



**Testimony of G. Douglas Jones**  
**Before the Subcommittees on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security**  
**and on**  
**the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties**  
**Committee on the Judiciary**  
**U.S. House of Representatives**  
**June 12, 2007**

**Justice for Four Little Girls:**  
**The Bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church Cases**

On September 15, 1963, four young African-American girls, Denise McNair, Addie Mae Collins, Cynthia Wesley and Carol Robertson, died from a bomb blast that ripped into the ladies lounge of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in Birmingham. The shockwave created by this senseless tragedy was felt around the world and proved to be a pivotal point in the struggle for civil rights in this country. On May 1, 2001, a jury in Birmingham convicted Thomas Edwin Blanton, Jr. of murder for his role in the bombing. A year later, on May 22, 2002, another Birmingham jury convicted Bobby Frank Cherry, the last surviving suspect in the crime. During the decades between these historic events, Alabama experienced a phenomenal shifting of attitudes which made the prosecutions possible. Yet, the passage of time also created numerous legal obstacles. Some of the strategies used in this overcoming these obstacles were particular to this unique case. Most, however, were the tools and techniques we as trial lawyers use throughout our careers.

Much can be written and said about the case of *State of Alabama v. Thomas Edwin Blanton, Jr.* and the case of *State of Alabama v. Bobby Frank Cherry*. What follows is only a brief answer to a couple of frequently asked questions and a summary of how the cases came together for trial.

**"WHY WAS THE CASE RE-OPENED AFTER SO MANY YEARS?"**

In the spring of 1974, I had the privilege of spending the better part of an afternoon with the late U.S. Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. It was the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision and Justice Douglas was the Law Day Speaker for the University of Alabama School of Law. Although an undergraduate at the time, Justice Douglas and I were in the same college fraternity and I had arranged for the Court's senior justice to come by my fraternity house for a reception following her activities at the law school. Aspiring to head to law school following graduation, I asked him what advice he would give a law student. He asked me what I wanted to do with my law degree and I replied that I wanted to be a trial lawyer. His advice, "go to court as often as you can. Learn to be a trial lawyer by observing trial lawyers."

Three years later I took Justice Douglas' advice to somewhat of an extreme. As a second year law student at Cumberland School of Law, I decided I could get more out of watching one of the state's most historic trials than attending some of my classes. As much as I felt I could get away with that week in November, 1977, I skipped classes to hang out in the balcony of Judge Wallace Gibson's courtroom in the Jefferson County Courthouse to watch then Attorney General Bill Baxley prosecute Robert Chambliss for the September, 1963 bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church and the murder of Denise McNair. It was clear from the testimony that Chambliss did not act alone. But as I gave my undivided attention to Baxley's powerful closing argument, I never in my wildest imagination dreamed that one day this case and my legal career would come full circle, giving me the opportunity, some 24 years later to prosecute the two remaining suspects for a crime that many say changed the course of history. It has been, to say the least, a remarkable journey.

In a world where two years is a long time to get your case on the trial docket, this case was facing trial almost forty years after the crime. The FBI had done an extensive investigation following the bombing, but the case was closed without any prosecutions in 1968. By all indications, the case was closed by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover without consulting the attorneys at the Justice Department. Despite Hoover's posthumous reputation, it appears Hoover was genuinely concerned about the ability to obtain a conviction. Although he was probably right, any decision about a prosecution should have been made by a prosecutor, not an investigator.

In 1971, newly elected Attorney General Bill Baxley re-opened the case and made it one of, if the not the highest, priorities of his office. Most, but not all, materials were given to Baxley for the 1977 prosecution of Robert "Dynamite Bob" Chambliss, who was convicted of the first degree murder of Denise McNair. It was clear from the evidence, however, that Chambliss did not act alone. Unfortunately, when Baxley left office in 1978, the investigation was once again shelved, with only some sporadic review over the next 20 years. But by 1996, a couple things occurred that breathed new life into what otherwise appeared to be a dead issue.

First, the newly installed special agent in charge of the Birmingham FBI office began to reach out to the

African-American community to mend fences that had broken down over the highly publicized corruption investigation into Birmingham City Hall. One of the concerns being expressed by black leaders was why the 16th Street church bombing case had not been re-examined. At about the same time, the conviction of Byron de la Beckwith for the 1963 murder of civil rights activist Medgar Evers proved that a prosecution of these forgotten cases can be successful with a new generation of southern jurors. The time seemed right for another look at the church bombing case that had remained an open wound for Birmingham.

