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In most cases, of course, the district court simply appointed the Attorney General's choice as interim U.S. Attorney, revealing the fact that most judges recognized the importance of appointing an interim U.S. Attorney who enjoys the confidence of the Attorney General. In other words, the most important factor in the selection of past court-appointed interim U.S. Attorneys was the Attorney General's recommendation. By foreclosing the possibility of judicial appointment of interim U.S. Attorneys unacceptable to the Administration, last year's amendment to Section 546 appropriately eliminated a procedure that created unnecessary problems without any apparent benefit.

S. 214 would not merely reverse the 2006 amendment; it would exacerbate the problems experienced under the prior version of the statute by making judicial appointment the only means of temporarily filling a vacancy—a step inconsistent with sound separation-of-powers principles. We are aware of no other agency where federal judges—members of a separate branch of government—appoint the interim staff of an agency. Such a judicial appointee would have authority for litigating the entire federal criminal and civil docket before the very district court to whom he or she was beholden for the appointment. This arrangement, at a minimum, gives rise to an appearance of potential conflict that undermines the performance or perceived performance of both the Executive and Judicial Branches. A judge may be inclined to select a U.S. Attorney who shares the judge's ideological or prosecutorial philosophy. Or a judge may select a prosecutor apt to settle cases and enter plea bargains, so as to preserve judicial resources. *See Wiener, Inter-Branch Appointments After the Independent Counsel: Court Appointment of United States Attorneys*, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 363, 428 (2001) (concluding that court appointment of interim U.S. Attorneys is unconstitutional).

Prosecutorial authority should be exercised by the Executive Branch in a unified manner, consistent with the application of criminal enforcement policy under the Attorney General. S. 214 would undermine the effort to achieve a unified and consistent approach to prosecutions and federal law enforcement. Court-appointed U.S. Attorneys would be at least as accountable to the chief judge of the district court as to the Attorney General, which could, in some circumstances become untenable. In no context is accountability more important to our society than on the front lines of law enforcement and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and the Department contends that the chief prosecutor should be accountable to the Attorney General, the President, and ultimately the people.

Finally, S. 214 seems to be aimed at solving a problem that does not exist. As noted, when a vacancy in the office of U.S. Attorney occurs, the Department typically looks first to the First Assistant or another senior manager in the office to serve as an Acting or interim U.S. Attorney. Where neither the First Assistant nor another senior manager is able or willing to serve as an Acting or interim U.S. Attorney, or where their service would not be appropriate under the circumstances, the Administration has looked to other Department employees to serve temporarily. No matter which way a U.S. Attorney is temporarily appointed, the Administration has consistently sought, and will continue to seek, to fill the vacancy—in consultation with home-State Senators—with a presidentially-nominated and Senate-confirmed nominee.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to answering the Committee's questions.

## Brinkley, Winnie

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**From:** Long, Linda E  
**Sent:** Monday, February 05, 2007 11:23 AM  
**To:** Brinkley, Winnie  
**Subject:** Fw: AG QFRS

**Follow Up Flag:** Follow up  
**Flag Status:** Completed

**Attachments:** SHCQFRS-011807-USA Atty issues - ODAG.doc

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-----Original Message-----

**From:** Scott-Finan, Nancy  
**To:** Sampson, Kyle; Goodling, Monica; Hertling, Richard; Seidel, Rebecca; Elston, Michael (ODAG); Moschella, William; Battle, Michael (USAEO); Nowacki, John (USAEO); Kirsch, Thomas  
**CC:** Long, Linda E  
**Sent:** Mon Feb 05 10:42:31 2007  
**Subject:** FW: AG QFRS

Cc: Linda for Paul

Attached are the written QFRs with regard to the hiring/firing of U.S Attorneys following the Department 1/18/07 oversight hearing at which the Attorney General testified. These were received at the end of last week.

EOUSA has the pen on the QFRs in the email; OAG has the pen on the QFRs in the attachment.



SHCQFRS-011807-  
USA Atty issues...

<<SHCQFRS 011807-USA Atty issues - ODAG.doc>>

Schumer:

11. Some have expressed concern about the level of relevant experience of various top level Department of Justice officials and United States Attorneys around the country. Please answer the following questions to fill in the record on the backgrounds of our most important law enforcement officials:

- a. How many United States Attorneys have been nominated during the Bush Administration to date?
- b. How many of those nominated had any prosecutorial experience before their nominations?
- c. Of those, how many had prosecutorial experience at the local level?
- d. How many had prosecutorial experience at the federal level?

