying \$95,000.00. Should the polita file.

(U) Reliability

- During STEELE so operation, VMU found no issues regarding his or her reliability.
- VMU did not locate any information to suggest STEELE fabricated information during the operation.

(U) Control

• While being operated, VMU did not locate information indicating STEELE was under the control of an outside entity. Furthermore, VMU noted no indication he or she would divulge their relationship with the FBI to the public.

(U) Production Review/Investigative Support

VMU assesses it is likely STEELE has informed the FBI across numerous programs. VMU makes this assessment with medium confidence, based on collection requirements addressed, IIRs produced, investigations supported, and minimal corroborated reporting.

- Since being opened, STEELE s reporting resulted in the dissemination of 10 IIRs.
- VMU notes due to STEELE significant in the FIFA scandal, it has resulted in four arrests, three convictions and agreed upon pleas of fraud. There was also pleas on bribery, structuring, tax evasion, fraud, and money laundering. Furthermore, there was approximately \$3.4 million dollars in forfeiture and an "additional unspecified amount of \$3 to \$4 million to be paid in satisfaction of tax debts by one of the defendants." (STEELE Main-9-Payment EC).
- also notes the information disseminated in one IIR from STEELE generated interest from an Other Government Agency (OGA) unit (STEELE Main Serial# 33).

(U) Corroboration

According to the FOASR, STEFLE has been corroborated by other intelligence sources (NFI). An FBI HQ IA noted



"extremely valuable and informative" (STEELE Main-8-Payment EC) with regards to Semion MOGILEVICH, an FBI Top Ten Fugitive.

Collection Requirements	
(U) Threat Issues	
	5
(U) Key Intelligence Questions:	
J Comments	
(U) Compliance Issues	



identity (A-13). According to the Confidential Human Source Policy Guide Section 15.2, SAC approval is required to disclose the identity of the CHS.

Even though concurrence for him or her to travel internationally. VMU notes STEELE traveled to Rome on 03 October 2016.
(U) Caveat
(U There are no caveats regarding STEELE
(U) Analyst Comments
VMU notes as a result of the disclosure of his or her relationship to an online publishing company, STEELE was closed. VMU notes the ALAT has addressed the following concerns in the Delta file to include STEELE as motivation and the reason behind divulging their relationship with the FBI to the public. Should the ALAT decide to re-open him or her, VMU has provided recommendations below. Furthermore, VMU notes difficulty in fully trusting him or her should they be re-opened in the future.
(U) Recommendations
Should STEELE be re-opened, VMU has provided a list of recommendations below.
VMU notes STEELE has provided much of his or her information through sub-sources. However, there is no documentation on the identities of all of the sub-sources. VMU notes sub-sources are individuals from whom FBI Sources obtain information. The Source, not the sub-source, reports the information directly to the handling agent. Sub-sources are not opened by the FO, are not operated at the direction of the FO, and therefore, cannot be controlled by the FBI. Additionally, they are not subject to the FBI's validation process, and their intelligence cannot necessarily be deemed reliable. Therefore, in order to prevent intelligence from being mistakenly disseminated within the Intelligence Community (IC) with the impression that it is derived from a reliable FBI Source, the information must be appropriately attributed to sub-source whose reliability is unknown. Source reporting must accurately describe the reliability of the information or its origin. As a result, the future handling agent of STEELE should identify all sub-sources providing information reported by and upload this into the Delta file. The ALAT should evaluate these sub-sources as potential Sources. VMU notes this will ensure the validity of the information being provided.
VMU discourages the use of e-mail to pass sensitive information. VMU recommends the ALAT reference Section for more information on policy requirements regarding communicating with SIELLE VMU also recommends making copies of all e-mails received and to pass them to the ALAT for scanning and upload them into Delta.

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VMU notes a lack of operational testing in the Delta file. Should be re-opened in the future, VMU recommends consulting with the Validation Operational Testing Unit (VOTU) regarding operational testing and uploading the results to the Delta file.
VMU recommends having STEELE refrain from bringing outside individuals to future debriefings. Should the FBI ALAT encounter another individual at future debriefs, VMU recommends providing proper concurrence for disclosure of the Source's identity.
Should there be future international travel for STEELE VMU recommends consulting with HCC prior to STEELE traveling.
According to the file, notes potential information being provided to FBI through STEELE is privately owned company. As a result, recommends consulting with
Should STEELE be re-opened, VMU recommends documenting any future corroboration and motivation to the Delta file.
recommends documenting if STEELE has paid his or her sub-sources for the information provided.
(U) Outlook
VMU assesses STEELE has provided valuable information for the FBI and across the USIC regarding multiple issues. However, VMU notes a serious control issue be addressed before re-opening STEELE VMU notes STEELE exposed their relationship with the FBI and has brought an individual to debriefings without prior notification and approval. VMU assesses there is a potential obstacle for the FBI to fully trust in him or her to not divulge the relationship again. Furthermore, VMU notes while STEELE access has been indirect through sub-sources, there does need to be an identification of them. VMU has provided several recommendations should he or she be re-opened.
(U) Consumers:
(U) From: VMU
(U) Drafted by:
(U) Case ID #:
(U) Approval:
(U) Contact:

FBI INTERNAL USE ONLY
6



(U) This HSVR was prepared by VMU. Please address any comments or questions to at

at

FBI INTERNAL USE ONLY



- (U) Appendix A: Expressions of Likelihood (or Probability)
- (U) Phrases such as "the FBI judges" and "the FBI assesses," and terms such as "likely" and "probably" convey analytical judgments and assessments. The chart approximates how expressions of likelihood and probability correlate with percentages of chance.

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Terms of Likelihood	Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain(ly)
Terms of Probability	Remote	Highly Improbable	Improbable (Improbably)	Roughly Even Odds	Probable (Probably)	Highly Probable	Nearly Certain
	1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%

(U) Unless otherwise stated, the FBI does not derive judgments via statistical analysis.



(U) Appendix B: Confidence in Assessments and Judgments Based on a Body of Information

- (U) Confidence levels reflect the quality and quantity of the source information supporting judgment. Consequently, the FBI ascribes high, medium, or low levels of confidence to assessments, as follows:
- (U) **High confidence** generally indicates the FBI's judgments are based on high quality information, from multiple sources. High confidence in a judgment does not imply the assessment is a fact or a certainty; such judgments might be wrong. While additional reporting and information sources may change analytical judgments, such changes are most likely to be refinements and not substantial in nature.
- (U) **Medium confidence** generally means the information is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence. Additional reporting or information sources have the potential to increase the FBI's confidence levels or substantively change analytical judgments.
- (U) **Low confidence** generally means the information's credibility or plausibility is uncertain, the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or the reliability of the sources is questionable. Absent additional reporting or information sources, analytical judgments should be considered preliminary in nature.

US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE DONALD TRUMP'S ACTIVITIES IN RUSSIA AND COMPROMISING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE KREMLIN

Summary

- Russian regime has been cultivating, supporting and assisting TRUMP for at least 5 years. Aim, endorsed by PUTIN, has been to encourage splits and divisions in western alliance
- So far TRUMP has declined various sweetener real estate business deals offered him in Russia in order to further the Kremlin's cultivation of him. However he and his inner circle have accepted a regular flow of intelligence from the Kremlin, including on his Democratic and other political rivals
- Former top Russian intelligence officer claims FSB has compromised TRUMP through his activities in Moscow sufficiently to be able to blackmail him. According to several knowledgeable sources, his conduct in Moscow has included perverted sexual acts which have been arranged/monitored by the FSB
- A dossier of compromising material on Hillary CLINTON has been collated by the Russian Intelligence Services over many years and mainly comprises bugged conversations she had on various visits to Russia and intercepted phone calls rather than embarrassing conduct. This dossier is controlled by chief Kremlin spokesman, PESKOV, on direct orders from PUTIN. It has not been distributed abroad as yet, including to TRUMP team, but PUTIN's intentions for its use remain unclear

Detail

 Speaking to a trusted compatriot in June 2016 sources A and B, a senior Russian Foreign Ministry figure and a former top-level Russian intelligence officer still active inside the Kremlin respectively, the Russian authorities had been cultivating and supporting US Republican presidential candidate, Donald TRUMP for at least 5 years. Source B asserted that the TRUMP operation was both supported and directed by Russian President Vladimir PUTIN. Its aim was to sow discord and disunity both within the US itself, but more especially within the Transatlantic alliance which was viewed as inimical to Russia's interests. Source C, a senior Russian financial official said the TRUMP operation should be seen in terms of PUTIN's desire to return to Nineteenth Century 'Great Power' politics, anchored upon countries' interests rather than the ideals-based international order established after World War Two. S/he had overheard PUTIN talking in this way to close associates on several occasions.

- 2. In terms of specifics, Source A confided that the Kremlin had been feeding TRUMP and his team valuable intelligence on his opponents for several years (see more below). This was confirmed by Source D, a close associate of TRUMP who had organized and managed his recent trips to Moscow, and who reported, also in June 2016, that this Russian intelligence had been "very helpful". The Kremlin's cultivation operation on TRUMP also had comprised offering him various lucrative real estate development business deals in Russia, especially in relation to the ongoing 2018 World Cup soccer tournament. However, so far, for reasons unknown, TRUMP had not taken up any of these.
- 3. However, there were other aspects to TRUMP's engagement with the Russian authorities. One which had borne fruit for them was to exploit TRUMP's personal obsessions and sexual perversion in order to obtain suitable 'kompromat' (compromising material) on him. According to Source D, where s/he had been present, TRUMP's (perverted) conduct in Moscow included hiring the presidential suite of the Ritz Carlton Hotel, where he knew President and Mrs OBAMA (whom he hated) had stayed on one of their official trips to Russia, and defiling the bed where they had slept by employing a number of prostitutes to perform a 'golden showers' (urination) show in front of him. The hotel was known to be under FSB control with microphones and concealed cameras in all the main rooms to record anything they wanted to.
- 4. The Moscow Ritz Carlton episode involving TRUMP reported above was confirmed by Source E, a senior (western) member of staff at the hotel, who said that s/he and several of the staff were aware of it at the time and subsequently. S/he believed it had happened in 2013. Source E provided an introduction for a company ethnic Russian operative to Source F, a female staffer at the hotel when TRUMP had stayed there, who also confirmed the story. Speaking separately in June 2016, Source B (the former top-level Russian intelligence officer) asserted that TRUMP's unorthodox behavior in Russia over the years had provided the authorities there with enough embarrassing material on the now Republican presidential candidate to be able to blackmail him if they so wished.
- Asked about the Kremlin's reported intelligence feed to TRUMP over recent years and rumours about a Russian dossier of 'kompromat' on Hillary CLINTON (being circulated), Source B confirmed the file's

existence. S/he confided in a trusted compatriot that it had been collated by Department K of the FSB for many years, dating back to her husband Bill's presidency, and comprised mainly eavesdropped conversations of various sorts rather than details/evidence of unorthodox or embarrassing behavior. Some of the conversations were from bugged comments CLINTON had made on her various trips to Russia and focused on things she had said which contradicted her current position on various issues. Others were most probably from phone intercepts.

6. Continuing on this theme, Source G, a senior Kremlin official, confided that the CLINTON dossier was controlled exclusively by senior Kremlin spokesman, Dmitriy PESKOV, on the direct instructions of PUTIN himself. The dossier had not been made available, as yet, inter alia, to any foreigners, including TRUMP and his inner circle. However PUTIN's intentions with regard to the dossier and its future dissemination remained unclear.

20 June 2016

8/29/16

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/100

RUSSIA/USA: GROWING BACKLASH IN KREMLIN TO DNC HACKING AND TRUMP SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Summary

- Head of PA IVANOV laments Russian intervention in US presidential election and black PR against CLINTON and the DNC. Vows not to supply intelligence to Kremlin PR operatives again. Advocates now sitting tight and denying everything
- Presidential spokesman PESKOV the main protagonist in Kremlin campaign to aid TRUMP and damage CLINTON. He is now scared and fears being made scapegoat by leadership for backlash in US. Problem compounded by his botched intervention in recent Turkish crisis
- Premier MEDVEDEV's office furious over DNC hacking and associated anti-Russian publicity. Want good relations with US and ability to travel there. Refusing to support or help cover up after PESKOV
- Talk now in Kremlin of TRUMP withdrawing from presidential race altogether, but this still largely wishful thinking by more liberal elements in Moscow

Detail

- Speaking in early August 2016, two well-placed and established Kremlin sources outlined the divisions and backlash in Moscow arising from the leaking of Democratic National Committee (DNC) e-mails and the wider pro-TRUMP operation being conducted in the US. Head of Presidential Administration, Sergei IVANOV, was angry at the recent turn of events. He believed the Kremlin "team" involved, led by presidential spokesman Dmitriy PESKOV, had gone too far in interfering in foreign affairs with their "elephant in a china shop black PR". IVANOV claimed always to have opposed the handling and exploitation of intelligence by this PR "team". Following the backlash against such foreign interference in US politics, IVANOV was advocating that the only sensible course of action now for the Russian leadership was to "sit tight and deny everything".
- Continuing on this theme the source close to IVANOV reported that PESKOV now was "scared shitless" that he would be scapegoated by PUTIN and the Kremlin and held responsible for the backlash against Russian political interference in the US election. IVANOV was determined

to stop PESKOV playing an independent role in relation to the US going forward and the source fully expected the presidential spokesman now to lay low. PESKOV's position was not helped by a botched attempt by him also to interfere in the recent failed coup in Turkey from a government relations (GR) perspective (no further details).

- 3. The extent of disquiet and division within Moscow caused by the backlash against Russian interference in the US election was underlined by a second source, close to premier Dmitriy MEDVEDEV (DAM). S/he said the Russian prime minister and his colleagues wanted to have good relations with the US, regardless of who was in power there, and not least so as to be able to travel there in future, either officially or privately. They were openly refusing to cover up for PESKOV and others involved in the DNC/TRUMP operations or to support his counter-attack of allegations against the USG for its alleged hacking of the Russian government and state agencies.
- 4. According to the first source, close to IVANOV, there had been talk in the Kremlin of TRUMP being forced to withdraw from the presidential race altogether as a result of recent events, ostensibly on grounds of his psychological state and unsuitability for high office. This might not be so bad for Russia in the circumstances but in the view of the source, it remained largely wishful thinking on the part of those in the regime opposed to PESKOV and his "botched" operations, at least for the time being.

5 August 2016

8/29/16

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/095

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER INDICATIONS OF EXTENSIVE CONSPIRACY BETWEEN TRUMP'S CAMPAIGN TEAM AND THE KREMLIN

Summary

- Further evidence of extensive conspiracy between TRUMP's campaign team and Kremlin, sanctioned at highest levels and involving Russian diplomatic staff based in the US
- TRUMP associate admits Kremlin behind recent appearance of DNC emails on WikiLeaks, as means of maintaining plausible deniability
- Agreed exchange of information established in both directions. TRUMP's team using moles within DNC and hackers in the US as well as outside in Russia. PUTIN motivated by fear and hatred of Hillary CLINTON. Russians receiving intel from TRUMP's team on Russian oligarchs and their families in US
- Mechanism for transmitting this intelligence involves "pension" disbursements to Russian emigres living in US as cover, using consular officials in New York, DC and Miami
- Suggestion from source close to TRUMP and MANAFORT that Republican campaign team happy to have Russia as media bogeyman to mask more extensive corrupt business ties to China and other emerging countries

Detail

- Speaking in confidence to a compatriot in late July 2016, Source E, an
 ethnic Russian close associate of Republican US presidential candidate
 Donald TRUMP, admitted that there was a well-developed conspiracy of
 co-operation between them and the Russian leadership. This was
 managed on the TRUMP side by the Republican candidate's campaign
 manager, Paul MANAFORT, who was using foreign policy advisor, Carter
 PAGE, and others as intermediaries. The two sides had a mutual interest
 in defeating Democratic presidential candidate Hillary CLINTON, whom
 President PUTIN apparently both hated and feared.
- Inter alia, Source E, acknowledged that the Russian regime had been behind the recent leak of embarrassing e-mail messages, emanating from the Democratic National Committee (DNC), to the WikiLeaks platform.

The reason for using WikiLeaks was "plausible deniability" and the operation had been conducted with the full knowledge and support of TRUMP and senior members of his campaign team. In return the TRUMP team had agreed to sideline Russian intervention in Ukraine as a campaign issue and to raise US/NATO defence commitments in the Baltics and Eastern Europe to deflect attention away from Ukraine, a priority for PUTIN who needed to cauterise the subject.

- 3. In the wider context of TRUMP campaign/Kremlin co-operation, Source E claimed that the intelligence network being used against CLINTON comprised three elements. Firstly there were agents/facilitators within the Democratic Party structure itself; secondly Russian émigré and associated offensive cyber operators based in the US; and thirdly, state-sponsored cyber operatives working in Russia. All three elements had played an important role to date. On the mechanism for rewarding relevant assets based in the US, and effecting a two-way flow of intelligence and other useful information, Source E claimed that Russian diplomatic staff in key cities such as New York, Washington DC and Miami were using the émigré 'pension' distribution system as cover. The operation therefore depended on key people in the US Russian émigré community for its success. Tens of thousands of dollars were involved.
- 4. In terms of the intelligence flow from the TRUMP team to Russia, Source E reported that much of this concerned the activities of business oligarchs and their families' activities and assets in the US, with which PUTIN and the Kremlin seemed preoccupied.
- 5. Commenting on the negative media publicity surrounding alleged Russian interference in the US election campaign in support of TRUMP, Source E said he understood that the Republican candidate and his team were relatively relaxed about this because it deflected media and the Democrats' attention away from TRUMP's business dealings in China and other emerging markets. Unlike in Russia, these were substantial and involved the payment of large bribes and kickbacks which, were they to become public, would be potentially very damaging to their campaign.
- 6. Finally, regarding TRUMP's claimed minimal investment profile in Russia, a separate source with direct knowledge said this had not been for want of trying. TRUMP's previous efforts had included exploring the real estate sector in St Petersburg as well as Moscow but in the end TRUMP had had to settle for the use of extensive sexual services there from local prostitutes rather than business success.

8/29/16

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/101

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: SENIOR KREMLIN FIGURE OUTLINES EVOLVING RUSSIAN TACTICS IN PRO-TRUMP, ANTI-CLINTON OPERATION

Summary

- Head of PA, IVANOV assesses Kremlinintervention in US presidential election and outlines leadershipthinking on operational way forward
- No new leaks envisaged, as too politically risky, but rather further exploitation of (WikiLeaks) material already disseminated to exacerbate divisions
- Educated US youth to be targeted as protest (against CLINTON) and swing vote in attempt to turn them
 over to TRUMP
- Russian leadership, including PUTIN, celebrating perceived success to date in splitting US hawks and elite
- Kremlin engaging with several high profile US players, including STEIN, PAGE and (former DIA Director Michael Flynn), and funding their recent visits to Moscow

Details

- 1. Speaking in confidence to a close colleague in early August 2016, Head of the Russian Presidential Administration (PA), Sergei IVANOV, assessed the impact and results of Kremlin intervention in the US presidential election to date. Although most commentators believed that the Kremlin was behind the leaked DNC/CUNTON e-mails, this remained technically deniable. Therefore the Russians would not risk their position for the time being with new leaked material, even to a third party like WikiLeaks. Rather the tactics would be to spread rumours and misinformation about the content of what already had been leaked and make up new content.
- 2. Continuing on this theme, IVANOV said that the audience to be targeted by such operations was the educated youth in America as the PA assessed that there was still a chance they could be persuaded to vote for Republican candidate Donald TRUMP as a protest against the Washington establishment (in the form of Democratic candidate Hillary CLINTON). The hope was that even if she won, as a result of this CLINTON in power would be bogged down in working for internal reconciliation in the US, rather than being able to focus on foreign policy which would damage Russia's interests. This also should give President PUTIN more room for manoeuvre in the run-up to Russia's own presidential election in 2018.
- 3. IVANOV reported that although the Kremlin had underestimated the strength of US media and liberal reaction to the DNC hack and TRUMP's links to Russia, PUTIN was generally satisfied with the progress of the anti-CLINTON operation to date. He recently had had a drink with PUTIN to mark this. In IVANOV's view, the US had tried to divide the Russian elite with sanctions but failed, whilst they, by contrast, had succeeded in splitting the US hawks inimical to Russia and the Washington elite more generally, half of whom had refused to endorse any presidential candidate as a result of Russian intervention.
- 4. Speaking separately, also in early August 2016, a Kremlin official involved in US relations commented on aspects of the Russian operation to date. Its goals had been threefold- asking sympathetic US actors how Moscow could help them; gathering relevant intelligence; and creating and disseminating compromising information ('kompromat'). This had involved the Kremlin supporting various US political figures, including funding indirectly their recent visits to Moscow. S/he named a delegation from Lyndon LAROUCHE; presidential candidate Jill STEIN of the Green Party; TRUMP foreign policy adviser

Carter PAGE; and former DIA Director Michael Flynn, in this regard and as successful in terms of perceived outcomes.

10 August 2016



RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: REACTION IN TRUMP CAMP TO RECENT NEGATIVE PUBLICITY ABOUT RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE AND LIKELY RESULTING TACTICS GOING FORWARD

Summary

- TRUMP campaign insider reports recent DNC e-mail leaks were aimed at switching SANDERS (protest) voters away from CLINTON and over to TRUMP
- Admits Republican campaign underestimated resulting negative reaction from US liberals, elite and media and forced to change course as result
- Need now to turn tables on CUNTON's use of PUTIN as bogeyman in election, although some resentment at Russian president's perceived attempt to undermine USG and system over and above swinging presidential election

Detail

- 1. Speaking in confidence on 9 August 2016, an ethnic Russian associate of Republican US presidential candidate Donald TRUMP discussed the reaction inside his camp, and revised tactics therein resulting from recent negative publicity concerning Moscow's clandestine involvement in the campaign. TRUMP's associate reported that the aim of leaking the DNC e-mails to Wiki Leaks during the Democratic Convention had been to swing supporters of Bernie SANDERS away from Hillary CLINTON and across to TRUMP. These voters were perceived as activist and anti-status quo and anti-establishment and in that regard sharing many features with the TRUMP campaign, including a visceral dislike of Hillary CLINTON. This objective had been conceived and promoted, inter alia, by TRUMP's foreign policy adviser Carter PAGE who had discussed it directly with the ethnic Russian associate.
- 2. Continuing on this theme, the ethnic Russian associate of TRUMP assessed that the problem was that the TRUMP campaign had underestimated the strength of the negative reaction from liberals and especially the conservative elite to Russian interference. This was forcing a rethink and a likely change of tactics. The main objective in the short term was to check Democratic candidate Hillary CUNTON's successful exploitation of the PUTIN as boggeyman/Russian interference story to tarnish TRUMP and bolster her own (patriotic) credentials. The TRUMP campaign was focusing on tapping into support in the American television media to achieve this, as they reckoned this resource had been underused by them to date.
- 3. However, TRUMP's associate also admitted that there was a fair amount of anger and resentment within the Republican candidate's team at what was perceived by PUTIN as going beyond the objective of weakening CLINTON and bolstering TRUMP, by attempting to exploit the situation to undermine the US government and democratic system more generally. It was unclear at present how this aspect of the situation would play out in the weeks to come.

10 August 2016

Sept 20,16

COMPANY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 2016/111

RUSSIA/US: KREMLIN FALLOUT FROM MEDIA EXPOSURE OF MOSCOW'S INTERFERENCE IN THE US PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

Summary

- Kremlin orders senior staff to remain silent in media and private on allegations of Russian interference in US presidential campaign
- Senior figure however confirms gist of allegations and reports IVANOV sacked as Head of Administration on account of giving PUTIN poor advice on issue. VAINO selected as his replacement partly because he was not involved in pro-TRUMP, anti-CLINTON operation/s
- Russians do have further 'kompromat' on CLINTON (e-mails) and considering disseminating it after Duma (legislative elections) in late September. Presidential spokesman PESKOV continues to lead on this
- However, equally important is Kremlin objective to shift policy consensus favourably to Russia in US post-OBAMA whoever wins. Both presidential candidates' opposition to TPP and TTIP viewed as a result in this respect
- Senior Russian diplomat withdrawn from Washington embassy on account of potential exposure in US presidential election operation/s

Detail

- Speaking in confidence to a trusted compatriot in mid-September 2016, a senior member of the Russian Presidential Administration (PA) commented on the political fallout from recent western media revelations about Moscow's intervention, in favour of Donald TRUMP and against Hillary CLINTON, in the US presidential election. The PA official reported that the issue had become incredibly sensitive and that president PUTIN had issued direct orders that Kremlin and government insiders should not discuss it in public or even in private.
- 2. Despite this, the PA official confirmed, from direct knowledge, that the gist of the allegations was true. PUTIN had been receiving conflicting advice on interfering from three separate and expert groups. On one side had been the Russian ambassador to the US, Sergei KISLYAK, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with an independent and informal network run by presidential foreign policy advisor, Yuri USHAKOV

(KISLYAK's predecessor in Washington) who had urged caution and the potential negative impact on Russia from the operation/s. On the other side was former PA Head, Sergei IVANOV, backed by Russian Foreign Intelligence (SVR), who had advised PUTIN that the pro-TRUMP, anti-CLINTON operation/s would be both effective and plausibly deniable with little blowback. The first group/s had been proven right and this had been the catalyst in PUTIN's decision to sack IVANOV (unexpectedly) as PA Head in August. His successor, Anton VAINO, had been selected for the job partly because he had not been involved in the US presidential election operation/s.

- 3. Continuing on this theme, the senior PA official said the situation now was that the Kremlin had further 'kompromat' on candidate CLINTON and had been considering releasing this via "plausibly deniable" channels after the Duma (legislative) elections were out of the way in mid-September. There was however a growing train of thought and associated lobby, arguing that the Russians could still make candidate CLINTON look "weak and stupid" by provoking her into railing against PUTIN and Russia without the need to release more of her e-mails. Presidential Spokesman, Dmitriy PESKOV remained a key figure in the operation, although any final decision on dissemination of further material would be taken by PUTIN himself.
- 4. The senior PA official also reported that a growing element in Moscow's intervention in the US presidential election campaign was the objective of shifting the US political consensus in Russia's perceived interests regardless of who won. It basically comprised of pushing candidate CLINTON away from President OBAMA's policies. The best example of this was that both candidates now openly opposed the draft trade agreements, TPP and TTIP, which were assessed by Moscow as detrimental to Russian interests. Other issues where the Kremlin was looking to shift the US policy consensus were Ukraine and Syria. Overall however, the presidential election was considered still to be too close to call.
- 5. Finally, speaking separately to the same compatriot, a senior Russian MFA official reported that as a prophylactic measure, a leading Russian diplomat, Mikhail KULAGIN, had been withdrawn from Washington at short notice because Moscow feared his heavy involvement in the US presidential election operation, including the so-called veterans' pensions ruse (reported previously), would be exposed in the media there. His replacement, Andrei BONDAREV however was clean in this regard.

Company Comment

The substance of what was reported by the senior Russian PA official in paras 1 and 2 above, including the reasons for Sergei IVANOV's dismissal, was corroborated independently by a former top level Russian intelligence officer and Kremlin insider, also in mid-September.

14 September 2016

RUSSIA: SECRET KREMLIN MEETINGS ATTENDED BY TRUMP ADVISOR, CARTER PAGE IN MOSCOW (JULY 2016)

Summary

- TRUMP advisor Carter PAGE holds secret meetings in Moscow with SECHIN and senior Kremlin Internal Affairs official, DIVYEKIN
- SECHIN raises issues of future bilateral US-Russia energy co-operation and associated lifting of western sanctions against Russia over Ukraine. PAGE non-committal in response
- DIVEYKIN discusses release of Russian dossier of 'kompromat' on TRUMP's opponent, Hillary CLINTON, but also hints at Kremlin possession of such material on TRUMP

Detail

- Speaking in July 2016, a Russian source close to Rosneft President, PUTIN close associate and US-sanctioned individual, Igor SECHIN, confided the details of a recent secret meeting between him and visiting Foreign Affairs Advisor to Republican presidential candidate Donald TRUMP, Carter PAGE.
- According to SECHIN's associate, the Rosneft President (CEO) had raised with PAGE the issues of future bilateral energy cooperation and prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related western sanctions against Russia. PAGE had reacted positively to this demarche by SECHIN but had been generally non-committal in response.
- 3. Speaking separately, also in July 2016, an official close to Presidential Administration Head, S. IVANOV, confided in a compatriot that a senior colleague in the Internal Political Department of the PA, DIVYEKIN (nfd) also had met secretly with PAGE on his recent visit. Their agenda had included DIVEYKIN raising a dossier of 'kompromat' the Kremlin possessed on TRUMP's Democratic presidential rival, Hillary CLINTON, and its possible release to the Republican's campaign team.
- 4. However, the Kremlin official close to S. IVANOV added that s/he believed DIVEYKIN also had hinted (or indicated more strongly) that the Russian leadership also had 'kompromat' on TRUMP which the latter should bear in mind in his dealings with them.

19 July 2016

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF TRUMP LAWYER, COHEN IN CAMPAIGN'S SECRET LIAISON WITH THE KREMLIN

Summary

- Kremlin insider outlines important role played by TRUMP's lawyer COHEN in secret liaison with Russian leadership
- COHEN engaged with Russians in trying to cover up scandal of MANAFORT and exposure of PAGE and meets Kremlin officials secretly in the EU in August in pursuit of this goal
- These secret contacts continue but are now farmed out to trusted agents in Kremlin-linked institutes so as to remain "plausibly deniable" for Russian regime
- Further confirmation that sacking of IVANOV and appointments of VAINO and KIRIYENKO linked to need to cover up Kremlin's TRUMP support operation

Detail

- Speaking in confidence to a longstanding compatriot friend in mid-October 2016, a Kremlin insider highlighted the importance of Republican presidential candidate Donald TRUMP's lawyer, Michael COHEN, in the ongoing secret liaison relationship between the New York tycoon's campaign and the Russian leadership. COHEN's role had grown following the departure of Paul MANNAFORT as TRUMP's campaign manager in August 2016. Prior to that MANNAFORT had led for the TRUMP side.
- 2. According to the Kremlin insider, COHEN now was heavily engaged in a cover up and damage limitation operation in the attempt to prevent the full details of TRUMP's relationship with Russia being exposed. In pursuit of this aim, COHEN had met secretly with several Russian Presidential Administration (PA) Legal Department officials in an EU country in August 2016. The immediate issues had been to contain further scandals involving MANNAFORT's commercial and political role in Russia/Ukraine and to limit the damage arising from exposure of former TRUMP foreign policy advisor, Carter PAGE's secret meetings with Russian leadership figures in Moscow the previous month. The

- overall objective had been to "to sweep it all under the carpet and make sure no connections could be fully established or proven"
- 3. Things had become even "hotter" since August on the TRUMP-Russia track. According to the Kremlin insider, this had meant that direct contact between the TRUMP team and Russia had been farmed out by the Kremlin to trusted agents of influence working in pro-government policy institutes like that of Law and Comparative Jurisprudence. COHEN however continued to lead for the TRUMP team.
- 4. Referring back to the (surprise) sacking of Sergei IVANOV as Head of PA in August 2016, his replacement by Anton VAINO and the appointment of former Russian premier Sergei KIRIYENKO to another senior position in the PA, the Kremlin insider repeated that this had been directly connected to the TRUMP support operation and the need to cover up now that it was being exposed by the USG and in the western media.

