STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR.

“COMPETITION IN COLLEGE ATHLETIC CONFERENCES AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF THE BOWL CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES”     

September 4, 2003

            The Committee on the Judiciary has exclusive jurisdiction over our nation’s antitrust laws. As Chairman of this Committee, I have made it a priority to periodically examine the state of competition in key markets in which the antitrust laws may be implicated. Today’s examination of the antitrust implications of college athletic conferences and the Bowl Championship Series in Division I-A college football reflects this commitment.

            The Supreme Court has held that intercollegiate athletic programs and associations are not immune from antitrust scrutiny. Intercollegiate athletic conferences are regional groupings of similarly-situated member institutions whose athletes compete against other conference members.

                        Membership in elite college conferences can mean the difference between an athletic program that is a financial burden on a member institution or one that generates millions of dollars in annual revenue.

            The jockeying and intrigue surrounding membership in these conferences is an increasingly common feature of modern college sports. The recent controversy surrounding the decision of the University of Miami and Virginia Tech to bolt the Big East Conference in favor of the Atlantic Coast Conference has reinforced concerns that college sports have become increasingly dominated by a number of elite conferences who place their financial interests ahead of their commitment to the principles of fairness and sportsmanship that have traditionally defined intercollegiate athletic competition. Donna Shalala, the President of the University of Miami has been called the “biggest player in college football” for triggering Miami’s decision to bolt the Big East earlier this year.

            In a recent interview, President Shalala indicated that she likes complex situations, and enjoys making difficult decisions under pressure. Notwithstanding this assertion, she declined my invitation to appear at today’s hearing on advice of counsel. However, because of her leadership role in fundamentally shifting the balance of conference power in college football, I believe her testimony is integral to better assess the issues we will address at today’s hearing. Consequently, I intend for the Committee to receive Donna Shalala’s testimony for today’s hearing within the next 60 days; whether she decides to submit it willingly or not.

            The current system that governs the Division I-A college football championship and other major post-season bowl match-ups has led some to allege a violation of the antitrust laws. College football generates hundreds of millions of dollars in annual revenue. Most of this income is derived from exclusive television broadcasting rights.

Profit generated by these football programs flows back to participating schools, producing a range of positive benefits.

            In addition to protecting the well-being of student athletes, the NCAA’s constitution requires it to set eligibility standards which advance “satisfactory standards of scholarship, sportsmanship, and amateurism” while preserving the fairness and integrity of college athletics. While the NCAA administers national championships in over 80 men’s and women’s intercollegiate sports, including Division I-AA college football, the post-season Division I-A college football championship is managed by the Bowl Championship Series (BCS).

             The BCS was established in 1997 to create a more objective basis for selecting national Division I-A college champions and other major bowl participants. The BCS consists of six athletic conferences: the Big Ten, the Big East, the Pacific Ten, the Southeastern Conference, the Atlantic Coast Conference, the Big 12; as well as independent Notre Dame. The BCS has an exclusive agreement with the Rose, Fiesta, Sugar and Orange Bowls.

            Under terms of this agreement, champions from each of these six conferences are guaranteed participation in one of the eight bowl slots, no matter their record, with two possible at-large berths available to other qualifying BCS and non-BCS teams. The national championship game is rotated among these bowls on an annual basis.

            While the BCS offers some improvement over the earlier Bowl Alliance, some have expressed concern that it has failed in its primary goal of creating a genuine Division I-A college championship. Others contend that the BCS creates a financial canyon between BCS and non-BCS schools. For example, during the 2002-2003 season, the BCS generated $109 million in revenue – only $5 million of which was distributed to non-BCS conferences.

            This disparity substantially affects the ability of non-BCS schools to recruit talented players and coaches and affects resources for academic and athletic programs.

            In July of this year, non-BCS schools established a coalition to ensure that their institutions receive greater opportunities to compete for the major bowl games that have been dominated by BCS members.

            Next week, several non-BCS schools will meet with BCS members and the NCAA in Chicago to explore ways to remedy perceived defects in the current Division I-A college football system.

            The purpose of today’s hearing is not to impose a solution that will satisfy all of the BCS and non-BCS schools, nor to abolish college athletic conferences. Rather, it is to examine the application of the antitrust laws to college athletics, and to help identify ways to ensure that in the realm of college sports, merit prevails over money, fundamental fairness trumps the fundamentals of good marketing, hard work triumphs over hard cash, and that the noble aspirations of amateur athletes do not yield to the cold reality of corporate and university profits.

            I yield to Ranking Member Conyers for his remarks.