UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

 

Hearing on H.R. 1115

“Class Action Fairness Act of 2003”

 

May 15, 2003

 

 

 

 

 

Testimony of Lawrence H. Mirel

 

Commissioner

District of Columbia Department of Insurance and Securities Regulation

 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, my name is Lawrence Mirel.  I am the Commissioner of Insurance and Securities for the District of Columbia.  The position I hold was originally created by Congress in 1901[1] as the Office of the Superintendent of Insurance for the District of Columbia and became part of the District’s “Home Rule” Government upon the passage of the Home Rule Act of 1973.[2] 

As you know, the business of insurance is regulated primarily by the states.[3]  Although the District of Columbia is not a state, I have the authority of a state insurance commissioner, and I am a full member of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).  My job is to enforce the insurance laws and the securities laws of the District of Columbia as enacted over the years by the Congress of the United States, as the District’s primary legislature,[4] and by the Council of the District of Columbia, with the approval of Congress, since that body was created in 1974.

Although I chair an NAIC working group looking into the issue of the impact of class action lawsuits on the regulatory authority of state insurance commissioners, I am speaking today solely in my capacity as insurance commissioner for the District of Columbia, and not on behalf of the NAIC.   The NAIC working group was established only recently and has just begun its work.

I want to thank the Committee for its consideration of H.R. 1115.  This is

very significant legislation and an important first step in curbing the abuses—“havoc” is not too strong a term—that certain kinds of class action lawsuits can visit on an orderly and well-regulated insurance system.  I do not think this legislation alone is sufficient to protect the public against the cost and dislocation of questionable class action litigation against insurers, but it will go a long way toward eliminating one of the most egregious aspects of the current system—the ability of plaintiffs’ lawyers to “forum shop.”   Currently plaintiffs’ lawyers can file their nationwide suits in the most favorable state or county court they can find. H.R. 1115 provides for the removal of most class action suits to federal District Courts, where appointed, tenured judges are likely to have a broader outlook on the issues at stake.

What H.R. 1115 does not address directly, however, is the larger issue of the impact of certain kinds of class action lawsuits on the statutory authority of elected or appointed state insurance regulators.  I would like to urge this Committee to consider, as part of this bill or as future legislation, an “exhaustion of administrative remedies” provision that would make clear that where there is a statutory regulator and an administrative remedy available for the abuse complained about, plaintiffs must show that they tried and failed to obtain relief from the regulator before they are allowed to file their complaint in court. 

As a state insurance commissioner, my primary function is to protect the public.  My colleagues and I see ourselves as consumer advocates, and the laws we administer give us that responsibility and authority.  Our expert staffs are knowledgeable about the stringent laws that govern the operation of the business of insurance, and about the complex financial rules that insurance companies must follow.  We receive and act upon consumer complaints against insurance companies.  We make sure that insurance contracts are fair, understandable, and in accordance with the law.  We go after companies that do not treat their customers properly, or that are engaged in fraud.  We have substantial enforcement tools at our disposal, including the authority to fine or even to close down insurance companies that misbehave, and to refer bad actors for criminal prosecution.

Insurance is a highly regulated business, and it needs to be.  There is no other business in which a customer pays up front for protection against some future event without knowing when, or sometimes even if, that event will occur.  As insurance commissioners, we must make sure that when a covered claim is made the company that took the consumer’s premium money is able and willing to pay that claim.  That means we must assure that the insurers we regulate are solvent and are prudent in how they manage and invest their capital and reserves.  We are also responsible for maintaining a fair and competitive insurance market that allows insurance companies to offer their customers good products at fair prices in accordance with clear and uniformly applied laws and regulations.  In other words, we have the statutory responsibility to balance all aspects of the insurance market to make sure that the public is well served.

Judges have very different responsibilities.  They are required to render justice as between the parties before them, without regard to the larger public or to issues of economic impact on persons or institutions that are not represented in the courtroom.   Where the matter at issue involves one or a small number of injured persons, a litigated solution can provide the fairest solution.  Where a claim is filed, however, on behalf of millions of persons, most of whom are unaware that they have been “injured,” and where the result of such litigation is to severely distort the insurance market, by increasing costs to policyholders and future policyholders in order to provide token benefits to those persons putatively injured, the system does not provide justice and does not serve the public interest.

Large-scale nationwide litigation against major insurance companies frequently circumvents or simply ignores state insurance laws and the role of state regulators.  Class action lawsuits against insurers can, and often do, directly impair our statutory authority to regulate the business of insurance in our jurisdictions.  Moreover these suits, whether successful or not, can have a major effect on the cost and even the availability of good insurance products to the public.  That is because they produce small, sometimes negligible, benefits to a large class of present or past policyholders—and, incidentally, huge legal fees to the lawyers who bring them—without regard to the impact on the insurance market as a whole and the cost to the insurance-buying public.

Consider the following examples:

§         In Texas, two of the state’s largest automobile insurance companies eventually decided to settle a $100 million class action lawsuit brought against them in 1996 over a long-standing, industry-wide practice of “rounding up” to the nearest dollar for auto insurance premiums.  Although the insurers’ premiums were calculated according to specific instructions from the Texas Department of Insurance, mounting legal expenses and negative publicity compelled the companies to settle for nearly $36 million.  Policyholders received refunds of about $5.50 each, while the lawyers took home almost $11 million.

§         More than 20 nationwide class action lawsuits are currently pending in New Mexico’s trial courts claiming that the nation’s largest life insurance companies are misleading policyholders by not disclosing the “annual percentage rate” of fees charged for processing installment payments of premiums.  In the District of Columbia, and in most if not all states, companies are allowed to charge small processing fees to customers who make “modal payments” on their annual premiums, so long as those charges are disclosed and are reasonable.  I would not permit companies selling in the District of Columbia to show these fees at an “annual percentage rate” because APRs imply that a loan was made, and there is no loan.  Modal payments are simply a convenience to customers who would rather not make lump-sum annual payments.    There has never been a complaint about such charges in the District of Columbia or any other jurisdiction, as far as I know.  Yet not only was the issue not raised with the New Mexico Insurance Commissioner before suit was filed, but when he tried to intervene in the case his petition was denied.

