July 23, 2013

Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Ranking Member
Committee on the Judiciary
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Conyers:

We write to present the views of the Judicial Conference Rules Committees on H.R. 2655, the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2013.

As the current chairs of the Judicial Conference’s Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure (the “Standing Rules Committee”) and the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Advisory Committee”), we oppose H.R. 2655, which seeks to reduce lawsuit abuse by amending Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The bill would reinstate a mandatory sanctions provision of Rule 11 that was adopted in 1983 and eliminated in 1993. The bill would also eliminate a provision adopted in 1993 to allow a party to withdraw challenged pleadings on a voluntary basis, without the costs and delay to the challenging party of seeking and obtaining a court order. The concerns we express are the same concerns expressed by the Judicial Conference in 2004 and 2005, and by the Standing Rules Committee and Advisory Committee in 2011, when similar legislation was introduced.

We greatly appreciate, and share, the desire to improve the civil justice system in our federal courts, including by reducing frivolous filings. But legislation that would restore the 1983 version of Rule 11 by undoing the 1993 amendments would create a “cure” far worse than the problem it is meant to solve. Such legislation also contravenes the longstanding Judicial Conference policy opposing direct amendment of the federal rules by legislation instead of through the careful, deliberate process Congress established in the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077.
The 1993 changes followed years of examination and were made on the Judicial Conference’s strong recommendation, with the Supreme Court’s approval, and after congressional review. The 1983 provision for mandatory sanctions was eliminated because it did not provide meaningful relief from the litigation behavior it was meant to address, and instead generated wasteful satellite litigation that had little to do with the merits of cases and that added to the time and costs of litigation.

The 1983 version of Rule 11 required sanctions for every violation of the rule. This mandatory sanctions provision quickly became a tool of abuse in civil litigation. Seeking to use mandatory sanctions to their advantage, aggressive lawyers filed motions for Rule 11 sanctions in response to virtually every filing in a civil case. Much time and money was spent in Rule 11 battles that had everything to do with strategic gamesmanship and little to do with underlying claims. Rule 11 motions came to be met with counter-motions that sought Rule 11 sanctions for making the original Rule 11 motion.

The 1983 version of Rule 11 spawned thousands of court decisions unrelated to the merits of the cases, sowed discord in the bar, and generated widespread criticism. As letters from the Judicial Conference commenting on proposed legislation similar to H.R. 2655 pointed out, some of the serious problems caused by the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 included:

1. creating a significant incentive to file unmeritorious Rule 11 motions by providing a greater possibility of receiving money;
2. engendering potential conflicts of interest between clients and their lawyers;
3. exacerbating tensions between lawyers; and
4. providing a disincentive to abandon or withdraw a pleading or claim that lacked merit — thereby admitting error and risking sanctions — even after determining that it no longer was supportable in law or fact.

The 1993 amendments to Rule 11 were designed to remedy the major problems with the rule, strike a fair balance between competing interests, and allow parties and courts to focus on the merits of the underlying cases rather than on Rule 11 motions. Since 1993, the rule has established a safe harbor, providing a party 21 days within which to withdraw a particular claim or defense before sanctions can be imposed. If the party fails to withdraw an allegedly frivolous claim or defense within the 21 days, a court may impose sanctions, including assessing reasonable attorney fees. The 1983 version of Rule 11 authorized a court to sanction discovery-related abuse under Rule 11, Rule 26(g), or Rule 37, which created confusion. Under the 1993 amendments to Rule 11, sanctioning of discovery-related abuse is limited to Rules 26 and 37, which provide for sanctions that include awards of reasonable attorney fees.
The 1993 amendments to Rule 11 culminated a long, critical examination of the rule begun four years earlier. The Advisory Committee reviewed a significant number of empirical studies of the 1983 version of Rule 11, including three separate studies conducted by the Federal Judicial Center in 1985, 1988, and 1991, a Third Circuit Task Force report on Rule 11 in 1989, and a New York State Bar Committee report in 1987.

After reviewing the literature and empirical studies of problems caused by the 1983 amendments to Rule 11, the Advisory Committee issued in 1990 a preliminary call for general comment on the operation and effect of the rule. The response was substantial and clearly called for a change in the rule. The Advisory Committee concluded that the cost-shifting in Rule 11 created an incentive for too many unnecessary Rule 11 motions. Amendments to Rule 11 were drafted by the Advisory Committee, approved by the Standing Rules Committee, and approved by the Judicial Conference. The Supreme Court promulgated and transmitted the amendments to Congress in May 1993 after extensive scrutiny and debate by the bench, bar, and public in accordance with the Rules Enabling Act process.

Experience with the amended rule since 1993 has demonstrated a marked decline in Rule 11 satellite litigation without any noticeable increase in frivolous filings. In June 1995, the Federal Judicial Center conducted a survey of 1,130 lawyers and 148 judges on the effects of the 1993 Rule 11 amendments. About 580 attorneys and 120 judges responded. The Center found general satisfaction with the amended rule. It also found that a majority of the judges and lawyers did not favor a provision that would require mandatory sanctions when the rule is violated.