Company Comment

The Kremlin insider was unsure of the identities of the PA officials with whom COHEN met secretly in August, or the exact date/s and locations of the meeting/s. There were significant internal security barriers being erected in the PA as the TRUMP issue became more controversial and damaging. However s/he continued to try to obtain these.

19 October 2016

RUSSIA. PUTIN NOW REGRETS US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION INFLUENCE OPERATION

Summary

- Top level Russian intelligence figure claims PUTIN now regrets operation to interfere in US presidential election
- PUTIN thought US political system similar to Russian one (corrupt) but now considers this
 was a big error

Detail

- Speaking to a colleague in mid October 2016, a former top level Russian intelligence
 officer and current Kremlin advisor claimed that President PUTIN now regretted Moscow's
 operation to interfere in the US presidential election in layour of Republican candidate
 Donald TRUMP. The officer said the operation now clearly had backfired.
- Continuing on this theme, the former top level intelligence officer opined that PUTIN's
 mistake had been to regard the US political system as more like Russia (corrupt) than
 something different and to think he understood it sufficiently well to interfere effectively. The
 Russian president now realised he had been wrong. The TRUMP influence operation had been
 one of his biggest mistakes.

Source Comment

The former top level former Russian intelligence officer was not explicit about from whom he had obtained the above information. However he had implied it was either directly from PUTIN himself or someone very close to him in the Kremlin.

13 October 2016

RUSSIA: KREMLIN ASSESSMENT OF TRUMP AND RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Summary

- Buyer's remorse sets in with Kremlin over TRUMP support operation in US presidential election. Russian leadership disappointed that leaked e-mails on CLINTON have not had greater impact in campaign
- Russians have injected further anti-CLINTON material into the 'plausibly deniable' leaks
 pipeline which will continue to surface, but best material already in public domain
- PUTIN angry with senior officials who "overpromised" on TRUMP and further heads likely to roll as result. Foreign Minister LAVROV may be next
- TRUMP supported by Kremlin because seen as divisive, anti-establishment candidate who
 would shake up current international status quo in Russia's favor. Lead on TRUMP operation
 moved from Foreign Ministry to FSB and then to presidential administration where it now sits

Detail

- Speaking separately in confidence to a trusted compatriot in early October 2016, a senior
 Russian leadership figure and a Foreign Ministry official reported on recent developments
 concerning the Kremfin's operation to support Republican candidate Donald TRUMP in the
 US presidential election. The senior leadership figure said that a degree of buyer's remorse
 was setting in among Russian leaders concerning TRUMP. PUTIN and his colleagues were
 surprised and disappointed that leaks of Democratic candidate. Hillary CLINTON's hacked
 e-mails had not had greater impact on the campaign.
- 2. Continuing on this theme, the senior leadership figure commented that a stream of further hacked CLINTON material already had been injected by the Kremlin into compliant western media outlets like Wikileaks, which remained at least "plausibly deniable", so the stream of these would continue through October and up to the election. However s/he understood that the best material the Russians had already was out and there were no real game-changers to come.
- 3. The Russian Foreign Ministry official, who had direct access to the TRUMP support operation, reported that PUTIN was angry at his subordinate's "over-promising" on the Republican presidential candidate, both in terms of his chances and reliability and being able to cover and/or contain the US backlash over Kremlin interference. More heads therefore were likely to roll, with the MFA the easiest target, fronically, despite his consistent urging of caution on the issue, Foreign Minister LAVROV could be the next one to go.
- 4. Asked to explain why PUTIN and the Kremlin had launched such an aggressive TRUMP support operation in the first place, the MFA official said that Russia needed to upset the liberal international status quo, including on Ukraine-related sanctions, which was seriously

disadvantaging the country. TRUMP was viewed as divisive in disrupting the whole US political system; anti-Establishment; and a pragmatist with whom they could do business. As the TRUMP support operation had gained momentum, control of it had passed from the MFA to the FSB and then into the presidential administration where it remained, a reflection of its growing significance over time. There was still a view in the Kremlin that TRUMP would continue as a (divisive) political force even if he lost the presidency and may run for and be elected to another public office.

12 October 2016

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: FURTHER DETAILS OF KREMLIN LIAISON WITH TRUMP CAMPAIGN

Summary

- Close associate of SECHIN confirms his secret meeting in Moscow with Carter PAGE in July
- Substance included offer of large stake in Rosneft in return for lifting sanctions on Russia. PAGE confirms this is TRUMP's intention
- SECHIN continued to think TRUMP could win presidency up to 17 October. Now looking to reorientate his engagement with the ${\tt US}$
- Kremlin insider highlights importance of TRUMP's lawyer, Michael COHEN in covert relationship with Russia. COHEN's wife is of Russian descent and her father a leading property developer in Moscow

Detail

- Speaking to a trusted compatriot in mid October 2016, a close associate of Rosneft President
 and PUTIN ally Igor' SECHIN elaborated on the reported secret meeting between the latter
 and Carter PAGE, of US Republican presidential candidate's foreign policy team, in Moscow in
 July 2016. The secret meeting had been confirmed to him/her by a senior member of SECHIN's
 staff, in addition to by the Rosneft President himself. It took place on either 7 or 8 July, the
 same day or the one after Carter PAGE made a public speech to the Higher Economic School in
 Moscow.
- 2. In terms of the substance of their discussion, SECHIN's associate said that the Rosneft President was so keen to lift personal and corporate western sanctions imposed on the company, that he offered PAGE/TRUMP's associates the brokerage of up to a 19 per cent (privatised) stake in Rosneft in return. PAGE had expressed interest and confirmed that were TRUMP elected US president, then sanctions on Russia would be lifted.
- According to SECHIN's close associate, the Rosneft President had continued to believe that TRUMP could win the US presidency right up to 17 October, when he assessed this was no longer possible. SECHIN was keen to re-adapt accordingly and put feelers out to other business and political contacts in the US instead.
- 4. Speaking separately to the same compatriot in mid-October 2016, a Kremlin insider with direct access to the leadership confirmed that a key role in the secret TRUMP campaign/Kremlin relationship was being played by the Republican candidate's personal lawyer Michael COHEN. COHEN had a wife of Russian origin, whose father, Efim SHUSTERMAN, was a leading Moscow property developer.

Source Comment

SECHIN's associate opined that although PAGE had not stated it explicitly to SECHIN, he had
clearly implied that in terms of his comment on TRUMP's intention to lift Russian sanctions if
elected president, he was speaking with the Republican candidate's authority.

Company Comment

It appears that SHUSTERMAN has a country house (dacha) in the settlement of Barvikha, west
of Moscow. This village is reserved for the residences of the top leadership and their close
associates.

18 October 2016

Company Note

We received this report from Jon WINER, US State Department on 18 October 2016. It is the second in this series we have seen. We consider it potentially significant and apologise in advance for its rough format. The sub-source, as we understand it, is a Turkish businessman with strong Russian, including FSB links. He is in touch with Cody SHEARER, a contact of Sydney BLUMENTHAL, a friend of the CLINTONs, who passed it to WINER. We have no means of verifying the source/s or information but note that some of the reporting is remarkably similar to our own, albeit from a completely different sourcing chain, and therefore could be important collateral, especially on the reported Ritz Carlton incident in 2013; TRUMP's compromise by the FSB (and knowledge of it); and subsequent Kremlin funding of the TRUMP campaign (through the AGALAROVs). We judge that WINER at least would be happy to discuss all this further with you.

19 October 2016

BEGINS

FSB†Interview $\neq \neq$

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ENDS

RUSSIA/US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: KREMLIN MOVE TO PROTECT EXPOSED TRUMP TEAM SECRET LIAISON FIGURE, DIVYEKIN

Summary

- Former TRUMP foreign policy adviser PAGE's secret Kremlin contact, DIVYEKIN, moved from PA to a senior Duma position following his exposure in western media
- New position gives DIVYEKIN diplomatic immunity if he travels abroad, making it harder for the USG to detain or question him. Move assessed by Kremlin insider as unorthodox, unsignalled and therefore as part of Kremlin TRUMP support operation cover-up

Detail

- 1. In mid October 2016, a mini-reshuffle of key staff took place in the Kremlin. As part of this reshuffle, the deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Internal Affairs department, Igor' DIVYEKIN, was moved from this position to a new one as Charge D'Affaires at the state Duma (Russian legislature). This move followed DIVYEKIN, a previously low key but senior Russian official, being exposed in the western media e.g. the Yahoo News story of September 23 2016 as a secret interlocutor of Carter PAGE, the then foreign policy advisor of the Republican US presidential candidate, Donald TRUMP.
- 2. Commenting on this move to a trusted friend and compatriot after the event in late October 2016, a Kremlin insider highlighted that DIVYEKIN's move was highly unusual. It did not form part of a wider rotation of staff; had not been prompted by a promotion or gazetted; and DIVYEKIN was not obviously qualified for the job, which required him to have both formal diplomatic skills and knowledge of legislative procedures. The new Duma position however gave him diplomatic immunity, at least in the Russian government's eyes, making it more difficult for the USG or other foreign governments to detain or question DIVYEKIN were he to travel abroad. The Kremlin insider compared the DIVYEKIN move to the manoeuvring of chief Aleksandr LITVINENKO murder suspect, Andrei LUGOVOY, into the Duma as a deputy after he had been exposed as a conspirator by the western media in 2007. LUGOVOY's position also gave him diplomatic immunity.

24 October 2016

FD-1040a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

HEADER

Source ID:

Date:

07/15/2016

Case Agent Name:

MICHAEL J GAETA

Field Office/Division:

International Operations

Squad:

Legat Rome

Classified By:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

From:

01/23/2016

To:

04/22/2016

OPENING/REOPENING

Have checks of NCIC, ELSUR, Sentinel, and confidential indices been conducted with results

Yes

attached?

Date of Record Checks

01/01/2016

Has the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, been reviewed or updated?

Yes

Have all appropriate instructions been given to the CHS, witnessed, and documented prior to

Yes

utilization and no later than 90 days after the opening?

Initial Admonishment Date: 12/10/2013

Have agent assignments been reviewed and deemed appropriate for the operation of this source? (And have co-case agents from outside agencies been advised of relevant FBI policies?)

Yes

SPECIAL APPROVAL CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a special approval category (Senior Leadership, High-Level Union Officials, High-Level Government Officials, Attorneys, Physicians, Clergy, Employees of the Media, or Long-Term)?

No

SENSITIVE CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a sensitive CHS category?

No

SECTION I CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section I has been reviewed and is accurate as of 04/22/2016

Yes

Page 1 of 4 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FD-1040a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT Explain any updates to Section I since the previous QSSR: All record check dates/certifications are listed as 01/01/16, pursuant to verbal assurance by handling agent and lack of access to complete file via (for unknown technical reason, only have access to "A" subfile at this time). Due to QSSR being overdue, effort to complete review was made despite technical glitch. Resolution on this issue being pursued with 1500. **OPERATIONAL MATTERS** 03/03/2016 Date of Last Reporting: Has the CHS been involved in Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA) during this review period? No OIA Authorizations (serialized during the QSSR period) OIA Revocations (serialized during the QSSR period) Has the CHS been involved in consensual monitoring during this review period? No Has the CHS been involved in operational travel during this review period? No Has the CHS been involved in personal international travel during this review period? No Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 1 UCO during this review period? No Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 2 UCO during this review period? No Have the CHS and Case Agent/Co-Case Agent communicated via email and/or text during this Yes review period? Date of Approval: 03/13/2015 Has the CHS participated in any UDP during this review period? No SECTION II CERTIFICATION I certify that all information contained in Section II has been reviewed and is accurate as of 04/22/2016 Explain any updates to Section II since the previous QSSR: All record check dates/certifications are listed as 01/01/16, pursuant to verbal assurance by handling agent and lack of access to complete file via (for unknown technical reason, only have access to "A" subfile at this time). Due to QSSR being overdue, effort to complete review was made despite technical glitch. Resolution on this issue being pursued with 1500. **PAYMENT MATTERS** Payments (Payment Date during the QSSR period) **Payment Date Total Services** Case Number Request Serial Expenses 03/03/2016 0.0000 0.0000 CE-012 Payments Requests (Serialized during the QSSR period) Serialized Date Total **Case Number** Serial 03/03/2016 15000.0000 CE-013 03/03/2016 5500.0000 CE-012 **AUSA Coordination Letter - CHS Payments** Serialized Date Serial FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Page 2 of 4

FD-1040a		RAL BUREAU OF II		
No data provid	ded.			
	orney was involved in the con ment(s) obtained and docume		ation, was his or her concurrence	N/A
Have expens	• •		ion of their absence been obtained	N/A
	ments been witnessed, and re t or government official?	ceipts signed, by an	FBI special agent and another FBI	N/A
	signed or initialed, in true or p ntained in the CHS's file.	payment name, and	dated the receipt for payment,	N/A
Have all payr	ments been reconciled?			Yes
	SEC	CTION III CERTIFICAT	ON	
I certify that 04/22/2016	all information contained in S	Section III has been	reviewed and is accurate as of	Yes
All record checand lack of accant this time). I	cess to complete file via Delta (fo	s 01/01/16, pursuant or unknown technical re rt to complete review v	to verbal assurance by handling agent eason, only have access to "A" subfile was made despite technical glitch.	
		ADMINISTRATION		
	horization obtained for any dinted in the CHS file?	sclosure of the CHS	s identity to non-DOJ personnel	N/A
		nal activity (does no	t include minor traffic offenses)?	No
Is the CHS cu			igation or prosecution by an FPO	No
	previously testified?			No
Is the CHS ex	xpected to testify?			No
s the CHS in	volved in certain federal judio	cial proceedings?		No
Will the CHS potentially obtain or provide privileged or exculpatory information?			No	
Has the CHS	been or is expected to be nam	ned in an Electronic	Surveillance Application?	No
Has the CHS	provided information to suppo	ort probable cause i	n a FISA application?	No
Were annual ELSUR?	queries conducted of FBI univ	versal and confident	ial indices and criminal history and	N/A
	provided all applicable instru official, and documented in th		witnessed by an Agent and a	Yes
Last Adm Date:	onishments 09/12/2013			
Was the FOASR prepared, approved, and submitted by the ASAC?		N/A		
			qualifying as a Long-Term CHS, appropriate notification to DOJ?	N/A
Is the SSI, in	cluding the CPS and Special C	Criteria sections, cur	rent?	Yes
	SEC	CTION IV CERTIFICATI	ON	
		Page 3 of 4	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIC	GATI(
		'''	LEELINE BONENO OF HIVESTIC	-, \ , \

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	
	QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT	
I certify that	t all information contained in Section IV has been reviewed and is accurate as of	Yes

I certify that all information contained in Section IV has been reviewed and is accurate as of 04/22/2016

Explain any updates to Section IV since the previous QSSR:

All record check dates/certifications are listed as 01/01/16, pursuant to verbal assurance by handling agent and lack of access to complete file via Delta (for unknown technical reason, only have access to "A" subfile at this time). Due to QSSR being overdue, effort to complete review was made despite technical glitch. Resolution on this issue being pursued with 1500.

CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM	
Stat Type	Total Count
Activities Observed/Detected by CHS	1
Disseminations Based on CHS Information	1
Does the CHS have value due to his/her unique or potential access to F intelligence responsive to FBI national and/or local collection requirem Productivity Value:	
Access:	
Access Value:	
CHS Utility Value:	
CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM	
Score:	
COMMENTS	

Comments/Instructions:

All record check dates/certifications are listed as 01/01/16, pursuant to verbal assurance by handling agent and lack of access to complete file via (for unknown technical reason, only have access to "A" subfile at this time). Due to QSSR being overdue, effort to complete review was made despite technical glitch. Resolution on this issue being pursued with 1500.

Workflow History

	Page 4 of 4	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
--	-------------	---------------------------------

FD-1040a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

HEADER

Source ID:

STEELE

Date:

08/23/2016

Case Agent Name:

MICHAEL J GAETA

Field Office/Division:

International Operations

Squad:

Legat Rome

Classified By:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

From:

04/23/2016

To:

07/22/2016

OPENING/REOPENING

Have checks of NCIC, ELSUR, Sentinel, and confidential indices been conducted with results

attached?

Date of Record Checks

03/13/2015

Has the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, been reviewed or updated?

Yes

Yes

Have all appropriate instructions been given to the CHS, witnessed, and documented prior to utilization and no later than 90 days after the opening?

Yes

diffization and no later than 30 days after the opening

Initial Admonishment Date: 12/10/2013

Have agent assignments been reviewed and deemed appropriate for the operation of this source? (And have co-case agents from outside agencies been advised of relevant FBI policies?)

Yes

SPECIAL APPROVAL CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a special approval category (Senior Leadership, High-Level Union Officials, High-Level Government Officials, Attorneys, Physicians, Clergy, Employees of the Media, or Long-Term)?

No

SENSITIVE CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a sensitive CHS category?

No

SECTION I CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section I has been reviewed and is accurate as of 07/22/2016

Yes

Explain any updates to Section I since the previous QSSR:

	IATTERS

Page 1 of 4 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	
	QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT	
Date of Last Reporting:	07/08/2016	

Has the CHS been involved in Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA) during this review period?

OIA Authorizations (serialized during the QSSR period)

OIA Revocations (serialized during the QSSR period)

Has the CHS been involved in consensual monitoring during this review period?

No
Has the CHS been involved in operational travel during this review period?

No
Has the CHS been involved in personal international travel during this review period?

No
Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 1 UCO during this review period?

No
Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 2 UCO during this review period?

No
Have the CHS and Case Agent/Co-Case Agent communicated via email and/or text during this review period?

Date of Approval: 03/13/2015

Has the CHS participated in any UDP during this review period?

No

No

SECTION II CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section II has been reviewed and is accurate as of 07/22/2016

Yes

Explain any updates to Section II since the previous QSSR:

PAYMENT MATTERS

Payments (Payment Date during the QSSR period)

Payment Date	Total Services	Expenses	Case Number	Request Serial
No data provided.				

Payments Requests (Serialized during the QSSR period)

Serialized Date	Total	Case Number	Serial
07/21/2016	6000.0000		STEELE CE-017
05/05/2016	1500.0000		STEELE CE-015

AUSA Coordination Letter - CHS Payments

Serialized Date	Serial	
No data provided.		

If an FPO attorney was involved in the conduct of the investigation, was his or her concurrence N/A with the payment(s) obtained and documented in the CHS main file?

Have expenses, vendor receipts, copies, or the CHS's explanation of their absence been obtained N/A and retained in the CHS file?

Have all payments been witnessed, and receipts signed, by an FBI special agent and another FBI Yes special agent or government official?

Page 2 of 4	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT	
	signed or initialed, in true or payment name, and dated the receipt for payment, intained in the CHS's file.	Yes
Have all pay	ments been reconciled?	Yes
	SECTION III CERTIFICATION	
I certify tha 07/22/2016	t all information contained in Section III has been reviewed and is accurate as of	Yes
Explain any	updates to Section III since the previous QSSR:	
	ADMINISTRATION	
	thorization obtained for any disclosure of the CHS's identity to non-DOJ personnel ented in the CHS file?	N/A
Did the CHS	engage in unauthorized criminal activity (does not include minor traffic offenses)?	No
Is the CHS currently or expected to become a subject of investigation or prosecution by an FPO or state or local prosecutor's office?		No
Has the CHS	previously testified?	No
Is the CHS	expected to testify?	No
Is the CHS i	nvolved in certain federal judicial proceedings?	No
Will the CHS	potentially obtain or provide privileged or exculpatory information?	No
Has the CHS	been or is expected to be named in an Electronic Surveillance Application?	No
Has the CHS	provided information to support probable cause in a FISA application?	No

Was the CHS provided all applicable instructions, which were witnessed by an Agent and a government official, and documented in the CHS's file?

Were annual queries conducted of FBI universal and confidential indices and criminal history and N/A

Last Admonishments

02/02/2016

Date:

ELSUR?

Was the FOASR prepared, approved, and submitted by the ASAC?

N/A

If the CHS was operated for more than five consecutive years, qualifying as a Long-Term CHS, has this been noted in the FOASR so that FBIHQ can make the appropriate notification to DOJ?

N/A

Is the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, current?

Yes

SECTION IV CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section IV has been reviewed and is accurate as of 07/22/2016

Yes

Explain any updates to Section IV since the previous QSSR:

CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM			
Stat Type			Total Count
Activities Observed/Detected by CHS			4
Does the CHS have value due to his/her unique or potential access to FBI priority targets or intelligence responsive to FBI national and/or local collection requirements? Productivity Value:			
	Page 3 of 4	FEDERAL BUREAU OF	INVESTIGATION

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT	
Access:		
Access Value:		
CHS Utility Value:		
	CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM	
Score:		
	COMMENTS	
CHS operation to continue		

Workflow History

FD-1040a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE 10/19/2016

Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Substantive Case File 97F-HQ-2063661

Number:

Stat Count: 1

Category: Countries

Sub Category: Russia

Stat Type: Identification(s) and Locate(s)

Sub Stat Type: FIS Technique

Agency: FBI

Stat: FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI

Other Comments:

Total stat count claimed on this form: 1

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By

Second Level Approved By

FD-1040a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 10/18/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Substantive Case File

97F-HQ-2063661

Number:

Stat Count: 2

Category: Countries

Sub Category: Russia

Stat Type: Identification(s) and Locate(s)

Sub Stat Type: FIS Technique

Agency: FBI

Stat: FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI

Substantive Case File

Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

Stat Count: 3

Category: Countries

Sub Category: Russia

Stat Type: Activities Observed/Detected by CHS

Sub Stat Type: Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) Activity

Agency: N/A

Stat: FIS ACTIVITY OBSERVED/DETECTED BY SOURCE

Other Comments:

NA

Total stat count claimed on this form: 5

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By

Second Level Approved By

FD-1040a	Page 1 of 1	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FD-1040a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 10/21/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

FD-1040a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Substantive Case File

97F-HQ-2063661

Number:

Stat Count: 1

Category: Countries

Sub Category: Russia

Stat Type: Identification(s) and Locate(s)

Sub Stat Type: FIS Agent/Asset

Agency: FBI

Stat: NO. FIS AGENT/ASSET IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI

97F-HQ-2063661

Substantive Case File

Number:

Stat Count: 1

Category: Countries

Sub Category: Russia

Stat Type:Identification(s) and Locate(s)Sub Stat Type:FIS Front Cover Organization

Agency: FBI

Stat: FIS FRONT COVER IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI

Substantive Case File

Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

Stat Count: 1

Category: Countries

Sub Category: Russia

Stat Type: Identification(s) and Locate(s)

Sub Stat Type: FIS Technique

Agency: FBI

Stat: FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI

Substantive Case File

Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

Stat Count: 1

Category: Countries

Sub Category: Russia

Stat Type: Disseminations Based on CHS Information

Sub Stat Type: Counter Intelligence Information

Agency: FBI

Stat: DISSEMINATIONS BASED UPON SOURCE INFO; CI; FBI

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FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
	STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Other Comments:

Total stat count claimed on this form: 4

SIGNATURE

Submitted By First Level Approved By Second Level Approved By

FD-1040a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE 10/24/2016

Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Substantive Case File

Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

Stat Count:

1

Category:

Countries

Sub Category:

Russia

Stat Type:

Identification(s) and Locate(s)

Sub Stat Type:

FIS Technique

Agency:

FBI

Stat:

FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI

Substantive Case File

Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

Stat Count:

1

Category:

Countries

Sub Category:

Russia

Stat Type:

Disseminations Based on CHS Information

Sub Stat Type:

Counter Intelligence Information

Agency:

FBI

Stat:

DISSEMINATIONS BASED UPON SOURCE INFO; CI; FBI

Other Comments:

Total stat count claimed on this form: 2

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By

Second Level Approved By

FD-1040a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

HEADER

Source ID:

STEELE

Date:

11/16/2016

Case Agent Name:

MICHAEL J GAETA

Field Office/Division:

International Operations

Squad:

Legat Rome

Classified By:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

From:

07/23/2016

To:

10/21/2016

OPENING/REOPENING

Have checks of NCIC, ELSUR, Sentinel, and confidential indices been conducted with results

Yes

attached?

Date of Record Checks

03/13/2015

Has the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, been reviewed or updated?

Yes

Have all appropriate instructions been given to the CHS, witnessed, and documented prior to utilization and no later than 90 days after the opening?

Yes

Initial Admonishment Date: 12/10/2013

2 mila ramonomomento de la 12/10/2010

Have agent assignments been reviewed and deemed appropriate for the operation of this

Yes

source? (And have co-case agents from outside agencies been advised of relevant FBI policies?)

SPECIAL APPROVAL CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a special approval category (Senior Leadership, High-Level Union Officials, High-Level Government Officials, Attorneys, Physicians, Clergy, Employees of the Media, or Long-Term)?

No

SENSITIVE CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a sensitive CHS category?

No

SECTION I CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section I has been reviewed and is accurate as of 10/21/2016

Yes

Explain any updates to Section I since the previous QSSR:

	TTONIAL	MATTERS
UPERA		MALIERS

Page 1 of 4 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FD-1040a		FEDERAL BUREAU (QUARTERLY SUPERVIS	OF INVESTIGATION SORY SOURCE REPORT		
Date of Last Repo	rting: 10/19	/2016			
Has the CHS been	involved in Othe	erwise Illegal Activity (OIA) during this review pe	riod?	No
OIA Authorization	ıs (serialized dur	ing the QSSR period)			
OIA Revocations (serialized during	g the QSSR period)			
Has the CHS beer	n involved in con	sensual monitoring dur	ing this review period?	1.0	No
Has the CHS beer	involved in ope	rational travel during th	nis review period?		No
Has the CHS been	involved in pers	onal international trave	l during this review period	1?	Yes
Has the CHS T been notified?		on form been complete	d and have the appropriate	e LEGAT(s)	No
Has the CHS been	approved for pa	rticipation in a Group 1	UCO during this review pe	riod?	No
Has the CHS been	approved for pa	rticipation in a Group 2	UCO during this review pe	riod?	No
Have the CHS and review period?	Case Agent/Co-	Case Agent communica	ted via email and/or text o	during this	Yes
Date of Ap	proval: 03/13	/2015			
Has the CHS parti	cipated in any UI	DP during this review p	eriod?		No
		SECTION II CERTIFI	CATION		
		since the previous QSSI s, personal international tr PAYMENT MATT	avel is not accounted for.		
Payments (Payme	ent Date during t		LKS		
			Constitution (Name of Section	
Payment Date	Total Services	Expenses	Case Number F	Request Serial	
No data provided.					
Payments Reques					
	ts (Serialized du	ring the QSSR period)			
Serialized Date	The second second	ring the QSSR period) Case Number	Serial		
Serialized Date 10/19/2016	Total	72.0	STEELE CE-02	0	
	Total	Case Number 97F-HQ-2063661	1000		
10/19/2016	Total 15000.0000 7500.0000	Case Number 97F-HQ-2063661	STEELE CE-02		
10/19/2016 10/13/2016 AUSA Coordinatio	Total 15000.0000 7500.0000	Case Number 97F-HQ-2063661	STEELE CE-02		
10/19/2016 10/13/2016 AUSA Coordination Serialized Date	Total 15000.0000 7500.0000 n Letter - CHS P	Case Number 97F-HQ-2063661	STEELE CE-02		
10/19/2016 10/13/2016 AUSA Coordination Serialized Date No data provided. If an FPO attorne	Total 15000.0000 7500.0000 n Letter - CHS Poserial y was involved in	Case Number 97F-HQ-2063661 ayments	STEELE CE-02 STEELE CE-01 estigation, was his or her o	9	N/A
10/19/2016 10/13/2016 AUSA Coordination Serialized Date No data provided. If an FPO attorney with the payment	Total 15000.0000 7500.0000 n Letter - CHS Poserial y was involved in (s) obtained and endor receipts, c	Case Number 97F-HQ-2063661 ayments the conduct of the invel documented in the CHS	STEELE CE-02 STEELE CE-01 estigation, was his or her o	oncurrence	

FD-1040a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT Have all payments been witnessed, and receipts signed, by an FBI special agent and another FBI Yes special agent or government official? Did the CHS signed or initialed, in true or payment name, and dated the receipt for payment, Yes which is maintained in the CHS's file. Have all payments been reconciled? Yes **SECTION III CERTIFICATION** I certify that all information contained in Section III has been reviewed and is accurate as of Yes 10/21/2016 **Explain any updates to Section III since the previous QSSR:** Pending payment amounts will not be provided to CHS pursuant to specific issues being addressed by FBIHQ and Legat Rome. **ADMINISTRATION** Was SAC authorization obtained for any disclosure of the CHS's identity to non-DOJ personnel No and documented in the CHS file? Did the CHS engage in unauthorized criminal activity (does not include minor traffic offenses)? No Is the CHS currently or expected to become a subject of investigation or prosecution by an FPO No or state or local prosecutor's office? Has the CHS previously testified? No Is the CHS expected to testify? No Is the CHS involved in certain federal judicial proceedings? Nο Will the CHS potentially obtain or provide privileged or exculpatory information? No Has the CHS been or is expected to be named in an Electronic Surveillance Application? Nο Has the CHS provided information to support probable cause in a FISA application? Nο Were annual queries conducted of FBI universal and confidential indices and criminal history and N/A **ELSUR?** Was the CHS provided all applicable instructions, which were witnessed by an Agent and a Yes government official, and documented in the CHS's file? **Last Admonishments** 09/12/2013 Date: Was the FOASR prepared, approved, and submitted by the ASAC? N/A If the CHS was operated for more than five consecutive years, qualifying as a Long-Term CHS, N/A has this been noted in the FOASR so that FBIHQ can make the appropriate notification to DOJ? Is the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, current? Yes **SECTION IV CERTIFICATION** I certify that all information contained in Section IV has been reviewed and is accurate as of Yes 10/21/2016 Explain any updates to Section IV since the previous OSSR: CHS recently self-disclosed relationship to media and as a result, closure has been directed by FRIHO

CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM		
Stat Type	Total Count	
Identification(s) and Locate(s)	2	

	Page 3 of 4	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT	
Activities Obs	erved/Detected by CHS	3
Identification(s) and Locate(s)	1
	S have value due to his/her unique or potential access to FBI priority targets or responsive to FBI national and/or local collection requirements? Value:	Yes
Access Value	2:	
CHS Utility V	alue:	
	CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM	
Score:		

COMMENTS

Comments/Instructions:

CHS' recent self-disclosure to the media and resulting media reporting will result in CHS closure. There has been no contact with CHS since closure order by AD IOD and AD CD. Closure will be completed upon completion of this QSSR and pending FOASR.

