Prepared Statement of Christopher A. Kojm
former Deputy Executive Director
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
before the Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
The
9/11 Commission Report
Chairman Coble, Ranking Member Scott, distinguished Members of the Judiciary Committee: it is an honor to appear before you today. The 9/11 Commission is grateful to you, and to the Leadership of the House, for your prompt consideration of the Report and recommendations of the Commission.
As you know, the Commission’s findings and recommendations were strongly endorsed by all Commissioners – five Republicans and five Democrats who have been active in the public life of our nation. In these difficult times, and in an election year, this unanimity is remarkable, and important. It reflects a unity of purpose to make our country safer and more secure in the face of the novel threat posed by transnational terrorism. The Commission calls upon the Congress and the Administration to respond to our Report in the same spirit of bipartisanship.
You have asked the Commission to present its recommendations related to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, border security, and the creation of a Center for Counterterrorism and the National Intelligence Director. Our recommendations follow.
The FBI
The FBI has for the past several decades performed two important but related functions.
First, it serves as our premier federal law enforcement agency, investigating possible violations of federal criminal statutes and working with federal prosecutors to develop and bring cases against violators of those laws.
Second, it is an important member of the Intelligence
Community, collecting information on foreign intelligence or terrorist
activities within the
We focused on the FBI’s performance as an intelligence
agency combating the al Qaeda threat within the
Director Freeh did make counterterrorism a priority in the 1990s, and Dale Watson, his Counterterrorism chief, made valiant efforts to communicate that priority to agents in the field. But that priority did not effectively find its way into the daily work of the FBI’s field offices. Nor did it result in the creation of a corps of intelligence officers and analysts with the professional qualifications and skills needed for an effective intelligence/counterterrorism operation.
Finally, when FBI agents did develop important information about possible terrorist-related activities, that information often did not get effectively communicated – either within the FBI itself or in the Intelligence Community as a whole.
Within the FBI itself, communication of important information was hampered by the traditional case-oriented approach of the agency and the possessive case-file mentality of FBI agents. This Committee is only too familiar with the information technology problems that have long hampered the FBI’s ability to “know what it knows.”
Even when information was communicated from the field to
headquarters, it did not always come to the attention of the Director or other
top officials who should have seen it.
This was the case in the now-famous incidents, in the summer of 2001, of
the
The other internal barrier to communication of intelligence information between FBI intelligence officials and FBI criminal agents and federal prosecutors was the “wall” between intelligence and law enforcement that developed in the 1980s and was reinforced in the 1990s. Through a combination of court decisions, pronouncements from the Department of Justice and its Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, and risk-averse interpretations of those pronouncements by the FBI, the flow of information between the intelligence and criminal sides of the FBI and the Justice Department was significantly restricted. This phenomenon continued until after 9/11, when the Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act, and when the Justice Department successfully appealed a FISA Court decision that had effectively reinstated the wall.
These failures in internal communications were exacerbated by a reluctance of the FBI to share information with sister agencies in the Intelligence Community, with the National Security Council at the White House, and with state and local law enforcement agencies. This culture of non-sharing was by no means unique to the FBI, but the FBI was surely one of the worst offenders.
The FBI, under the leadership of its current Director, Robert Mueller, has undertaken significant reforms to try to deal with these deficiencies and build a strong capability in intelligence and counterterrorism. These include the establishment of an Office of Intelligence, headed by an Associate Director, Maureen Baginski, who is an experienced manager of intelligence systems. The FBI has embarked on an ambitious program to recruit qualified analysts, to train all agents in counterterrorism, and to develop career tracks for agents who want to specialize in counterterrorism or intelligence. The agency is also making progress, albeit slowly, in upgrading its internal information technology system. But, as Director Mueller himself has recognized, much more remains to be done before the FBI reaches its full potential as an intelligence agency.
Because of the history of serious deficiencies, and because
of lingering doubts about whether the FBI can overcome its deep-seated
law-enforcement culture, the Commission gave serious consideration to proposals
to move the FBI’s intelligence operations to a new agency devoted exclusively
to intelligence collection inside the
We decided not to make such a recommendation for several reasons, set forth in our Report. Chief among them were the disadvantages of separating domestic intelligence from law enforcement and losing the collection resources of FBI field offices around the country, supplemented by relationships with state and local law enforcement agencies. Another major reason was civil liberties concerns that would arise from creating outside the Justice Department an agency whose focus is on collecting information from and about American citizens, residents, and visitors. The rights and liberties of Americans will be better safeguarded, we believe, if this sensitive function remains in an agency trained and experienced in following the law and the Constitution, and subject to the supervision of the Attorney General.
We also believe that while the jury is still out on the
ultimate success of the reforms initiated by Director Mueller, the process he
has started is a promising one. And many
of the benefits that might be realized by creating a new agency will be
achieved, we are convinced, if our important recommendations on restructuring of
the Intelligence Community – creation of a
What the Commission recommends, therefore, is that further steps be taken – by the President, the Justice Department, and the FBI itself -- to build on the reforms that have been undertaken already, and to institutionalize those reforms so that the FBI is transformed into an effective intelligence and counterterrorism agency. The goal, as our Report states, is to create within the FBI a specialized and integrated national security workforce of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who create a new FBI culture of expertise in national security and intelligence. This Committee will have a vital oversight role in monitoring progress by the FBI and ensuring that this new capacity so critical to our nation is created and maintained.