#### **"HOW AND WHERE DO YOU BEGIN WITH A CASE THAT OLD"**

All of the old investigative files remained at the Birmingham office of the FBI. Special Agent Bill Fleming was assigned the task of compiling the file and beginning the painstaking task of review. He was joined by Birmingham Police Detective Ben Herren, who was assigned to work the case full time. Ben would later retire and finish the case as an FBI Research Analyst.

Slowly and methodically the agents began the painstaking process of sifting through thousands of pages of interviews of witnesses and informants.

Once the files had been reviewed and the agents felt that they had a handle on the facts, it was time to begin interviewing witnesses. Old witnesses from the earlier investigation, who were still alive, as well as recent acquaintances and family members of Chambliss, Cherry, Blanton and others were identified for questioning. But before the FBI would take to the streets, and thereby expose the fact that the case was being re-examined, what proved to be a critical decision was made concerning the first interview to be conducted.

By all indication, Bobby Frank Cherry was a cocky Klan member in the 60's whose name kept coming up whenever there was trouble. He had been interviewed a dozen times or more in the 60's, each time denying any involvement in the crime, but each time giving the impression that he wanted to brag about his involvement. Cherry was a talker and if there was anyone who might say something to crack the case it was likely him. Interviewing him first was what turned out to be the first of many strategic moves that paid off.

In the summer of 1997, Ben Herren and Bob Eddy, who had been Baxley's investigator in the 70's, interviewed Cherry in Texas for about two hours. Although now almost 70 years old, Cherry was as cocky and defiant as ever. His two hour interview provided some helpful information, but it was his post interview press conference that really jump started the case. Although nothing had been publicized about the case being re-opened, Cherry decided to call a press conference to proclaim his innocence and to denounce the agents for continuing to hound him. When he did, the phones at the FBI began ringing: Cherry's granddaughter called to say she had overheard her grandfather admit to blowing up the church and that everyone in the family knew the story; a co-worker from his Texas carpet cleaning days called to say Cherry had admitted his involvement to him back in the early 80's; and a man who was a friend of Cherry's oldest son and only 11 years old at the time of the bombing called to say that in the days before the bombing he had been at the Cherry house and overheard Cherry and three other men talking about a bomb and the 16th Street Baptist Church. The Cherry interview provided the breaks that were needed to move the investigation forward; to hopefully bring closure to the case that had been so intensely investigated by the FBI and continued by Baxley.

#### **"FEDERAL V. STATE"**

Shortly after the Cherry interview and press conference I was sworn in as United States Attorney for the Northern District of Alabama September 8, 1997. What I found with this file was that while the new witnesses had sparked some hope, there was very little else that was encouraging. There was no forensic evidence from the scene, no DNA and no residue of explosive material. There were no eyewitnesses, or at least none that had come forward. There were no co-conspirators who had decided to get this off their chest before they pass from this life into the next. Over the years many potential witnesses, and suspects, had died and many others were elderly and frail. What we did have was a series of circumstances, including many of the prior statements of Blanton and Cherry, that clearly pointed to the guilt of these two men.

We assembled a team to begin the next phase of the investigation that would include having witnesses appear before a federal grand jury. Robert Posey, a former state Assistant District Attorney and a 10 year veteran of the U.S. Attorney's office, was assigned to assist. Jeff Wallace, one of the most seasoned prosecutors in the Jefferson County DA's office came on board. Following the Blanton trial, Assistant U. S. Attorney Don Cochran, who had also been a former state assistant DA, was added to assist in the Cherry trial. It was essential that we have both state and federal prosecutors looking at this case because there was no way to tell which forum would be chosen should we seek indictments.

Initially, all investigation was conducted out of the U.S. Attorney's office and the federal grand jury. Grand Jury subpoenas from a federal grand jury had a much larger reach for the many witnesses from out of state. There were also more resources out of the Department of Justice that we could draw on for witness expenses.

