Testimony
of James M. Shannon
President
and CEO
NFPA
Before
the
House
Committee on the Judiciary
Anti-Trust
Task Force
US
House of Representatives
April 9, 2003
Mr. Chairman, ranking Member Conyers and Members of the Committee, I
am honored to appear before this Committee again. I am James M. Shannon and I am President and
Chief Executive Officer of NFPA (the National Fire Protection
Association). NFPA is an international
organization that develops voluntary consensus codes and standards that are
adopted by state and local jurisdictions throughout the
As a public official I sought to understand, improve, and enforce the
antitrust laws to further the goals of enhanced competition. The bill that I am here to support today, the
Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2003, will help standards
developers continue their important work on behalf of all of our citizens while
reaffirming the central role of our competition statutes in a free-market
economy.
Let me take a minute to describe NFPA to give you a sense of the
organizations that are covered by this proposal and why it is in the public
interest to adopt this legislation.
NFPA was founded over one hundred years ago and has as its mission the
protection of lives and property from fire and related hazards. This mission is accomplished principally
through the development of nearly 300 codes and standards in a consensus
process under rules sanctioned by the American National Standards
Institute. These codes include the
National Electrical Code, which is used in just about every jurisdiction in
Our rules require that standards be developed using procedures that
ensure due process, openness, fairness and the participation of all materially
affected interests. Our technical
committees that draft and update our codes are balanced to ensure that no
single group of interested persons can dominate the process. Decisions are reached by consensus after
consideration of all the technical arguments.
In our system, any party who disagrees with a decision may file an
appeal and receive a hearing before a standard or code is issued. The wide acceptance of NFPA codes and
standards and codes and standards of similar nonprofit organizations is
testament to the benefits provided by these activities.
What is unique about the
The legislation before you today is necessary because standards
development, by its nature, places competitors or potential competitors in a
position where they may carry their competition into a standards development
process. If one of these actors believes
that its position in the market has been unfairly hindered by a particular
standards decision, it may sue its competitor who has advocated that decision,
alleging violations of the antitrust laws and in many cases will sue the
standards development organization as well.
This happens even though the standards development organization is a
nonprofit organization with no profit or other motive to violate the antitrust
laws. Because of the complexity of the
antitrust laws and the continuing uncertainty of their potential application to
standards development organizations, the prospect is that standards developers
will continue to be named as pattern defendants in antitrust cases alleging
anticompetitive conduct of business competitors carried out in the standards
development context.
NFPA, for example, has been named in several antitrust suits that have
arisen in this way. It has never been
found liable for any antitrust violation.
These suits, however, are very costly and disruptive to defend even when
the court dismisses the standards development organization defendant, and,
merely the threat of substantial treble damages severely restrains the
operations of a nonprofit organization that develops codes and standards.
While I believe that a compelling case can be made for full antitrust
immunity for nonprofit standards development organizations, the relief we are
seeking today is far more moderate and similar to an approach adopted by this
committee when it wrote the 1984 National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) and
amended that act in 1993. In those
instances, this committee adopted an approach whereby procompetitive joint
venture activity could be predisclosed to the antitrust agencies. In return for such disclosure, the parties
receive not immunity but “detrebled” damages (actual damages), provided
that their subsequent conduct stays within the bounds of their disclosure to
the Department of Justice.
The NCRA has been a great success allowing cooperation to bring about
technical innovation without sacrificing the procompetitive protection of
antitrust law. With regard to the
R&D activities covered by that Act, a balanced approach of not granting
immunity but establishing a voluntary and transparent predisclosure process in
return for reduced liability was in the best interests of both innovation and
safeguarding competition. The same
approach for standards development will provide similar benefits for the
public.
The proposed legislation would simply amend the existing statute to
allow SDO’s to use the very same predisclosure system as now used for R&D
joint ventures and production joint ventures.
Thus, the bill would leave the statutory scheme in place and simply
include properly disclosed standards development activity as being eligible for
the protections established by the NCRA.
As in 1984 and again in 1993, the proposed bill would
ensure that the definition of “standards setting” would never include any of
the per se offenses, like price fixing, boycott or dividing territories. In order to qualify for this treatment the
SDO would have to follow the open, voluntary and non-exclusionary principles
embodied in the OMB circular. The
protections provided in the Act would apply only to activities that had been
disclosed in advance to the Department of Justice, and not to other activities
of the standards development organizations.
These changes in law would not mean that standards development
organizations could never be joined as a defendant in an antitrust suit
involving standards development activities.
These changes would mean that potential antitrust plaintiffs would be on
notice that, to the extent that a standards developing organization stayed
within the bounds of its pre-disclosure to the antitrust reviewing agency, it
would be subject only to actual, not treble damage. In addition, under the proposed legislation,
joinder of an SDO in an antitrust suit along with the actual business
competitors could no longer be done lightly.
As with the National Cooperative Research Act, this legislation provides
for court awarded costs and attorneys fees where an Act-compliant SDO is sued
unreasonably or in bad faith.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, in summary, the
Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2003, is an act that
alleviates what has become a significant problem for the nonprofit
organizations that develop the codes and standards that provide protection for
the health and safety of American workers and our whole citizenry. The procedures embodied in the Act have
proven to be very successful with regard to cooperation in research and
development as allowed in the National Cooperative Research Act. Just as with that Act this legislation will remove
a growing obstacle to activity that is clearly in the public interest while
leaving intact the important protection provided by strong antitrust laws.
Thank you.