Workflow History

FD-1040a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT

HEADER

Source ID: STEELE

Date: 11/17/2016
Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

ADMINISTRATIVE

Legacy Case File Number:

Legacy Symbol Number:

Co-Case Agent(s):

From: 10/31/2015 **To:** 10/30/2016

Date of Last FOASR:

Gender: Male

SSN:

Alias SSN(s):

DOB:

Alias DOB(s):

Country(ies) of Citizenship:

Does the CHS live in, or is he/she operated in the United States?

False

Alien Status Registration Number		Issued Date	Expiration Date
No data provided.			

Race:

Ethnicity, Nationality, and Tribal Affiliations

UK

Language(s) Spoken:

Primary language used during debriefing, if a translator was used, and frequency of use:

English

Prior operational periods of the CHS by the FBI (start with the most recent).

Opened: 10/30/2013

Closed:

Programs to which the CHS has contributed during the review period.

FD-1040a	Page 1 of 8	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT			
HQ Division	Program	Subprogram	Primary?	
Criminal Investigative Division	TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROGRAM	EURASIAN CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES	Yes	
Counterintelligence Division	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM	COUNTERINTELLIGENCE	No	
Criminal Investigative Division	COMPLEX FINANCIAL CRIME PROGRAM	MONEY LAUNDERING	No	
Criminal Investigative Division	COMPLEX FINANCIAL CRIME PROGRAM	OTHER MATTERS - CFC	No	
Criminal Investigative Division	COMPLEX FINANCIAL CRIME PROGRAM	MONEY LAUNDERING	No	

Has any of the CHS's information been provided to an AUSA or DOJ attorney during the review period, for use in furtherance of a prosecution or in a court document?

No

CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM

Highly paid - review period (> \$100,000 in the review period).

No

Amount paid includes payments from CHS funds, case funds, other agencies (if known, etc.)

Amount Paid During \$0.00

Review Period:

Amount Paid During \$0.00

Review Period (non-

FBI money):

Highly paid - cumulative (>= \$250,000 over entire CHS operation).

No

Amount paid includes payments from CHS funds, case funds, other agencies (if known, etc.).

Cumulative Amount \$74,000.00

Paid:

Cumulative Amount \$0.00

Paid (non-FBI money):

If funds other than those calculated above were used, please provide details.

Defector. No

Recruitment-in-Place or Double Agent.

ity No

Are there reasonable grounds to believe the CHS engaged in Unauthorized Illegal Activity

(UIA), other than minor traffic offenses per CHSPG, within the review period?

Yes

No

CHS who resides outside the United States.

res

Please provide details (city, state/region, country, etc):

CHS resides in the United Kingdom. Legat London is fully aware and concurs.

Any international travel during the review period?

Yes

Travel Start Date	Travel End Date	Countries	Travel Type
No data provided.			

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FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT	
•	de any additional details, including type and frequency of travel: to Rome Italy on October 3 to meet with handling agent and FBI reps from HQ - CI/CD.	
Former or cu	rrent subject of FBI investigation(s).	No
CHS subjecte	ed to polygraph with inconclusive and/or deceptive results at any time.	No
may not refe	s ever Closed for Cause by the FBI or any other agency. (Note: Other agencies or to this closure as such; however, if another agency closed the CHS for one of asons, it would be considered as closing for Cause.)	No
CHS who has and/or his/h	s ever received immigration benefits from the FBI and/or the USIC for him/her ner family.	No
Score:		

SPECIAL CRITERIA	
Long-Term CHS (5+ consecutive years).	No
Is the CHS a Criminal and/or National Security CHS?	No
Has the CHS been operated by the same Case Agent for 5+ years?	No
Senior Leadership CHS – CHS who is in a position to exercise significant decision-making authority over, or to otherwise manage and direct the unlawful activities of the participants in a group or organization involved with unlawful activities that are nationwide or international in scope or deemed to be of high significance to the FBI's criminal investigative priorities, even if the unlawful activities are local or regional in scope.	No
High-Level Government or Union CHS- CHS is either (a) the chief executive, the office next in succession to the chief executive, or a member of the legislature of the federal or a state government, or (b) a president, secretary-treasurer, or vice-president of an international labor union or the principal officer or officers of a subordinate regional entity of an international or national labor union.	No
Privileged (Attorney, Physician, or Clergy) and/or Media CHS.	No
CHS involved in Group I and/or Group II Undercover Operation (UCO) and/or Asset Business Enterprise during the review period.	No
CHS participated in Tier I and/or Tier II Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA) within the review period. Do not check if OIA is solely for consensual monitoring in two-party states.	No
Within the review period, was the CHS involved in an operation using sophisticated techniques, other than Tier I/II OIA, Group I/II UCO, or Asset Business Enterprise activities?	No
Opened three or more times.	No
CHS subjected to Level 1 and/or Level 2 Operational Test at any time.	No
Have ANY intelligence products (IIR, SIR, IA, IB, etc) been generated as a result of the CHS's reporting?	Yes
CHS with 3+ intelligence products (IIR, SIR, IA, IB, etc) and/or 2+ intelligence products which led to investigative action or contained singular information (within review period)	Yes
Please provide the number of products, type of products (IIR, SIR, IA, IB, etc) and iden number(s) and name(s) of products.	tifying

FD-1040a	Page 3 of 8	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FD-1040a		RAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATI D OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT	10 D	
Product Type	Title	Number (case file product number,		Product Date
No data provided.				
CHS responsible for	recruitment of another	CHS.		No
the CHS. Pleas) recruited and S number(s) of a f the relationship(s) between the is affiliated:		
Is the CHS a former	or current jointly opera	ited CHS?		No
Has the CHS ever m separate matters?	et with, been debriefed	by, or been operated by another	agency on	No
Has the CHS ever be or criminal organiza		eign intelligence service, known t	errorist group), I
Provide detail	s:			
How did the CHS co Brought to the FBI by	me to the attention of the anon-FBI agency	ne FBI?		
	The state of the s	-DBI member, name the agency	that brought t	he CHS.
Agency Name		. DOI		
Is the CHS being ut	Agency Name: ilized jointly with anothe	er FBI Field Office/Field Division	?	No
Has the CHS or his/ other affiliations wi		atives, former employees, etc.) e	ever had any	
Please provide	e details:			
		r foreign legal proceedings (e.g.	arrested, cite	d, No
Source of Income, A	Amount and Frequency (e.g. Monthly)		
No data provided.				
Asset and Value				
No data provided.				
Debt and Amount				
No data provided.				
	HISTORY OF	F ASSOCIATION WITH THE FBI		
Name	Role	Field Office/Division	Date Assigned	Date Removed
	Co-Case Agent	International Operations	04/15/2016	Property and the second

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT			
	Co-Case Agent	Philadelphia	04/29/2016	
	Case Agent	New York	10/24/2013	07/22/2014
Gaeta, Michael J	Case Agent	International Operations	07/22/2014	

Explain reason for change in primary handlers, if within review period, and if known: CHS was transferred to ALAT Gaeta upon beginning new position at

Problems encountered during review period either meeting or handling the CHS:

On October 3, 2016, CHS was tasked by FBIHQ CI/CD representatives to obtain and provide espionage related intelligence in support of 97F-HQ-2063661. CHS was specifically instructed not supply this intelligence to any other party. CHS was advised that in exchange for this intelligence and agreement, FBI CI/CD would compensate the CHS. On November 1, 2016, an article in MotherJones.com was published highlighting the provision of this intelligence to the FBI. Handling agent asked the CHS if CHS was the source of the article's information to which the CHS replied "yes." As such, the CHS is being closed.`

MOTIVATION

Describe the CHS's motivations for providing information to the FBI and how this was determined:

Have the CHS's motivations changed during the review period?

No

PAYMENTS

Total Payments for Reporting Period

By FBI: \$0.00 By Other Agencies: \$0.00

Lifetime Aggregate Payments

By FBI: \$74,000.00

By Other Agencies: \$0.00

During the review period, was the CHS ever paid without another FBI special agent or No government official present?

Was SAC authorization obtained and documented?

Identify any benefits the CHS received during the period other than money not already covered by question III-A (e.g., sentencing benefits or immigration benefits)

THE CHS REPORT RE \$ PAID IS INCORRECT. AS FULLY DOCUMENTED IN THE CHS FILE, THE CHS HAS BEEN PAID AN AGGREGATE TOTAL OF \$95,000 SINCE OPENING IN OCTOBER 2013. AS EVIDENCED AND FULLY DOCUMENTED IN THE CHS FILE CHS WAS PAID \$21,000 DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD.

Describe any instance in which the CHS requested special favors, consideration, or treatment, including, but not limited to

- 1. Assistance for the CHS's family members
- 2. Intervention by the FBI in business, employment, or civil matters

NA

REPORTING

Substantive Case File 97F-HQ-2063661, Number:

Below are stats claimed during the review period relevant to validation:

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FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT		
Stat		Reporting Document	
FIS ACTIVITY OBSERVED/DETECTED BY SOURCE		STEELE V-048.pdf	
DISSEMINATION	ONS BASED UPON SOURCE INFO; CI; FBI	STEELE V-050.pdf	
FIS ACTIVITY	OBSERVED/DETECTED BY SOURCE	V-036.pdf	
FIS ACTIVITY OBSERVED/DETECTED BY SOURCE		STEELE V-040.pdf	
FIS FRONT CC	VER IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI	STEELE V-050.pdf	
FIS TECHNIQUE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI		STEELE V-046.pdf	
FIS TECHNIQU	JE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI	STEELE V-050.pdf	
FIS TECHNIQU	JE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI	STEELE V-048.pdf	
DISSEMINATIONS BASED UPON SOURCE INFO; CI; FBI		STEELE V-052.pdf	
FIS TECHNIQU	JE IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI	STEELE V-052.pdf	
NO. FIS AGEN	T/ASSET IDENTIFIED AND/OR LOCATED; FBI	STEELE V-050.pdf	
DISSEMINATIONS BASED UPON SOURCE INFO; CRIM; FBI STEELE V-032.pdf		STEELE V-032.pdf	

TIMELINESS OF INFORMATION

Describe whether the CHS's information was provided promptly and consistently with the CHS's access; whether the CHS reporting was delayed; or whether the information was historical in nature.

CHS provided reporting as obtained. CHS has sub-sources, some of whom are out of contact for periods of time.

ACCESS

The CHS's access is:

Indirect

Describe the CHS's access to information:

Unknown

Is the information obtained through a sub-source?

Yes

Describe the relationship between the CHS and the sub-source:

CHS has had long-standing relationships with sub-sources.

Describe the sub-source's access and motivation:

Sub-sources motivations are primarily money.

Describe actions taken, if any, to independently confirm the sub-source exists and has logical access to the information claimed. If none, explain.

Some of CHS' sub sources have been identified. The sub-sources reside in areas where the Bureau can not operate freely. FBI HQ CI/CD has worked to verify the known sub-sources and their information.

Is the identity of the sub-source known?

No

Is the sub-source aware that the CHS is providing information to the FBI?

No

Is the sub-source a member of a hostile intelligence service or a member of a terrorist or criminal organization?

No **IS's access to**

Describe any significant changes during the review period of the CHS's targets or the CHS's access to information:

NA

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	UNCLASSIFIED	
FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT	
	CORROBORATION	
Some of CHS' for review and regarding the date (February	inces in which the CHS's reporting was verified by circumstances or other info has been corroborated by other intel sources. The CHS intel is provided to and assessment as compared to other intel. CHS was the original CHS who provided in FIFA investigation (281H-NY-305564) and identified others for contact to the case y 8, 2016) There have been over 30 individuals indicted and agreed upon forfeiture \$170,000,000. CHS' intel provided for 97F-HQ-2063661 has been corroborated to t case.	alysts at HQ (CID) nformation squad. As of this e amounts of
Discuss insta reporting ins NA	nces in which the CHS's reporting was not consistent with the facts and the tance:	he impact of each
	RELIABILITY EVALUATION	
Cite Case Ag Professional. I Discuss any tasking: CHS never ob Describe any This should i reporting, ar alter a prior the CHS is in On October 3, intelligence in party. CHS wa CHS. On Nove intelligence to	ent observations of the CHS's behavior: However, CHS acted unprofessionally in providing information to reporters for Moth handling problems including any instances in which the CHS objected to adjected to tasking. Information not previously provided that could reasonably be construed a nclude information from other CHS reporting, substantive case documents and statements made by the CHS. Ensure that all available information that validation assessment, including information pertaining to unauthorized il cluded. 2016, CHS was tasked by FBIHQ CI/CD representatives to obtain and provide esp support of 97F-HQ-2063661. CHS was specifically instructed not supply this intellies advised that in exchange for this intelligence and agreement, FBI CI/CD would comber 1, 2016, an article in MotherJones.com was published highlighting the provision the FBI. Handling agent asked the CHS if CHS was the source of the article's information "yes." As such, the CHS is being closed.	as derogatory. s, other agency might materially llegal activity by sionage related gence to any other ompensate the sion of this
	of the CHS's character traits, habits, or weaknesses that may impact the sclosure to MotherJones reporters.	CHS's reporting
	indications of undisclosed control by an entity or individual other than th ligence concerns, criminal organization interests, etc).	e FBI (e.g.,
	easonably believed to be the subject or target of a pending criminal , is under arrest, or has been charged in a pending prosecution?	No
Are current	criminal history checks contained in the CHS's file?	Yes

Date of Record Checks

11/17/2016

Were any new references obtained from FBI database checks during this review period?

CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM

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FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT			
QSSR Period 1		QSSR Period 2	QSSR Period 3	QSSR Period 4
10/24/2015 - 01/2	2/2016	01/23/2016 - 04/22/2016	04/23/2016 - 07/22/2016	07/23/2016 - 10/21/2016

Average CHS Utility Value =

COMMENTS

Author's Comments:

CHS will be closed

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By

Second Level Approved By

UNCLASSIFIED

From: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (DO) (FBI) Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2017 9:30 AM To: Subject: FW: Emailing: July 5, July 25 ----Original Message-----From: AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI) Sent: Tuesday, October 04, 2016 5:12 AM To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI) < JPIENTKA@ MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) < JCMOFFA STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI) < PPSTRZOK@ Cc: GESSFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI) <BEGESSFORD@ SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI) HEIDE, CURTIS A. (CG) VARACALLI, MICHAEL F. (CD) (FBI) < MFVARACALLI@ <SMSOMMA@ (FBI) < CAHEIDE@ Subject: RE: Emailing: July 5, July 25 -

All -- I wanted to attach a short write-up from yesterday's CHS meeting to this particular email string b/c it will reference some additional details re: sourcing, especially for CHS report numbers 2016-80, 2016-94, and 2016-95.

This email string has now been classified

- It would appear that the CHS has one major sub-source, who in turn meets with an assortment of individuals with direct and indirect knowledge and access. It appears that most, if not all, of the sub-source's contacts are unwitting of where their information is going. The CHS's sub-source travels in/out of target country, and appears to be wellconnected.
- 2. The first time CHS debriefed his sub-source regarding the Trump material was 16 June [hence, the customer request for his company's services took place prior to 16 June]. CHS carried a notebook with him to the debriefing here, and he was able to reference the date. CHS's services were originally requested re: doing research and intelligence collection re: FURY's debts, and the DRAGON material, etc. was collected as a result of that.

meeting with "Igor Ivanovich [Sechin]"
4. In July 25 [2016-94], the source to the head of the Russian presidential administration is related to CHS sub-source office conversation where DRAGON's meeting with Diveykin was discussed.
5. CHS indicated that some of his sub-sources contacts had been "reporting" for a longer period than others; some of them were fairly new.
6. In July 5 [2016-80], the "former top level Russian intelligence officer" =
7. CHS's sub-source has had personal contact with Sergey Millian. Millian appears to be Source E in 2016-95 (and may

3. In July 25 [2016-94], the source close to Sechin = Sechin's mistress. She is the one who reported re: DRAGON's secret

- 7. CHS's sub-source has had personal contact with Sergey Millian. Millian appears to be Source E in 2016-95 (and may also be Source D in 2016-80). Millian has had direct interaction with CHS's sub-source. CHS indicated that Millian told his sub-source that DRAGON "played monkey to [FURY's] organ grinder." Millian allegedly heard about FURY, DRAGON and the Russians "at campaign HQ." CHS added, however, that Millian is a "boaster" and an "egotist" and may engage in some embellishment. Millian has been involved in Trump's business dealings, as well as with business dealings for other Russians -- including Russian Duma members. CHS mentioned Millian's involvement in selling condos in Miami, and also said that Millian was involved in [spelling -- see list of names/terms that came from NY source involving Trump and OC-type stuff] real estate deals.
- 8. CHS indicated that FURY owes 100 million dollars to a single creditor.
- 9. CHS had never heard TYPHOON's name. He had not come across TYPHOON's name in his research or reporting.
- 10. CHS gave a few other names which, he indicated, could be of interest. The first, Greg Hartley (sp), is connected with an outfit called Cloakroom Advisors. CHS described Hartley as a "Republican lobbyist." CHS was somewhat unclear, but there is some connection between Hartley and a pro-Trump and anti-HRC PR campaign financed by Russia [Kremlin]. This information apparently came from Millian, and there was also some connection between Hartley and a Dmitriy [Dmitry] Z [CHS couldn't remember the last name] with Novosti in the United States. [This needs follow-up by Gaeta]
- 11. There were two additional names of US-based individuals provided by CHS who may have information re: Russia/Trump: (1) Charles Doland (sp); and (2) Stephen/Steven Kupka (sp). Another name provided later by CHS re: USPER with knowledge of Russia/Trump was David Giovannis (sp).
- 12. CHS reiterated information from 2016-95, paragraph 4, re: quid pro quo and "two way flow" of information w/ Trump team -- specifically, collection of information vs. oligarchs and family/asset activity in the United States.
- 13. CHS suggested that Aras Agalarov -- Azeri businessman with close ties to Trump -- may be someone of interest re: information about Trump's Russian connections.
- 14. CHS added to FI of interest re: shifting within Russia's Presidential Administration. When discussing the removal of Sergey Ivanov as Chief of Staff and the ascension of Anton Vaino, CHS indicated that public blowback from the DNC/Trump operation was used as the "final straw" by Putin to remove Ivanov. It was CHS's understanding that Ivanov may have gone off the reservation re: Syrian matters -- CHS made an off-hand reference to the involvement of mercenaries/freelancers -- but as a whole, Ivanov was becoming "too big for himself." Vaino's elevation as Ivanov's replacement wasn't a direct consequence of the DNC/Trump operation, but Putin had a close relationship with Vaino and Vaino hadn't been involved in the DNC/Trump op. CHS reiterated that Dmitriy Peskov is very much involved in the DNC/Trump op.
- 15. CHS reported on an individual he identified as DRAGON's possible "handler" or "case agent" -- Igor Yatsenko. Yatsenko may have had a Gazprom connection and lives "in the West" -- possibly/presumably in London.

- 16. According to CHS, there is RUMINT that DRAGON has a Russian girlfriend -- a ballerina or opera singer of some sort. CHS did not have a name. CHS had never heard RUMINT that DRAGON was homosexual.
- 17. CHS provided another name of possible interest -- FNU Temeko. Temeko lives in the UK, and has some sort of former relationship with Yukos. He is close to former head of the FSB, Nikolay Patrushev. Temeko has "burrowed himself" into the UK Conservative Party and is a "British version of [Sergey] Millian." Temeko is connected to Boris Johnson, and is tied to Brexit issues. Temeko also has some type of relationship with US politicos.

Upon return, I will write this information up for Gaeta's source file. Best, Brian ----Original Message-----From: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI) Sent: Monday, September 19, 2016 3:48 PM To: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI) Subject: FW: Emailing: July 5, July 25 --- UNCLASSIFIED Classification: UNCLASSIFIED ----Original Message-----From: GAETA, MICHAEL J. (RO) (FBI) Sent: Monday, September 19, 2016 8:49 AM To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI) Subject: FW: Emailing: July 5, July 25 --- UNCLASSIFIED Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Joe, First two. I actually have 4 more that are more on point for you that I am sending in a few min. Mike ----Original Message-----From: GAETA, MICHAEL J. (RO) (FBI) Sent: Friday, August 05, 2016 5:10 PM Subject: Emailing: July 5, July 25 --- UNCLASSIFIED Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Until the EC.

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Classification:
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MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (DO) (FBI) From: Subject: FW: Meeting with Crown in Rome 10/3 -Date: Wednesday, October 11, 2017 11:26:23 AM TRANSITORY RECORD From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI) Sent: Tuesday, October 04, 2016 10:05 AM To: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) Subject: FW: Meeting with Crown in Rome 10/3 -TRANSITORY RECORD From: GESSFORD, BENJAMIN E. (CV) (FBI) Sent: Tuesday, October 04, 2016 5:13 AM To: PIENTKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI) Cc: AUTEN, BRIAN J. (CD) (FBI); SOMMA, STEPHEN M. (NY) (FBI); VARACALLI, MICHAEL F. (CD) (FBI); GAETA, MICHAEL J. (RO) (FBI) Subject: Meeting with Crown in Rome 10/3 --

TRANSITORY RECORD

I will send a separate email with CHS ident. Auten took notes regarding specific CHS reporting and will send a sep email covering those notes.

Meeting occurred on 10/3/2016, offsite from USEMB, from approx 1500 to 1800. CHS had met with ALAT Gaeta prior (approx 1400) to meeting with Gessford, Varacelli, and Auten. ALAT Gaeta remained in meeting, also. ALAT advised that CHS volunteered his reporting relationship with USDOS in a previous conversation.

CHS was introduced to CH team and advised that his business partner was unable to attend meeting. **FGI**

CHS advised that he runs a small, business/financial intelligence firm in London with his partner and a small number of staff. CHS advised that he uses an "agent handler" (SA Note: CHS continually referred to one handler, and upon further questioning, implied that he had several, but it appears that he has one primary handler who he continually referred to in this matter) who travels into Russia and interacts with a number of subsources (who are not witting) to gather his intelligence. He has a number of unnamed "clients" who he provides intelligence reports to and if he determines that there is information of interest to the USG, he provides duplicate copies of those reports to ALAT Gaeta for distribution and consumption within the FBI.

CHS continually made reference to the importance of confidentiality with his clients and subsources but advised that he knows of the importance of the information that predicated the meeting. CHS advised that his primary agent handler was currently inside Russia and that he would debrief him upon his return on Sunday, October 8, 2016. CHS mentioned that he was becoming increasingly fearful for the safety of his agent handler in Russia as he believed that his Russian sub sources are becoming increasingly reluctant to discuss the Trump-Russian relationship and this is increasingly becoming a closed topic for discussion. CHS also mentioned that it was very dangerous to identify his sub source network by name, as it was well know that that the USIC and "our agency" (the FBI) have had problems in the past with internal penetrations (CHS was advised that SA Gessford was very well versed with internal penetrations to include the Hanssen case, and because of that experience, SA Gessford was uniquely situated to assist the FBI and CHS in protecting the information being discussed).

The CHS was then given a general overview of the FBI's CROSSFIRE HURRICANE investigation and told that it was a small cell that was exploring a small piece of the overall problem of Russian interference in the U.S. Electoral process. CHS was advised that the CH team was made aware of TYPHOON's' May 2016 comments in the U.K. in late July by a friendly foreign service and that TYPHOON had predicated a small analytical effort that eventually expanded to include FURY, RAZOR, and DRAGON. CHS advised that he was not aware of TYPHOON.

The CHS was sensitized to the fact that the FBI was particularly interested in additional information on FURY and DRAGON as well as any additional information that could be developed on others as yet unknown. CHS was sensitized that the FBI was specifically interested in additional information on DRAGON, as it was assessed that DRAGON is the most vulnerable to an approach by the FBI and any information gathered by the CHS would be scrutinized by the FBI for use in a possible future approach/interview by the FBI of DRAGON. Going forward, the CHS was advised that the FBI was interested in three "buckets":

1. Additional intelligence/reporting on specific, named individuals (such as DRAGON or FURY) involved in facilitating the Trump campaign-Russian relationship;

- 2. Physical evidence of specific individuals involved in facilitating the Trump campaign-Russian relationship (such as emails, photos, ledgers, memorandums etc);
- 3. Any individuals or sub sources who the CHS could identify who could serve as cooperating witnesses to assist in identifying persons involved in the Trump campaign-Russian relationship.

In regards to the three "buckets" mentioned above, and with the FBI's future relationship with the CHS in the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE matter, the CHS was advised that the FBI was willing to compensate the CHS significantly (the CHS was told that it was routine for the FBI to pay upwards of a million dollars to sources who provide information to the FBI regarding penetrations of the USG/USIC which lead to judicial action), and the CHS was admonished that if the CHS and FBI were going to have a reporting relationship regarding specific items of interest to the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE team (i.e. FURY and DRAGON), that the CHS must have an exclusive reporting relationship with the FBI, rather than providing that information to the clients that hired the CHS's firm to provide reporting on Trump and FURY.

Going forward, CHS will remain in contact with ALAT Gaeta for future handling and contact, with the understanding that SA Gessford or others on the CH team may also meet with CHS. CHS was advised that he will be paid \$15,000 USD for his time and efforts for the meeting in Rome.

CHS will consider future ways to assist the FBI (SA Note: It appeared that the CHS intended to come to the meeting prepared to generally discuss his operations and continue to provide the FBI with general, background information regarding Russian interference in the U.S. Electoral process. CHS appeared to be caught off guard with the specific tasking that he received, and it remains to be seen if the CHS can provide specific intelligence to the FBI in response to the tasking).

CHS advised that he is personal friends with Ivanka Trump and that the USIC may see some email traffic in that regard. CHS advised that Ivanka is very smart and that CHS can't see her involved with this matter.

Lastly, CHS advised that CHS had provided Trump Campaign information to a member of the U.S. State Department (who was a personal friend/long term contact) in an effort to ensure that the information was reaching the proper elements of the USG. CHS was advised to stand down on taking those types of action and to only provide the information to the FBI through ALAT Gaeta and the CH team.

Investigation continues.

Ben





Date: 09/30/2016

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: (U) CHS STEELE Reporting received

between July 5 and September 20, 2016.

CC: Benjamin E. Gessford

Joe Pientka III

From: ROME

Contact: GAETA MICHAEL JOSEPH,

Approved By: RAMSEY KIERAN L

Drafted By: GAETA MICHAEL JOSEPH

Case ID #: 97F-HQ-2063661-NY CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -

RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

Synopsis: (U/ CHS STEELE Reporting received between July 5 and

September 20, 2016 being sent to the instant file.



Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

- 1. (U/) CHS report received July 5, 2016
- 2. (U/) 4 CHS reports received Aug 29, 16
- 3. (U/) 1 CHS Report received July 25, 16
- 4. (U/) 1 CHS Report received September 20, 2016

Details:

On July 5, 2016, ALAT Gaeta met with CHSSTEELE. CHS advised that CHS had been contracted by GLENN SIMPSON, on behalf of an unnamed Washington D.C. based law firm, to develop and provide information regarding Donald Trump's connections to, and relationships within,

Title: (U/ CHS STEELE Reporting received between July 5 and

September 20, 2016.

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 09/30/2016

Russia. CHS has obtained information, as described fully in the attached seven reports, detailing these relationships and activities. CHS provided these reports to ALAT Gaeta independently and without tasking. CHS advised that similar information from different sources unrelated to the CHS, may already be in the hands of those at a "high level" in Washington D.C.

The attached reports are in the original form as prepared by the CHS and given to the client, SIMPSON. The handwritten dates on the face of each report are the dates that they were received by the handling by ALAT Gaeta. Between July 5 and September 20, 2016, ALAT Gaeta spoke with (FBINY), (FBINY), ASAC (FBINY) and SSA Joe Pientka (FBIHQ) regarding the dissemination of the attached information. As such, it was determined that the attached reporting will be submitted to the instant file.



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: Meeting with CHS CROWN in Rome on

Date: 11/14/2016

october 3, 2016

From: CLEVELAND

Contact: Benjamin E. Gessford,

ord,

Approved By: Joe Pientka III

Drafted By: Benjamin E. Gessford

Case ID #: 97F-HQ-2063661-NY

CROSSFIRE HURRICANE; FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -

RUSSIA:

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

Synopsis: To document outside of Delta a meeting held with FBI CHS CROWN in Rome, Italy, on October 3, 2016

Reason:
Derived From:
Declassity On:

Details:

The purpose of this EC is to document, for the record, a meeting held between SA Ben Gessford, SIA Brian Auten, A/Section Chief Mike Varacalli, and Rome ALAT Mike Gaeta with FBI CHS CROWN in Rome, Italy on October 3, 2016. The objective of the meeting was for ALAT Gaeta to introduce CROWN to members of the FBI CROSSFIRE HURRICANE (CH) Team and to assess if CROWN was in possession of additional pertinent information and was willing to enter into an exclusive reporting relationship with the FBI.