Federal jurisdiction, however, hung by a thread. The statute of limitations for all civil rights violations had long since run. However, under 18 U.S.C. 841, et. seq, as it was written in 1963, there was no statute of limitation when a death resulted from the offense of interstate transportation of explosives. The problem

for us was that with no forensic evidence we did not know exactly what explosives were used, much less where they came from. Fleming and Herren chased leads all over the country, particularly about dynamite coming out of Atlanta and Kentucky, but to no avail. In the end, there was no proof of any interstate transportation of explosives leaving a state murder charge in Jefferson County as our only option.

In May of 2000, with the express approval of both U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno and Alabama Attorney General Bill Pryor, we began presenting our case to a state grand jury. Three days later the Grand Jury indicted Tommy Blanton and Bobby Frank Cherry for the murder of the four young girls who died in the bomb blast of the 16th Street Baptist Church.

#### **“SURVIVING THE MOTION TO DISMISS”**

Defense lawyers for both defendants filed motions to dismiss the indictments, citing the age of the case and the loss of witnesses as evidence that their clients would be denied a fair trial if forced to defend themselves on a 38 year old murder charge. The law in Alabama, however, is difficult for a defendant to be successful in this type of motion. The defendant must show not just a delay, but an intentional delay designed to gain a tactical advantage and that the delay caused actual substantial prejudice to the conduct of his defense. Defendants failed on both counts. In fact, I believe that the State was more prejudiced by the delay than the defendants. For instance, a witness visiting from Detroit identified Tommy Blanton's car as the car parked behind the church at 2:00 a.m. on the morning of the bombing. Robert Chambliss and two other unidentified white men were in the car. This witness testified against Chambliss, but died in 1985, thereby losing forever critical testimony.

#### **“SURVIVING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE KITCHEN TAPE”**

In piecing together the chronology of events leading up to the bombing on Sunday morning, there were a series of meetings at the Modern Sign Shop, a local gathering spot for the Klan and anti-integration crowd, and at the Cahaba River Bridge, where Chambliss and Blanton were recruiting others to form a new Klan klavern. Blanton and his girlfriend, Jean, told agents that Blanton broke his date with Jean on Friday night before the bombing to make signs at the sign shop. Cherry, after initially stating he was at home that Friday night, admitted that he was also at the sign shop and that Blanton and Chambliss were both there. The significance of these interviews, given in the early stages of the investigation in 1963, was not realized until January, 2000, when Ben Herren was reviewing tape recordings prior to releasing them to the defense.

The bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church was the first in the civil rights era that had resulted in deaths. The tragedy energized the FBI to find the murders and the to prevent further violence. While scores of agents hit the streets interviewing witnesses and working informants, FBI Director Hoover and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy personally approved the use of wiretaps and electronic “bugs” on the telephones and at the homes of numerous suspects. While reviewing one of those tapes, made by a “bug” under the kitchen sink in Blanton's apartment, Ben Herren made a remarkable discovery.

It was June of 1964. Tommy Blanton had married Jean and, in the presence of an unknown third person, they were discussing the Friday night broken date and their FBI interviews. Captured on tape was the following conversation, which proved to be the critical piece of evidence in this case:

JEAN:

Well, you never bothered to tell me what you went to the river for Tommy.

TOMMY:

What did you tell them I did?

JEAN:

You didn't even.

TOMMY:

What did you tell them I did at the river? What did they ask you I did at the river?

JEAN:

They asked me what you went for and I told them I didn't know.

TOMMY:

They were interested in that meeting that I went to. They knew I went to the meeting.

JEAN:

What meeting?

TOMMY:

To the Big One.

JEAN:

What Big One?

TOMMY:

The meeting where we planned the bomb.

JEAN:

Tommy, what meeting are you talking about now?

TOMMY:

We had that meeting to make the bomb.

JEAN:

I know that.

TOMMY:

I think I'll wear this sh-I'm going to wear this shirt.

JEAN:

It's what you were doing that Friday night when you stood me up.

TOMMY:

(UI) Oh, we were making the bomb.

JEAN:

Modern Sign Company.

TOMMY:

Yeah

Naturally, Blanton's defense team filed a Motion to Suppress, claiming a violation of the Forth Amendment. The microphone had, in fact, been placed in the Blanton apartment under orders from FBI headquarters, but without any court order or judicial review. What our research indicated, however, was that exceptions to the "exclusionary rule" provided a window of opportunity for the admission of this critical evidence.