In 2005, the Federal Judicial Center surveyed federal trial judges to get a clearer picture of how the revised Rule 11 was operating. A copy of the study is enclosed. The study showed that judges on the front lines — those who must contend with frivolous litigation and apply Rule 11 — strongly believe that the current rule works well. The study’s findings include the following highlights:

- more than 80 percent of the 278 district judges surveyed indicated that “Rule 11 is needed and it is just right as it now stands”;
- 87 percent prefer the existing Rule 11 to the 1983 version or the version proposed by legislation (e.g., H.R. 4571 (the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2004) or H.R. 420 (the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005));
- 85 percent strongly or moderately support Rule 11’s safe harbor provisions;
- 91 percent oppose the proposed requirement that sanctions be imposed for every Rule 11 violation;
- 84 percent disagree with the proposition that an award of attorney fees should be mandatory for every Rule 11 violation;
85 percent believe that the amount of groundless civil litigation has not grown since the promulgation of the 1993 rule (for judges commissioned before 1992) or since their first year as a federal district judge (for judges commissioned after January 1, 1992), with 12 percent noting that such litigation has not been a problem, 19 percent noting that such litigation decreased during their tenure on the federal bench, and 54 percent noting that such litigation has remained relatively constant; and

72 percent believe that addressing sanctions for discovery abuse in Rules 26(g) and 37 is better than in Rule 11.

The findings of the Federal Judicial Center underscore the judiciary’s united opposition to legislation amending Rule 11. Lawyers share this view. In 2005, the American Bar Association issued a resolution opposing a proposed bill similar to H.R. 2655.

Minimizing frivolous filings is, of course, vital. But there is no need to reinstate the 1983 version of Rule 11 to work toward this goal. Judges have many tools available to respond to, and deter, frivolous pleadings. Those tools include 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), which requires courts to dismiss cases brought in forma pauperis that the court determines are frivolous or malicious or fail to state a claim, and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires courts to dismiss prisoner complaints against governmental entities, officers, or employees that are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim. Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes courts to dismiss pleadings that fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Section 1927 of Title 28 of the United States Code authorizes sanctions against lawyers for “unreasonably and vexatiously” multiplying the proceedings in any case. And the present version of Rule 11 itself provides an effective, balanced tool, without the problems and satellite litigation the 1983 version created.

In May 2010, the Advisory Committee held a major conference on civil litigation, examining the problems of costs and delay — which encompass frivolous filings — and potential ways to improve the system. The Conference encouraged, and generated, a broad spectrum of criticisms by lawyers, litigants (including businesses and governmental entities), judges, and academics of the current approaches to federal civil cases, including the rules, and proposals for change. Conspicuous in their absence were any criticism of Rule 11 or any proposal to restore the 1983 version of the rule. Three years after the Conference, the Advisory Committee and Standing Rules Committee have approved publication of rules amendments designed to respond to suggestions made at the Conference on new means of reducing cost and delay in civil litigation and enhancing practical access to the federal courts. These three years of intense work did not find any reason to consider Rule 11 amendments.

Undoing the 1993 Rule 11 amendments would frustrate the purpose and intent of the Rules Enabling Act. Congress designed the Rules Enabling Act process in 1934 and reformed it in 1988 to produce the best rules possible by ensuring broad public participation and thorough review by the bench, the bar, and the academy. The Act charges the judiciary with the task of neutral, independent, and thorough analysis of the rules and their operation. The Rules Committees are
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dedicated to extensive study and analysis of the rules, including empirical research, so that they can propose rules that will best serve the American justice system and will not produce unintended consequences. Experience has shown that this process works well.

In summary, experience, research, and thoughtful deliberation have shown that there is no need to reinstate the 1983 version of Rule 11 that proved contentious and costly to litigants and diverted so much time and energy of the bar and bench. Doing so would add to, not improve, the problems of costs and delay that we are working to address. We urge you on behalf of the Rules Committees to not adopt the proposed legislation amending Rule 11.

Thank you for considering the Rules Committees’ views. We look forward to continuing to work together to ensure that our civil justice system is working well to fulfill its vital role. If you or your staff have any questions, please contact Benjamin Robinson, Deputy Rules Officer and Counsel, at 202-502-1820.

Sincerely,

Jeffrey S. Sutton
United States Circuit Judge
Sixth Circuit
Chair, Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure

David G. Campbell
United States District Judge
District of Arizona
Chair, Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules

Enclosure

Identical letter sent to: Honorable Bob Goodlatte

David Rauma & Thomas E. Willging

FJC Project Team:
George Cort
Vashty Gobinpersad
Maria E. Huidobro

Federal Judicial Center
2005

This Federal Judicial Center publication was undertaken at the request of the Judicial Conference’s Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and is in furtherance of the Center’s statutory mission to conduct and stimulate research and development for the improvement of judicial administration. The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Advisory Committee or of the Federal Judicial Center.
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Introduction

The Judicial Conference’s Advisory Committee on Civil Rules asked the Federal Judicial Center to design and implement a survey of a representative national sample of federal district judges. The purpose of the survey was to gather information about the judges’ experiences with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as to elicit their opinions about recent proposals in Congress to amend Rule 11. The chair of the Advisory Committee and the committee’s reporters helped develop the questionnaires. Center staff conducted the survey and analyzed the results during December 2004 and January 2005.

As currently written, Rule 11 expressly authorizes judges to impose sanctions on lawyers and parties who present to a district court a pleading, written motion, or other paper without reasonable support in fact or law or for an improper purpose, such as to cause unnecessary cost or delay. Rule 11 provides that sanctions for violations are within the judge’s discretion; that a party should have a period of time, a “safe harbor,” within which to withdraw or correct a filing alleged to violate Rule 11; and that Rule 11’s primary purpose is to deter future violations and not necessarily to compensate the opposing party for losses, including attorney fees.