The meeting occurred on October 3, 2016, offsite of the U.S. Embassy, from approx 1500 to 1800. CHS had previously met with ALAT Gaeta prior on the same day (approx 1400) to meeting with Gessford, Varacelli, and Auten. After the intial meeting, ALAT advised that CHS

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volunteered his reporting relationship with the U.S. State Department. Upon initial introductions, ALAT Gaeta remained in the CH meeting.

CHS was introduced to the CH team and advised that his business partner was unable to attend the meeting. CHS is a CHS advised that he runs a small, business/financial intelligence firm in London with his partner and a small number of staff. CHS advised that he uses an "agent handler" (SA Note: CHS continually referred to one handler, and upon further questioning, implied that he had several, but it appeared that he has one primary handler who he continually referred to in this matter) who travels into Russia and interacts with a number of subsources (who are not witting) to gather his intelligence. He has a number of unnamed "clients" who he provides intelligence reports to and if he determines that there is information of interest to the USG, he provides duplicate copies of those reports to ALAT Gaeta for distribution and consumption within the FBI.

CHS continually made reference to the importance of confidentiality with his clients and subsources but advised that he knows of the importance of the information that predicated the meeting. CHS advised that his primary agent handler was currently inside Russia and that he would debrief him upon his return on Sunday, October 8, 2016. CHS mentioned that he was becoming increasingly fearful for the safety of his agent handler in Russia as he believed that his Russian sub sources are becoming increasingly reluctant to discuss the Trump-Russian relationship and this is increasingly becoming a closed topic for discussion. CHS also mentioned that it was very dangerous to identify his sub source network by name, as it was well known that the USIC and "your agency" (the FBI) have had problems in the past with internal penetrations (CHS was advised that SA Gessford was very well versed with internal penetrations to include the Hanssen case, and because of that experience, SA Gessford was uniquely situated to assist the FBI and CHS in protecting the information being discussed).

The CHS was then given a general overview of the FBI's

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CROSSFIRE HURRICANE investigation and told that it was a small cell that was exploring a small piece of the overall problem of Russian interference in the U.S. Electoral process. CHS was advised that the CH team was made aware of CROSSFIRE TYPHOON's' May 2016 comments in the U.K. in late July by a friendly foreign service and that TYPHOON had predicated a small analytical effort that eventually expanded to include CROSSFIRE FURY, CROSSFIRE RAZOR, and CROSSFIRE DRAGON. CHS advised that he was not aware of TYPHOON.

The CHS was sensitized to the fact that the FBI was particularly interested in additional information on FURY and DRAGON as well as any additional information that could be developed on others as yet unknown. CHS was sensitized that the FBI was specifically interested in additional information on DRAGON, as it was assessed that DRAGON is the most vulnerable to an approach by the FBI and any information gathered by the CHS would be scrutinized by the FBI for use in a possible future approach/interview by the FBI of DRAGON.

Going forward, the CHS was advised that the FBI was interested in three "buckets":

- 1. Additional intelligence/reporting on specific, named individuals (such as DRAGON or FURY) involved in facilitating the Trump campaign-Russian relationship;
- 2. Physical evidence of specific individuals involved in facilitating the Trump campaign-Russian relationship (such as emails, photos, ledgers, memorandums etc);
- 3. Any individuals or sub sources who the CHS could identify who could serve as cooperating witnesses to assist in identifying persons involved in the Trump campaign-Russian relationship.

In regards to the three "buckets" mentioned above, and with the FBI's future relationship with the CHS in the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE matter, the CHS was advised that the FBI was willing to compensate the CHS significantly (the CHS was told that it was routine for the FBI to pay upwards of a million dollars to sources who provide information to the FBI regarding penetrations of the USG/USIC which lead to judicial

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action), and the CHS was admonished that if the CHS and FBI were going to have a reporting relationship regarding specific items of interest to the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE team (i.e. FURY and DRAGON), that the CHS must have an exclusive reporting relationship with the FBI, rather than providing that information to the clients that hired the CHS's firm to provide reporting on Trump and FURY.

Going forward, CHS will remain in contact with ALAT Gaeta for future handling and contact, with the understanding that SA Gessford or others on the CH team may also meet with CHS. CHS was advised that he will be paid \$15,000 USD for his time and efforts for the meeting in Rome.

CHS will consider future ways to assist the FBI (SA Note: It appeared that the CHS intended to come to the meeting prepared to generally discuss his operations and continue to provide the FBI with general, background information regarding Russian interference in the U.S. Electoral process. CHS appeared to be caught off guard with the specific tasking that he received, and it remains to be seen if the CHS can provide specific intelligence to the FBI in response to the tasking).

CHS advised that he is personal friends with Ivanka Trump and that the USIC may see some email traffic in that regard. CHS advised that Ivanka is very smart and that CHS can't see her involved with this matter.

Lastly, CHS advised that CHS had provided Trump Campaign information to a member of the U.S. State Department (who was a personal friend/long term contact) in an effort to ensure that the information was reaching the proper elements of the USG. CHS was advised to stand down on taking those types of action and to only provide the information to the FBI through ALAT Gaeta and the CH team.

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 11/14/2016



party.

	8/12/12 (Date)
	1/4
- T - t	(Location)
1. Mitch	, authorize
(Name)	7777777777
Special Agents Benjamin & Gessford	and Stephen M. Somm-
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United State	s Department of Justice, to utilize the following
(initial all that apply):	
WA	
Body Recorder, microphone, or ot	her recording device on or in the vicinity of my person
M Transmitter on or in the vicinity of	f my person;
	ent to capture and record telephone communications, ext messages, e-mails, Internet, or other over any telephone used by me;
Utilize Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) or other video equipment located at
(I produce Name / control of United and	to view Description of vehicle etc., or sizte "on consenting party")
(If not "on consenting party," describe are:	a to be viewed (i.e. residence kitchen area, restaurant rear table etc.)
and/or	
10	
Other (Specify):	o document consent for the monitoring of computer electronic
communications For consent/authorization	to monitor computer communications, including the refer to the FD-1070 and/or FD-1071, as appropriate)
for the purpose of monitoring, viewing, listening to,	and/or recording any activity I may have with
Crossfire Dryon (Name of Subject(s))	and others as yet unknown
(Name of Subject(s))	Y
which I may have on or about 8/12/16 (Date)	and continuing thereafter until such a time as
either I revoke my permission or the FBI terminates	the investigation.
communication. I therefore agree not to leave the rec	ommunication in order to record or monitor that cording or monitoring equipment unattended or take or monitoring of communications to which I am not a

AND/OR

	of electronic or wire communications service and/or long distance carrier for the purpose of identifying telephone numbers calling and being called by telephone number located at/subscribed to by
	which is used by me.
	(Address)
threats	I have given this written permission to the above-named Special Agents voluntarily, and without or promises of any kind.
	Mitch
	(Signature)
Witness	ses

Privacy Act Statement: Any information collected from you on this form, along with any other device provided to you for use on your person, vehicle, or other object, or for use at the designated location listed on this form, will collect information about you, as authorized by law, and will be used to support FBI activities. Your consent to providing information on this form and to the subsequent collection of information in the manner outlined on this form is voluntary. This information is maintained in the system of records FBI-002, FBI Central Records System, and may be disclosed in accordance with published routine uses for the system. The text of FBI-002 and its routine uses may be found on the FBI internet site at http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacv-act/systems-records

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

HEADER

Source ID: HALPER

Date: 06/17/2016

Case Agent Name: Non SES

Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 8

Classified By:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

From: 03/03/2016 To: 06/01/2016

OPENING/REOPENING

Have checks of NCIC, ELSUR, Sentinel, and confidential indices been conducted with results attached?

Yes

Date of Record Checks

04/15/2016

Has the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, been reviewed or updated?

Yes

Have all appropriate instructions been given to the CHS, witnessed, and documented prior to utilization and no later than 90 days after the opening?

Yes

Initial Admonishment Date: 02/01/2012

Have agent assignments been reviewed and deemed appropriate for the operation of this source? (And have co-case agents from outside agencies been advised of relevant FBI policies?)

Yes

SPECIAL APPROVAL CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a special approval category (Senior Leadership, High-Level Union Officials, High-Level Government Officials, Attorneys, Physicians, Clergy, Employees of the Media, or Long-Term)?

No

SENSITIVE CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a sensitive CHS category?

No

SECTION I CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section I has been reviewed and is accurate as of 06/01/2016

Yes

Explain any updates to Section I since the previous QSSR:

OPERAT	IONAL	MATT	ERS
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Page 1 of 4 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FD-1040a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT					
Date of Last Rep	oorting:				
Has the CHS bee	en involved in Other	wise Illegal Activity	(OIA) during this review	w period?	No
OIA Authorizati	ons (serialized duri	ng the QSSR period)			
OIA Revocations	(serialized during	the QSSR period)			
Has the CHS be	en involved in cons	ensual monitoring du	ring this review period	?	No
Has the CHS be	en involved in opera	ational travel during	this review period?		No
Has the CHS bee	en involved in perso	nal international trav	el during this review p	eriod?	Ye
Has the CHS been notified		on form been complet	ed and have the approp	oriate LEGAT(s)	No
Has the CHS bee	en approved for par	ticipation in a Group	1 UCO during this revie	w period?	No
Has the CHS bee	en approved for par	ticipation in a Group	2 UCO during this revie	w period?	No
Have the CHS ar	nd Case Agent/Co-C	Case Agent communic	ated via email and/or t	ext during this	No
	ticipated in any UD	P during this review	period?		No
		SECTION II CERTI	FICATION		
06/01/2016		ned in Section II has	been reviewed and is a	ccurate as or	Ye
		ince the previous QSS	SR:	ccurate as or	Yes
Explain any upd	ates to Section II s	ince the previous QSS	SR:	ccurate as or	Ye
Explain any upd		ince the previous QSS	SR:	ccurate as or	Ye
Explain any upd Payments (Payn	ates to Section II s	ince the previous QSS	SR:	Request Seria	
Explain any upd Payments (Payn Payment Date	ates to Section II s nent Date during th Total Services	PAYMENT MAT e QSSR period)	SR: TERS		
Explain any upd Payments (Payn Payment Date No data provided.	ates to Section II s nent Date during th Total Services	PAYMENT MAT e QSSR period)	TERS Case Number		
Explain any upd Payments (Payn Payment Date No data provided. Payments Reque	ates to Section II s nent Date during th Total Services ests (Serialized duri	PAYMENT MAT e QSSR period) Expenses	TERS Case Number		
Explain any upd Payments (Payn Payment Date No data provided. Payments Reque	nent Date during th Total Services	PAYMENT MAT e QSSR period) Expenses ing the QSSR period)	TERS Case Number		
Explain any upd Payments (Payn Payment Date No data provided. Payments Reques Serialized Date No data provided.	nent Date during th Total Services	PAYMENT MAT e QSSR period) Expenses ing the QSSR period) Case Number	TERS Case Number		
Explain any upd Payments (Payn Payment Date No data provided. Payments Reque Serialized Date No data provided. AUSA Coordinat	nent Date during the Total Services ests (Serialized duri	PAYMENT MAT e QSSR period) Expenses ing the QSSR period) Case Number	TERS Case Number		
Payments (Payn Payment Date No data provided. Payments Reque Serialized Date No data provided.	nent Date during th Total Services ests (Serialized duri Total (PAYMENT MAT e QSSR period) Expenses ing the QSSR period) Case Number	TERS Case Number		

Page 2 of 4	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Have all payments been witnessed, and receipts signed, by an FBI special agent and another FBI $\,$ N/A

Did the CHS signed or initialed, in true or payment name, and dated the receipt for payment, which is maintained in the CHS's file.

special agent or government official?

N/A

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	
	QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT	
Have all payments been	reconciled?	N/A
	SECTION III CERTIFICATION	
06/01/2016	stion contained in Section III has been reviewed and is accurate as of Section III since the previous QSSR:	Yes
	ADMINISTRATION	
Was SAC authorization and documented in the	obtained for any disclosure of the CHS's identity to non-DOJ personnel CHS file?	N/A
Did the CHS engage in u	mauthorized criminal activity (does not include minor traffic offenses)?	No
Is the CHS currently or or state or local prosecu	expected to become a subject of investigation or prosecution by an FPO itor's office?	No
Has the CHS previously	testified?	No
Is the CHS expected to	testify?	No
Is the CHS involved in c	ertain federal judicial proceedings?	No
Will the CHS potentially	obtain or provide privileged or exculpatory information?	No
Has the CHS been or is	expected to be named in an Electronic Surveillance Application?	No
Has the CHS provided in	formation to support probable cause in a FISA application?	No
Were annual queries co ELSUR?	nducted of FBI universal and confidential indices and criminal history and	Yes
Date of Database Check	S.	
04/15/2016		
	II applicable instructions, which were witnessed by an Agent and a documented in the CHS's file?	Yes
Last Admonishment Date:	s 05/11/2015	
Was the FOASR prepare	d, approved, and submitted by the ASAC?	Yes
	for more than five consecutive years, qualifying as a Long-Term CHS, he FOASR so that FBIHQ can make the appropriate notification to DOJ?	Yes
Is the SSI, including the	CPS and Special Criteria sections, current?	Yes
	SECTION IV CERTIFICATION	
06/01/2016	ition contained in Section IV has been reviewed and is accurate as of	Yes
Explain any updates to	Section IV since the previous QSSR:	
	CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM	
Te there justification for	no contact with CHS during review period?	Yes
Justification: CHS unavailable	no contact with chis during review period?	163
Productivity Value:		
	Page 3 of 4 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTI	

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	
	QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT	

Access:

Access Value:

CHS Utility Value:

No statistical accomplishments have been claimed for this period.

CHS Utility Value = CHS NOT EVALUATED

CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM

Score:

COMMENTS

Comments/Instructions:

CHS spends parts of his year in the UK. As such, contact is not regular. However, the CHS continues to be in a advantageous position to assist the USICOGA

CHS was previously closed and re-opened. It is just 5 years now since the re-

opening. Follow up with CHS on

case. Continue to operate.

Workflow History

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Derived From:

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS CONTACT REPORT

-	_	•		_

 Source ID:
 HALPER

 Date:
 08/11/2016

Case Agent Name: Non SES

Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 8

Classified By:

Declassify On:

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 08/11/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

SA Benjamin E. Gessford SOSNon SES

SA Stephen M. Somma

Type of Contact: In Person

Country: UNITED STATES

Address Line 1:

Address Line 2:

City:

State: Virginia

ZIP/Postal Code:

Anomalies:

None

Life Changes:

None

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

None

Other:

None

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

Substantive Case File Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS CONTACT REPORT

HEADER

 Source ID:
 HALPER

 Date:
 08/17/2016

Case Agent Name: Non SES

Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 8

Classified By: Derived From:

Declassify On:

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 08/16/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

SA Benjamin Gessford SA Stephen M. Somma

Type of Contact: In Person

Country: UNITED STATES

Address Line 1:

Address Line 2:

City:

State: Virginia

ZIP/Postal Code:

Anomalies:

None

Life Changes:

None

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

CHS was introduced to several recoding devices he will be utilizing during an operation related to CROSSFIRE HURRICANE.

Other:

None

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

Substantive Case File Number:

97F-HQ-2063661

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS CONTACT REPORT

HEADER

 Source ID:
 HALPER

 Date:
 08/23/2016

Case Agent Name: Non SES

Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 8

Classified By:
Derived From:

Declassify On:

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 08/28/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

SA Stephen M. Somma SA Benjamin E. Gessford SOS Non SES

Type of Contact: In Person

Country: UNITED STATES

Address Line 1:

Address Line 2:

City:

State: Virginia

ZIP/Postal Code:

Anomalies:

None

Life Changes:

None

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

None

Other:

None

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS CONTACT REPORT

HEADER

 Source ID:
 HALPER

 Date:
 09/05/2016

Case Agent Name: Non SES

Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 8

Classified By: Derived From:

Declassify On:

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 09/04/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

SA Stephen M. Somma

Type of Contact: Telephonic

Anomalies:

None

Life Changes:

None

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

None
Other:
None

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS CONTACT REPORT

HEADER

 Source ID:
 HALPER

 Date:
 09/05/2016

Case Agent Name: Non SES

Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 8

Classified By: Derived From:

Declassify On:

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 09/01/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

SA Benjamin E, Gessford SA Stephen M. Somma SOS Non SES

Type of Contact: In Person

Country: UNITED STATES

Address Line 1:

Address Line 2:

City:

State: Virginia

ZIP/Postal Code:

Anomalies:

None

Life Changes:

None

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

CHS had a recording device for a meeting.

Other: None

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

Substantive Case File Number:

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

HEADER

Source ID: HALPER

Date: 09/22/2016

Case Agent Name: Non SES

Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 8

Classified By:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

From: 06/02/2016 To: 08/31/2016

OPENING/REOPENING

Have checks of NCIC, ELSUR, Sentinel, and confidential indices been conducted with results

attached?

Date of Record Checks

04/15/2016

Has the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, been reviewed or updated?

Yes

Yes

Have all appropriate instructions been given to the CHS, witnessed, and documented prior to utilization and no later than 90 days after the opening?

Yes

Initial Admonishment Date: 02/01/2012

Have agent assignments been reviewed and deemed appropriate for the operation of this source? (And have co-case agents from outside agencies been advised of relevant FBI policies?)

Yes

SPECIAL APPROVAL CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a special approval category (Senior Leadership, High-Level Union Officials, High-Level Government Officials, Attorneys, Physicians, Clergy, Employees of the Media, or Long-Term)?

No

SENSITIVE CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a sensitive CHS category?

No

SECTION I CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section I has been reviewed and is accurate as of 08/31/2016

Yes

Explain any updates to Section I since the previous QSSR:

OPERATIONAL MATTERS

Page 1 of 4

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Date of Last Repo	rting: 0	8/18/201	6			
Has the CHS been	involved in	Otherwis	se Illegal Activity	(OIA) during this review	period?	No
OIA Authorization	s (serialized	during t	the QSSR period)			
OIA Revocations (serialized du	iring the	QSSR period)			
Has the CHS beer	n involved in	consens	ual monitoring d	uring this review period?		No
Has the CHS beer	involved in	operatio	nal travel during	this review period?		No
Has the CHS been	involved in p	personal	international tra	vel during this review pe	riod?	Ye
Has the CHS T been notified?		ization f	orm been comple	ted and have the appropr	iate LEGAT(s)	No
Has the CHS been	approved fo	r partici	pation in a Group	1 UCO during this review	period?	No
Has the CHS been	approved fo	r partici	pation in a Group	2 UCO during this review	period?	No
Have the CHS and review period?	Case Agent/	Co-Case	Agent communi	cated via email and/or te	xt during this	No
Has the CHS parti	cipated in an	v UDP d	uring this review	period?		No
		Parit.	SECTION II CERTI	1,000		Av t
			PAYMENT MA	TTERS		
Payments (Payme	nt Date duri	ng the Q	SSR period)			
Payment Date	Total Serv	/ices	Expenses	Case Number	Request Seria	al
08/19/2016		5000.00	00	0.0000 97F-HQ-2063661	HALPER C	E-06
	CONTRACTOR CANADA	Ldurina	the OSSR period			
Payments Reques	ts (Serialized	auring	THE RESIDENCE OF THE PROPERTY OF			
	ts (Serialized	10000	e Number	Serial		
Serialized Date	Total	Cas	and the second second	Serial	-060	
Serialized Date 08/15/2016	Total 5000.0	Cas	e Number -HQ-2063661	Serial	-060	
Payments Reques Serialized Date 08/15/2016 AUSA Coordinatio Serialized Date	Total 5000.0	Cas	e Number -HQ-2063661	Serial	-060	
Serialized Date 08/15/2016 AUSA Coordination Serialized Date	Total 5000.0 n Letter - Ch	Cas	e Number -HQ-2063661	Serial	-060	
Serialized Date 08/15/2016 AUSA Coordination Serialized Date No data provided.	Total 5000.0 n Letter - Ch Serial y was involved	Cas 0000 97F IS Paymo	e Number -HQ-2063661 ents conduct of the ir	Serial HALPER CE		N/
Serialized Date 08/15/2016 AUSA Coordination Serialized Date No data provided. If an FPO attorney with the payment Have expenses, vo	Total 5000.0 n Letter - Ch Serial y was involve (s) obtained	Cas 2000 97F IS Paymonth and in the and doc	e Number -HQ-2063661 ents conduct of the ir	Serial HALPER CE	er concurrence	
Serialized Date 08/15/2016 AUSA Coordination Serialized Date No data provided. If an FPO attorney with the payment Have expenses, vo	Total 5000.0 n Letter - Ch Serial y was involve (s) obtained endor receipt e CHS file? s been witne	Cas 2000 97F- 4S Payment and in the and doc ts, copie	e Number -HQ-2063661 ents conduct of the in umented in the C	Serial HALPER CE Investigation, was his or his main file?	er concurrence e been obtained	

Did the CHS signed or initialed, in true or payment name, and dated the receipt for payment, which is maintained in the CHS's file.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

N/A

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT	
Have all payme	nts been reconciled?	Yes
	SECTION III CERTIFICATION	
I certify that al 08/31/2016	l information contained in Section III has been reviewed and is accurate as of	Yes
	dates to Section III since the previous QSSR: needs to be reconciled. It will be completed this week.	
	ADMINISTRATION	
	rization obtained for any disclosure of the CHS's identity to non-DOJ personnel of in the CHS file?	N/A
Did the CHS en	gage in unauthorized criminal activity (does not include minor traffic offenses)?	No
	ently or expected to become a subject of investigation or prosecution by an FPO I prosecutor's office?	No
Has the CHS pr	eviously testified?	No
Is the CHS exp	ected to testify?	No
Is the CHS invo	lved in certain federal judicial proceedings?	No
Will the CHS po	tentially obtain or provide privileged or exculpatory information?	No
Has the CHS been or is expected to be named in an Electronic Surveillance Application?		
Has the CHS pr	ovided information to support probable cause in a FISA application?	No
Were annual qu ELSUR?	ueries conducted of FBI universal and confidential indices and criminal history and	Yes
Date of Databa	se Checks	
04/15/2016		
	rovided all applicable instructions, which were witnessed by an Agent and a ficial, and documented in the CHS's file?	Yes
Last Admon Date:	ishments 05/11/2015	
Was the FOASR	prepared, approved, and submitted by the ASAC?	Yes
If the CHS was has this been n	operated for more than five consecutive years, qualifying as a Long-Term CHS, oted in the FOASR so that FBIHQ can make the appropriate notification to DOJ?	Yes
Is the SSI, incl	uding the CPS and Special Criteria sections, current?	Yes
	SECTION IV CERTIFICATION	
I certify that al 08/31/2016	I information contained in Section IV has been reviewed and is accurate as of	Yes
Explain any up	dates to Section IV since the previous QSSR:	
	CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM	
Stat Type	Total Co	unt
	omplishments have been claimed for this period.	- 0.5

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FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT	
Document (Actionable	tionable intelligence which was memorialized in a Source Reporting intelligence is defined as inteIs lligence which generates investigative ds to national or local collection requirements)?	Yes
	ue due to his/her unique or potential access to FBI priority targets or to FBI national and/or local collection requirements?	Yes
Productivity Value:		
Access:		
Access Value:		
CHS Utility Value:		
	CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM	
Score:		
	COMMENTS	
advantageous position to opening. CHS is currently	ear in the UK. As such, contact is not regular. However, the CHS continues to be	the re-
Workflow History		

Page 4 of 4 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

HEADER

Source ID: HALPER

 Date:
 12/13/2016

 Case Agent Name:
 Non SES

Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 8

Classified By:

Derived From: Declassify On:

PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

From: 09/01/2016 To: 11/30/2016

OPENING/REOPENING

Have checks of NCIC, ELSUR, Sentinel, and confidential indices been conducted with results attached?

Charles and Control

Date of Record Checks

04/15/2016

Has the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, been reviewed or updated?

Yes

Yes

Have all appropriate instructions been given to the CHS, witnessed, and documented prior to utilization and no later than 90 days after the opening?

Yes

Initial Admonishment Date: 02/01/2012

Have agent assignments been reviewed and deemed appropriate for the operation of this source? (And have co-case agents from outside agencies been advised of relevant FBI policies?)

Yes

SPECIAL APPROVAL CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a special approval category (Senior Leadership, High-Level Union Officials, High-Level Government Officials, Attorneys, Physicians, Clergy, Employees of the Media, or Long-Term)?

No

SENSITIVE CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a sensitive CHS category?

No

SECTION I CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section I has been reviewed and is accurate as of 11/30/2016

Yes

Explain any updates to Section I since the previous QSSR:

OPERATIONAL MATTERS

Page 1 of 4

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	
	QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT	

Date of Last Reporting: 09/06/2016

Has the CHS been involved in Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA) during this review period?

OIA Authorizations (serialized during the QSSR period)

OIA Revocations (serialized during the QSSR period)

Has the CHS been involved in consensual monitoring during this review period? No Has the CHS been involved in operational travel during this review period? No Has the CHS been involved in personal international travel during this review period? Yes Has the CHS Travel Authorization form been completed and have the appropriate LEGAT(s) No been notified? Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 1 UCO during this review period? No Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 2 UCO during this review period? No Have the CHS and Case Agent/Co-Case Agent communicated via email and/or text during this No review period?

SECTION II CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section II has been reviewed and is accurate as of 11/30/2016

Explain any updates to Section II since the previous QSSR:

Has the CHS participated in any UDP during this review period?

PAYMENT MATTERS

Payments (Payment Date during the QSSR period)

Payment Date	Total Services	Expenses	Case Number	Request S	erial
09/29/2016	25000.0000	0.0000	97F-HQ-2067748	HALPER	CE-062
09/08/2016	15000.0000	0.0000	97F-HQ-2063661	HALPER	CE-061

Payments Requests (Serialized during the QSSR period)

Serialized Date	Total	Case Number	Serial
09/06/2016	25000.0	000 97F-HQ-2067748	HALPER CE-062
09/01/2016	15000.0	000 97F-HQ-2063661	HALPER CE-061

AUSA Coordination Letter - CHS Payments

Serialized Date	Serial
No data provided.	

If an FPO attorney was involved in the conduct of the investigation, was his or her concurrence N/A with the payment(s) obtained and documented in the CHS main file?

Have expenses, vendor receipts, copies, or the CHS's explanation of their absence been obtained N/A and retained in the CHS file?

	Page 2 of 4	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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No

Yes

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION	
FD-1040a	QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT	
Have all payments been witnessed, a special agent or government official?	and receipts signed, by an FBI special agent and another FB	E N/A
Did the CHS signed or initialed, in tru which is maintained in the CHS's file.	ie or payment name, and dated the receipt for payment,	N/A
Have all payments been reconciled?		Yes
	SECTION III CERTIFICATION	
11/30/2016	ed in Section III has been reviewed and is accurate as of	Yes
Explain any updates to Section III si	nce the previous QSSR:	
	ADMINISTRATION	
Was SAC authorization obtained for a and documented in the CHS file?	any disclosure of the CHS's identity to non-DOJ personnel	N/A
Did the CHS engage in unauthorized	criminal activity (does not include minor traffic offenses)?	No
Is the CHS currently or expected to b or state or local prosecutor's office?	pecome a subject of investigation or prosecution by an FPO	No
Has the CHS previously testified?		No
Is the CHS expected to testify?		No
Is the CHS involved in certain federal judicial proceedings?		
Will the CHS potentially obtain or provide privileged or exculpatory information?		
Has the CHS been or is expected to be named in an Electronic Surveillance Application?		
Has the CHS provided information to	support probable cause in a FISA application?	No
Were annual queries conducted of FE ELSUR?	3I universal and confidential indices and criminal history an	d Yes
Date of Database Checks		
04/15/2016		
Was the CHS provided all applicable i government official, and documented Last Admonishments 05/11/20 Date:		Yes
Was the FOASR prepared, approved,	and submitted by the ASAC?	Yes
If the CHS was operated for more tha	an five consecutive years, qualifying as a Long-Term CHS, that FBIHQ can make the appropriate notification to DOJ?	Yes
Is the SSI, including the CPS and Spe	Is the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, current?	
	SECTION IV CERTIFICATION	
11/30/2016	ed in Section IV has been reviewed and is accurate as of	Yes
Explain any updates to Section IV sin	nce the previous QSSK:	
	CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM	
Stat Type	Total Co	ount

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT	
No statistical accomplishm	ents have been claimed for this period.	
Document (Actionable i	tionable intelligence which was memorialized in a Source Reporting ntelligence is defined as inteIs lligence which generates investigative Is to national or local collection requirements)?	Yes
	e due to his/her unique or potential access to FBI priority targets or to FBI national and/or local collection requirements?	Yes
Productivity Value:		
Access:		
Access Value:		
CHS Utility Value:		
	CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM	
Score:		
	COMMENTS	
advantageous position to a opening. CHS is currently	ear in the UK. As such, contact is not regular. However, the CHS continues to be	the re-

Workflow History

Page 4 of 4 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Derived From:

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS CONTACT REPORT

HEADER

Source ID: HALPER

 Date:
 02/27/2017

 Case Agent Name:
 Non SES

Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 8

Classified By:

Declassify On:

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 02/25/2017

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

SA Stephen M. Somma

Type of Contact: Telephonic

Anomalies:

None

Life Changes:

None

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

None

Other:

SA Somma spoke with CHS to set-up a meeting for 2/28/2017.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS CONTACT REPORT

HEADER

 Source ID:
 HALPER

 Date:
 02/27/2017

Case Agent Name: Non SES

Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 8

Classified By: Derived From:

Declassify On:

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 02/01/2017

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

SSA Non SES

Type of Contact: In Person

Country: UNITED STATES

Address Line 1:

Address Line 2:

City:

State: Virginia

ZIP/Postal Code:

Anomalies:

None

Life Changes:

None

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

None
Other:
None

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

Substantive Case File Number:

97F-NY-2067747

FD-209a	Page 1 of 1	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS CONTACT REPORT

HEADER

 Source ID:
 HALPER

 Date:
 02/27/2017

Case Agent Name: Non SES

Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 8

Classified By: Derived From:

Declassify On:

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 01/25/2017

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

SSA Non SES

SA Stephen M. Somma

Type of Contact: In Person

Country: UNITED STATES

Address Line 1:

Address Line 2:

City:

State: District of Columbia

ZIP/Postal Code:

Anomalies:

None

Life Changes:

None

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

CHS was provided with an Eagle to wear during meeting with target.