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**From:** Scott-Finan, Nancy  
**Sent:** Monday, February 05, 2007 9:26 AM  
**To:** Wade, Jill C  
**Subject:** RE: AG QFRS

Thank you.

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**From:** Wade, Jill C

Sent: Monday, February 05, 2007 9:21 AM  
To: Scott-Finan, Nancy  
Subject: RE: AG QFRS

Yes I will get them for you.

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From: Scott-Finan, Nancy  
Sent: Sunday, February 04, 2007 10:31 PM  
To: Seidel, Rebecca; Wade, Jill C; Chambers, Shane P  
Subject: AG QFRS

Were there any questions about the USA firings in the AG QFRS that we received last week?  
If so, may I have a copy. Thanks.

ODAG QFRS

Jill Wade

LEAHY:

37 "Press reports say that seven or more United States Attorneys have recently announced their resignations, and these reports suggest that you and the Administration have asked them to step down. These include well-regarded prosecutors like Kevin Ryan in San Francisco, who is leading investigations into corporate backdating of employee stock options, and Carole Lam in San Diego, who led the successful Duke Cunningham corruption investigation. These U.S. Attorneys are being replaced under a new provision inserted by the Republican Congress into the PATRIOT Act reauthorization, which allows you to name interim U.S. Attorneys, without any Congressional input or confirmation, who will serve indefinitely.

Why have you asked such a large and unprecedented number of U.S. Attorneys – appointed by this Administration and well-regarded in their communities – to step down?

38 Isn't there a threat to the independence of U.S. Attorneys when groups of them are fired en masse and replaced indefinitely by people of your choosing without any Senate input?

39 Wouldn't a system where interim U.S. Attorneys were appointed by the federal district court – which is how it used to be done – help ensure that qualified and independent prosecutors held the job until a permanent appointee could be confirmed?

SPECTER

119 The McNulty Memo provides that prosecutors may still negatively weigh a corporation's refusal to disclose factual, privileged "Category I" information. Such information includes copies of key documents, witness statements, and reports containing investigative facts documented by counsel. To make such a request, a prosecutor must establish a "legitimate need" for the information and must obtain authorization from the United States Attorney, who must "consult" with the Assistant AG for the Criminal Division. What is the consultation that must take place for the prosecutor to make such a request, and may the request be made even without the Assistant AG's assent?

120 Can the Assistant Attorney General overrule the U.S. Attorney's decision?

ODAG QFRS  
Jill Wade

121 Is there a standard for this type of review?

122 May the corporation appeal the DOJ's decision to request the information or its possibly subsequent finding of noncooperation as a result?

KENNEDY:

190 Please provide the employment application or current resume of each individual appointed as an interim United States Attorney during the past two years.

191 What will you do to assure Congress that the removal of Ms. Lam and others is not an effort to terminate uncomfortable public corruption investigations? Will you consider as a principal factor in each interim appointee the ability and willingness of the appointee to pursue public corruption investigations? What abilities and experience do you consider important in a public corruption prosecutor?

197 How many interim United States Attorneys are now serving?

198 Please state the date that each was appointed to his or her current position, and the time that elapsed between the departure of the confirmed United States Attorney and the appointment of the interim United States Attorney.

199 Please state whether a replacement has been nominated for each position and when each replacement nomination was sent to the Senate.

ODAG QFRS

Jill Wade

SCHUMER:

352 "12. Some have recently expressed concern about the possible politicization of the hiring and firing of United States Attorneys.

a. How many United States Attorneys have been asked to resign prior to the ends of their terms? For each, please provide the name, the district, the date of confirmation, the date of resignation or termination, and the name of the proposed replacement.

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353 b. Do you believe that there is any constitutional infirmity in allowing (as was done prior to the PATRIOT Act change), in certain circumstances, federal judges to make interim appointments of United States Attorneys? If so, please provide a detailed explanation of your constitutional concerns. Are you aware of any legal challenges, prior to 2006, to the method of interim U.S. Attorney appointments. If so, please provide the details of those legal challenges and the resolution of the litigation.