In the 108th Congress, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 4571, the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2004, which would have amended Rule 11. That bill would have provided for mandatory sanctions for violations, repealed the safe harbor, and required judges to order the offending lawyer or party to compensate the opposing party for attorney fees incurred as a direct result of a Rule 11 violation. The proposed legislation would have reversed three amendments to Rule 11 adopted through the rulemaking process in 1993: to convert mandatory sanctions to discretionary sanctions, to create a safe harbor, and to deemphasize attorney fee awards. The proposed legislation also would have introduced a requirement that a district court suspend an attorney’s license to practice in that district for one year if the attorney was found to have violated Rule 11 three or more times in that district.

The survey was designed, in part, to elicit district judges’ views based on their experience with the 1993 amendments. The Advisory Committee was particularly interested in having the survey identify any differences in the views of district judges concerning the current Rule 11, the legislative pro-

1. H.R. 4571, 108th Cong. 2d Sess. (2004). The House version was introduced in the Senate on Sept. 15, 2004, referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and was not the subject of a vote.
The pre-1993 version of Rule 11. The pre-1993 version differs from the legislative proposal in significant ways, particularly in its treatment of attorney fees as a discretionary, not a mandatory, sanction for a violation of Rule 11.

On December 10, 2004, the Center E-mailed questionnaires to two random samples of 200 district judges each. District Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, chair of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, provided a cover letter for the E-mail. One sample comprised solely judges appointed to the bench before January 1, 1992, who would be expected to have had considerable experience with the pre-1993 version of Rule 11. The other sample comprised solely judges appointed to the bench after January 1, 1992, who would be expected to have had most of their judicial experience working with the 1993 amended version of Rule 11. Judge Rosenthal sent a follow-up E-mail on January 3, 2005. Of the 400 judges, 278 responded, a rate of 70%. Appendix A explains the methods used to select the samples. Appendix B contains a composite copy of the two questionnaires used in the survey.

Summary of Results

More than 80% of the 278 district judges indicated that “Rule 11 is needed and it is just right as it now stands.” In evaluating the alternatives, 87% of the respondents preferred the current Rule 11, 5% preferred the version in effect between 1983 and 1993, and 4% preferred the version proposed in H.R. 4571.

Judges’ opinions about specific provisions in Rule 11 and the proposed legislation followed a similar pattern. The results indicated that relatively large majorities of the judges who responded to our survey have the following views about Rule 11:

- 85% strongly or moderately support Rule 11’s safe harbor provision;
- 91% oppose the proposed requirement that sanctions be imposed for every Rule 11 violation;
- 84% disagree with the proposition that an award of attorney fees should be mandatory for every Rule 11 violation; and
- 72% believe that having sanctions for discovery in Rules 26(g) and 37 is best.

A majority of the judges (55%) indicated that the purpose of Rule 11 should be both deterrence and compensation; almost all of the other judges (44%) indicated that deterrence should be the sole purpose of Rule 11.
The views of judges who responded to the survey are likely to be related to their estimation of the amount of groundless civil litigation they see in their own docket, especially when focusing on cases where the plaintiff is represented by counsel. Approximately 85% of the district judges view groundless litigation in such cases as no more than a small problem and another 12% see such litigation as a moderate problem. About 3% view groundless litigation brought by plaintiffs who are represented by counsel as a large or very large problem. For 54% of the judges who responded, the amount of groundless litigation has remained relatively constant during their tenure on the federal bench. Only 7% indicated that the problem is now larger. For 19%, the amount of groundless civil litigation has decreased during their tenure on the federal bench, and for 12% there has never been a problem.

Results

The Advisory Committee was especially interested in having a survey that was designed to inquire about district court judges’ experience with Rule 11 as well as to solicit judges’ opinions about the current Rule 11 relative to the proposed changes contained in the legislation. Those interests shaped the organization and content of the survey questionnaires. The survey results in this section of the report are presented in tables and text in the order in which the questions appeared on the survey instrument. The title of each table states the question asked of the judges, and the response categories are a shorthand version of the responses called for in the questionnaire. The preface of each questionnaire indicated in bold type that “This questionnaire is about the effects of Rule 11 in cases in which the plaintiff is represented by counsel.” Many of the questions were modeled on questions asked of judges in a 1995 Center survey. In order to facilitate comparisons between the findings of the 1995 survey and the current survey, we present applicable results of both surveys with appropriate references.

Frequency of Groundless Litigation

The questionnaire first asked judges about their perception of any problems with groundless litigation and whether such problems, if they exist, had

changed since Rule 11 was last amended in 1993. Table 1 shows that 85% of the judges described any perceived problem with groundless litigation as being no more than a small one. Among judges commissioned before January 1, 1992, this figure was over 75%; the figure was almost 90% for judges commissioned after that date. In our 1995 study, 40% of the judges indicated that the problem with groundless litigation was moderate to very large; only 15% believed this to be the case in the current study.

Table 1
Responses to Question 1.1. Is there a problem with groundless litigation in federal civil cases on your docket?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible Answer</th>
<th>All Judges (N=276)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned Before 1/1/92 (N=128)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned After 1/1/92 (N=148)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No problem</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very small problem</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small problem</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate problem</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large problem</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very large problem</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can’t say</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The questionnaire next asked whether such problems, if they exist, had changed since Rule 11 was last amended in 1993. Table 2 shows that about 7% said that the problem had increased. More than half said that the problem was the same, and 12% said that there has never been a problem. Judges commissioned after January 1, 1992, were more likely to say that there has never been a problem but, if there is a problem, it is about the same as it was during their first year on the bench.

3. *Id.* at 3.