Other: None

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

Substantive Case File Number:

97F-NY-2067747

FD-209a	Page 1 of 1	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS CONTACT REPORT

HEADER

 Source ID:
 HALPER

 Date:
 03/01/2017

Case Agent Name: Non SES
Field Office/Division: New York

Field Office/Division: New Yor Squad: CD 8

Classified By: Derived From:

Declassify On:

CONTACT REPORT

Date of Contact: 03/01/2017

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

SA Stephen M. Somma

Type of Contact: In Person

Country: UNITED STATES

Address Line 1:

Address Line 2:

City:

State: Virginia

ZIP/Postal Code:

Anomalies:

None

Life Changes:

None

FBI investigative techniques/information revealed to source for operational purposes:

None
Other:
None

PROGRAM(S) ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT

HQ Division: Counterintelligence Division

Program: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

Subprogram: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Substantive Case File Number:

97F-NY-2067747

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

HEADER

Source ID:

HALPER

Date:

04/04/2017

Case Agent Name:

Non SES

Field Office/Division:

New York

Squad:

CD 10

Classified By:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

From:

12/01/2016

To:

03/01/2017

OPENING/REOPENING

Have checks of NCIC, ELSUR, Sentinel, and confidential indices been conducted with results

No

attached?

Has the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, been reviewed or updated?

Yes

Have all appropriate instructions been given to the CHS, witnessed, and documented prior to utilization and no later than 90 days after the opening?

Yes

Initial Admonishment Date: 02/01/2012

intial Admonistiment Date: 02/01/

Have agent assignments been reviewed and deemed appropriate for the operation of this source? (And have co-case agents from outside agencies been advised of relevant FBI policies?)

Yes

SPECIAL APPROVAL CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a special approval category (Senior Leadership, High-Level Union Officials, High-Level Government Officials, Attorneys, Physicians, Clergy, Employees of the Media, or Long-Term)?

No

SENSITIVE CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a sensitive CHS category?

No

SECTION I CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section I has been reviewed and is accurate as of 03/01/2017

Yes

Explain any updates to Section I since the previous QSSR:

OPERATIONAL MATTERS

Date of Last Reporting:

02/27/2017

Has the CHS been involved in Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA) during this review period?

No

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FD-1040a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT OIA Authorizations (serialized during the QSSR period) OIA Revocations (serialized during the QSSR period) Has the CHS been involved in consensual monitoring during this review period? Yes Has the CHS agreed to testify and that agreement was documented in the CHS file? No Was SAC approval obtained? No In a criminal matter where there were no sensitive circumstances, was approval from a DOJ N/A attorney (i.e., the AUSA) obtained? In an investigation conducted pursuant to the NSIG, where there were no sensitive No circumstances, was approval from the CDC or FBIHQ OGC obtained? If sensitive circumstances existed, was approval from DOJ/OEO obtained through a field No office lead to the FBIHQ substantive unit? If exigent circumstances existed, was approval obtained from the SAC or ASAC and the N/A appropriate FBIHQ substantive unit notified? Is all required documentation (e.g., FD-472, 473, 473a, FD-1071) for consensual monitoring in the CHS file? Has the CHS been involved in operational travel during this review period? No Has the CHS been involved in personal international travel during this review period? Yes Has the CHS Travel Authorization form been completed and have the appropriate LEGAT(s) No been notified? Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 1 UCO during this review period? No Has the CHS been approved for participation in a Group 2 UCO during this review period? No Have the CHS and Case Agent/Co-Case Agent communicated via email and/or text during this No review period? Has the CHS participated in any UDP during this review period? No SECTION II CERTIFICATION I certify that all information contained in Section II has been reviewed and is accurate as of Yes 03/01/2017 Explain any updates to Section II since the previous QSSR: CHS was involved in a sensitive investigation. As part of the investigation, the CHS was consensually monitored by the FBI. The DAD overseeing the investigation was aware of the consensually monitored conversations. **PAYMENT MATTERS** Payments (Payment Date during the QSSR period) **Total Services** Case Number **Payment Date** Request Serial Expenses 02/01/2017 25000.0000 0.0000 97F-NY-2067747 CE-065 Payments Requests (Serialized during the QSSR period) Serialized Date Case Number Serial 01/11/2017 25000.0000 97F-NY-2067747 CE-065 **AUSA Coordination Letter - CHS Payments**

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FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT	
Serialized Date	Serial	
No data provided.		
ARCHITECTURE AND ACCOUNTS OF THE PARTY OF TH	ey was involved in the conduct of the investigation, was his or her concurrence t(s) obtained and documented in the CHS main file?	N/A
Have expenses, and retained in	vendor receipts, copies, or the CHS's explanation of their absence been obtained the CHS file?	N/A
	ts been witnessed, and receipts signed, by an FBI special agent and another FBI government official?	N/A
	ed or initialed, in true or payment name, and dated the receipt for payment, ned in the CHS's file.	N/A
Have all payme	ts been reconciled?	Yes
	SECTION III CERTIFICATION	
I certify that all	information contained in Section III has been reviewed and is accurate as of	Yes

Explain any updates to Section III since the previous QSSR:

ADMINISTRATION	
Was SAC authorization obtained for any disclosure of the CHS's identity to non-DOJ personnel and documented in the CHS file?	N/A
Did the CHS engage in unauthorized criminal activity (does not include minor traffic offenses)	? No
Is the CHS currently or expected to become a subject of investigation or prosecution by an FP or state or local prosecutor's office?	O No
Has the CHS previously testified?	No
Is the CHS expected to testify?	No
Is the CHS involved in certain federal judicial proceedings?	No
Will the CHS potentially obtain or provide privileged or exculpatory information?	No
Has the CHS been or is expected to be named in an Electronic Surveillance Application?	No
Has the CHS provided information to support probable cause in a FISA application?	No
Were annual queries conducted of FBI universal and confidential indices and criminal history ELSUR?	and N/A
Was the CHS provided all applicable instructions, which were witnessed by an Agent and a government official, and documented in the CHS's file?	Yes
Last Admonishments 08/19/2017 Date:	
Was the FOASR prepared, approved, and submitted by the ASAC?	Yes
If the CHS was operated for more than five consecutive years, qualifying as a Long-Term CHS has this been noted in the FOASR so that FBIHQ can make the appropriate notification to DOJ	
Is the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, current?	Yes
SECTION IV CERTIFICATION	

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*	

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

Explain any updates to Section IV since the previous QSSR:

CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM	
Stat Type Tot	tal Count
No statistical accomplishments have been claimed for this period.	
Did the CHS provide actionable intelligence which was memorialized in a Source Reporting Document (Actionable intelligence is defined as intels lligence which generates investigativactivity and/or responds to national or local collection requirements)?	Yes re
Does the CHS have value due to his/her unique or potential access to FBI priority targets or intelligence responsive to FBI national and/or local collection requirements?	Yes
Productivity Value:	
Access:	
Access Value:	
CHS Utility Value:	
CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM	
Score:	
COMMENTS	

Comments/Instructions:

CHS was an integral part of a close hold National Security investigation. CHS has been transferred to a new Case Agent and the CHS's focus will shift to other matters.

Workflow History

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	1 CONTRACTOR OF CHEST PROPERTY AND ADDRESS CONTRACTOR OF

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT

HEADER

Source ID:

HALPER

Date:

04/20/2017

Case Agent Name:

Non SES

Field Office/Division:

New York

Squad:

CD 10

Classified By:

CD 10

Derived From:

- 1

Declassify On:

ADMINISTRATIVE

Legacy Case File Number:

Legacy Symbol Number:

Co-Case Agent(s):

Non SES

From:

03/27/2016

To:

03/26/2017

Date of Last FOASR:

Gender:

ender:

SSN:

DOB:

Alias DOB(s):

Alias SSN(s):

Country(ies) of Citizenship: UNITED STATES, UNITED STATES

Does the CHS live in, or is he/she operated in the United States?

Race:

Language(s) Spoken:

Primary language used during debriefing, if a translator was used, and frequency of use:

English

Prior operational periods of the CHS by the FBI (start with the most recent).

Opened:

03/24/2011, 12/18/2008

Closed:

01/25/2011

Programs to which the CHS has contributed during the review period.

Has any of the CHS's information been provided to an AUSA or DOJ attorney during the review period, for use in furtherance of a prosecution or in a court document?

No

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT

CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM

Highly paid - review period (> \$100,000 in the review period).

No

Amount paid includes payments from CHS funds, case funds, other agencies (if known, etc.)

Amount Paid During \$70,000.00

Review Period:

Amount Paid During \$0.00

Review Period (non-

FBI money):

Highly paid - cumulative (>= \$250,000 over entire CHS operation).

Yes

Amount paid includes payments from CHS funds, case funds, other agencies (if known, etc.).

Cumulative Amount \$596,906.60

Paid:

Cumulative Amount \$0.00

Paid (non-FBI

money):

If funds other than those calculated above were used, please provide details.

Defector.

No

Recruitment-in-Place or Double Agent.

No

Are there reasonable grounds to believe the CHS engaged in Unauthorized Illegal Activity (UIA), other than minor traffic offenses per CHSPG, within the review period?

No

CHS who resides outside the United States.

Yes

Please provide details (city, state/region, country, etc):

CHS resides in the UK for several months during the year as part of the CHS' position. Cambridge, United Kingdom.

Any international travel during the review period?

Yes

Travel Start Date	Travel End Date	Countries	Travel Type
No data provided.			

Please provide any additional details, including type and frequency of travel:

Please see attached travel history Excel file. A review of the CHS' travel history was consistent with prior travel. CHS travels frequently for personal and professional reasons.

Former or current subject of FBI investigation(s).

No

CHS subjected to polygraph with inconclusive and/or deceptive results at any time.

No

CHS who was ever Closed for Cause by the FBI or any other agency. (Note: Other agencies may not refer to this closure as such; however, if another agency closed the CHS for one of the below reasons, it would be considered as closing for Cause.)

Yes

Indicate Reason(s) (per CHSPG):

Violated Instructions

Please provide details:

Since the reopening, the CHS has complied with all instructions given to him by the FBI.

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FD-1040a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT

CHS who has ever received immigration benefits from the FBI and/or the USIC for him/her and/or his/her family.

No

Score:

FD-1040a

SPECIAL CRITERIA Long-Term CHS (5+ consecutive years). Yes Is the CHS a Criminal and/or National Security CHS? Yes Select all that apply: National Security CHS Has the CHS been operated by the same Case Agent for 5+ years? No Please provide details: CHS was an integral part of a close hold National Security investigation. CHS was recently transferred to a new Case Agent and the CHS's focus will shift to other matters. Senior Leadership CHS - CHS who is in a position to exercise significant decision-making No authority over, or to otherwise manage and direct the unlawful activities of the participants in a group or organization involved with unlawful activities that are nationwide or international in scope or deemed to be of high significance to the FBI's criminal investigative priorities, even if the unlawful activities are local or regional in scope. High-Level Government or Union CHS- CHS is either (a) the chief executive, the office next No in succession to the chief executive, or a member of the legislature of the federal or a state government, or (b) a president, secretary-treasurer, or vice-president of an international labor union or the principal officer or officers of a subordinate regional entity of an international or national labor union. Privileged (Attorney, Physician, or Clergy) and/or Media CHS. No CHS involved in Group I and/or Group II Undercover Operation (UCO) and/or Asset Business No Enterprise during the review period. CHS participated in Tier I and/or Tier II Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA) within the review No period. Do not check if OIA is solely for consensual monitoring in two-party states. Within the review period, was the CHS involved in an operation using sophisticated No techniques, other than Tier I/II OIA, Group I/II UCO, or Asset Business Enterprise activities? Opened three or more times. No CHS subjected to Level 1 and/or Level 2 Operational Test at any time. Yes Please select the type of test(s): Level 2 Please provide details (and/or Delta Serial Number): CHS passed Level 2 Ops test. Have ANY intelligence products (IIR, SIR, IA, IB, etc) been generated as a result of the No CHS's reporting? CHS with 3+ intelligence products (IIR, SIR, IA, IB, etc) and/or 2+ intelligence products No which led to investigative action or contained singular information (within review period) CHS responsible for recruitment of another CHS. No

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT

Please provide S number(s) of CHS(s) recruited and S number(s) of any other CHSs affiliated with the CHS. Please describe the nature of the relationship(s) between the CHS and the CHS(s) recruited CHS(s) with whom the CHS is affiliated:

Is the CHS a former or current jointly operated CHS?

No

Has the CHS ever met with, been debriefed by, or been operated by another agency on separate matters?

No

Has the CHS ever been affiliated with a foreign intelligence service, known terrorist group, or criminal organization?

No

How did the CHS come to the attention of the FBI? Other

Please specify:

previously utilized by FBI, circa 2008

If the CHS was brought to the FBI by a non-DBI member, name the agency that brought the CHS.

Is the CHS being utilized jointly with another FBI Field Office/Field Division?

No

Has the CHS or his/her associates (e.g., relatives, former employees, etc.) ever had any other affiliations with another agency?

No

Has the CHS been the subject of U.S. and/or foreign legal proceedings (e.g. arrested, cited, or detained for any reason)?

No

Source of Income, Amount and Frequency (e.g. Monthly)

No data provided.

Asset and Value

No data provided.

Debt and Amount

No data provided.

HISTORY OF ASSOCIATION WITH THE FBI				
Name	Role	Field Office/Division	Date Assigned	Date Removed
Non SES	Case Agent	New York	03/26/2014	03/26/2014
Non SES	Co-Case Agent	New York	03/08/2017	
Non SES	Case Agent	New York	11/09/2016	03/08/2017
SOMMA, STEPHEN M.	Case Agent	New York	03/26/2014	10/21/2015
Non SES	Case Agent	New York	10/21/2013	10/21/2013
SOMMA, STEPHEN M.	Case Agent	New York	10/21/2013	
Non SES	Case Agent	New York	03/08/2017	
Non SES	Co-Case Agent	New York	03/10/2014	03/25/2014

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FD-1040a		L BUREAU OF INVEST OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE		
Non SES	Case Agent	New York	10/21/2015	11/09/2016
Non SES	Co-Case Agent	New York	10/21/2015	11/09/2016
Non SES	Co-Case Agent	New York	08/21/2013	03/10/2014
Non SES	Co-Case Agent	New York	10/21/2015	
Non SES	Co-Case Agent	New York	03/25/2014	10/21/2015
Non SES	Co-Case Agent	New York	05/18/2012	08/21/2013
Non SES	Co-Case Agent	New York	03/10/2014	
SOMMA, STEPHEN M.	Co-Case Agent	New York	10/28/2015	03/08/2017
SOMMA, STEPHEN M.	Case Agent	New York	03/26/2014	
SOMMA, STEPHEN M.	Case Agent	New York	09/20/2012	
Non SES	Case Agent	New York	05/18/2012	09/20/2012
Non SES	Co-Case Agent	New York	10/21/2015	10/21/2015
Non SES	Case Agent	New York	09/20/2012	09/20/2012

Explain reason for change in primary handlers, if within review period, and if known:

Problems encountered during review period either meeting or handling the CHS: No problems have been encountered.

MOTIVATION

Describe the CHS's motivations for providing information to the FBI and how this was determined: Monetary compensation, patriotism/ideology

Have the CHS's motivations changed during the review period?

No

PAYMENTS

Total Payments for Reporting Period

By FBI:

\$70,000.00

By Other Agencies:

\$0.00

Lifetime Aggregate Payments

By FBI:

\$596,906.60

By Other Agencies:

\$0.00

During the review period, was the CHS ever paid without another FBI special agent or government official present?

No

Was SAC authorization obtained and documented?

Identify any benefits the CHS received during the period other than money not already covered by question III-A (e.g., sentencing benefits or immigration benefits)

None

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FD-1040a	Page 5 of 7	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT

Describe any instance in which the CHS requested special favors, consideration, or treatment, including, but not limited to

- 1. Assistance for the CHS's family members
- 2. Intervention by the FBI in business, employment, or civil matters

None

REPORTING

Substantive Case File Number:

97F-HQ-2063661, 97F-NY-2067747,

Below are stats claimed during the review period relevant to validation:

Stat Reporting Document

No data provided.

TIMELINESS OF INFORMATION

Describe whether the CHS's information was provided promptly and consistently with the CHS's access; whether the CHS reporting was delayed; or whether the information was historical in nature.

All information was provided promptly and consistently.

ACCESS

The CHS's access is:

Direct

Describe the CHS's access to information:

Is the information obtained through a sub-source?

No

Describe any significant changes during the review period of the CHS's targets or the CHS's access to information:

None

CORROBORATION

Discuss instances in which the CHS's reporting was verified by circumstances or other intelligence: None

Discuss instances in which the CHS's reporting was not consistent with the facts and the impact of each reporting instance:

Has not happened

RELIABILITY EVALUATION

Discuss any reason to doubt this CHS's identity:

None

Cite Case Agent observations of the CHS's behavior:

CHS behavior has been excellent. The CHS has agreed to assist the case agent in the goals of the investigation. The CHS has devoted significant time and energy to assisting the FBI in it's goals.

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Page 6 of /	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
	Page 6 of 7

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FIELD OFFICE ANNUAL SOURCE REPORT

Discuss any handling problems including any instances in which the CHS objected to any operational tasking:

CHS has not objected to any operational taskings.

Describe any information not previously provided that could reasonably be construed as derogatory. This should include information from other CHS reporting, substantive case documents, other agency reporting, and statements made by the CHS. Ensure that all available information that might materially alter a prior validation assessment, including information pertaining to unauthorized illegal activity by the CHS is included.

Describe any of the CHS's character traits, habits, or weaknesses that may impact the CHS's reporting No known character traits, habits or weaknesses are known.

Describe any indications of undisclosed control by an entity or individual other than the FBI (e.g., counterintelligence concerns, criminal organization interests, etc).

There are no concerns.

Is the CHS reasonably believed to be the subject or target of a pending criminal investigation, is under arrest, or has been charged in a pending prosecution?

No

Are current criminal history checks contained in the CHS's file?

Yes

Date of Record Checks

04/19/2017

Were any new references obtained from FBI database checks during this review period?

No

CHS	UTIL	ITY VA	LUE	SYSTEM

QSSR Period 1	QSSR Period 2	QSSR Period 3	QSSR Period 4
03/03/2016 - 06/01/2016	06/02/2016 - 08/31/2016	09/01/2016 - 11/30/2016	12/01/2016 - 03/01/2017

Average CHS Utility Value =



COMMENTS

Author's Comments:

CHS has provided the FBI with unique access to targets who are very difficult to gain access to. The CHS has been more than willing to do whatever she/he could do in order to assist the FBI in its mission. Since re-opening, the CHS has complied with all requests by the FBI and has offered to assist in other investigations, which he has, most notably in another important National Security Investigation.

SIGNATURE

Submitted By First Level Approved By Second Level Approved By Non SES smsomma (stephen somma) Non SES

Mon, 24 Apr 2017 13:42:47 -0400 Mon, 24 Apr 2017 16:36:42 -0400 Tue, 2 May 2017 08:57:11 -0400

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

HEADER

Source ID: HALPER

Date: 06/20/2017

Case Agent Name: Non SES

Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 10

Classified By:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT

From: 03/02/2017

To: 05/31/2017

OPENING/REOPENING

Have checks of NCIC, ELSUR, Sentinel, and confidential indices been conducted with results

attached?

Has the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, been reviewed or updated?

Have all appropriate instructions been given to the CHS, witnessed, and documented prior to

utilization and no later than 90 days after the opening?

Initial Admonishment Date: 02/01/2012

Have agent assignments been reviewed and deemed appropriate for the operation of this Yes source? (And have co-case agents from outside agencies been advised of relevant FBI policies?)

SPECIAL APPROVAL CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a special approval category (Senior Leadership, High-Level Union Officials, High-Level Government Officials, Attorneys, Physicians, Clergy, Employees of the Media, or Long-Term)?

SENSITIVE CATEGORIES

Is the CHS in a sensitive CHS category?

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

SECTION I CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section I has been reviewed and is accurate as of 05/31/2017

Yes

Explain any updates to Section I since the previous QSSR:

OPERATIONAL MATTERS

Date of Last Reporting:

Has the CHS been involved in Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA) during this review period?

No

Page 1 of 4

FD-1040a		to all the same	RTERLY SUPERV				
OIA Authorizatio	ns (serialized dı	uring the	QSSR period)				
OIA Revocations	(serialized duri	ng the QS	SSR period)				
Has the CHS bee	en involved in co	nsensual	monitoring du	ring this	review period	?	No
Has the CHS bee	en involved in op	erationa	l travel during	this revie	w period?		No
Has the CHS bee	n involved in per	rsonal int	ternational trav	el during	this review p	eriod?	No
Has the CHS bee	n approved for p	participat	ion in a Group	1 UCO dui	ring this revie	w period?	No
Has the CHS bee	n approved for p	participat	ion in a Group	2 UCO du	ring this revie	w period?	No
Have the CHS an	d Case Agent/Co	o-Case Ag	gent communic	ated via e	mail and/or t	ext during this	No
review period? Has the CHS part	ticipated in any l	UDP durii	ng this review	period?			No
		SI	ECTION II CERTI	FICATION			
				SR:	ewed and is a	ccurate as of	Yes
Explain any upda	ates to Section I	I since th	PAYMENT MAT	SR:	ewed and is a	ccurate as of	Yes
Explain any upda Payments (Paym	ates to Section I	I since th	PAYMENT MAT	SR: TERS	ewed and is a	ccurate as of Request Seria	
Explain any upda Payments (Paym Payment Date	ates to Section I	I since th	PAYMENT MAT	SR: TERS			
Explain any upda Payments (Paym Payment Date No data provided.	ntes to Section I	I since th	PAYMENT MAT R period) Expenses	TERS Cas			
Explain any upda Payments (Paym Payment Date No data provided. Payments Reque	ntes to Section I	I since th	PAYMENT MAT R period) Expenses e QSSR period)	TERS Cas			
Explain any upda Payments (Paym Payment Date No data provided. Payments Reque Serialized Date	ent Date during Total Servic	I since the the QSSI	PAYMENT MAT R period) Expenses e QSSR period)	TERS Cas	e Number		
Payments (Paym Payment Date No data provided. Payments Reque Serialized Date No data provided.	ent Date during Total Servic sts (Serialized d	I since the the QSSI res	PAYMENT MAT R period) Expenses e QSSR period)	TERS Cas	e Number		
Explain any upda Payments (Paym Payment Date No data provided. Payments Reque Serialized Date No data provided. AUSA Coordination	ent Date during Total Servic sts (Serialized d	I since the the QSSI res	PAYMENT MAT R period) Expenses e QSSR period)	TERS Cas	e Number		
Explain any upda Payments (Payment Date No data provided. Payments Requents Requents Serialized Date No data provided. AUSA Coordination Serialized Date	nent Date during Total Servicests (Serialized de Total	I since the the QSSI res	PAYMENT MAT R period) Expenses e QSSR period)	TERS Cas	e Number		
Payments (Payments (Payment Date No data provided. Payments Reque Serialized Date No data provided. AUSA Coordination Serialized Date No data provided. If an FPO attorned.	nent Date during Total Service sts (Serialized de Total on Letter - CHS Serial	the QSSI es luring the Case N Payment	PAYMENT MAT R period) Expenses e QSSR period) lumber es	TERS Cas	e Number Serial n, was his or	Request Seria	
Payments (Payments (Payment Date No data provided. Payments Reque Serialized Date No data provided. AUSA Coordination Serialized Date No data provided. If an FPO attornomith the payments	rent Date during Total Servic sts (Serialized d Total on Letter - CHS Serial ey was involved and total option of the content of the conten	the QSSI es luring the Case N Payment in the co	PAYMENT MAT R period) Expenses e QSSR period) lumber es	SR: TERS Cas vestigation	e Number Serial n, was his or le?	Request Seria	N/A
and retained in t	rent Date during Total Service sts (Serialized de Total on Letter - CHS Serial ey was involved et(s) obtained an ovendor receipts, the CHS file?	the QSSI es luring the Case N Payment in the cond docum copies, c	PAYMENT MAT R period) Expenses QSSR period) lumber s induct of the intented in the Cl or the CHS's ex	TERS Cas vestigation IS main fi	e Number Serial n, was his or le? of their abser	Request Seria	N// N//

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SECTION III CERTIFICATION

I certify that all information contained in Section III has been reviewed and is accurate as of

Have all payments been reconciled?

05/31/2017

Yes

FD-1040a

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT

Explain any updates to Section III since the previous QSSR:

ADMINISTRATION	
Was SAC authorization obtained for any disclosure of the CHS's identity to non-DOJ personnel and documented in the CHS file?	N/A
Did the CHS engage in unauthorized criminal activity (does not include minor traffic offenses)?	No
Is the CHS currently or expected to become a subject of investigation or prosecution by an FPO or state or local prosecutor's office?	No
Has the CHS previously testified?	No
Is the CHS expected to testify?	No
Is the CHS involved in certain federal judicial proceedings?	No
Will the CHS potentially obtain or provide privileged or exculpatory information?	No
Has the CHS been or is expected to be named in an Electronic Surveillance Application?	No
Has the CHS provided information to support probable cause in a FISA application?	No
Were annual queries conducted of FBI universal and confidential indices and criminal history and ELSUR?	N/A
Was the CHS provided all applicable instructions, which were witnessed by an Agent and a government official, and documented in the CHS's file?	Yes
Last Admonishments 05/11/2015 Date:	
Was the FOASR prepared, approved, and submitted by the ASAC?	Yes
If the CHS was operated for more than five consecutive years, qualifying as a Long-Term CHS, has this been noted in the FOASR so that FBIHQ can make the appropriate notification to DOJ?	Yes
Is the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, current?	Yes
SECTION IV CERTIFICATION	
I certify that all information contained in Section IV has been reviewed and is accurate as of 05/31/2017	Yes
Explain any updates to Section IV since the previous QSSR:	
CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM	
Is there justification for no contact with CHS during review period?	Yes
Justification: CHS unavailable	
Productivity Value:	
Access:	
Access Value:	
CHS Utility Value:	

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT	
No statistical accomplished CHS Utility Value = CHS	ments have been claimed for this period. S NOT EVALUATED	
202 7000 000 200	CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM	
Attent	CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM	

COMMENTS

Comments/Instructions:
CHS has been valuable on a variety of cases. CHS will be providing assistance to CD-10 on related matters going forward. Continue to operate as needed

Workflow History

Page 4 of 4 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED FD-1040a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION **OUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT** HEADER Source ID: HALPER Date: 10/20/2020 Case Agent Name: Non SES Field Office/Division: New York Squad: CD 10 PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT From: 05/28/2020 To: 08/26/2020 OPENING/REOPENING Have checks of NCIC, ELSUR, Sentinel, and confidential indices been conducted with results No attached? Has the SSI, including the CPS and Special Criteria sections, been reviewed or updated? No The SSI is required to be reviewed or updated every 90 days. Have all appropriate instructions been given to the CHS, witnessed, and documented prior to Yes utilization and no later than 90 days after the opening? Initial Admonishment Date: 02/01/2012 Have agent assignments been reviewed and deemed appropriate for the operation of this Yes source? (And have co-case agents from outside agencies been advised of relevant FBI policies?) SPECIAL APPROVAL CATEGORIES Is the CHS in a special approval category (Senior Leadership, High-Level Union Officials, High-Yes Level Government Officials, Attorneys, Physicians, Clergy, Employees of the Media, or Long-Term)? Is the CHS reporting on Criminal Matters? No **SENSITIVE CATEGORIES** Is the CHS in a sensitive CHS category? No SECTION I CERTIFICATION I certify that all information contained in Section I has been reviewed and is accurate as of Yes 08/26/2020 Explain any updates to Section I since the previous QSSR: **OPERATIONAL MATTERS** Date of Last Reporting: Has the CHS been involved in Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA) during this review period? No

OIA Authorizations (serialized during the QSSR period)

OIA Revocations (serialized during the QSSR period)

Page 1 of 4	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNCLASSIFIED

		UNCLASSIF	IED		
FD-1040a	7		OF INVESTIGATION ISORY SOURCE REPORT		
Has the CHS bee	n involved in consen	sual monitoring du	ring this review period	?	No
	n involved in operati		10 2 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10		No
Has the CHS beer	n involved in persona	l international trav	el during this review p	eriod?	No
Has the CHS beer	approved for partic	pation in a Group	1 UCO during this revie	w period?	No
Has the CHS been	approved for partic	pation in a Group	2 UCO during this revie	w period?	No
Have the CHS and review period?	d Case Agent/Co-Cas	e Agent communic	ated via email and/or t	ext during this	No
Has the CHS part	icipated in any UDP o	luring this review	period?		No
		SECTION II CERTI	FICATION		
08/26/2020	tes to Section II sinc				Yes
			TERS		
Payments (Paym	ent Date during the ((SSR period)			
Payment Date	Total Services	Expenses	Case Number	Request Seria	
No data provided.					
Payments Reque	sts (Serialized during	the QSSR period)			
Serialized Date	Total Cas	se Number	Serial		
No data provided.					
AUSA Coordinatio	n Letter - CHS Paym	ients			
Serialized Date	Serial				
No data provided.					
	ey was involved in the t(s) obtained and do		vestigation, was his or IS main file?	her concurrence	N/A
and retained in t	he CHS file?		planation of their abser		
special agent or	government official?	2121240234023	by an FBI special agen		Ye
which is maintair	ned in the CHS's file.	or payment name	, and dated the receipt	for payment,	Yes
Have all payment	ts been reconciled?	CECTION III CEC	CICATION		Ye
I certify that all i	nformation container	SECTION III CERTI	FICATION been reviewed and is	accurate as of	Ye
08/26/2020	mormación contame	i iii occuoii iii ilas	, Dean reviewed and is	accurate as or	10
Explain any upda	tes to Section III sin	ce the previous QS	SR:		
	0.031 0001-107-0-20	ADMINISTRA	TION		
		ADMINISTRA Page 2 of		BUREAU OF INVESTI	

UNCLASSIFIED

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT	
Was SAC authorizatio and documented in th	n obtained for any disclosure of the CHS's identity to non-DOJ personnel te CHS file?	N/A
Did the CHS engage in	n unauthorized criminal activity (does not include minor traffic offenses)?	No
Is the CHS currently o or state or local prose	or expected to become a subject of investigation or prosecution by an FPO ecutor's office?	No
Has the CHS previous	ly testified?	No
Is the CHS expected t	o testify?	No
Is the CHS involved in	certain federal judicial proceedings?	No
Will the CHS potentia	lly obtain or provide privileged or exculpatory information?	No
Has the CHS been or i	s expected to be named in an Electronic Surveillance Application?	No
Has the CHS provided	information to support probable cause in a FISA application?	No
Were annual queries ELSUR?	conducted of FBI universal and confidential indices and criminal history and	No
	d all applicable instructions, which were witnessed by an Agent and a and documented in the CHS's file?	Yes
Last Admonishme Date:	nts 09/22/2017	
Was the FOASR prepa	red, approved, and submitted by the ASAC?	Yes
	ted for more than five consecutive years, qualifying as a Long-Term CHS, in the FOASR so that FBIHQ can make the appropriate notification to DOJ?	Yes
Is the SSI, including t	the CPS and Special Criteria sections, current?	No
The SSI is require	d to be reviewed or updated every 90 days.	
	SECTION IV CERTIFICATION	
I certify that all infor: 08/26/2020	mation contained in Section IV has been reviewed and is accurate as of	Yes
Explain any updates t	o Section IV since the previous QSSR:	
	CHS UTILITY VALUE SYSTEM	
Is there justification (for no contact with CHS during review period?	Yes
Justification: Case Agent TDY or o	otherwise unavailable	
Productivity Value:		
Access:		
Access Value:		
CHS Utility Value:		
No statistical accomplish	nments have been claimed for this period.	
CHS Utility Value = CI	HS NOT EVALUATED	
	Page 3 of 4 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIG	CVII
	Page 3 of 4 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIG	SHII

UNCLASSIFIED

FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION QUARTERLY SUPERVISORY SOURCE REPORT	
	CHS PRIORITIZATION SYSTEM	
Score:		
	COMMENTS	

Workflow History



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



HEADER

Source ID:

HALPER

Date:

08/11/2016

Case Agent Name:

Non SES

Field Office/Division:

New York

Squad:

CD 8

Classified By:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact:

08/11/2016

20/20/20

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

SA Benjamin E. Gessford

sos Non SES

SA Stephen M. Somma

Type of Contact:

In Person

Country:

UNITED STATES

City:

State:

Virginia

Date of Report:

08/11/2016

Substantive Case File Number

97F-HQ-2063661

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

SA Benjamin E. Gessfort, SOS Non SES and SA Stephen M. Somma met with the CHS regarding CROSSFIRE HURRICANE targets. Due to the sensitivities of the investigation, a debriefing document will be written under separate cover and filed in the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE file.