To begin with, in 1963, there were no provisions for court approved electronic surveillance as there are now. A search warrant was not available because the items to be seized, conversations, could not be particularly described in an affidavit. The executive branch of government could, however, utilize electronic surveillance for national security purposes. Although one could question how a local KKK member could involve national security, we cleared that hurdle by reminding the court of the climate of the time: the deaths cause by the blast and the unrest in the community, concerns over Communist influence on both sides of the civil rights struggle, the common practice of federalizing national guard troops to keep order and the assassination of President Kennedy that occurred just 2 months after the bombing. Moreover, determining what was or was not national security was exclusively an executive branch function. The evidentiary problem for us was that the law at the time only permitted electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes. Use as evidence in a trial was prohibited.

The law involving the use of electronic surveillance has been altered considerably since 1963. In 1968 Congress passed a wiretapping and electronic surveillance law which requires all law enforcement, state or federal, to get court approval before such investigative tools can be used in criminal investigations and trials. The statute also provides for the exclusion of evidence if a court order is not obtained or the law not followed. See 18 U.S.C. 2510, et. seq. The exclusionary rule for "bugs" that exists by statute is important when considering the exclusionary rule developed by caselaw. Over the years, the Supreme Court has chipped away at the once rigid, absolute rule of exclusion of any illegally seized evidence. Today there are exceptions for, among other things, good faith and inevitable discovery. Today's Supreme Court has held on more than one occasion that the exclusionary rule is not one of punishment of the offending officer in a particular case, but one of deterrence for future cases and that the value of the truth seeking process must be weighed against the value of deterrence. In this case, when there exists an legislative statute that completely governs the use of electronic "bugs" there is no deterrent value to excluding evidence based on conduct that occurred long before the statute went into effect. When weighed against the truth seeking process, as was obvious by the content of the tape, it seemed clear that the suppression motion should be denied. Judge Garrett agreed and our jury was able to hear an admission out of Blanton's own mouth.

Interestingly, on appeal, Attorney General Pryor and his staff developed an even stronger argument. Overlooked in our efforts during the suppression hearing was a document from the FBI that indicated that the microphone had been placed "without trespass." At trial, Ralph Butler, the FBI tech who installed the mike testified that when the wall was torn out from the apartment that the FBI rented next to Blanton, they discovered a small hole in Blanton's wall. The microphone was then place on the inside of the wall, not intruding into the Blanton residence. The evidence is critical to a review of the law that existed at the time in that a "bug" placed without any trespass was admissible under the 1928 case of *Olmstead vs. United States*, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The appeal was argued before the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on May 20, 2003.

#### **"SELECTING THE JURY: THE USE OF JURY CONSULTANTS"**

Jury selection is always critical, but in these cases there seemed to be so many more issues that permeated the case that could influence a juror: the age of the defendants, the age of the case, the historical significance of the case, the racial overtones, the life experiences of each juror living in the South, then and now. To assist in jury selection, we brought in two highly regarded consulting firms who were experts in the process. Andy Sheldon, of Sheldon & Associates in Atlanta, had assisted the prosecution in two other high profile civil rights cases in Mississippi, including the Medgar Evers murder case. Steve Patterson and Norma Silverstein, with Vinson & Dimitri of Los Angeles, had assisted in a number of high profile and juror sensitive cases, such as the McVeigh case and former Louisiana governor Edwin Edwards. Together they were a powerful and insightful team.

The first step was to conduct a focus group where pieces of the case were presented to a panel of randomly chosen citizens. There were two separate groups, moderated by Andy and Norma, in more of a discussion fashion than a mock trial. They also discussed three separate cases, our bombing case, the Eric Rudolph case, and the O.J. case, in order to mask who was staffing the presentation. Various themes were tested, as were the strengths and weaknesses of key pieces of evidence. Through a one-way glass prosecutors and agents were also able to observe the dynamics between the various age, gender and

ethnic origins of the participants.

The second stage of the process was a community attitude survey, built on questions developed from the focus groups. This was an extensive telephone survey that went into great detail regarding potential jurors' opinions of the case, the impact of media coverage, race relations, and general themes. The results were broken down by age, gender, race and address. What we learned was that by in large the participants had heard of the case through the media, but had not formed a hard opinion about guilt or innocence; that neither the age of the case nor the age of the defendants were a concern if the evidence existed and that some of our strongest evidence was the inconsistent, and what we believed to be lies, statements of the defendants about their whereabouts that weekend. We were also encouraged that the attitudes on race and race relations clearly proved that Alabama has, in fact, come a long way from where we were as a state in the 1960's.