4. *N* refers to the number of judges who answered the question. The value of *N* varies across tables because of differences in the number of judges who answered a particular question. Percentages in columns with results for all judges are weighted to reflect the fact that, by drawing two samples independently from two groups of judges, we have a stratified sample. In this case, weighted results for the entire sample are appropriate. Weighting is unnecessary for results reported separately by group. Finally, as a result of rounding, column percentages may not sum to 100.
Table 2
Responses to Question 1.2, Is the current problem (if any) with groundless litigation in civil cases on your docket smaller than, about the same as, or larger now than it was before Rule 11 was amended? (asked of pre-1992 judges) or during your first year as a federal district judge? (asked of post-1992 judges)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible Answer</th>
<th>All Judges (N=276)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned Before 1/1/92 (N=128)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned After 1/1/92 (N=148)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There has never been a problem</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The problem is much smaller now than it was then</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The problem is slightly smaller now than it was then</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The problem is the same now as it was then</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The problem is slightly larger now than it was then</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The problem is much larger now than it was then</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can’t say</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Safe Harbor” Provision and Rule 11 Activity
The questionnaire asked judges if they supported or opposed the Rule 11 “safe harbor” provision, which was added as part of the 1993 amendments. Table 3 shows that 86% of the judges said they supported it, with the majority of the judges expressing strong support. Table 3 also shows somewhat stronger support among judges commissioned after 1992. This subgroup has very little or no experience with the pre-1993 version of Rule 11, which did not include the safe harbor provision. Overall, the percentage of judges supporting the safe harbor has increased from 70% to 86% since 1995; judges showing strong support has increased from 32% to 60%. The percentage of judges opposing the safe harbor has decreased from 16% to 10%.5

Table 3
Responses to Question 2.1, Based on your experience and your assessment of what would be fairest to all parties, do you oppose or support Rule 11’s “safe harbor” provision?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible Answer</th>
<th>All Judges (N=277)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned Before 1/1/92 (N=128)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned After 1/1/92 (N=149)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly support</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately support</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately oppose</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly oppose</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I find it difficult to choose</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can’t say</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The questionnaire contained a follow-up question for the pre-1992 judges about changes in Rule 11 activity as a result of the addition of the safe harbor provision. Judges commissioned prior to 1992 were asked how the safe harbor provision has affected the amount of Rule 11 activity since the provision went into effect in 1993. Table 4 shows that 45% of these judges reported that Rule 11 activity had decreased, either slightly or substantially, and 29% reported that activity was about the same. Only 5% reported increases in Rule 11 activity, and 21% indicated that they could not give a definitive answer to this question. Similarly, judges commissioned after 1992 were asked about Rule 11 activity since their first year on the bench. Table 4 shows that almost two-thirds of the post-1992 judges reported that Rule 11 activity had remained about the same, 22% reported decreases, and 7% reported increases.
Table 4
Responses to Question 2.2,

How has the safe harbor provision affected the amount of Rule 11 activity on your docket since it went into effect in 1993? (asked of pre-1992 judges) or
Since your first year as a district judge what, if any, changes have you observed in the amount of Rule 11 activity on your docket? (asked of post-1992 judges)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible Answer</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned Before 1/1/92 (N=127)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned After 1/1/92 (N=148)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased substantially</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased slightly</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the same</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreased slightly</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreased substantially</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can’t say</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rule 11 Sanctions

The current version of Rule 11 allows a district judge to impose sanctions for violations of the rule, at his or her own discretion, with the purpose of deterring similar conduct in the future. H.R. 4571 would require sanctions for every violation, with the purpose of compensating the injured party for reasonable expenses and attorney fees as well as to deter repetitions of such conduct.

The judges were asked first whether sanctions, monetary or nonmonetary, should be required. Table 5 shows that 91% said that sanctions should not be required. Among judges commissioned before 1992, 86% said sanctions should not be required; for judges commissioned after 1992 the figure was 95%. In 1995, 22% of the judges thought that a sanction should be required for every Rule 11 violation, compared with 9% who think so now.6

6. Id. at 6.
Table 5
Responses to Question 3.1. Should the court be required to impose a monetary or nonmonetary sanction when a violation is found?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible Answer</th>
<th>All Judges (N=277)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned Before 1/1/92 (N=128)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned After 1/1/92 (N=149)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can’t say</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Judges were next asked whether an award of attorney fees, sufficient to compensate the injured party, should be mandatory when a sanction is imposed. Table 6 shows that 84% of the judges said no. The result is approximately the same whether the judges were commissioned before or after 1992. The percentage of judges favoring mandatory attorney fees for Rule 11 violations was 15% in both the 1995 and 2005 surveys.7

Table 6
Responses to Question 3.2. When a sanction is imposed, should it be mandatory that the sanction include an award of attorney fees sufficient to compensate the injured party?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible Answer</th>
<th>All Judges (N=277)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned Before 1/1/92 (N=128)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned After 1/1/92 (N=149)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can’t say</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the proposed legislation’s inclusion of financial compensation as a general purpose for Rule 11, judges were asked what should be the purpose of Rule 11. Almost 100% of the judges said that a purpose of Rule 11 should be deterrence. Their views were split on the role of compensation. The results in Table 7 reveal that slightly more than half, 55%, said that the purpose should be deterrence and compensation; 44% said that the purpose should be deterrence, with compensation if needed for the sake of deterrence. Reading the Table 7 results in light of the opinions expressed in

7. Id.
Table 5 and 6, it appears that most judges who favor compensating the opposing party do not favor such compensation in all cases and do not necessarily favor compensation in the form of attorney fees. In the 1995 survey, 66% of the judges thought that Rule 11 should include both compensatory and deterrent purposes.8

Table 7
Responses to Question 3.3, What should the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions be?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible Answer</th>
<th>All Judges (N=275)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned Before 1/1/92 (N=126)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned After 1/1/92 (N=149)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deterrence (&amp; compensation if warranted)</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation only</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both deterrence &amp; compensation</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three Strikes

Under the proposed legislation, when an attorney violates Rule 11 the federal court would determine how many times that attorney had violated Rule 11 in that court during the attorney’s career. If that attorney had committed three or more violations, the court would suspend for one year the attorney’s license to practice in that court.