Border Control
As our Report makes clear, in the decade before 9/11, border
security was not seen as a national security matter. From a strategic perspective, border policy
focused on counternarcotics efforts, illegal
immigration, and, more recently, the smuggling of weapons of mass
destruction. Our government simply did
not exhibit a comparable level of concern about terrorists’ ability to enter
and stay in the
During that same period, however, al Qaeda
studied how to exploit gaps and weaknesses in the passport, visa, and entry
systems of the
As we know, Al Qaeda’s travel
tactics allowed the 9/11 hijackers to enter the
More robust enforcement of routine immigration laws,
supported by better information, could also have made a difference. Two hijackers made statements on their visa
applications that could have been shown to be false by
Neither the intelligence community, nor the border security agencies or the FBI, had programs in place to analyze and act upon intelligence about terrorist travel tactics – how they obtained passports, made travel arrangements, and subverted national laws and processes governing entry and stays in foreign countries.
Congress during the 1990s took some steps to provide better information to immigration officials by legislating requirements for a foreign student information system and an entry-exit system. As we know, these programs were not successfully implemented before 9/11.
Since 9/11, some important steps have been taken to
strengthen our border security. The Department of Homeland Security has been
established, combining the resources of the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service and the Customs Bureau into new agencies to protect our
borders and to enforce the immigration laws within the
These efforts have made us safer, but not safe enough. As a nation we have not yet fully absorbed
the lessons of 9/11 with respect to border security. The need to travel makes terrorists
vulnerable. They must leave safe havens,
travel clandestinely, and use evasive techniques, from altered travel documents
to lies and cover stories. Terrorist entry often can be prevented and terrorist
travel can be constrained by acting on this knowledge.
Targeting terrorist travel is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting their finances.
The Commission therefore has recommended that we combine terrorist travel intelligence, operations, and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility.
Targeting Terrorist Travel
Front line border agencies must not only obtain from the Intelligence Community – on a real-time basis information on terrorists; they must also assist in collecting it. Consular officers and immigration inspectors, after all, are the people who encounter travelers and their documents. Specialists must be developed and deployed in consulates and at the border to detect terrorists through their travel practices, including their documents. Technology has a vital role to play. The three years since 9/11 have been more than enough time for border officials to integrate into their operations terrorist travel indicators that have been developed by the intelligence community. The intelligence community and the border security community have not been close partners in the past. This must change.
We also need an operational program to target terrorist travel facilitators -- forgers, human smugglers, travel agencies, and corrupt border officials. Some may be found here, but most will be found abroad. Disrupting them would seriously constrain terrorist mobility. While there have been some successes in this area, intelligence far outstrips action. This should be rectified by providing the interagency mandate and the necessary resources to Homeland Security’s enforcement arm, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and other relevant agencies, including the FBI.
This problem illustrates the need for a
Screening Systems
To provide better information to our consular officers and immigration inspectors, the government must accelerate its efforts to build a biometric entry and exit screening system. This is an area in which Congress has been active since the mid-1990’s. It has been a frustrating journey. Congress first legislated an entry-exit system in 1996, to increase compliance with our immigration laws. It was neither associated with counterterrorism, nor with biometric identification. As a practical matter, the entry-exit effort was not seriously funded until the end of 2002. By that time, aspects of a system were governed by four separate laws. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security then changed the organizational context for implementing those laws.
The new Department is emerging from its difficult start-up period and is, we believe, poised to move forward to implement Congress’s mandates in this area. We would like to stress four principles that we believe must guide our efforts in this arena.
First, the U.S. border security system must be an effective part of a larger network of screening points that includes our transportation system and access to vital facilities, such as nuclear reactors. The Department of Homeland Security should lead an effort to design a comprehensive screening system, addressing common problems and setting common standards with system-wide goals in mind.
Second, a biometric entry and exit screening system is fundamental to intercepting terrorists and its development should be accelerated. Each element of the system is important. The biometric identifier makes it difficult to defeat a watchlist by an alteration in spelling of a name, a technique relied upon by terrorists. The screening system enables border officials access to all relevant information about a traveler, in order to assess the risk they may pose. Exit information allows authorities to know if a suspect individual has left the country and to establish compliance with immigration laws.
Third, United States citizens should not be exempt from carrying biometric passports or otherwise enabling their identities to be securely verified. Nor should Canadians or Mexicans.
Fourth, there should be a unified program to speed known travelers, so inspectors can focus on those travelers who might present greater risks. This is especially important for border communities.
We believe that the schedule for completion of this biometric entry-exit screening system should be accelerated to the extent feasible. This will require additional annual funding, and a mandate to a central organizational authority, such as the US VISIT office, to manage the effort.