# Department of Justice

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STATEMENT

OF

PAUL J. McNULTY  
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY  
UNITED STATES SENATE

CONCERNING

**"PRESERVING PROSECUTORIAL INDEPENDENCE:  
IS THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
POLITICIZING THE HIRING AND FIRING  
OF U.S. ATTORNEYS?"**

PRESENTED ON

FEBRUARY 6, 2007

DAG000001727

**Testimony  
of**

**Paul J. McNulty  
Deputy Attorney General  
U.S. Department of Justice**

**Committee on the Judiciary  
United States Senate**

**“Is the Department of Justice Politicizing the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?”**

February 6, 2007

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Chairman Schumer, Senator Sessions, and members  
of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to  
discuss the importance of the Justice Department’s  
United States Attorneys. As a former United States  
Attorney, I particularly appreciate this opportunity to  
address the critical role U.S. Attorneys play in

enforcing our Nation's laws and carrying out the priorities of the Department of Justice.

I have often said that being a United States Attorney is one of the greatest jobs you can ever have. It is a privilege and a challenge—one that carries a great responsibility. As former Attorney General Griffin Bell said, U.S. Attorneys are “the front-line troops charged with carrying out the Executive’s constitutional mandate to execute faithfully the laws in every federal judicial district.” As the chief federal law-enforcement

officers in their districts, U.S. Attorneys represent the Attorney General before Americans who may not otherwise have contact with the Department of Justice. They lead our efforts to protect America from terrorist attacks and fight violent crime, combat illegal drug trafficking, ensure the integrity of government and the marketplace, enforce our immigration laws, and prosecute crimes that endanger children and families—including child pornography, obscenity, and human trafficking.

U.S. Attorneys are not only prosecutors; they are government officials charged with managing and implementing the policies and priorities of the Executive Branch. United States Attorneys serve at the pleasure of the President. Like any other high-ranking officials in the Executive Branch, they may be removed for any reason or no reason. The Department of Justice—including the office of United States Attorney—was created precisely so that the government's legal business could be effectively managed and carried out through a coherent program

under the supervision of the Attorney General. And  
unlike judges, who are supposed to act independently of  
those who nominate them, U.S. Attorneys are  
accountable to the Attorney General, and through him,  
to the President—the head of the Executive Branch.

For these reasons, the Department is committed to  
having the best person possible discharging the  
responsibilities of that office at all times and in every  
district.

The Attorney General and I are responsible for

evaluating the performance of the United States Attorneys and ensuring that they are leading their offices effectively. It should come as no surprise to anyone that, in an organization as large as the Justice Department, U.S. Attorneys are removed or asked or encouraged to resign from time to time. However, in this Administration U.S. Attorneys are never—repeat, never—removed, or asked or encouraged to resign, in an effort to retaliate against them, or interfere with, or inappropriately influence a particular investigation, criminal prosecution, or civil case. Any suggestion to

the contrary is unfounded, and it irresponsibly undermines the reputation for impartiality the Department has earned over many years and on which it depends.

Turnover in the position of U.S. Attorney is not uncommon. When a presidential election results in a change of administration, every U.S. Attorney leaves and the new President nominates a successor for confirmation by the Senate. Moreover, U.S. Attorneys do not necessarily stay in place even during an

administration. For example, approximately half of the U.S. Attorneys appointed at the beginning of the Bush Administration had left office by the end of 2006.

Given this reality, career investigators and prosecutors exercise direct responsibility for nearly all investigations and cases handled by a U.S. Attorney's Office. While a new U.S. Attorney may articulate new priorities or emphasize different types of cases, the effect of a U.S. Attorney's departure on an existing investigation is, in fact, minimal, and that is as it should be. The career civil servants who prosecute federal

criminal cases are dedicated professionals, and an effective U.S. Attorney relies on the professional judgment of those prosecutors.

The leadership of an office is more than the direction of individual cases. It involves managing limited resources, maintaining high morale in the office, and building relationships with federal, state and local law enforcement partners. When a U.S. Attorney submits his or her resignation, the Department must first determine who will serve temporarily as interim

U.S. Attorney. The Department has an obligation to ensure that someone is able to carry out the important function of leading a U.S. Attorney's Office during the period when there is not a presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed United States Attorney. Often, the Department looks to the First Assistant U.S. Attorney or another senior manager in the office to serve as U.S. Attorney on an interim basis. When neither the First Assistant nor another senior manager in the office is able or willing to serve as interim U.S. Attorney, or when the appointment of either would not be

appropriate in the circumstances, the Department has looked to other, qualified Department employees.