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

SMSOMMA (STEPHEN SOMMA)

Thu, 11 Aug 2016 17:14:33 -0400

First Level Approved By

Non SES

Fri, 12 Aug 2016 08:56:35 -0400

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



HE	а	13	w

Source ID:

HALPER

Date:

08/17/2016

Case Agent Name:

New York

Field Office/Division: Squad:

Classified By:

CD 8

Derived From:

Declassify On:

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact:

08/16/2016

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

SA Benjamin Gessford SA Stephen M. Somma

Type of Contact:

In Person

Country:

UNITED STATES

City: State:

Virginia

Date of Report:

08/16/2016

Substantive Case File Number

97F-HQ-2063661

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

Source Reporting:

CHS was prepped for an operation regarding the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE investigation, a close hold investigation.

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By

SMSOMMA (STEPHEN SOMMA)

Wed, 17 Aug 2016 16:37:55 -0400

Thu, 18 Aug 2016 09:16:24 -0400

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



HEADER

SOURCE REPORTING

Source ID:

HALPER

Date:

09/05/2016

Case Agent Name:

Field Office/Division:

New York

Squad:

Classified By:

CD 8

Derived From:

Declassify On:

09/01/2016

Date of Contact:

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

SA Benjamin E. Gessford SA Stephen M. Somma

SOS

Type of Contact:

In Person

Country:

UNITED STATES

City:

State:

Virginia

Date of Report:

09/05/2016

Substantive Case File Number

97F-HQ-2063661

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

Source Reporting:

Due to the sensitivity of the investigation, the writeup is in the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE FILE.

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

SMSOMMA (STEPHEN SOMMA)

Mon, 5 Sep 2016 18:05:10 -0400

First Level Approved By

Tue, 6 Sep 2016 15:29:51 -0400

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



HEADER

Source ID:

HALPER

Date:

02/27/2017

Case Agent Name:

Non SES

Field Office/Division:

New York

Squad:

CD 8

Classified By:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact:

02/01/2017

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

SSA Non SES

Type of Contact:

In Person

Country:

UNITED STATES

City:

State:

Virginia

Date of Report:

02/27/2017

Substantive Case File Number

97F-NY-2067747

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

CHS discussed potential operations against the subject of the investigation.

SA Somma also presented the CHS with \$25,000 for CHS services, the signed receipt is attached.

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

SMSOMMA (STEPHEN SOMMA)

Mon, 27 Feb 2017 14:24:51 -0500

First Level Approved By

Non SES

Mon, 27 Feb 2017 14:25:17 -0500

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



HEADER

Source ID: HALPER

Date: 02/27/2017

Case Agent Name: Non SES

Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 8

Classified By:

Derived From:
Declassify On:

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact: 01/25/2017

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

SSA Non SES

SA Stephen M. Somma

Type of Contact: In Person

Country: UNITED STATES

City:

State: District of Columbia

Date of Report: 02/27/2017

Substantive Case File Number

97F-NY-2067747

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

CHS was met by writer and SSA Non SES at the Sofitel Hotel. CHS was meeting with the subject of the investigation. CHS met with writer and SSA Non SES prior to a meeting with the subject and was recovered by the same team approximately 2 hours later. Due to the sensitivity of the investigation, a write-up of the meeting will be placed in the case file.

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

SMSOMMA (STEPHEN SOMMA)

First Level Approved By

Non SES

Mon, 27 Feb 2017 14:35:38 -0500

Mon, 27 Feb 2017 14:51:43 -0500

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CHS REPORTING DOCUMENT



	D	

Source ID:

HALPER

Date:

03/01/2017

Case Agent Name:

Non SES

Field Office/Division:

New York

Squad:

CD 8

Classified By:

Derived From:

Derived From.

Declassify On:

SOURCE REPORTING

Date of Contact:

03/01/2017

List all present including yourself (do not include the CHS):

SA Stephen M. Somma

Type of Contact:

In Person

Country:

UNITED STATES

City:

State:

Virginia

Date of Report:

03/01/2017

Substantive Case File Number

Substantive Case File Number

97F-NY-2067747

Check here if additional reporting is in Echo

No

Source Reporting:

CHS informed SA Somma that he had been contacted by a reporter from the Wall Street Journal regarding Russian Influence at the CHS' university. The reporter was following-up on an article written earlier in the year about the same subject.

Other topics were discussed regarding a sensitive investigation, which will be written in the case file.

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

SMSOMMA (STEPHEN SOMMA)

Wed, 1 Mar 2017 11:29:13 -0500

First Level Approved By

Non SES

Wed, 1 Mar 2017 13:16:16 -0500

FD-1023 Page 1 of 1 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PAYMENT REQUEST

HEADER

 Source ID:
 HALPER

 Date:
 08/15/2016

Case Agent Name: Non SES

Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 8

Classified By:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

PAYMENT REQUEST

Payment Request Form Type: General

Official Bureau Name: SOMMA, STEPHEN

UEID:

Phone Number:

Payee Name: SOMMA, STEPHEN

UEID:

Payment Name: MITCH

Enclosures:

Include if payment is for reimbursement of case-related expenditures made by the CHS.

Enclosed are receipts for expenses incurred by the Confidential Human Source (CHS) at the behest of the FBI, which are being reimbursed as expenses. (or) Enclosed is a statement documenting the amount spent by the CHS, the date(s) and the reason(s) why a receipt could not be obtained.

CHS was opened/re-opened on: 03/24/2011
Aggregate Total Paid: \$526,906.60
Total Paid since re-open (if needed): \$181,643.51

Total Paid in Current FY: \$0.00

Is this payment for medical expenses?

Is the CHS expected to testify?

Financial Justification

No

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PAYMENT REQUEST

Agents should utilize this block to document the operational necessity for expenditures (i.e. costs associated with a CHS debrief; utilization of Undercover Credit Card for CHS expenses; agent exceeding per diem allowance; alcohol consumption by agent) which normally would require separate SAC/ASAC approval. See Confidential Funding Guide for other expenditures, Specific operational details should not be entered here.

CHS has been integral in the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE investigation. Due to the fact the the case is close hold, please contact SA Somma with any questions. Current payment is for CHS' time in assisting with the CH investigation.

The Attorney General's Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a CHS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official. However, in extraordinary circumstances, the SAC is authorized to approve an exemption to this requirement. This allows the FBI Agent to be the payer and only witness.

Is SAC approval for an exemption to the second witness requirement requested for this payment?

Period covered for this payment:

Begin: 08/11/2016 End: 08/19/2016

Payment Request Amount Substantive Case File Number Financial Program Financial Subprogram 97F-HQ-2063661 **Payment Description Expense Incurred By Payment Amount CHS Services** CHS Service \$5,000.00

Operational Payment justification narrative:

During the time period covered for the payment, the CHS has been integral in the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE (CH) investigation. The CHS is being paid for her/his services.

Total CHS Services: \$5,000.00 **Total CHS Expenses:** \$0.00 **Total Agent Expenses:** \$0.00

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

SMSOMMA (STEPHEN SOMMA)

First Level Approved By Second Level Approved By Non SES

Mon, 15 Aug 2016 15:29:45 -0400 Mon, 15 Aug 2016 15:57:12 -0400 Mon, 15 Aug 2016 16:33:19 -0400

FD-794b FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Page 2 of 2

No

		Di	RAFT TYPE		
Request Type:	General	Payment Type: Cor	nfidential Forfe	iture or Drug Rel	ated: No
		INFORMATION ABOUT	THE REQUESTING EN	IPLOYEE	
Offici	al Bureau Name		UEID	Date of	Request
SOM	MA, STEPHEN	3.337		08/15	5/2016
Field Office	e	Squad	User Dimension 4	Telephone	Number
New York		CD 8			
		INFORMATION ABO	OUT THE REQUESTED	PAYEE	
	Payee Name		U	EID	
S	OMMA, STEPHEN				
s this a one-time no	n-symbol source pay	ment? No			
Source Number	Serial Number	Payment Name	Date of Approved Waiver Request	Period Covered From	Period Covered To
HALPER	CE-06	0 MITCH		08/11/2016	08/19/2016
Financial Justificat	fact the the	CHS has been integral in case is close hold, please or CHS' time in assisting	e contact SA Somma with	h any questions. C	
		DETAILS ABOUT	THE REQUESTED DR	AFT	
Attributable to Age or CHS	nt Catalog	File No.	Financial Program	/Subprogram	Amount
		97F-HQ-2063661			
CHS Service		Description:	CHS Services		\$5,000.00
			Total For 97F-HC	2-2063661	\$5,000.00
			Total		\$5,000.00
		ACCOL	JNTING DETAILS		
Org Level 2	Fund SOC	Sub SOC BBI	FY EBFY P	artition User	Dimension 5
	- 1			FBI	

F	D	-7	9	4	b

F	INANCE OFFICE O	NLY - SETTLEMENT	OF ADVANCE		
Document No.:	Creator Date	Creator Initials	FOS Approver Date	FOS Approver Initials	
Commitment:			-		
Obligation:				-	
Advance:					
Expense				-	
Cash Receipt:					
Cash Receipt – OTCnet (CRO):			4		
OTCnet Deposit Ticket #:			-		
Debit/Draft/EFT No.:					
Prior Month Adv	ance Balance:				
	This Advance:				
	CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF			_	
	Less Receipts:			_	
Funds Returned and/or	Cash on Hand:			_	
Amount to b	e Reimbursed:	No.			
		APPROVAL			
	Nan		Da	te/Time	
Approved By SSA:	Non S		8/15/2016 3:	57:18 PM	
Certified by ASAC:	Non S	ES	8/15/2016 4:	33:30 PM	
Draft Approval Officer:					

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PAYMENT REQUEST

HEADER

 Source ID:
 HALPER

 Date:
 08/30/2016

Case Agent Name: Non SES

Field Office/Division: New York
Squad: CD 8

Classified Bv:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

PAYMENT REQUEST

Payment Request Form Type: General

Official Bureau Name: SOMMA, STEPHEN

UEID:

Phone Number:

Payee Name: SOMMA, STEPHEN

UEID:

Payment Name: MITCH

Enclosures:

Include if payment is for reimbursement of case-related expenditures made by the CHS.

Enclosed are receipts for expenses incurred by the Confidential Human Source (CHS) at the behest of the FBI, which are being reimbursed as expenses. (or) Enclosed is a statement documenting the amount spent by the CHS, the date(s) and the reason(s) why a receipt could not be obtained.

CHS was opened/re-opened on: 03/24/2011
Aggregate Total Paid: \$526,906.60
Total Paid since re-open (if needed): \$181,643.51

Total Paid in Current FY: \$0.00

Is this payment for medical expenses?

No

Is the CHS expected to testify?

No

Financial Justification

Agents should utilize this block to document the operational necessity for expenditures (i.e. costs associated with a CHS debrief; utilization of Undercover Credit Card for CHS expenses; agent exceeding per diem allowance; alcohol consumption by agent) which normally would require separate SAC/ASAC approval. See Confidential Funding Guide for other expenditures. Specific operational details should not be entered here.

CHS was operational in a sensitive investigation.

FD-794b	Page 1 of 2	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PAYMENT REQUEST

The Attorney General's Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a CHS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official. However, in extraordinary circumstances, the SAC is authorized to approve an exemption to this requirement. This allows the FBI Agent to be the payer and only witness.

Is SAC approval for an exemption to the second witness requirement requested for this payment?

No

Period covered for this payment:

Begin: 08/20/2016 End: 09/03/2016

	Payment Request Amount	
Substantive Case File Number	Financial Program	Financial Subprogram
97F-HQ-2063661		
Payment Description	Expense Incurred By	Payment Amount
CHS Services	CHS Service	\$15,000.00

Operational Payment justification narrative:

CHS was integral in an operation against the subject of a sensitive investigation.

Total CHS Services: \$15,000.00

Total CHS Expenses: \$0.00

Total Agent Expenses: \$0.00

SIGNATURE

Submitted By First Level Approved By Second Level Approved By 5MSOMMA (STEPHEN SOMMA)

Non SES Non SES Tue, 30 Aug 2016 13:55:45 -0400 Tue, 30 Aug 2016 14:29:58 -0400 Thu, 1 Sep 2016 12:32:31 -0400

FD-794b	Page 2 of 2	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

		D	RAFT TYPE		
Request Type:	General	Payment Type: Cor	nfidential Forfe	iture or Drug Rela	ated: No
		INFORMATION ABOUT	THE REQUESTING EN	IPLOYEE	
Offici	al Bureau Name		UEID	Date of	Request
SON	IMA, STEPHEN			08/30	/2016
Field Office	e	Squad	User Dimension 4	Telephone	Number
New York		CD 8			
		INFORMATION ABO	OUT THE REQUESTED	PAYEE	
	Payee Name		U	EID	
SC	OMMA, STEPHEN				
s this a one-time no	n-symbol source pay	ment? No			
Source Number	Serial Number	Payment Name	Date of Approved Waiver Request	Period Covered From	Period Covered To
HALPER	CE-06	1 MITCH		08/20/2016	09/03/2016
Financial Justificat	cion: CHS was op	erational in a sensitive in	nvestigation.		
		DETAILS ABOUT	THE REQUESTED DR	AFT	
Attributable to Age or CHS	nt Catalog	File No.	Financial Program	/Subprogram	Amount
		97F-HQ-2063661			
				1	The state of the s
CHS Service		Description:	CHS Services		\$15,000.00
CHS Service		Description:	CHS Services Total For 97F-HC	2-2063661	\$15,000.00 \$15,000.00
CHS Service		Description:	11.310.310.310.31	2-2063661	
CHS Service			Total For 97F-HC	2-2063661	\$15,000.00
	Fund SOC		Total For 97F-HC Total UNTING DETAILS		\$15,000.00

F	D	-7	9	4	b

F	FINANCE OFFICE O	NLY - SETTLEMENT	OF ADVANCE		
Document No.;	Creator Date	Creator Initials	FOS Approver Date	FOS Approver Initials	
Commitment:					
Obligation:	-		8	-	
Advance:			-		
Expense:					
Cash Receipt:					
Cash Receipt – OTCnet (CRO):			4		
OTCnet Deposit Ticket #:					
Debit/Draft/EFT No.;					
Prior Month Adv	vance Balance:			_	
	This Advance:				
	Contract of the Contract of				
	Less Receipts:			_	
Funds Returned and/or	Cash on Hand:				
Amount to b	e Reimbursed:				
		APPROVAL			
	Nan		Da	te/Time	
Approved By SSA:	Non S		8/30/2016 2:	30:15 PM	
Certified by ASAC:	Non S	ES	9/1/2016 12:	32:40 PM	
Draft Approval Officer:					

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PAYMENT REQUEST

HEADER

Source ID: HALPER

Date: 09/06/2016

Case Agent Name:
Non SES
Field Office/Division:
New York
Squad:
CD 8

Squad: CD
Classified Bv:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

PAYMENT REQUEST

Payment Request Form Type: General

Official Bureau Name: SOMMA, STEPHEN

UEID:

Phone Number:

Payee Name: SOMMA, STEPHEN

UEID:

Payment Name: MITCH

Enclosures:

Include if payment is for reimbursement of case-related expenditures made by the CHS.

Enclosed are receipts for expenses incurred by the Confidential Human Source (CHS) at the behest of the FBI, which are being reimbursed as expenses. (or) Enclosed is a statement documenting the amount spent by the CHS, the date(s) and the reason(s) why a receipt could not be obtained.

CHS was opened/re-opened on: 03/24/2011
Aggregate Total Paid: \$526,906.60
Total Paid since re-open (if needed): \$181,643.51

Total Paid in Current FY: \$0.00

Is this payment for medical expenses?

Is the CHS expected to testify?

Financial Justification

Agents should utilize this block to document the operational necessity for expenditures (i.e. costs associated with a CHS debrief; utilization of Undercover Credit Card for CHS expenses; agent exceeding per diem allowance; alcohol consumption by agent) which normally would require separate SAC/ASAC approval. See Confidential Funding Guide for other expenditures. Specific operational details should not be entered here.

Payment to CHS for services.

|--|

No

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PAYMENT REQUEST

The Attorney General's Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a CHS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official. However, in extraordinary circumstances, the SAC is authorized to approve an exemption to this requirement. This allows the FBI Agent to be the payer and only witness.

Is SAC approval for an exemption to the second witness requirement requested for this payment?

No

Period covered for this payment:

Begin: 09/02/2016 End: 09/07/2016

	Payment Request Amount	
Substantive Case File Number	Financial Program	Financial Subprogram
97F-HQ-2067748		
Payment Description	Expense Incurred By	Payment Amount
CHS Services	CHS Service	\$25,000.00

Operational Payment justification narrative:

Payment for CHS for services performed on the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE/TYPHOON investigations.

Total CHS Services: \$25,000.00


Total CHS Expenses: \$0.00

Total Agent Expenses: \$0.00

SIGNATURE

Submitted By SMSOMMA (STEPHEN SOMMA)

First Level Approved By Second Level Approved By



Tue, 6 Sep 2016 10:21:12 -0400
Tue, 6 Sep 2016 10:23:53 -0400
Tue, 6 Sep 2016 11:59:06 -0400

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	70	

		DF	RAFT TYPE		4-1-4		
Request Type: (General	Payment Type: Cor	nfidential Forfe	iture or Drug Rel	ated: No		
		INFORMATION ABOUT	THE REQUESTING EN	IPLOYEE			
Officia	al Bureau Name		UEID	Date of	Request		
SOM	IMA, STEPHEN		09/06/2016				
Field Offic	e	Squad	Squad User Dimension 4 Telephone Number				
New York		CD 8					
		INFORMATION ABO	OUT THE REQUESTED	PAYEE			
	Payee Name		U	EID			
SC	OMMA, STEPHEN	- 1					
Is this a one-time nor	n-symbol source pay	ment? No					
Source Number	Serial Number	Payment Name	Date of Approved Waiver Request	Period Covered From	Period Covered To		
HALPER	CE-06	2 MITCH	1	09/02/2016	09/07/2016		
Financial Justificat	ion: Payment to	CHS for services.					
		DETAILS ABOUT	THE REQUESTED DR	AFT			
Attributable to Age or CHS	nt Catalog	File No.	Financial Program	/Subprogram	Amount		
		97F-HQ-2067748					
CHS Service		Description:	CHS Services		\$25,000.00		
			Total For 97F-HC	Q-2067748	\$25,000.00		
		() = i	Total		\$25,000.00		
		ACCOL	JNTING DETAILS				
Org Level 2	Fund SOC	Sub SOC BBI	FY EBFY P	artition User	Dimension 5		
				FBI			

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F	INANCE OFFICE O	NLY - SETTLEMENT	OF ADVANCE		
Document No.:	Creator Date	Creator Initials	FOS Approver Date	FOS Approver Initials	
Commitment:			1		
Obligation:				0	
Advance:					
Expense:					
Cash Receipt:	4/ (-	-			
Cash Receipt – OTCnet (CRO):					
OTCnet Deposit Ticket #.	9		i.		
Debit/Draft/EFT No.:					
Prior Month Adv	ance Balance:				
	This Advance:				
	Contract of the Contract of th				
	Less Receipts:				
Funds Returned and/or 0	Cash on Hand:				
Amount to be	e Reimbursed:	Name of			
		APPROVAL			
The second second second	Nan	ne	Da	te/Time	
Approved By SSA: Non SES			9/6/2016 10	23:56 AM	
Certified by ASAC: Non SES			9/6/2016 11	59:09 AM	
Draft Approval Officer:					

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PAYMENT RECEIPT

Jomma, Stephin	M:
Received from Non SES	the total amount of \$15,000.00 representing \$15,000.00 for
services rendered and/or \$0.00 for	expenses for the period 08/20/2016 from to 09/03/2016 .

Paying official advised that monies paid for services are considered taxable income and must be reported to the appropriate tax authorities.

CHS Payment Name (Signature)

Date

CHS Payment Name (Printed)

X

Afther M-Somme
Paying Agent (Signature)

Paying Agent (Signature)

Date

Paying Agent (Printed)

Agent (Printed)

Date

Witness (Printed)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY:

Payment Name: MITCH

Name initials)

Page 1 of 1

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Received from Non SES the Management of \$25,000.00 representing \$25,000.00 for services rendered and/or \$0.00 for expenses for the period 09/02/2016 from to 09/07/2016. X Paying official advised that monies paid for services are considered taxable income and must be reported to the appropriate tax authorities. (CHS's Payment Name initials) X MHCh CHS Payment Name (Signature) Date CHS Payment Name (Printed) Paying Agent (Signature) Date Paying Agent (Printed) Paying Agent (Printed)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY:

Payment Name: MITCH

Witness (Printed)

FD-794b FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PAYMENT REQUEST

HEADER

Source ID: HALPER

Date: 01/05/2017

Case Agent Name: Non SES
Field Office/Division: New York

Squad: CD 8

Classified By:

Derived From: Declassify On:

PAYMENT REQUEST

Payment Request Form Type: General

Official Bureau Name: SOMMA, STEPHEN

UEID:

Phone Number:

Payee Name: SOMMA, STEPHEN

UEID:

Payment Name: MITCH

Enclosures:

Aggregate Total Paid:

Include if payment is for reimbursement of case-related expenditures made by the CHS.

\$571,906.60

Enclosed are receipts for expenses incurred by the Confidential Human Source (CHS) at the behest of the FBI, which are being reimbursed as expenses. (or) Enclosed is a statement documenting the amount spent by the CHS, the date(s) and the reason(s) why a receipt could not be obtained.

CHS was opened/re-opened on: 03/24/2011

Total Paid since re-open (if needed): \$226,643.51

Total Paid in Current FY: \$0.00

Is this payment for medical expenses?

Is the CHS expected to testify?

Financial Justification

Agents should utilize this block to document the operational necessity for expenditures (i.e. costs associated with a CHS debrief; utilization of Undercover Credit Card for CHS expenses; agent exceeding per diem allowance; alcohol consumption by agent) which normally would require separate SAC/ASAC approval. See Confidential Funding Guide for other expenditures. Specific operational details should not be entered here.

For Services from 11/1/2016-1/5/2017.

FD-794b	Page 1 of 2	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

PAYMENT REQUEST

The Attorney General's Guidelines dated 12/13/2006 require that the payment of any FBI funds to a CHS be made by an FBI Agent and another government official. However, in extraordinary circumstances, the SAC is authorized to approve an exemption to this requirement. This allows the FBI Agent to be the payer and only witness.

Is SAC approval for an exemption to the second witness requirement requested for this payment?

No

Period covered for this payment:

Begin: 11/01/2016 End: 01/05/2017

	Payment Request Amount	
Substantive Case File Number	Financial Program	Financial Subprogram
97F-NY-2067747		
Payment Description	Expense Incurred By	Payment Amount
CHS Services	CHS Service	\$25,000.00

Operational Payment justification narrative:

Payment for services provided by the CHS during the course of the captioned investigation.

Total CHS Services: \$25,000.00

Total CHS Expenses: \$0.00

Total Agent Expenses: \$0.00

SIGNATURE

Submitted By SMSOMMA (STEPHEN SOMMA)

First Level Approved By
Second Level Approved By
Non SES

Wed, 11 Jan 2017 12:14:20 -0500 Wed, 11 Jan 2017 12:27:54 -0500 Wed, 11 Jan 2017 13:55:37 -0500

FD-794b	Page 2 of 2	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
		The state of the s

		D	RAFT TYPE		
Request Type:	General	Payment Type: Co	nfidential Forfe	iture or Drug Rel	ated: No
		INFORMATION ABOUT	THE REQUESTING EN	IPLOYEE	
Officia	al Bureau Name		UEID	Date of	Request
SOM	MA, STEPHEN			01/05	/2017
Field Offic	e	Squad	User Dimension 4	Telephone	Number
New York		CD 8			
		INFORMATION ABO	OUT THE REQUESTED	PAYEE	
	Payee Name		U	EID	
SC	MMA, STEPHEN	7			
this a one-time nor	n-symbol source pay	ment? No			
Source Number	Serial Number	Payment Name	Date of Approved Waiver Request	Period Covered From	Period Covered To
HALPER	CE-06	5 MITCH		11/01/2016	01/05/2017
nancial Justificat	ion: For Services	from 11/1/2016-1/5/201	7.		
		DETAILS ABOUT	THE REQUESTED DR	AFT	
attributable to Age	nt Catalog	File No.	Financial Program	/Subprogram	Amount
		97F-NY-2067747			
CHS Service		Description:	CHS Services		\$25,000.00
			Total For 97F-NY	-2067747	\$25,000.00
	100		Total		\$25,000.00
		ACCO	UNTING DETAILS		
Org Level 2	Fund SOC	Sub SOC BB	FY EBFY P	artition User	Dimension 5
	1			FBI	

F	D	-7	9	4	b

F	INANCE OFFICE O	NLY - SETTLEMENT	OF ADVANCE		
Document No.:	Creator Date	Creator Initials	FOS Approver Date	FOS Approver Initials	
Commitment:			-	61	
Obligation:			1-		
Advance:					
Expense:			1		
Cash Receipt:					
Cash Receipt – OTCnet (CRO):	1.3		-		
OTCnet Deposit Ticket #:			-		
Debit/Draft/EFT No.;					
	This Advance: Less Receipts:			-	
Funds Returned and/or (Cash on Hand:				
Amount to be	e Reimbursed:				
		APPROVAL			
	Nan	ne	Da	te/Time	
Approved By SSA: Non SES			1/11/2017 1	2:28:01 PM	
Certified by ASAC: Draft Approval Officer:	ES	1/11/2017 1	:55:44 PM		

		FEDERA	BUI: III	To Ele	36 400	ULTI (1) I
	ived from No	on SES the total \$0.00 for expenses for the				sen arg \$20,000.00 for services o 0. 705/3017.
<	M	Paying official advis- must be reported to				s a + cons wered taxable income and
	HS's Paymer Jame initials					V V
•	mit	ch 1	FeB;	1017		miles
	CHS Payme	ent Name (Signature)	(37.5		Ch Payment Name (Printed)
c			21	117		Slephon M. Somm
	Paying A	Agent (Signature)		D).		Paying Agent (Printed)
(NON	SES				Non SES
-	Witne	ess (Signature)	**************************************	11 100	10.9	Witness (Printed)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY:

Payment Name: MITCH

Received from Non SES the total amount of \$5,000.00 representing \$5,000.00 for services rendered and/or \$0.00 for expenses for the period 08/11/2016 from to 08/19/2016. Paying official advised that monies paid for services are considered taxable income and must be reported to the appropriate tax authorities. (CHS's Payment Name initials) CHS Payment Name (Signature) Date CHS Payment Name (Printed) Stept. M. Somme Paying Agent (Printed)

Date

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY:

Payment Name: MITCH

Witness (Printed)

Received from the total amount of \$15,000.00 representing \$15,000.00 for services rendered and/or \$0.00 for expenses for the period 08/20/2016 from to 09/03/2016. Paying official advised that monies paid for services are considered taxable income and must be reported to the appropriate tax authorities. (CHS's Payment Name initials) CHS Payment Name (Signature) Date CHS Payment Name (Printed) Paying Agent (Signature) Date Paying Agent (Printed) Witness (Printed)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY:

Payment Name: MITCH

Received from the total amount of \$25,000.00 representing \$25,000.00 for services rendered and/or \$0.00 for expenses for the period 09/02/2016 from to 09/07/2016. X Paying official advised that monies paid for services are considered taxable income and must be reported to the appropriate tax authorities. (CHS's Payment Name initials) X MHCh CHS Payment Name (Signature) Date CHS Payment Name (Printed) X Paying Agent (Printed) X Paying Agent (Printed) X Paying Agent (Printed) Date Witness (Signature) Date Witness (Signature) Date Witness (Printed)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY:

Payment Name: MITCH





Human Source Validation Report

HUMINT Operations Section, Validation Management Unit

Classified by: Derived from: Declassify on:

(U Human Source Validation Report: HALPER

GA

Some of the information contained in this document is derived from an exclusive product of the Validation Operational Testing Unit (VOTU) and contains sensitive reporting, which, if disseminated without prior authorization, could negatively impact future activities of the VOTU. Authority for release of information contained in this document may be obtained through Directorate of Intelligence-Validation Section senior management.