To gauge the frequency with which this portion of the proposed Rule 11 might be invoked, judges were asked whether they had encountered an attorney with three or more violations in their district. Table 8 shows that 77% of the judges reported that they had not. Of the remaining 23%, more than half were not sure if they had encountered an attorney with three or more violations. Judges commissioned before 1992 were more likely to say they had encountered such an attorney. This result may, of course, be largely the result of their longer time on the bench.

8. Id.
Table 8
Responses to Question 4.1, In your experience as a district judge, have you encountered an attorney who has violated Rule 11 three or more times in your district?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible Answer</th>
<th>All Judges (N=277)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned Before 1/1/92 (N=128)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned After 1/1/92 (N=149)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can’t say</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At present, the efforts and methods required to enable courts to track attorney violations, in order to apply the proposed legislation’s “three strikes” provision, are unknown. Judges were asked for their views, which are reported in Table 9. The choices were not mutually exclusive: Judges could check more than one response and therefore the percentages do not sum to 100. The most frequent response, given by 48% of the judges, was that a new database would be required to track Rule 11 violations. Examination of prior docket records was the next most frequent response, given by 35% of the judges. Only 4% said that little or no additional effort would be required, and nearly one-third (32%) were unsure about what would be needed to apply the three strikes provision.
Table 9
Responses to Question 4.2. In your district, how much effort would be required to obtain information about the number of prior Rule 11 violations committed by an attorney during his or her career?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible Answer</th>
<th>All Judges (N=277)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned Before 1/1/92 (N=128)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned After 1/1/92 (N=149)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Little or no additional effort</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examining prior docket records for past violations</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating a new database for Rule 11 violations</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An affidavit or declaration from each attorney</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other court action</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can’t say</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Judges were next asked their views on the impact of the proposed three strikes provision in deterring groundless litigation relative to the cost of implementation and in light of their courts’ existing procedures for disciplining attorneys. Table 10 shows that 40% felt that the cost of implementation would exceed the deterrent value, while 25% of the judges felt that the value of the deterrent effect would exceed the cost of implementation. However, 27% were unsure about the tradeoff between cost and deterrent effect. Judges commissioned after 1992, compared with those commissioned earlier, were more likely to view the cost as exceeding the value of the proposed legislation and were less likely to view the deterrent value as exceeding the cost. They were also more likely to express uncertainty over the tradeoff.
Table 10
Responses to Question 4.3, Which of the following statements best captures your expectations regarding the impact of the proposal in deterring groundless litigation in comparison to the cost of implementing the proposal in your district?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible Answer</th>
<th>All Judges (N=277)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned Before 1/1/92 (N=128)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned After 1/1/92 (N=149)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value of the deterrent effect would greatly exceed its cost</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of the deterrent effect would somewhat exceed its cost</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of the deterrent effect would about equal its cost</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of implementing the proposal would somewhat exceed the value of the deterrent effect</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of implementing the proposal would greatly exceed the value of the deterrent effect</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can’t say</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Application of Rule 11 to Discovery

The proposed legislation would extend Rule 11’s application to discovery-related activity. Standards and sanctions for discovery are currently covered by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(g) and 37, and the proposed legislation would augment these rules with an expanded Rule 11. The sampled judges were asked their opinion on the best combination of rules and sanctions. Table 11 shows that 72% of the judges (compared with 48% in 1995)\(^9\) feel that the best option is the current version of Rule 11; 14% favored the proposed legislation. Judges commissioned after 1992 were a little more likely to favor the current version of the rule than judges commissioned before 1992.

\(^9\) Id. at 7.
Table 11
Responses to Question 5, Based on your experience, which of the following options do you believe would be best?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible Answer</th>
<th>All Judges (N=276)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned Before 1/1/92 (N=127)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned After 1/1/92 (N=149)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions provisions contained only in Rules 26(g) and 37</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions provisions contained in Rules 26(g), 37, and 11</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions provisions consolidated in Rule 11</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No significant difference among the three options</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can’t say</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How to Control Groundless Litigation?
To gauge judges’ overall views on the proposed legislation and on controlling groundless litigation, the judges were asked whether Rule 11 should be modified. Table 12 shows their responses to the given options. The great majority of judges (81%) said that Rule 11 is just right as currently written. In 1995, 52% of the judges indicated that the same version of Rule 11 was just right as written. In 2005, there were differences among judges depending on when they were commissioned: 71% of judges commissioned before 1992 agreed that the current Rule 11 is just right, compared with 89% of judges commissioned afterwards. There was almost no support for modifying Rule 11 to reduce the risk of deterring meritorious filings, and only some support, primarily among the longer-serving judges, to modify Rule 11 to more effectively deter groundless filings.
Table 12
Responses to Question 6, Based on your view of how effective or ineffective these other methods are, how, if at all, should Rule 11 be modified?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible Answer</th>
<th>All Judges (N=270)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned Before 1/1/92 (N=124)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned After 1/1/92 (N=146)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modified to increase its effectiveness in deterring groundless filings</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule 11 is just right as it now stands</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modified to reduce the risk of deterring meritorious filings</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule 11 is not needed</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can’t say</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, the judges were asked which version of Rule 11 they would prefer to have if and when they have to deal with groundless litigation. Given the choice among the current version of Rule 11, the pre-1993 version, or the proposed legislation, 87% of the judges preferred the current version. The percentages for surveyed judges commissioned before and after 1992 are 83% and 91%, respectively. There was little support expressed for either the pre-1993 version or the version contained in H.R. 4571.