At no time, however, has the Administration sought to avoid the Senate confirmation process by appointing an interim U.S. Attorney and then refusing to move forward, in consultation with home-State Senators, on the selection, nomination, confirmation and appointment of a new U.S. Attorney. The appointment of U.S. Attorneys by and with the advice and consent of the Senate is unquestionably the appointment method

preferred by both the Senate and the Administration.

In every single case where a vacancy occurs, the Bush Administration is committed to having a United States Attorney who is confirmed by the Senate. And the Administration's actions bear this out. Every time a vacancy has arisen, the President has either made a nomination, or the Administration is working—in consultation with home-state Senators—to select candidates for nomination. Let me be perfectly clear—at no time has the Administration sought to avoid the

Senate confirmation process by appointing an interim United States Attorney and then refusing to move forward, in consultation with home-State Senators, on the selection, nomination and confirmation of a new United States Attorney. Not once.

Since January 20, 2001, 125 new U.S. Attorneys have been nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. On March 9, 2006, the Congress amended the Attorney General's authority to appoint interim U.S. Attorneys, and 13 vacancies have occurred

since that date. This amendment has not changed our commitment to nominating candidates for Senate confirmation. In fact, the Administration has nominated a total of 15 individuals for Senate consideration since the appointment authority was amended, with 12 of those nominees having been confirmed to date. Of the 13 vacancies that have occurred since the time that the law was amended, the Administration has nominated candidates to fill five of these positions, has interviewed candidates for nomination for seven more positions, and is waiting to

receive names to set up interviews for the final position—all in consultation with home-state Senators.

However, while that nomination process continues, the Department must have a leader in place to carry out the important work of these offices. To ensure an effective and smooth transition during U.S. Attorney vacancies, the office of the U.S. Attorney must be filled on an interim basis. To do so, the Department relies on the Vacancy Reform Act (“VRA”), 5 U.S.C. §

3345(a)(1), when the First Assistant is selected to lead the office, or the Attorney General's appointment authority in 28 U.S.C. § 546 when another Department employee is chosen. Under the VRA, the First Assistant may serve in an acting capacity for only 210 days, unless a nomination is made during that period. Under an Attorney General appointment, the interim U.S. Attorney serves until a nominee is confirmed the Senate. There is no other statutory authority for filling such a vacancy, and thus the use of the Attorney General's appointment authority, as amended last year,

signals nothing other than a decision to have an interim U.S. Attorney who is not the First Assistant. It does not indicate an intention to avoid the confirmation process, as some have suggested.

No change in these statutory appointment authorities is necessary, and thus the Department of Justice strongly opposes S. 214, which would radically change the way in which U.S. Attorney vacancies are temporarily filled. S. 214 would deprive the Attorney General of the authority to appoint his chief law

enforcement officials in the field when a vacancy occurs, assigning it instead to another branch of government.

As you know, before last year's amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 546, the Attorney General could appoint an interim U.S. Attorney for the first 120 days after a vacancy arose; thereafter, the district court was authorized to appoint an interim U.S. Attorney. In cases where a Senate-confirmed U.S. Attorney could not be appointed within 120 days, the limitation on the

Attorney General's appointment authority resulted in recurring problems. Some district courts recognized the conflicts inherent in the appointment of an interim U.S. Attorney who would then have matters before the court—not to mention the oddity of one branch of government appointing officers of another—and simply refused to exercise the appointment authority. In those cases, the Attorney General was consequently required to make multiple successive 120-day interim appointments. Other district courts ignored the inherent conflicts and sought to appoint as interim U.S.

Attorneys wholly unacceptable candidates who lacked the required clearances or appropriate qualifications.

In most cases, of course, the district court simply appointed the Attorney General's choice as interim U.S. Attorney, revealing the fact that most judges recognized the importance of appointing an interim U.S. Attorney who enjoys the confidence of the Attorney General. In other words, the most important factor in the selection of past court-appointed interim U.S. Attorneys was the Attorney General's recommendation. By foreclosing

the possibility of judicial appointment of interim U.S. Attorneys unacceptable to the Administration, last year's amendment to Section 546 appropriately eliminated a procedure that created unnecessary problems without any apparent benefit.

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U.S. Attorney who shares the judge's ideological or prosecutorial philosophy. Or a judge may select a prosecutor apt to settle cases and enter plea bargains, so as to preserve judicial resources. *See* Wiener, Inter-Branch Appointments After the Independent Counsel: Court Appointment of United States Attorneys, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 363, 428 (2001) (concluding that court appointment of interim U.S. Attorneys is unconstitutional).

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