(U) Summary

Validation Management Unit (VMU) recommends
FBI New York (NY) continue to operate HALPER VMU
assesses it is likely HALPER will continue to contribute to
the FBI's Counterintelligence Program. VMU makes this
assessment with medium confidence, b based on the fact that
HALPER s access and placement is commensurate with his
or her reporting; the reporting has not been corroborated; and
on the absence of minimal handling issues noted in the Delta
file. While there have been serious handling issues noted in
previous HSVRs, VMU did not locate similar issues during
this period of review. VMU assesses HALPER has
provided valuable information for FBI NY based on his or her
unique access.

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Administrative

) Validation is a multilayered process that may begin before meeting a potential CHS and may not end until sometime after the CHS relationship is terminated. As such, the collection of complete and current biographical data is critical to the accurate validation of the CHS. The Quarterly SSA Source Report (QSSR) ensures the CHS is properly managed; the Field Office Annual Source Report (FOASR) is designed to be the annual review of the CHS by the Special Agent and the Field Office. The FBIHO VMU CHS validation reviews are prioritized using high-risk characteristics outlined in the Confidential Human Source Policy Guide (CHSPG) and the

FBI INTERNAL USE ONLY

a (U) See Appendix A (Expressions of Likelihood).

^b (U) See Appendix B (Confidence in Assessments and Judgments Based on a Body of Information).



(U) Details

This Human Source Validation Report (HSVR) conveys VMU's validation review and assessment of HALPER for the period of 07 May 2013 to 10 March 2017.

(Previously closed for cause, resides outside the US, extraterritorial traveler,

highly paid [cumulative])

Purpose of Review: Special Request

Primary Reporting Program: Counterintelligence Program

Secondary Reporting Program: Russia

Field Office: New York

Confidential Human Source Coordinator (CHSC): Non SES Handling Agent: SA Non SES

Date CHS was Opened/Closed: 23 March 2011

(U) Background

HALPER is a US citizen employed at a codename MITCH, is being utilized to provide information on two initiatives both dealing with Russia. MITCH . He or she has also provided information pertaining to the US election involving Donald Trump's close associates and their potential ties to the Russian government. MITCH has a residence in both the US and the United Kingdom (UK). This is the third HSVR completed on MITCH. This HSVR is consistent with the second HSVR and includes recommendations.

- The first HSVR was completed on 28 February 2011 with a finding to close for cause.
- The second HSVR was completed on 07 May 2013 with a finding to continue to operate.

(U) Suitability

VMU assesses it is likely **HALPER** is suitable for continued operation, based on his or her authenticity, reliability, and control.

(U) Authenticity

According to information contained in the Delta file, there are no reasons to doubt his or her identity. FBI NY has sufficiently verified HALPE identity through background investigations and updated criminal history checks.

FBI INTERNAL USE ONLY

⁽U) This validation review includes a check of the following databases: Delta, Sentinel, OGA, Automated Case Support (ACS), OGA , Data Warehouse System (DWS), OGA Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Requirements Reporting and Operations Management Environment (CHROME), and Data Integration and Visualization System (DIVS). VMU conducted database checks on 02 March 2017

FBI INTERNAL USE ONLY

•	located biographical information not previously located in previous
	HSVRs pertaining to MITCH's FBI NY has addressed VMU's concerns by e-mail correspondence dated 06 March 2017.
OGA	While the two entries contained MITCH's correct name, date of birth, and usual travel patterns, the picture provided in the results do not match with MITCH's identity. VMU assesses this to be a
	one-time error, but recommends FBI NY to verify future travel and ensure no other individual is using MITCH's identity to travel overseas.
•	According to the FOASR, MITCH has direct access to the information provided. MITCH OGA. As a result, VMU ascertains MITCH to still maintain access to pertinent information.
	VMU found no issues regarding MITCH's access.
•	According to the FOASR, MITCH is motivated by monetary compensation and patriotism/ideology. During the period of review, MITCH has been paid \$48.99 in expenses and \$156,000.00 in payments. VMU notes to include the last HSVR, FBI NY has paid MITCH \$1,181,064.44 dating back to 1991 to include both expenses and payments. VMU concurs with the FOASR's assessment of MITCH being motivated by monetary compensation.
(U) R	eliability
•	MITCH was instructed to send an e-mail to a target to arrange a meeting. The results indicated no derogatory information.
•	During the period of review, VMU found no derogatory issues regarding MITCH's reliability.
(U) C	Control
٠	VMU conducted a OGA search on 01 March 2017 and found numerous occasions of unreported travel. VMU has provided FBI NY a list of departure and arrival locations with the dates of unreported international travel. FBI NY is requested to provide the appropriate concurrence for future international travel.
(U) P	roduction Review/Investigative Support
	VMU assesses it is likely MITCH will continue to inform the FBI Counterintelligence m. VMU makes this assessment with medium confidence, based on collection ements addressed, investigations supported, and no corroborated reporting.

FBI INTERNAL USE ONLY

VMU notes due to the singular nature of MITCH's access, there is no corroboration in the Delta file. However, VMU notes MITCH has been productive in providing valuable insight and access to targets of interest for FBI NY.




(U) Corroboration

According to the 15 April 2016 FOASR, VMU notes there is no corroboration
provided concerning MITCH's reporting. Due to the singular nature of his or her access,
VMU was unable to locate corroboration regarding MITCH's reporting. As a result, FBI
NY is requested to provide any future corroboration of MITCH's reporting to the Delta
file.

Collection Requirements	
U) Threat Issues	
•	
•	
U) Key Intelligence Questions:	
•	
U) Compliance Issues	
VMU notes MITCH has not been admon Guidelines (AGGs) since 11 May 2015. The	
requires Confidential Human innually thereafter.	a Sources be admonished at opening and at lea

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FBI INTERNAL USE ONLY



major handling issues during the period of review. Due to MITCH's unique access to the information provided, VMU assesses MITCH will continue to provide valuable information to FBI NY. VMU has provided recommendations for FBI NY's benefit and assesses MITCH will continue to provide information.

(U) Consumers: SSA Stephen Somma
CHSC Non SES
SA Non SES

(U) From: VMU

(U) Drafted by: IA Non SES

(U) Case ID #:

(U) Approval: UC Non SES
SSA Non SES

(U) Contact: IA Non SES

(U) This HSVR was prepared by VMU. Please address any comments or questions to IA Non SES
or to SSA Non SES
at

FBI INTERNAL USE ONLY



(U) Appendix A: Expressions of Likelihood (or Probability)

(U) Phrases such as "the FBI judges" and "the FBI assesses," and terms such as "likely" and "probably" convey analytical judgments and assessments. The chart approximates how expressions of likelihood and probability correlate with percentages of chance.

UNCLASSIFIED


Terms of Likelihood	Almost Very No Unlikely		Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain(ly)
Terms of Probability	Remote	Highly Improbable	Improbable (Improbably)	Roughly Even Odds	Probable (Probably)	Highly Probable	Nearly Certain
	1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%

(U) Unless otherwise stated, the FBI does not derive judgments via statistical analysis.



(U) Appendix B: Confidence in Assessments and Judgments Based on a Body of Information

- (U) Confidence levels reflect the quality and quantity of the source information supporting judgment. Consequently, the FBI ascribes high, medium, or low levels of confidence to assessments, as follows:
- (U) **High confidence** generally indicates the FBI's judgments are based on high quality information, from multiple sources. High confidence in a judgment does not imply the assessment is a fact or a certainty; such judgments might be wrong. While additional reporting and information sources may change analytical judgments, such changes are most likely to be refinements and not substantial in nature.
- (U) **Medium confidence** generally means the information is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence. Additional reporting or information sources have the potential to increase the FBI's confidence levels or substantively change analytical judgments.
- (U) Low confidence generally means the information's credibility or plausibility is uncertain, the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or the reliability of the sources is questionable. Absent additional reporting or information sources, analytical judgments should be considered preliminary in nature.



Date	Amount		Payment Type	Period of Performance
8/19/2016	\$	5,000.00	Services	08/11/2016-08/19/2016
9/8/2016	\$	15,000.00	Services	08/20/2016-09/03/2016
9/29/2016	\$	25,000.00	Services	09/02/2016-09/07/2016
2/1/2017	\$	25,000.00	Services	11/01/2016-01/05/2017

Total	Ś	70,000.00
	~	, 0,000.00



Electronic Communication

Title: Date: 08/15/2016

CROSSFIRE HURRICANE

From: NEW YORK

NY-CD1

Contact: SOMMA STEPHEN M,

Approved By: Joe Pientka III

Drafted By: SOMMA STEPHEN M

Case ID #: 97F-HQ-2063661 CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -

RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

97F-HQ-2067747 CROSSFIRE DRAGON

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -

RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

97F-HQ-2067748 CROSSFIRE TYPHOON

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT-RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

97F-HQ-2067749 CROSSFIRE FURY

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT-RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

Synopsis: CROSSFIRE H Meeting with CHS on 8/11/2016 to discuss

CROSSFIRE H

Reason:

Derived From:

Declassity On:

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/31/2016

Details:

On 08/11/2016, SA Benjamin E. Gessford, SOS

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661, 08/15/2016

and SA Stephen M. Somma met with HALPER (CHS) to discuss CROSSFIRE HURRICANE. The meeting took place at the CHS' home and lasted approximately 1 1/2 hours. After introduction of SA Gessford to the CHS the following discussion took place:

CROSSFIRE TYPHOON

The CHS was informed by the interview team that they were currently assigned to a project looking at the roll of the Russian Federation in the current U.S. Presidential campaign. As such, there were some individuals associated with the Trump Campaign that were of particular interest to the team. The team asked the CHS if s/he had heard of CROSSFIRE TYPOON (CT), the CHS stated that s/he did not but asked for some background information on CT, which the team provided. The CHS, upon hearing of CT's pedigree information, stated that s/he was unaware of CT.

The team inquired if the CHS would be able and/or willing to invite CT to his/her university in the UK to speak. The team explained that it would allow the FBI to obtain assessment information on CT as well as possibly conduct an operation against CT. The CHS stated that s/he would be willing to help, however, prior to the invitation, the CHS would want to meet CT first, as without knowing CT, CT could be "thrown to the wolves" at the university. The team agreed with the CHS and agreed to work with the CHS to obtain an initial meeting.

CROSSFIRE DRAGON

The CHS asked the team if they would be interested in CROSSFIRE DRAGON (CD). The CHS stated that CD had been invited to speak, earlier in July, at a presentation put together by the CHS' doctoral student, who had asked CD to attend. The CHS said that former Secretary of State Maldeline Albright was also at the presentation. CD, was described by the CHS, as being "very guarded" during the presentation and stating that his/her views were his/her own and not of the Trump campaign.

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661, 08/15/2016

The CHS explained to the team that s/he had a private meeting with CD on or about 7/18/2016 when CD was at the CHS' university in the UK. [Writer's note: it's believed that the meeting occurred on 7/13/2016, which was the date CD left London and flew to the U.S. as per FBI records checks] The CHS told the team that the purpose of the meeting was to ask the CHS if the s/he would want to join the Trump campaign as a foreign policy adviser. The CHS stated that s/he was non-committal to CD about joining the campaign. The CHS told the interviewing team that he had no intention of joining the campaign.

The CHS met with CD in the CHS' office and the meeting lasted approximately 2 hours. During the course of the meeting CD discussed his/her relationship with Gazprom, CD's views on Putin, the current U.S. Presidential campaign and that CD "retold Russia's view on the Ukraine."

The CHS also related that when CD had heard that the CHS had recently been in Dubai, CD mentioned that s/he was in Abu Dhabi around the same time as the CHS. CD told the CHS that s/he was in Abu Dhabi representing Gazprom. When asked by the team what s/he thought CD was advising Gazprom on, the CHS opined that it was most likely about American policy as CD does not have a background in geology and Gazprom "certainly doesn't need any more advisers" on energy.

As stated previously the CHS stated that s/he had no intention of joining the campaign, but the CHS had not conveyed that to anyone related to the Trump campaign. The CHS was willing to assist with the ongoing investigation and to not notify the Trump campaign about the CHS' decision not to join.

CROSSFIRE FURY

In discussions with the interviewing team about the investigation, the CHS stated the s/he has known CROSSFIRE FURY (CF) for over 30 years. The CHS worked with CF on several political

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661, 08/15/2016

campaigns. The CHS described CF as a savvy political operator. The CHS offered to reach out to CF, but stated, given the timing of the campaign, the CHS doubted CF would have time to respond or meet with the CHS.

CROSSFIRE RAZOR

The CHS relayed an incident s/he witnessed when CROSSFIRE RAZOR (CR) spoke at the CHS' university. The CHS was unsure of the date, but noted that CR was still in his/her position within the USIC. [Writer's note: per open source, CR spoke at the university on 02/28/2014.] The CHS told the team that after CR spoke and socialized with members of the university at dinner and over drinks, members of the university got CR a cab to take CR to the train station to bring him/her to London. The CHS stated that a woman, SVETLANA LOKHOVA, surprised everyone and got into CR's cab and joined CR on the train ride to London. The CHS recalled that LOKHOVA "latched" onto CR when he was at the university. The CHS stated that s/he is somewhat suspicious of LOKHOVA, as she has been affiliated with several prominent members of his university. The CHS believes taht LOKHOVA's father may be a Russian Oligarch living in London. The CHS could not provide further information on CR and LOKHOVA's trip.

Other

The CHS expects to hear from Sam Clovis soon about joining the Trump campaign. The CHS described Clovis as the "type of guy who could make a campaign work."

The CHS advised that a friend, Peter Navaro, who is a professor at a university in California, is one of the Trump Campaign's senior policy adviser related to Trade.

The CHS provided atmospherics about the current situation at his university and at his/her new company.

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661, 08/15/2016

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Electronic Communication

Title: Date: 08/15/2016

From: NEW YORK

NY-CD1

Contact: SOMMA STEPHEN M,

Approved By: Joe Pientka III

Drafted By: SOMMA STEPHEN M

Case ID #: 97F-HQ-2063661 CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -

RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

97F-HQ-2067747 CROSSFIRE DRAGON

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -

RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

97F-HQ-2067748 CROSSFIRE TYPHOON

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT-RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

97F-HQ-2067749 CROSSFIRE FURY

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT-RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

Synopsis: CHS meeting 08/12/2016 regarding captioned subjects.

Reason:

Derived From:

Declassity On:

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/31/2016

Details:

On 08/12/2016, SA Benjamin E. Gessford, SOS and SA Stephen M. Somma met with HALPER (CHS) to discuss CROSSFIRE

Title: CHS Meeting 08/12/2016

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661, 08/15/2016

HURRICANE. The meeting took place at the CHS' home and lasted approximately 2 hours.

CROSSFIRE DRAGON

The interviewing team informed the CHS that CROSSFIRE DRAGON (CD), whom they had spoken about the prior day, was of interest to them. The team explained that due to CD's ties back to the Russian Federation (RF), CD would be the logical conduit for the RF to message to the Trump Campaign. The team asked if the CHS would be willing to contact CD, based off of their previous discussions in the UK in July, and invite CD to a private meeting. The CHS agreed to contact CD and offered her/his home for the meeting or at a private club in the Washington, DC area. The team suggested that the CHS' home would be preferable, as it would allow for a more private atmosphere, but would work with wherever the CHS and CD agree to meet.

The team and the CHS discussed, that given the Trump Campaign's desire to hire the CHS as an adviser, the CHS is in a prefect position to ask CD direct questions about the Trump campaign's alleged ties to the RF. The team provided the CHS with several open source articles about the Trump Campaign.

The team asked the CHS if s/he recalled when CD said he was in Abu Dhabi for Gazprom (discussed with the CHS the previous day). The CHS said that s/he beleives that it was approximately 3 months ago. The team asked if it was unusual for a senior foreign policy adviser to a presidential campaign to still be advising a company like Gazprom, the CHS thought it was. The CHS stated that s/he was under the impression that CD was connected to the Russian Government either through Gazprom or through other connections.

The CHS was going to contact her/his doctoral student to obtain CD's e-mail address so that the CHS could recontact CD. The team told the CHS that if the student is unable to provide one, they could give the CHS the e-mail address they have. The team told the CHS that they would like to have the CHS contact CD as soon as possible.

Title: CHS Meeting 08/12/2016

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661, 08/15/2016

CROSSFIRE RAZOR

The CHS was asked to recall the incident that s/he spoke about the previous day regarding CR. The team asked if the CHS recalled how CR was invited to speak at his university in the UK. The CHS believed that the invite was most likely sent out by another member of the committee who shared responsibility of inviting speakers to their university. The CHS stated that s/he could contact someone on the committee and inquire how CR was invited.

The CHS was asked if s/he recalled if CR was alone during the presentation at the university, or if CR was joined by a staff officer. The CHS did not remember another officer with CR, but said that that there was a representative from CR's organization there from a local military base. The CHS did clarify to the team that SVETLANA LAKHOVA got into the cab with CR at the university and then joined CR on the train to London.

The team thought, that given that the Trump Campaign was interested in the CHS joining, the CHS may be able to meet with CR as part of the CHS' due diligence of the campaign. During a meeting with CR, the team thought it would be another opportunity for the CHS to address the RF ties to the Trump campaign.

CROSSFIRE TYHPOON

The team asked the CHS if s/he thought an invitation to CT for CT to speak at the CHS' university would be better if extended via the CHS' doctoral student. The venue would be a small setting for CT to speak with current students and then travel to London. The CHS stated that s/he thought of an institute/think tank in London where CT might be able to speak as well, thereby allowing the FBI or others to have access to CT. The CHS opined that the university would be open around the first or second week of October. The team asked if there was an opportunity to have CT to the UK sooner, the CHS said s/he would look into it.

Title: CHS Meeting 08/12/2016

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661, 08/15/2016

The team provided the CHS with CT's e-mail address.

SENATOR SESSIONS

The CHS was asked about Senator Sessions role as a senior foreign policy adviser on the Trump Campaign. The CHS does not know Sessions, but opined that Sessions is a conservative who would not be friendly to Russia.

OTHER

The CHS told the team that s/he was thinking of contacting Peter Navaro to inquire about the Trump campaign. The CHS mentioned that Navaro had approached her/him about joining the campaign in the past and that the CHS would be able to ask Navaro direct questions as well, since they are personal friends.

The team inquired what the role of a foreign policy adviser consists of. The CHS explained that the main job is to put together position papers for the candidate. As the campaign progresses, the advisers help prepare the candidate for debates, playing the role of reporters in the rehearsals. After the debates are over, the CHS stated that the main role is to "put out fires" for the candidate.

The CHS signed, under her/his codename, a FD-472 allowing the FBI to consensually monitor any conversations related to the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE investigation.



Electronic Communication

Title:

CROSSFIRE DRAGON Operational

Date: 08/24/2016

CC: MOYER SALLY ANNE

From: NEW YORK

NY-CD1

Contact: SOMMA STEPHEN M,

Approved By: Joe Pientka III

MOYER SALLY ANNE STRZOK PETER P II

Drafted By: SOMMA STEPHEN M

Case ID #: 97F-HQ-2067747

CROSSFIRE DRAGON

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -

RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

Synopsis:

DRAGON on Objection

Operational plan for a CHS to meet with CROSSFIRE

Reason:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

Full Investigation Initiated: 08/10/2016

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1.

FD-472

2.

FD-759

Details:

BACKGROUND

Re: 97F-HQ-2067747, 08/24/2016

The CROSSFIRE HURRICANE (CH) investigative team is attempting to determine if anyone in the Trump Campaign is in a position to have received information either directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation (RF) regarding the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton. CROSSFIRE DRAGON (CD) is one of the main subjects in the investigative effort. CD has extensive ties to the various state-owned entities of the RF, most notably, Gazprom. Additionally, CD has, in the past, been in direct contact with SVR officers and continued his contact after FBI defensive briefings.

In July 2016, CD spoke at a conference in Moscow, Russia, whereby CD stated he went to Moscow as a "private person" and was not representing the Trump Campaign. After his speech in Moscow, CD flew to the United Kingdom (UK). While in the UK, CD took part in a presentation at Cambridge University with Madeleine Albright. A FBI CHS was present at the presentation and described CD as "guarded" during the presentation and as being "careful" while speaking with Albright.

The following operational plan is being proposed in furtherance of the CROSSFIRE DRAGON and CROSSFIRE HURRICANE investigative efforts.

CD/FBI CHS RELATIONSHIP

By way of background, the FBI-NY CHS (S-00010788), is a lifetime fellow at a prestigious overseas university. The CHS has also been involved in several U.S. presidential campaigns and is a published author of several position papers and books. The CHS has been asked to join recent U.S. presidential campaigns, but has declined.

When in Cambridge, CD met privately with the FBI-NY CHS (CHS) for approximately 2 hours. During the meeting, CD asked if the CHS would be interested in joining the Trump Campaign as a foreign policy adviser. While the CHS has no intention of joining the campaign, the CHS was non-committal and agreed to continue a dialogue with CD for the benefit of the FBI.

Re: 97F-HQ-2067747, 08/24/2016

Initial Contact

The CHS received an e-mail from CD on 08/14/2016, CD stated that he and another individual, would like to meet with the CHS to discuss the CHS potentially joining the Trump Campaign. The CHS responded to the e-mail on 08/15/2016 to set up a meeting with CD. The CHS invited CD to meet with the CHS privately at the CHS' home in Virginia, since it offers a relaxed, yet intimate setting on 8/20/2016. The CHS and CD have had several e-mail exchanges regarding the date and time. CD, in these exchanges, has indicated that he will be meeting with the CHS without the previously mentioned individual. On 08/18/2016, the CHS received an e-mail from CD confirming a meeting at the CHS' home on 08/20/2016 between 3 and 4 p.m.

The main goal of the operation is to have CD admit that he has direct knowledge of and is either helping coordinate or assisting the RF conduct an active measure campaign with the "Trump Team." The CHS will press CD on the Trump Campaigns alleged ties to the RF. The FBI believes the CHS is in a unique position to ask direct questions about the ties, as the CHS would be conducting proper due diligence prior to possibly joining the campaign. The FBI assesses CD is an opportune target for the CHS to question given their prior relationship and since CD is not a professional political operator. The FBI believes the CHS may be able to elicit information from CD due to CD's inexperience and CD's ego.

Depending on how much information CD provides to the CHS during their meeting and how CD reacts to the CHS' questions the writer believes that there are two possible scenarios.

SCENARIO 1

CD provides direct knowledge of RF involvement in the campaign and admits to being the conduit of information from the RF to the Trump Campaign. If this occurs, the CH Team will meet with FBIHQ and make a determination as to next steps to take with CD. The CH Team

Re: 97F-HQ-2067747, 08/24/2016

will direct the CHS to continue to meet with CD, while a decision is made by FBIHQ.

SCENARIO 2

If CD does not provide tangible information during the meeting, or if CD explicitly states he does not know of any RF involvement in the campaign the FBI will focus on a second target of the investigation.

POSSIBLE COMPLICATIONS

CD may recognize this meeting as a way to collect information about the Trump Campaign that he is not willing to share. The conversation may be relayed to others in the Trump Campaign and create a possible issue for the CHS. However, because CD reached out to the CHS and given the CHS' ties to several senior members of the Trump Campaign the FBI assesses this to be a low risk operation.

OPERATIONS

The CHS has signed a FD-472 allowing for consensually monitored conversations between the CHS and CD. The CHS has offered for the FBI to install recording devices in his home. The operation will be conducted in Virginia, which is a one party consent state, and applicable FD-759s for CCTV and audio are attached.

The CH team had met with WFO who will install audio and video recording devices in the CHS' home in order to record the meetings. Redundant systems will be utilized and the CHS will be wearing recording devices on his person. The CH team will be present on the CHS' property in order to live monitor the conversations between the CHS and CD. The CH team will minimize any conversations when the CHS is not present.

SSG assets from WFO will cover CD during CD's time in Washington, D.C. CD has indicated to the CHS that he will be in the

Re: 97F-HQ-2067747, 08/24/2016

D.C. area until 08/23/2016.

OUTCOMES

The FBI sees various possible outcomes from the meeting. CD could refuse to meet with the CHS or be uncooperative during the initial meeting, which would end the operation. The team would then change its posture and move forward with an operation against CROSSFIRE TYPHOON. However, CD could either fully divulge RF connections or provide an ambiguous answer, the CHS has been tasked to press CD with a direct question if CD is evasive. If, even after being directly questioned, CD is still evasive, a determination would be made if the information obtained would be worth continuing the operation or ending it.

If the meeting is successful, the FBI could obtain information from CD about the RF, which would allow for additional investigative techniques.

SPECIAL NOTE

The CHS will not be joining the Trump Campaign at the behest of the FBI. The CH Team will continue to encourage the CHS to make contact with individuals in furtherance of the CH investigation.

***** *



Electronic Communication

Title: Meeting with CHS discussing Sam Date: 09/06/2016

Clovis

From: NEW YORK

NY-CD1

Contact: SOMMA STEPHEN M,

Approved By: Joe Pientka III

Drafted By: SOMMA STEPHEN M

Case ID #: 97F-HQ-2063661 CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -

RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

97F-HQ-2067747 CROSSFIRE DRAGON

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -

RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

Synopsis: Meeting with CHS and FBI discussing Sam Clovis

Reason:
D
Declassity On:

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/31/2016

Details:

On 08/28/2016, SAs Benjamin E. Gessford and Stephen M. Somma as well as SOS met with FBI-NY CHS HALPER at the CHS' home. During the course of the meeting the CHS informed the interviewing team that s/he had heard from CROSSFIRE DRAGON (CD) on 08/25/2016. During the call, CD informed the CHS that Sam Clovis will be in the Washington, D.C. area the following week and asked if the CHS would like to meet with him. The CHS told CD that he would like to,

Title: Meeting with CHS discussing Sam Clovis

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661, 09/06/2016

however, during the course of the conversation it seemed as though CD wasn't sure if the meeting might actually take place.

The interviewing team gave the CHS an e-mail for Sam Clovis, which it had obtained via open source. The team instructed the CHS to reach out directly to Clovis in the hope of setting up a meeting. The CHS stated that s/he would send an e-mail to Clovis the following day.

***** *



Electronic Communication

Title: Observation of CROSSFIRE DRAGON

Date: 10/05/2016

using a Smartphone

From: NEW YORK

NY-CD1

Contact: SOMMA STEPHEN M,

CONTACT: SOMMA SIEPHEN M,

Approved By: Joe Pientka III

Drafted By: SOMMA STEPHEN M

Case ID #: 97F-HQ-2063661 CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -

RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

Synopsis: Observation of CROSSFIRE DRAGON utilizing a

smartphone during a meeting with a CHS.

Reason:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/31/2016

Details:

During the course of a meeting between a CHS and CROSSFIRE DRAGON (CD) on 08/20/2016, CD was observed by the FBI utilizing a smartphone to show the CHS articles written about CD.

Title: Observation of CROSSFIRE DRAGON using a Smartphone

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661, 10/05/2016





Electronic Communication

Title: Observation of CROSSFIRE DRAGON

Date: 10/19/2016

using a Smartphone

From: NEW YORK

NY-CD1

Contact: SOMMA STEPHEN M,

Approved By: Joe Pientka III

Drafted By: SOMMA STEPHEN M

Case ID #: 97F-HQ-2063661 CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -

RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

97F-NY-2067747 CROSSFIRE DRAGON

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -

RUSSIA:

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

Synopsis: Observation of CROSSFIRE DRAGON utilizing a smartphone during a meeting with a CHS.

Reason:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/31/2016

Details:

During the course of a meeting between a CHS and CROSSFIRE DRAGON (CD) on 08/20/2016, CD was observed by the FBI utilizing a smartphone to show the CHS articles written about CD.

Title: Observation of CROSSFIRE DRAGON using a Smartphone

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661, 10/19/2016

***** *

FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title: CROSSFIRE DRAGON Operational Date: 10/25/2016

Plan

From: NEW YORK

NY-CD1

Contact: SOMMA STEPHEN M,

Approved By: Joe Pientka III

MOYER SALLY ANNE STRZOK PETER P II

Drafted By: SOMMA STEPHEN M

Case ID #: 97F-NY-2067747 CROSSFIRE DRAGON

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -

RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

Synopsis: Operational plan for a CHS to meet with CROSSFIRE DRAGON on 10/17/2016

Reason: Derived From:

Declassity On:

Full Investigation Initiated: 08/10/2016

Details:

BACKGROUND

The CROSSFIRE HURRICANE (CH) investigative team is attempting to determine if anyone in the Trump Campaign is in a position to have received information either directly or indirectly from the Russian Federation (RF) regarding the anonymous release of information during the campaign that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton. CROSSFIRE DRAGON (CD) is one of the main subjects in the

Re: 97F-NY-2067747, 10/25/2016

investigative effort. CD has extensive ties to the various state-owned entities of the RF, most notably, Gazprom. Additionally, CD has, in the past, been in direct contact with SVR officers and continued his contact after FBI defensive briefings.

In July 2016, CD spoke at a conference in Moscow, Russia, whereby CD stated he went to Moscow as a "private person" and was not representing the Trump Campaign. After his speech in Moscow, CD flew to the United Kingdom (UK). While in the UK, CD took part in a presentation at Cambridge University with Madeleine Albright. A FBI CHS was present at the presentation and described CD as "guarded" during the presentation and as being "careful" while speaking with Albright.

The following operational plan is being proposed in furtherance of the CROSSFIRE DRAGON and CROSSFIRE HURRICANE investigative efforts.

CD/FBI CHS RELATIONSHIP

By way of background, the FBI-NY CHS HALPER, is a lifetime fellow at a prestigious overseas university. The CHS has also been involved in several U.S. presidential campaigns and is a published author of several position papers and books. The CHS has been asked to join recent U.S. presidential campaigns, but has declined.

When in Cambridge, CD met privately with the FBI-NY CHS (CHS) for approximately 2 hours. During the meeting, CD asked if the CHS would be interested in joining the Trump Campaign as a foreign policy adviser. While the CHS has no intention of joining the campaign, the CHS was non-committal and agreed to continue a dialogue with CD for the benefit of the FBI.