Table 13
Responses to Question 7, Proposed legislation would repeal the safe harbor provision in Rule 11 and require that the court shall impose an appropriate sanction on a party or attorney who signed a pleading, motion, or other paper in violation of Rule 11 standards. Which approach would you prefer in dealing with groundless litigation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible Answer</th>
<th>All Judges (N=271)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned Before 1/1/92 (N=123)</th>
<th>Judges Commissioned After 1/1/92 (N=148)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The current Rule 11</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1983–1993 version of Rule 11</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The proposed legislation</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can’t say</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

Based on their experiences in managing groundless civil litigation in their own courts, federal district judges find the current Rule 11 to be well suited to their needs. Almost all of the judges reported that, in their experience, groundless civil litigation is a small or at most a moderate problem. District judges’ views on proposed changes to Rule 11 appear to be consistent with their experiences on the federal bench. Substantial majorities of the responding judges said, in effect, that none of the proposals for changing Rule 11—that is, proposals for mandatory sanctions, mandatory attorney fee awards, removal of the safe harbor, and application of Rule 11 to discovery disputes—would resolve problems that district judges are experiencing.
Appendix A

Method

Separate forms of the questionnaire were E-mailed by Center staff with a cover letter from the chair of the Advisory Committee to two samples of active and active-senior federal district court judges. The samples, each one of 200 judges, were separately and randomly selected from within two groups of judges defined by their commission date. Judges commissioned before January 1, 1992, formed one group; judges commissioned on or after that date formed the other. This date was selected in order that all judges in the first group would have had at least one year on the bench before the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 went into effect. This group of judges received a form of the questionnaire that, where necessary, asked them to use their pre-1993 period on the bench as a basis for comparison. The second group of judges received a questionnaire that instead asked them to use their first year on the bench as their basis for comparison. A composite of the two versions of the questionnaire is contained in Appendix B.

In order to quickly and easily convert the returned questionnaires into data files, Center research staff used special software to produce and read the questionnaires. Each of the two forms of the questionnaire was converted to Portable Document Format (PDF) and sent via E-mail to the 400 sampled judges. Each judge’s file was named using a sequential, numbered ID that was used to track returned questionnaires for follow-up purposes. Upon receipt of the file, the judges were able to open the PDF file, answer the questions, save the file, and return it via E-mail. The software that produced the files was used to convert the returned questionnaires to a data file for analysis. Judges were also given the option of printing the PDF file, completing it, and faxing it to a fax server at the Center. Of the 280 responses received, 44 were returned via E-mail; the remainder were returned via fax. The questionnaires were sent on December 9, 2004, and a reminder was sent on January 3, 2005, to judges who had not yet responded. The response rates for the two samples were different. Post-1992 judges were more likely to return the questionnaire (74%) than were pre-1992 judges (64%).

The sample procedure described above produced a stratified sample in which the judges’ commission dates defined the strata. In order to correctly interpret results for the sample of all judges, when reported, these data were weighted to reflect the fact that different sampling fractions were used for
the different strata. Results reported separately by strata do not require weighting.
Appendix B
Questionnaire

The questionnaire sent to judges commissioned before January 1, 1992 is reproduced below. Questions 1.2 and 2.2 differed in the version sent to judges commissioned on or after that date. The differences are indicated by bracketed text. Bold and underlined text was in that format in the original questionnaires.

**RULE 11 SURVEY**

PURPOSE AND INSTRUCTIONS. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (Rule 11) provides sanctions for presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper without reasonable support in fact or law or for an improper purpose, such as to cause unnecessary cost or delay. This questionnaire seeks information from you about how Rule 11 is working and also seeks your evaluation of several issues concerning Rule 11 and current Congressional proposals to amend that rule. Rule 11 provides that sanctions for violations are within the judge’s discretion; that a party should have a period of time, a “safe harbor,” within which to withdraw or correct a filing alleged to violate Rule 11; and that Rule 11’s primary purpose is to deter future violations and not necessarily to compensate the opposing party for losses, including attorney fees.

Proposed legislation (HR 4571, adopted by the House of Representatives on September 14, 2004) would amend Rule 11 to provide that sanctions for violations be mandatory, repeal the safe harbor, and require courts to order compensation to a party for attorney fees incurred as a direct result of a Rule 11 violation. The proposed legislation would reverse three changes made by Rule 11 amendments adopted in 1993, namely to delete mandatory sanctions, to deemphasize attorney fee awards, and to create a safe harbor. The proposed legislation also requires a district court to suspend an attorney’s license to practice in that district for one year if the attorney has violated Rule 11 three or more times in that district.

This questionnaire is about the effects of Rule 11 in cases in which the plaintiff is represented by counsel. Do not include in your evaluation of Rule 11 the effects it may or may not have had on cases in which the plaintiff is proceeding pro se.

Please respond to the questions on the basis of your own experience as a judge with cases on your docket, not the experiences of other judges or attorneys.