 

Facing billions of dollars in potential liability, as well as the threat of massive costs to defend themselves against these suits, insurance companies are under tremendous pressure to settle.  Once the first modal premium case was settled, with $7.5 million paid to the plaintiffs attorneys and nothing to class members, that pressure increased.  A second insurer agreed to a proposed settlement of $10 million, all of which was to go to the plaintiffs attorneys, but this proposal was withdrawn when Trial Lawyers for Public Justice—a plaintiffs’ lawyers trade association—denounced it as “outrageous” and “an abuse of both the class-action device and class members.”  The settlement was reinstated when the company agreed to give all class members $30 off their next purchase of an insurance policy from that company.  None of these modal payment cases has yet to be tried on the merits, but the damage already done to the insurance market is enormous.

§         A county court in southern Illinois rendered a billion-dollar judgment against the nation’s largest auto insurer that would provide miniscule payments to the six million members of the plaintiff class and huge fees for the lawyers who brought the suit.  The case has already caused the insurer to discontinue nationally its practice of replacing damaged auto parts with parts made by companies other than the original manufacturer of the automobile.   Now on appeal before the Illinois Supreme Court, the trial court decision has been strongly denounced by consumer advocates.   Clarence Ditlow, director of the Center for Auto Safety, a non-profit group founded by Ralph Nader and Consumers Union, has expressed fear that the decision will end the use of after-market parts, which are allowed in the District of Columbia and most states, and required by some.  Mr. Ditlow believes such a move could cost consumers an extra $2 billion to $3 billion a year for auto repairs, which of course means higher auto insurance premiums. 

§         A suit was brought in a Los Angeles municipal court alleging that a large national mutual insurance company based in Illinois is keeping too much money in reserves, thereby depriving its policyholders of the benefits of that money in the form of refunds or reduced premiums.  The suit ignores the fact that insurance commissioners, such as myself, require insurance companies to maintain adequate reserves, so that we can assure the public that their covered claims will be paid.  Who should decide what level of insurer reserves are “adequate” to protect the policyholders in the District of Columbia, the statutory Commissioner of Insurance for the District of Columbia or a lay jury in California?  The trial judge dismissed the suit, but it was ordered reinstated by an intermediate appellate court (in a 2 to 1 decision) and is now before the California Supreme Court.

§         A case was brought in Georgia against a major auto insurer claiming that the company is defrauding its insureds by paying only the cost of fixing a damaged car, and not the loss of value of the car because it has been damaged in an accident—even though the insurance contract, which has been approved by insurance commissioners of the various states where the company operates, specifically requires the company to fix the car, not to pay for any diminished value of the vehicle.

There are many more examples like these where multimillion dollar nationwide class action lawsuits are dreamed up by creative plaintiffs’ attorneys and filed against insurance companies that have large amounts of money in “reserve”—money that we insurance commissioners require companies to maintain in order to fulfill our statutory obligation to protect the public by making sure that insurers are able to pay legitimate claims.   The lawyers reap millions of dollars in fees from these cases, most of which are settled because of the high cost of defending against them and the fear that a loss in court could be crippling.  The large policy-owning public in whose names these suits are filed generally receive little if any benefit, but end up paying for them through higher insurance premiums as companies factor the risk and cost of this kind of litigation into their rate bases.

Let me be clear about my position.  I am not opposed to class action lawsuits per se, but rather to the abuse of such powerful and expensive litigation weapons.  Class action suits, when used properly, have an important role to play in our legal system.  But they should not be allowed to substitute for, or interfere with, administrative systems enacted into law by the various state legislatures and the U.S. Congress for protecting the public.  When suits are filed on behalf of persons residing in more than one state, those suits should be heard in Federal, not state, court so that we do not have a court in one state, applying the law of that state, setting policy for all the other states and the District of Columbia. 

The costs of large class action lawsuits are substantial, whether the cases are litigated or settled, and these costs will be paid by insurance consumers in the form of higher premiums.  When valid insurance company practices, reviewed and approved by state insurance regulators, are challenged in class action litigation, we must recognize that the result could be the discontinuation of products that are desired by the public and are beneficial to the public.  

I commend the House Judiciary Committee for holding hearings on this important topic, and for considering H.R. 1115, the “Class Action Fairness Act of 2003.”  It would be very helpful to those of us who regulate insurance at the state level to know that class actions brought in the name of our citizens in another state are going to be heard in Federal court, under Federal procedural rules, rather than the courts of that state. 

I want to conclude by expressing my hope that class action reform not be looked at as a partisan issue.  I was appointed to my present position by the Democratic Mayor of the District of Columbia, Anthony A. Williams.  In an earlier part of my career I worked here in the House of Representatives for former Representative Robert Kastenmeier of Wisconsin, a Democrat, and in the Senate for Democratic Senator George McGovern.  Before that I had been a special assistant to another Democrat, Abraham Ribicoff, when he was Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.  I do not think that concerns about possible abuses in the use of class action lawsuits should be limited to one party or one level of government.  We are all in agreement about the goal—protecting the public in the most effective and efficient way we can.

 

Thank you for inviting me to testify.  I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

 

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[1] 31 Stat. 1289, CH 854 § 645

[2] The District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, 87 Stat. 777, D.C. Official Code, § 1-201.01 et seq.

[3] McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1011 et seq.

[4] U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Section 8, clause 17.