Judge James Garrett had already indicated that he would allow the use of a juror questionnaire when jury selection began. After dissecting the results of the focus groups and the survey, and after receiving input from the defense, a questionnaire consisting of 100 questions was proposed. The questionnaire dealt with just about everything from the routine questions about the jurors' backgrounds and knowledge of the witnesses, to more detailed information covering the books they read, the television shows they watch, the radio programs they listen to, their knowledge about the case and their opinions on race relations.

Because questions arose concerning Cherry's competency, the two cases were severed so that while Blanton proceeded to trial, Cherry was undergoing mental evaluations. Prior to the Blanton trial our consultants argued for a "mock trial" to test the various themes and defenses. I resisted for fear that in this age of commercialization of high profile cases we could not control the confidentiality of our evidence, which could jeopardize our venue in Birmingham. For the Blanton trial we waded into the jury selection process armed with a great deal of information, but no true test of our case. However, because the evidence in the two cases was considerably different, and even though Blanton had been convicted, the decision was made to test the Cherry evidence in a mock trial. Don Cochran, who had not participated in the Blanton case and was thus probably not as easily recognized by the participants, prosecuted the State's case. Assistant U.S. Attorney, Mike Rasmussen, presented the case for the defense. Both did an excellent job of presenting what turned out to be a pretty accurate rendition of the upcoming trial. The results of the mock trial were nothing short of dramatic. What we thought was a relatively thin case against Cherry turned out to be surprisingly compelling.

Trial lawyers have to be sensitive to the jurors and the jury selection process in order to be successful. What is hard to admit, however, is that we don't know everything about everyone on a jury panel. The use of consultants, with a fresh, but experienced, perspective can make all the difference.

#### **"CAPTURING THE JURY'S FOCUS: SETTING OUT A THEME IN BLACK AND WHITE"**

The themes of both trials took jurors on a journey back through history. It was a history that some of the jurors had lived, while others had only learned about it in school. Using black and white video footage and photographs, jurors were walked through the black and white world of 1960's Birmingham. The black and white images were a constant, albeit subtle, reminder throughout the trial of a once segregated Birmingham.

The journey started in 1957, when Rev. Fred Shuttlesworth attempted to enroll his children in the all-white Phillips High School. He was met by an angry mob of white men, about ten of whom proceeded to attack Rev. Shuttlesworth and his wife in front of the school. The scene was captured on 8mm film and is standard footage in most civil rights documentaries. Seeing that such attempt to integrate the Birmingham City Schools would not work, a lawsuit, based on the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, was filed in federal court. That case and its ultimate outcome would set the stage for many events to follow. But the footage of the mob beating Rev. Shuttlesworth also had additional importance in the Cherry case.

To the courtroom spectator, Bobby Frank Cherry appeared to be anybody's grandfather: a 71 year old man more comfortable wearing overalls in the garden than wearing a suit sitting in a courtroom. But witnesses identified Cherry in the thick of the mob attacking Rev. Shuttlesworth, even using what appeared to be brass knuckles. Thus, from opening arguments jurors were shown what Bobby Frank Cherry was like as a 33 year old man in 1963: a member of the KKK, who resorted to violence to stop integration.

Jurors also learned, through photographs and testimony, that 1963 and the months leading up to the bombing were pivotal times for the City of Birmingham. That spring the famous "children's marches" were organized by Dr. King and others to integrate the public facilities of downtown Birmingham. The Sixteenth Street Baptist Church had already become a focal point for the civil rights movement in Birmingham, but now it was even more prominent with the marchers gathering in the sanctuary before facing Bull Connor's forces just outside. When a settlement was reached to begin the process of integrating Birmingham, Cherry and Blanton saw the first real cracks in their segregated way of life.