On 08/20/2016, the CHS and CD met for approximately 3 hours at the CHS' home. During the time at the CHS' home, the CH team was able to obtain valuable assessment information on CD. CD viewed the CHS as a potential mentor. As a result of the meeting, the CH team

Re: 97F-NY-2067747, 10/25/2016

was able to conduct several operations utilizing the CHS against other targets of the CH investigation.

OPERATIONS

The CHS, at the FBI's request, sent an e-mail to CD on or about 10/5/2016, after several news articles came out about CD and CD's alleged ties to the Russian Federation. As a result of the articles, the Trump campaign distanced themselves from CD. Additionally, CD wrote a letter to the FBI asking to be interveiwed by the FBI. The CHS' e-mail was to check in on CD as a welfare check. As a result of the e-mail, the CHS and CD set-up a lunch at the CHS' home in Northern Virginia on 10/17/2016.

The time of the meeting is scheduled for 11:00 a.m. on 10/17. The CH team anticipates the meeting lasting no longer than 3 hours. During the course of the meeting the FBI will task the CHS to ask CD specific questions related to the CH investigation.

The CHS has signed a FD-472 allowing for consensually monitored conversations between the CHS and CD. The CHS has offered for the FBI to install recording devices in his home. The operation will be conducted in Virginia, which is a one party consent state, and applicable FD-759s for CCTV and audio are attached.

The CH team will have WFO install audio and video recording devices in the CHS' home in order to record the meetings. Redundant systems will be utilized and the CHS will be wearing recording devices on his person. The CH team will be present on the CHS' property in order to live monitor the conversations between the CHS and CD. The CH team will minimize any conversations when the CHS is not present.

SSG assets from WFO will cover CD during CD's time in Washington, D.C. CD has indicated to the CHS that he will be in the D.C. area until 10/18/2016.

Re: 97F-NY-2067747, 10/25/2016

SPECIAL NOTE

The CHS will not be joining the Trump Campaign at the behest of the FBI. The CH Team will continue to encourage the CHS to make contact with individuals in furtherance of the CH investigation.

***** *



Electronic Communication

Title: CD Meeting with FBI CHS on Date: 11/16/2016

From: NEW YORK

NY-CD1

Contact: SOMMA STEPHEN M,

Approved By: Joe Pientka III

Drafted By: SOMMA STEPHEN M

Case ID #: 97F-NY-2067747 CROSSFIRE DRAGON

FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -

RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

Synopsis: CD Meeting with FBI CHS on 10/17/2016.

Reason:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

Full Investigation Initiated: 08/10/2016

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. CD Mitch Meet 10/17/2016

Details:

On 10/17/2016, CROSSFIRE DRAGON (CD) visited a FBI CHS
HALPER at the CHS' home in Great Falls, VA. The CHS had set-up the
meeting with CD at the FBI's request via e-mail. The two had
previously met at the CHS' home in August 2016 and in the United
Kingdom in July 2016. During the course of the August meeting, the FBI
was able to obtain assessment information about CD. The meeting was
consensually recorded by the FBI.

Title: CD Meeting with FBI CHS

Re: 97F-NY-2067747, 11/16/2016

The FBI had recently learned that CD was traveling to London, U.K. and Johannesburg, South Africa. The goal of the meeting was to have the CHS determine the reason for CD's overseas travel, this was CD's first international trip since being dismissed from the Trump campaign. The FBI had recently received information from another CHS that CD may have a "handling agent" in London, U.K., the FBI's goal was to determine if CD was meeting with anyone that would be of interest in furtherance of the CD investigation.

CD arrived at the CHS' home via bicycle, as CD had done in the past, and was greeted by the CHS and the CHS' wife. The CHS had been instructed to have a private meeting with CD in the CHS' sitting room. The FBI hoped the intimate nature of the private meeting may relax CD and CD may elicit information about CD's recent interactions with the campaign and possibly any connections with the Russian Federation.

When asked about CD's trips, CD mentioned that he was staying in Bromley, a suburb of London and that he has stayed in an area of Johannesburg called Sandton in the past. CD informed the CHS that he was going to be on a television show on Channel 4 on Monday 10/24/2016 with John Snow, discussing the U.S. election.

During lunch with the CHS and the CHS' wife, CD referenced George Kennan, the author of containing the Soviet Union during the Cold War. CD stated he wanted to start a think tank. When asked by the CHS, CD said "...I don't want to say there'd [SIC] be an open checkbook, but the Russians would definitely..." The CHS said "They would fund it-yeah you could do alright there." and CD responded "Yeah, but that has its pros and cons, right?" The exact language is attached. CD intimated that he may be visiting with potential backers of his proposed think tank when he was overseas, however, there was no further information.

CD departed the CHS' home shortly after lunch and promised to be in touch with the CHS.

Title: CD Meeting with FBI CHS

Re: 97F-NY-2067747, 11/16/2016

Specific excerpts of the meeting is attached.

(1) PLANS TO DEVELOP RESEARCH INSTITUTE

11:30:02 – There's a guy George Kennan... there's an interesting overlap between his predicament and the things he's dealt with and today... and well I'm the Kennan equivalent. Again, cause he kind of put out the idea of containment or a perceived idea of containment... and he spent 50 years arguing against this...

11:31:19 — So here's my kind of thought on... you know, like I've always said... in terms of personal ambitions... I think this beltway... this is one of the dirtiest places in the world and I've never had any ambitions to go into government regardless of who won... the analogy I always make is like... Biden when he's not doing political stuff, his big ambition is to fight cancer... I'm the same thing, fighting the cancerous foreign policy that's leading to so many deaths, so this is kind of my mission if you will. So I'm sort of thinking about if Kennan found his Institute of Advanced Study, I'd love to you... [analyst note: create something similar]

11:48:25 – There's a lot of similarities between what – although I've been much more in the public light than he ever was back in those years, cause you know there was the old school diplomacy of working discreetly backstage, but you know, here's a guy who... he came out with these concepts related to containment and et cetera... and people built up on these containment ideas and became much more hawkish and aggressive in a lot of ways against the Russians. And he spent the next fifty years of his life fighting against this... but what we're talking about... it's being a rare voice that talks against this consensus, this hawkish... it's also getting out some ideas and working on some research that will kind of state this in a more you know, instead of these sound bites on CNN

12:28:54 (Russians will fund his development of a research institute akin to Kennan Institute and some of his work in London may be related to this)

CHS: So you're in London for a couple of days...

<u>DRAGON</u>: I really appreciate that, that was a great idea I need to think about that though... I like the

entrepreneurial approach. The only big question obviously like most things, is the funding

for it, but I need to...

<u>CHS:</u> I imagine you could probably find funds because people are distressed with U.S. foreign

policy

DRAGON: Well I know... the interesting thing – and I've got a growing... [break in conversation]... well

the only interesting question, on your point, is I don't want to say there'd be an open

checkbook, but the Russians would definitely [laughs]...

<u>CHS:</u> They would fund it – yeah you could do alright there

DRAGON: Yeah but that has its pros and cons right?

CHS: Well, nobody needs to know exactly where it's from

<u>DRAGON</u>: Yeah that was my letter to Comey right? Everyone is so interested that I owned a couple of

American depository receipts of Gazprom.

(2) OTHER RUSSIAN CONNECTIONS

11:08:20 – Look, when I first moved to Moscow, people say to me, "the key is to develop relationships... this place is all about relationships". And you know, you're never going to be in a situation where everyone likes you. You gotta' find a couple of companies, executives that really trust you. You know, it's a typical banker term: *trusted relationship*. It's all about trusted relationships.

11:37:08 – this is extremely off the record, I've been talking to – I forwarded you that Sputnik news article, they were – some of the journalists I've been talking to there, which is the Russian state media organization...

12:00:19 – The same thing in Russia, so just as he [Bill Clinton] received more work from Monica [Lewinsky]... you know she's more attractive than Hillary... but you know so, the exact same thing with me and Russia. The Russians really, you know CHS and I were talking about relationships, I have a longstanding constructive relationship with the Russians going back throughout my life. This is so annoying to them, that you know...

12:01:06 – She [Hillary Clinton] doesn't care about lacking love and respect from her husband, but Russia is a strategically important country and, you know, love/hate, Bill/Hillary, who cares about that? But Russia is really important, and that goes back to my point of the op-ed I wrote last week

(3) IDEOLOGY/DEFENSE OF WIKILEAKS

10:48:33 – I think there's been this vicious downward circle of relations where each side – particularly in the west – antagonizes the other and then they're surprised when people, you know reciprocate the bad-will. You know, there's zero good will left. And a lot of it actually... I was talking with someone from one of the think tanks in town here and they were saying particularly in Eastern Europe, with the NATO commitment mutual defense, it's a lot of risk for our military as well if some of these border countries – the Baltics et cetera – start antagonizing, and also not only antagonizing, but also false information. There's so much false information... you know, referring to something that happens that might be an overstatement.

10:55:26 (DRAGON's views on WIKILEAKS' release of the DNC emails and discussion of what happened to the GOP platform at the RNC)

CHS: I guess what they're trying to do is work out the link between the Russians and Wikileaks,

what do we know about that?

<u>DRAGON</u>: You know, I-I-I've made clear in a lot of you know, subsequent discussions/interviews that

I've been part of... I know nothing about that — on a personal level, you know no one's ever said one word to me. But it's interesting, you know, off the record between us — if the only source of transparency and the truth is an external source, you know, c'est la vie right? I mean, that's Podesta's and Clinton's main argument right? This is tainted information because it came from the Russians, it's sort of that downward cycle and that's you know, when we were in Cambridge in mid-July there was starting to be these conspiracy theories and started to spin up — but then it wasn't until Cleveland and things percolated a little... the

following week is when it really got out of control cause of Philadelphia – Debbie

Wasserman Schultz... Let's distract from all the bad information – the damning information

that's in these documents – and talk about the source, or the purported source.

<u>CHS:</u> You mentioned Cleveland – you stopped by in Cleveland didn't you? So what about the

platform committee? Did you chat with them at all?

<u>DRAGON</u>: [laughs] I stayed clear of that – there was a lot of conspiracy theories that I was one of them,

/eah.

<u>CHS:</u> Cause I would've thought the platform committee would be a place where there'd be an

opportunity to clarify our relationship with the Russians or others, and you could've been

very helpful.

<u>DRAGON</u>: Well again, totally off the record, but I – members of our team were working on that, and

you know, again, in retrospect it's way better off that I, you know remained at arms length.

But again, our team was working on that.

10:59:13 (DRAGON mentions a relationship with the PM of a NATO ally country and shoes his disdain for current policies regarding Russia/sanctions)

CHS: Your point is well taken, you can provoke the hell out of the Russians and you can get a

reaction, and that then is very costly

<u>DRAGON</u>: But there's more to it... here's my fear – it's less of a fear for myself – a NATO ally, Prime

Minister of a NATO ally said to me – and you know, they've been hurt by sanctions... that's the interesting thing for the Americans, it doesn't have any impact on us. We can kind of put all of these restrictions. But for Europeans it's hard, it's a hardship on both sides. So – and his economy has been significantly negative impact given the whole sanctions thing – but then he says to me when all these lies started coming out on me over the summer: 'Well

what do you think? Do you fear for your life?'

CHS: What? What country is this?

DRAGON: W-w-well [laughs] we're very off the record already but,..

CHS: Why would he be thinking such a thing?!

<u>DRAGON</u>: But it's true! And what I told him is I don't fear for my life, I fear for the lives of service

members and other people in government who if these ridiculous approaches and these

failed policies continue next January, you know... we're on the brink of war.

11:40:39 – Let me tell you something, we could talk for the next 5 hours about all these sneaky little approaches that the USG has been taking against Russia – going back you know a couple decades. Perfect example is this Victoria Nuland... her infamous thing is – we talk about Russia interfering in our elections – you compare her level of interference in Ukraine, the democratic processes in Ukraine, to some Wikileaks – which is essentially on par with listening in on Merkel's phone calls. So she's recorded – she had this leaked [laughs] phone call where she's talking to the U.S. Ambassador to Kiev deciding who the next government leader should be.

(4) DEFENSE OF MEDIA ACCUSATIONS (SECHIN/DIVEYKIN & LAWYERS)

10:51:32 - it's beyond rumor though, a lie is a lie.

10:51:49 – (In discussing the Yahoo! News claim about meetings with Sechin and Diveykin in Moscow July 2016, DRAGON referenced advice from lawyers)

CHS: What's the core argument they're making?

DRAGON: Well the core argument – one of the core lies – and this is also the irony of it right? The core

lie is that I met with these sanctioned Russian officials, several of which I've never even met

in my entire life, but they said that I met them in July, right?

CHS: This is uh.. S..s..s...

<u>DRAGON</u>: Sechin is the main guy, the head of Roseneft... there's another guy I had never even heard

of, you know he's like, in the inner circle...

CHS: What's his name again?

DRAGON: I can't even remember, it's just so outrageous

CHS: He's in the inner circle; he works in the Kremlin or something

DRAGON: But he's you know not someone again, I was asking, I wanted to double check, because I did

meet, you know, I wanted to make sure, that at the graduation, I called up people that were, you know when I was a commencement speaker, did I happen to shake hands? This guy, this is just completely...they didn't even know of him, I know it's like, for example a senior

director on the NSC, right they're not household names.

CHS: They're hardly known and they may have never met the president

<u>DRAGON</u>: They're hardly known and they may not...it's just so outrageous, it defies any logic

whatsoever.

CHS: But so they said that you met with these people?

DRAGON: But you know this is the irony of it, there's no law against meeting with sanctioned officials...

DRAGON:And I have lawyers, you know I talk to lawyers about... the lawyer said as long as you don't

take gifts or have any sort of business dealings

CHS: No tangible exchange...

<u>DRAGON</u>: The tangible exchange – the lawyer quote was "don't even take a pen", you know don't

even take a gift of a pen, you know just to kind of keep everything completely clean and so...

10:55:03 (DRAGON denied meeting with Sechin/Diveykin and referenced legal advice again)

CHS: So they're claiming you met with these two guys – and you're saying it's perfectly legal to do

DRAGON: Even if I had – which I didn't do by the way – but you know, so...

CHS: And that is supposed to prove what?

DRAGON: Well you know, I'm in bed with the Russians. And everyone hates the Russians, right, you

know.

11:15:20 (In discussing whether he could help facilitate invitations to Sechin and Diveykin to speak at a seminar in Cambridge, DRAGON immediately responded with advice from his lawyers, but did not deny knowing them)

CHS: It may be that the two people you mentioned – you mentioned the Rosneft guy...

DRAGON: Yeah, Sechin

CHS: And the other one who I can't remember, he was part of the administration, it would be

very interesting to have them at Cambridge and to have – if you wish – for you to come, and

I could invite them, and...

DRAGON: [laughs]

<u>CHS:</u> ...it would be a very productive conversation. They'd enjoy it. DRAGON: [laughs] My lawyers would probably advise me to... [laughs]

CHS: Not to come?

DRAGON: To well, again, Harry Reid's letter to Director Comey – 'please look into Carter Page's

connections to these people!' [laughs and conversation topic changes]

11:18:10 (CHS asked him again – DRAGON brought up lawyer again; said he didn't have contact info, but never denied knowing them)

<u>CHS:</u> It occurred to me when I was thinking about all of this, what a wonderful event that would

be, cause it would be an opportunity for a Moscow-based senior person to present the argument for reduction of tensions and sort of clean slate type idea, and it could be done so that there were Brits or even Americans - I hadn't thought of any in particular – Brits who might enter that conversation with a measure of skepticism but could be neutralized

<u>DRAGON</u>: [laughs] my, you know...here's...

CHS: Your lawyers?

<u>DRAGON</u>: Again, I'm thinking, you know lawyers are always cautious... and you know I think this would

be setting off such big alarm bells [laughs] just for my personal – you know – it might be a

great idea... here let me just kind of...

CHS: Maybe you could put me in touch with them?

DRAGON: Again, I don't have their contact details

CHS: Oh okay – well I could find them

<u>DRAGON</u>: Yeah, it's better, you know [laughs], again... there's this great quote... [switches topic to

Politico article]

(5) SOUTH AFRICA TRIP

10:43:56 (CHS asks DRAGON about travel plans and he omits his travel plans to South Africa)

<u>CHS:</u> Where are you off to? You said you were going someplace?

DRAGON: Yeah, I'm uh, I actually have a couple days in Chicago at the tail end of this week and then I

fly straight to Heathrow over the weekend and spend some time there in London and then

uh... I was going to ask you about this guy...

11:46:02 (DRAGON is asked about travel plans by UF and changes topic immediately)

UF: I think you need a nice long vacation, do you have travel plans?

DRAGON: Well, we were talking, so this is a strategy question, so...

<u>UF:</u> Yeah I think a nice warm...

<u>DRAGON</u>: Well, no, but here's my thing... [changes topic back to PM/fear discussion]

UF: ...but are you going to take a little break? Someplace warm?

<u>DRAGON</u>: Well, uh, well this is uh strategy sessions, again, as agreed with, we are completely off the

record... [switches topic and brings up George Kennan then mentions his trip to London]

11:52:39 (DRAGON changes topic again when asked about travel plans)

UF: That's why I say that you must need a vacation, like I would say someplace warm that's very

far away from...

DRAGON: Well I-I-I go back to my Chris Stevens quote, I'm not concerned about protecting my own

skin, I'm more concerned about trying to come out with some more ideas that help counter

these crazy arguments

12:14:25 (DRAGON appears to get uncomfortable answering questions about South Africa – there is a clear difference in his tone compared to other discussion topics)

<u>UF:</u> ...stay in London for a while – are you going to come back after your interview? DRAGON: I got a, well, I got a what do you call it, I'm going to Johannesurg for a couple of days

UF: Oh! Well there's your vacation! You were hiding the best place!

<u>DRAGON</u>: Ah, well, it's alright. Cape Town is a vacation... CHS: ...where are you staying down in Jo-burg?

DRAGON: I haven't pick-...I'm like... this is like... you know I was telling him uh... I can't

remember if I mentioned to you, breaking my iPhone, I mean I've been running one thing after the other, I haven't even... uh, figured it out yet. I usually stay at Sandton – it's called the richest mile in Africa, it's like a little business community, and they've got some nice

hotels. There's a Marriot I typically stay at.

12:34:34 (DRAGON appears to get uncomfortable answering questions about South Africa – there is a clear difference in his tone compared to other discussion topics)

CHS: So I just want to ask you, are you going to be in South Africa for a while?

<u>DRAGON</u>: Maybe five days, but I uh...

CHS: So maybe you could get over to Durban then?

<u>DRAGON</u>: I'm not gonna... I've got... there's a couple of companies I'm doing some work with, so

CHS: Are you making some investments there?

<u>DRAGON</u>: Uh we're looking at – we're thinking... no uh, we're looking at some possibilities, nothing

imminent so, you know, anyway, to be continued though

(6) CLINTON INVESTIGATORS IN LONDON

10:50:29 – And then they [Clinton campaign] put out a press release – oh, Yahoo! News reveals that Carter Page did X, Y, Z, and look, the other journalists – the ones that are closer to me – will say specifically that they were told this by the Clinton team in Brooklyn.

11:56:34 – This is also, you know I've never discussed this with anyone, and this is very deep off the record, but they've hired investigators to come after me, including some in London.

12:02:20 – They hired investigators to look into these women [Hillary Clinton re: Bill Clinton's accusers of sexual assault], so it's the same, it's the very same concept... it's well documented according to unofficial sources that the US government [holding that against me?]... but also the Clinton campaign, at somewhat arms length, they're careful about having this too well-documented. I have very good sources, I know the names of the investigators as well.

(7) CONTINUING TO ACT AS SURROGATE FOR TRUMP CAMPAIGN

11:51:22 – Here's the question list [for an upcoming interview he's giving in London on 10/24]... topics covered will be your views in Russian involvement in Syria, how a Trump presidency would change U.S. involvement in Syria and what the U.S. relationship with Russia would be like, and your thoughts of British criticism of Putin



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Electronic Communication

Title:	12/15/2016	CHS Meeting with CD	Date: 01/09/201	7
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From: NEW YORK

NY-CD1

Contact: SOMMA STEPHEN M,

Approved By:

Drafted By: SOMMA STEPHEN M

Case ID #: 97F-NY-2067747

CROSSFIRE DRAGON FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -

RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

Synopsis: CHS meeting with CD on 12/15/2016 discussing a think tank.

Reason:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

Full Investigation Initiated: 08/10/2016

Details:

On 12/14/2016 CD contacted NY FBI CHS HALPER about meeting in Washington, D.C on 12/15/2106. After consulting with the case agent, the CHS set-up a meeting for 12/15/2016 at the Cosmos Club in Washington, D.C.

The CHS recorded the conversation, without being asked by the case agent. The CHS provided a recording of the meting to the case agent. A more detailed write-up of the meeting will follow.

During the course of the meeting, the CHS questioned CD about CD's comment in October 2016, where CD stated that he would have an

Title: CHS Meeting with CD

Re: 97F-NY-2067747, 01/09/2017

"Open Checkbook" from the Russians, in establishing a think tank.

During the discussion, the CHS brought up CD's think tank, which was discussed in October 2016. The CHS suggested an individual with whom CD may be able to speak with (the CHS did not mention the individuals name as per the instructions of the Case Agent). The CHS explained that the individual who has moderate views on Russia and has may have an "easy relationship" with perhaps the Russian government, individuals or think tanks. CD asked several detailed questions on the background on the individual, the CHS stated that he would be able to get CD his contact information for CD if CD wanted. CD told the CHS that he wanted to update the CHS on the think tank. CD said that he was in Moscow and brought the idea of the think tank up to individuals at the New Economic School (NES) and that "they were quite positive" about the think tank. CD said NES mentioned maybe doing something either there (in Russia) or jointly. CD then stated that they have a lot of "support internally." The CHS asked CD: "support from faculty or government?" to which CD responded: "government...higher up." The CHS stated "I guess the government is always involved in stuff" CD did not answer directly, but tried to draw a parallel with the Council of Foreign relations." CD changed the conversation to individuals who may be considered for positions in the new Presidential administration.

After some further discussion, the CHS asked CD where he is with the think tank. CD stated that he's "making some progress on it" and brought up the NES. The CHS asked CD directly, if the NES would finance it (the think tank), CD responded with "possibly" and that they're "enthusiastic about it." The CHS stated "you said last time we met that, you though you had the funding lined up, you said the Russians will give you a blank check." CD responded saying "I don't know if I went that far, I thought there was some support, certainly this trip proved it...having an institutional base, they actually like the sort of blank slate, open questions, come back to us with a proposal, very high level people, who are quite supportive, not just at the university, but in general." CD said that some people have warned him about not having too much of a "Russian Connection."

Title: CHS Meeting with CD

Re: 97F-NY-2067747, 01/09/2017

The CHS and CD continued the conversation.

*** ***

Statements from 09/15/2016 Meeting Between Source and George Papadopolous:

During the meeting, Source asked Papadopolous about Russian/Wikileaks involvement in the release of Democratic National Committee emails.

Source: "...and given Hillary's weakness and your strengths, help from a third party like Wikileaks or some other third party like the Russians could be incredibly helpful. I mean it might make all the difference."

Papadopolous: "As again, of course we don't advocate for this type of activity, cause at the end of the day it's illegal. First and foremost, it compromises US national security and third it sets a very bad precedent so the campaign does not advocate for this, it does not support what is happening, if the indirect consequences are out of our hands, that's how, that's the best way I can. For example, our campaign is not engaged or reaching out to Wikileaks or to whoever it is to tell them please work with us collaboratively because we don't. No one does that. Unless there is something going on I don't know, which I doubt as I don't think anybody would risk their life or potentially going to prison over doing something like that because at the end of the day it's an illegal, illegal activity. Espionage is treason. This is a form of treason.

Source: "You know, well, particularly involvement with American elections."

Papadopolous: "Especially is somebody is collaborating with X group that no one yet knows who they are. I mean that's why it became a very big issue when Mr. Trump said 'Russia if you are listening.' Do you remember?

Source: "Yeah, I remember that moment."

Papadopolous: "We had to retract it. Of course he didn't, he doesn't mean for them to hack or engaging in espionage, but the media took it and ran with it."

TAB 3

FD-1040a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SOURCE CLOSING COMMUNICATION

HEADER

Source ID: STELLE

Date: 11/17/2016

Case Agent Name: Gaeta, Michael J

Field Office/Division: International Operations

Squad: Legat Rome

DETAILS

CHS is being closed. After serializing this Source Closing Communication, only the Confidential File Room personnel may access or grant access to this Source Site.

Was the source closed for cause?

No

Note: Cause is defined as any grievous action by, or set of previously unknown facts/circumstances, that deem the individual not suitable for use as a CHS.

Closing for Cause is based on the facts and circumstances as determined on a case-by-case basis. Closing for Cause is a decision based on the seriousness of the violation. The following are possible reasons which may justify Closing for Cause: Unauthorized Criminal Activity, Serious control problems, Unreliable, and Violated instructions.

General Reason for Closing: Confidentiality revealed

Provide additional details:

CHS confirmed to an outside third party that CHS has a confidential relationship with the FBI. CHS was used as a source for an online article. In the article, CHS revealed CHS' relationship with the FBI as well as information that CHS obtained and provided to FBI. On November 1, 2016, CHS confirmed all of this to the handling agent. At that time, handling agent advised CHS that the nature of the relationship between the FBI and CHS would change completely and that it was unlikely that the FBI would continue a relationship with the CHS. Additionally, handling agent advised that CHS was not to operate to obtain any intelligence whatsoever on behalf of the FBI. Thereafter, handling agent was advised by FBI CI/CD and FBI IOD EM not to contact the CHS.

For note, the aggregate amount listed is incorrect. As noted in the file, the CHS has been paid \$95,000 to date since opening.

Would you recommend the CHS for reopening?

Yes

On: 11/01/2016

the CHS: was notified of deactivation.

FBI SA: Mike Gaeta

Other Government Witness: NA

CHS Response: acknowledged receipt and understanding of the notice to close.

Is an FPO attorney participating in the conduct of an investigation utilizing this CHS or is the FPO working with this CHS in connection with the prosecution of a case?

Has the case agent or co-case agent determined that there is sufficient reason to close a CHS, No however, immediate notification to the CHS would jeopardize an ongoing investigation, prosecution, or cause a flight from prosecution?

Note: Absent exceptional circumstances that are approved by an SSA, in advance if possible, an FBI Agent shall not initiate contact with, or respond to contacts from, a former CHS who has been closed for cause. Such approval must be documented in the CHS's main file. Further, if approved, such contact must be coordinated, in advance if possible, with any FPO participating in the conduct of an investigation that will utilize that CHS or in which that CHS will be expected to testify.

Was the captioned individual authorized to engage in OIA?

No

Is the CHS an undocumented alien?

No

FD-1040a	Page 1 of 2	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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FD-1040a	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
	SOURCE CLOSING COMMUNICATION

Have all CHS payment issues been addressed and completed?

Yes

Total Paid Amount:

\$74,000.00

Was the individual ever publicly acknowledged by the FBI?

No

Was the individual aware of his/her status as a CHS?

Yes

Ensure that all other necessary forms on this source site have been serialized before serializing this Source Closing Communication. After serializing this form, only the CHSC and CFR personnel may access or grant access to this Source Site.

SIGNATURE

Submitted By

First Level Approved By

mjgaeta (Michael Gaeta)

Thu, 17 Nov 2016 17:19:38 +0100

Thu, 17 Nov 2016 17:37:24 +0100

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FD-1040a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SOURCE CLOSING COMMUNICATION

HEADER

Source ID:

Date: 10/13/2020

Case Agent Name: Non SES

Field Office/Division: New York

Squad: CD 10

DETAILS

CHS is being closed. After serializing this Source Closing Communication, only the Confidential File Room personnel may access or grant access to this Source Site.

Was the source closed for cause?

No

Note: Cause is defined as any grievous action by, or set of previously unknown facts/circumstances, that deem the individual not suitable for use as a CHS.

Closing for Cause is based on the facts and circumstances as determined on a case-by-case basis. Closing for Cause is a decision based on the seriousness of the violation. The following are possible reasons which may justify Closing for Cause: Unauthorized Criminal Activity, Serious control problems, Unreliable, and Violated instructions.

General Reason for Closing: Other (specify)

Provide additional details:

At the direction of FBIHQ Counterintelligence Division, this source is being closed.

Would you recommend the CHS for reopening?

No

Please explain:

Confidentiality of the source has been revealed.

On: 10/13/2020

the CHS: was not notified for other reasons.

Is an FPO attorney participating in the conduct of an investigation utilizing this CHS or is the Yes FPO working with this CHS in connection with the prosecution of a case?

Has the case agent or co-case agent coordinated with the FPO attorney regarding any of the decisions to close this CHS?

The case agent or co-case agent shall coordinate with the FPO attorney, in advance if possible, regarding any decisions to close this CHS.

Has the case agent or co-case agent determined that there is sufficient reason to close a CHS, however, immediate notification to the CHS would jeopardize an ongoing investigation, prosecution, or cause a flight from prosecution?

Note: Absent exceptional circumstances that are approved by an SSA, in advance if possible, an FBI Agent shall not initiate contact with, or respond to contacts from, a former CHS who has been closed for cause. Such approval must be documented in the CHS's main file. Further, if approved, such contact must be coordinated, in advance if possible, with any FPO participating in the conduct of an investigation that will utilize that CHS or in which that CHS will be expected to testify.

Was the captioned individual authorized to engage in OIA?

No

Is the CHS an undocumented alien?

No

Have all CHS payment issues been addressed and completed?

Yes

Total Paid Amount: \$602,342.00

Was the individual ever publicly acknowledged by the FBI?

No

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FD-1040a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SOURCE CLOSING COMMUNICATION

Was the individual aware of his/her status as a CHS?

Yes

Ensure that all other necessary forms on this source site have been serialized before serializing this Source Closing Communication. After serializing this form, only the CHSC and CFR personnel may access or grant access to this Source Site.

SIGNATURE					
Submitted By	Non SES	Tue, 20 Oct 2020 10:47:55 -04:00			
First Level Approved By	Non SES	Tue, 20 Oct 2020 11:07:02 -04:00			

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