For convenience, throughout this questionnaire we refer to pleadings, written motions, and other papers that do not conform to the requirements of Rule 11 as groundless litigation.

Please respond by marking the box next to your answer.
1. FREQUENCY OF GROUNDLESS LITIGATION

1.1 Is there a problem with groundless litigation in federal civil cases on your docket? Please mark one.
   
a) There is no problem.
b) There is a very small problem.
c) There is a small problem.
d) There is a moderate problem.
e) There is a large problem.
f) There is a very large problem.
g) I can't say.

1.2 Is the current problem (if any) with groundless litigation in civil cases on your docket smaller, about the same as, or larger than it was before Rule 11 was amended in 1993? [Is the current problem (if any) with groundless litigation in civil cases on your docket smaller, about the same as, or larger than it was during your first year as a federal district judge?] Please mark one.
   
a) There has never been a problem.
b) The problem is much smaller now than it was then.
c) The problem is slightly smaller now than it was then.
d) The problem is the same now as it was then.
e) The problem is slightly larger now than it was then.
f) The problem is much larger now than it was then.
g) I can't say.

2. THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISION. Rule 11 provides that a motion for sanctions shall not be filed with the court until 21 days after a copy is served on the opposing party. This provision creates a "safe harbor" by specifying that a party will not be subjected to sanctions on the basis of another party's motion unless, after receiving the motion, the party fails to withdraw or correct the challenged filing. Proposed legislation would eliminate the "safe harbor" provision.

Proponents of the safe harbor provision argue that it leads to the efficient resolution of both the Rule 11 issues and the underlying legal and factual issues with less court involvement; gives incentives to parties to withdraw or abandon questionable positions; decreases the number of sanctions motions that are filed for inappropriate reasons; and provides that abuses of the "safe harbor" can be dealt with by sua sponte sanctions. Opponents of the "safe harbor" provision argue that it allows filing of groundless papers without penalty and denies compensation to parties who have been subjected to groundless filings.
2.1 Based on your experience and your assessment of what would be fairest to all parties, do you oppose or support Rule 11’s "safe harbor" provision? Please mark one.

a) I strongly support Rule 11’s safe harbor provision.
b) I moderately support Rule 11’s safe harbor provision.
c) I moderately oppose Rule 11’s safe harbor provision.
d) I strongly oppose Rule 11’s safe harbor provision.
e) I find it difficult to choose because the pros and cons of the safe harbor provision are about equally balanced.
f) I can’t say.

2.2 How has the safe harbor provision affected the amount of Rule 11 activity on your docket since it went into effect in 1993? [Since your first year as a federal district judge what, if any, changes have you observed in the amount of Rule 11 activity on your docket?] Please mark one.

a) Rule 11 activity has increased substantially 
b) Rule 11 activity has increased slightly 
c) Rule 11 activity has remained about the same 
d) Rule 11 activity has decreased slightly 
e) Rule 11 activity has decreased substantially 
f) I can’t say

3. RULE 11 SANCTIONS. Rule 11 provides that the court "may" impose a sanction when the rule has been violated, leaving the matter to the court’s discretion. Rule 11 also provides that the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter repetition of the offending conduct, rather than to compensate the parties injured by that conduct; that monetary sanctions, if imposed, should ordinarily be paid into court; and that awards of compensation to the injured party should be made only when necessary for effective deterrence.

Proposed legislation would alter these standards and require that a sanction be imposed for every violation. Proposed legislation would also provide that a purpose of sanctions is to compensate the injured party as well as to deter similar conduct and would require that any sanction be sufficient to compensate the injured party for the reasonable expenses and attorney fees that an injured party incurred as a direct result of a Rule 11 violation.

Please indicate for each of the three questions below what you think would be, on balance, the fairest form of Rule 11 for the types of cases you encounter on your docket.

3.1 Should the court be required to impose a monetary or nonmonetary sanction when a violation is found? Please mark one.

a) Yes 
b) No 
c) I can’t say.
3.2 When a sanction is imposed, should it be mandatory that the sanction include an award of attorney fees sufficient to compensate the injured party? Please mark one.
   a) Yes, an award of attorney fees should be mandatory if a sanction is imposed.
   b) No, an award of attorney fees should not be mandatory.
   c) I can't say.

3.3 What should the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions be? Please mark one.
   a) deterrence (and compensation if warranted for effective deterrence)
   b) compensation only
   c) both compensation and deterrence
   d) other (please specify in the answer space for question 8)

4. THREE STRIKES PROVISION. Proposed legislation would require a federal district court, after it has determined that an attorney violated Rule 11, to “determine the number of times that attorney has violated [Rule 11] in that Federal district court during that attorney’s career. If an attorney has violated Rule 11 three or more times, the court must suspend that attorney’s license to practice in that court for a period of one year.”

4.1 In your experience as a district judge, have you encountered an attorney who has violated Rule 11 three or more times in your district? Please mark one:
   a) Yes
   b) No
   c) I can’t say

4.2 In your district, how much effort would be required to obtain information about the number of prior Rule 11 violations committed by an attorney during his or her career? Mark all that apply.
   a) Obtaining such information would require little or no additional effort
   b) Obtaining such information would require examining prior docket records for past violations
   c) Obtaining such information would require creating a new database for Rule 11 violations
   d) Obtaining such information would require an affidavit or declaration from each attorney
   e) Obtaining such information would require other court action (specify) ________________
   f) I can’t say
4.3 Which of the following statements best captures your expectations regarding the impact of the proposal in deterring groundless litigation in comparison to the cost of implementing the proposal in your district. In assessing the value of the proposal consider the effectiveness of existing procedures in your district for disciplining lawyers found to have engaged in misconduct of the type forbidden by Rule 11. Please mark one:

a) The value of the deterrent effect would greatly exceed its cost  
b) The value of the deterrent effect would somewhat exceed its cost  
c) The value of the deterrent effect would about equal its cost  
d) The cost of implementing the proposal would somewhat exceed the value of the deterrent effect.  
e) The cost of implementing the proposal would greatly exceed the value of the deterrent effect.  
f) I can’t say

5. APPLICATION TO DISCOVERY. Rule 11 does not apply to discovery-related activity because Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(g) and 37 establish standards and sanctions that apply to discovery disclosures, requests, responses, objections, and motions. Proposed legislation would amend Rule 11 to make it applicable to discovery-related activity.