As the civil rights movement gathered steam with the August, 1963 "March on Washington," the case to integrate Birmingham Schools was coming to a close. Six years after the case began, the final orders were issued that forced Birmingham to accept African-American students. On September 10, 1963, just five days before the bombing, two young men enrolled at Graymont Elementary School and for the first time, Birmingham had an integrated school system. Blanton and Cherry saw their segregated way of life erode even further. It was, I believe, no coincidence that five days after the schools were finally integrated a

bomb was placed under the steps of a prominent player in the civil rights movement, the 16th Street Baptist Church, on a Sunday morning where other prominent players in the movement, the youth, were preparing for the first of the planned monthly youth worship services.

#### **THE CASE AGAINST BLANTON AND CHERRY**

The evidence introduced in the Blanton trial and the Cherry trial obviously had many similarities. Testimony from the victims' families and from those on the scene was essentially the same in both trials, but the evidence that pointed to the guilt of each defendant was considerably different.

The Blanton jury heard evidence of the defendant's hatred for blacks and his membership in the Klan. Tapes were played of conversations between Blanton and an informant in which Blanton joked about "bombing my next church." There was testimony by James Lay who identified Blanton and Chambliss as the men he saw standing on the side of the church at one o'clock in the morning two weeks prior to the bombing. The man identified as Blanton was holding some type of satchel and standing next to the steps where the bomb was eventually placed. Agents who had interviewed Blanton following the bombing testified about Blanton's inconsistent statements concerning his whereabouts the weekend of the bombing. Finally, the jury heard Blanton himself, on tape, admitting to being part of meetings where the bomb was planned and made.

With Cherry, the witnesses who came forward all gave compelling testimony about Cherry's admissions to them. In addition, an ex-wife who had also called the FBI when she read about the case in Montana, testified about Cherry's admissions to her. Like Blanton, Cherry also gave many conflicting statements about his whereabouts the night before the bombing. His latest version of where he had been on Saturday night was that he was home early because his wife was dying with cancer and he always watched live studio wrestling at 10 p.m. We introduced medical records proving that Mrs. Cherry was not diagnosed with cancer until 1965, two years after the bombing, and that there was no Saturday night wrestling on TV at the time. Most significantly, Cherry admitted to being at the Modern Sign Shop with Blanton and Chambliss on the Friday night before the bombing, the same Friday night and location where Blanton said "we" had planned and made the bomb.

In both trials, we concluded the prosecution's case on an emotional high note. People sometimes forget that there were actually five little girls in the ladies lounge that morning. Our last witness was Sarah Collins Rudolph, the sister of Addie Mae. She testified about walking to church that morning with her sisters and going into the basement and the ladies lounge with Addie. As she went to wash her hands she turned around and saw Addie tying the sash of Denise's new dress. The explosion then trapped her beneath rubble, unable to move and unable to see because of injuries to her eyes. I asked her what happened after the explosion? "I called out for my sister." What did you say? "I called out Addie, Addie, Addie," her words echoing in a silent courtroom much as they would have 38 years earlier. "Did she answer you back?" I asked. "No." she said softly. Did you ever see her alive again? "No" she said, wiping back the tears. With that, the State of Alabama rested.

It took the jury only 2 and one-half hours to find Tommy Blanton guilty on four counts of first degree murder. It took the Cherry jury about six hours to reach the same result. Both were immediately sentenced to life in prison and were whisked out of the courtroom by Sheriff's deputies.

#### **"THE AFTERMATH"**

It is impossible to express the emotion felt by the prosecution team and the satisfaction gained from being a part of these cases. I have said many times that I wish every lawyer, at least once in their career, could work on a case that meant so much to so many. There are many things that can come from such a case, but only two I would like to highlight here.

First, I am always asked about threats or hate mail that we received throughout the course of this investigation. I guess it is assumed that even today the hatred of the past remains with us. I am sure it does in some quarters. But the fact is that we received absolutely nothing in the way of the hate mail or threats. None. That is not to say there was not some criticism of the prosecution, but that is always expected in any high profile case. It seems to me though, that the complete lack of anonymous threats or hate mail speaks volumes about where we as a state have come since 1963.

Finally, as lawyers we have to remember that we are a service profession. Our job is to seek justice for our clients no matter what the obstacles or delay. Justice delayed does not have to mean justice denied. The odds are that you will never see a case that has such an impact on so many, but every case does have an impact on the client we represent, whether it is injured child, the defrauded consumer or the family of a victim. Each of these clients deserve as much attention and effort as Carol, Denise, Addie and Cynthia.