Proponents of that legislative proposal argue that including discovery under Rule 11 or under Rule 11 together with Rules 26(g) and 37 is more effective in deterring groundless discovery-related activity than Rules 26(g) and 37 alone. Opponents of that proposal support the current version of Rule 11 and argue that discovery should not be covered by Rule 11 because the sanctions provisions of Rules 26(g) and 37 are stronger and are specifically designed for the discovery process. Based on your experience, which of the following options do you believe would be best? Please mark one.

a) Sanctions provisions related to discovery contained only in Rules 26(g) and 37 (the current rule).  
b) Sanctions provisions related to discovery contained in both Rules 26(g) and 37 and Rule 11.  
c) Sanctions provisions related to discovery consolidated in Rule 11 and eliminated from Rules 26(g) and 37.  
d) There is no significant difference among the three options.  
e) I can’t say.
6. RULE 11 AND OTHER METHODS OF CONTROLLING GROUNDLESS LITIGATION. Federal statutes, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and inherent judicial authority provide judges with a number of opportunities and methods for deterring or minimizing the harmful effects of groundless claims, defenses, or legal arguments (e.g., informal admonitions, Rule 16 and Rule 26(f) conferences, 28 U.S.C. Section 1927, prompt dismissal of groundless claims, summary judgment). Based on your view of how effective or ineffective those other methods are, how, if at all, should Rule 11 be modified? Please mark one.

a) Rule 11 is needed, but it should be modified to increase its effectiveness in deterring groundless filings (even at the expense of deterring some meritorious filings).
b) Rule 11 is needed, and it is just right as it now stands.
c) Rule 11 is needed, but it should be modified to reduce the risk of deterring meritorious filings (even at the expense of failing to deter some groundless filings).
d) Rule 11 is not needed.
e) I can’t say.

7. PREFERENCE FOR CURRENT OR PAST VERSIONS OF RULE 11 OR PROPOSED LEGISLATION.

The version of Rule 11 in effect from 1983 to 1993 required that the court shall impose an appropriate sanction on a party or attorney who signed a pleading, motion or other paper in violation of Rule 11 standards. The appropriate sanction may, but need not, have included an order to pay the opposing party’s reasonable attorney fees.

Rule 11 now provides that a court may impose an appropriate sanction on a party or attorney who signed a pleading, motion or other paper in violation of Rule 11 standards. The appropriate sanction may, but need not, include an order to pay the opposing party’s reasonable attorney fees. Rule 11 also provides a safe harbor that permits withdrawal without penalty of a filing that allegedly violates Rule 11, as long as the withdrawal takes place within 21 days of notice that another party intends to file a motion for Rule 11 sanctions.

Proposed legislation would repeal the safe harbor provision in Rule 11 and require that the court shall impose an appropriate sanction on a party or attorney who signed a pleading, motion or other paper in violation of Rule 11 standards. The proposed legislation would also require that the appropriate sanction be sufficient to compensate the parties injured by the conduct, including reasonable expenses and attorney fees. Which of the above approaches would you prefer to use in dealing with groundless litigation? Please mark one.

a) I prefer the current Rule 11
b) I prefer the 1983-1993 version of Rule 11
c) I prefer the proposed legislation
d) I can’t say

8. Please use the space provided for any additional comments or suggestions you may have about issues raised in this questionnaire or about Rule 11 in general.
The Federal Judicial Center

Board
The Chief Justice of the United States, Chair
Magistrate Judge Robert B. Collings, U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
Judge Bernice B. Donald, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee
Judge Terence T. Evans, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Chief Judge Robert F. Hershner, Jr., U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Georgia
Judge Pierre N. Leval, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Judge James A. Parker, U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico
Judge Sarah S. Vance, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts

Director
Judge Barbara J. Rothstein

Deputy Director
Russell R. Wheeler

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By statute, the Chief Justice of the United States chairs the Center’s Board, which also includes the director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and seven judges elected by the Judicial Conference.

The organization of the Center reflects its primary statutory mandates. The Education Division plans and produces education and training programs for judges and court staff, including satellite broadcasts, video programs, publications, curriculum packages for in-court training, and Web-based programs and resources. The Research Division examines and evaluates current and alternative federal court practices and policies. This research assists Judicial Conference committees, who request most Center research, in developing policy recommendations. The Center’s research also contributes substantially to its educational programs. The two divisions work closely with two units of the Director’s Office—the Systems Innovations & Development Office and Communications Policy & Design Office—in using print, broadcast, and on-line media to deliver education and training and to disseminate the results of Center research. The Federal Judicial History Office helps courts and others study and preserve federal judicial history. The International Judicial Relations Office provides information to judicial and legal officials from foreign countries and assesses how to inform federal judicial personnel of developments in international law and other court systems that may affect their work.