International Collaboration
We need to dedicate a much greater effort to collaboration with foreign governments with respect to border security. This means more exchange of information about terrorists and passports, and improved global passport design standards. Implicit in this recommendation is continued close cooperation with Mexico and Canada. One particularly important effort is to improve screening efforts prior to departure from foreign airports, especially in countries participating in the visa waiver program.
Immigration Law and Enforcement
We must be able to monitor and respond to entries along our long borders with Canada and Mexico, working with those countries as much as possible. Our law enforcement system ought to send a message of welcome, tolerance, and justice to members of the immigrant communities in the United States, while also fostering the respect for the rule of law. Good immigration services are one way to reach out that is valuable, including for intelligence. State and local law enforcement agencies need more training and partnerships with federal agencies so they can cooperate more effectively with those federal authorities in identifying terrorist suspects.
Finally, secure identification should begin in the United States. We believe that the federal government should set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification such as drivers’ licenses.
The agenda on immigration and border control, then, is multi-faceted and vital to our national security. The bottom line is that our visa and border control systems must become an integral part of our counterterrorism intelligence system. We must steer a course that remains true to our commitment to an open society that welcomes legitimate immigrants and refugees while concentrating our resources on identification of potential of potential terrorists and prevention of their entry into the United States.
The National
Intelligence Director
As
part of the 9/11 story, we spent a very considerable time looking at the
performance of the Intelligence Community.
We identified at least six major problems confronting the Intelligence
Community that became apparent in 9/11 and still continue today.
First,
there are major structural barriers to the performance of joint intelligence
work. National intelligence is still
organized around the collection disciplines of the home agencies, not the joint
mission. The importance of integrated,
all-source analysis cannot be overstated.
Without it, it is not possible to “connect the dots.”
Second,
there is a lack of common standards and practices across the foreign-domestic
divide for the collection, processing, reporting, analyzing, and sharing of
intelligence.
Third, there is divided management of national intelligence capabilities, between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Defense Department
Fourth, the Director of Central Intelligence has a weak capacity to set priorities and move funds and other resources;
Fifth, the Director of Central Intelligence now has at least three jobs – running the CIA, running the Intelligence Community, and serving as the President’s Chief Intelligence Adviser. No one person can perform all three.
Finally, the Intelligence Community is too complex, and too secret. Its 15 agencies are governed by arcane rules, and all of its money and most of its work is shielded from public scrutiny.
We come to the recommendation of a National Intelligence Director not because we want to create some new “czar” or new layer of bureaucracy to sit atop the existing bureaucracy. We come to this recommendation because we see it as the only way to effect what we believe is necessary: a complete transformation of the way the Intelligence Community does business.
We believe that the Intelligence Community needs a wholesale Goldwater-Nichols reform of the way it does business. The collection agencies should have the same mission as the Armed Services do: they should organize, train and equip their personnel. Those intelligence professionals, in turn, should be assigned to unified joint commands, or in the language of the Intelligence Community, “Joint Mission Centers.” A joint mission center on WMD and proliferation, for example, would bring together the imagery, signals, and HUMINT specialists, both collectors and analysts, who would work together jointly on behalf of the mission. All the resources of the community would be brought to bear on the key intelligence issues as identified by the National Intelligence Director.
We believe you cannot get the necessary transformation of the Intelligence Community--smashing the stovepipes and creating joint mission centers--unless you have a National Intelligence Director.
The National Intelligence Director needs authority over all intelligence community elements, including authority over personnel, information technology and security. Appropriations for intelligence should come to him, and he should have the authority to reprogram funds within and between intelligence agencies.
The National Intelligence Director would create, and then oversee the joint work done by the intelligence centers. He should have a small staff—about the size of the current Community Management Staff.
He would not be like other “czars” who get the title but have no meaningful authority. The National Intelligence Director would have real authority. He will control National Intelligence Program purse strings. He will have hire and fire authority over agency heads in the Intelligence Community. He will control the IT. He will have real “troops,” as the National Counterterrorism Center and all the Joint Mission Centers would report to him.
We concluded that the Intelligence Community just isn’t going to get its job done unless somebody is in charge. That is just not the case now, and we paid the price: information wasn’t shared, agencies didn’t work together. We have to–and can–do better as a government.
To underscore again, we support a National Intelligence Director not for the purpose of naming another Chief to sit on top of all the other Chiefs. We support the creation of this position because it is the only way to catalyze transformation in the Intelligence Community, and manage a transformed Community afterward.
The National Counterterrorism Center
Our report details many unexploited opportunities to disrupt the 9/11 plot: failures to watchlist, failures to share information, failure to connect the dots. The story of Hazmi and Mihdhar in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000 is a telling example. We caught a glimpse of the future hijackers, but we lost their trail in Bangkok. Domestic officials were not informed until August, 2001 that Hazmi and Mihdhar had entered the United States. Late leads were pursued, but time ran out.
In this and in other examples, we find that no one was firmly in charge of managing the case. No one was able to draw relevant intelligence from anywhere within the government, assign responsibilities across the agencies (foreign or domestic), track progress and quickly bring obstacles up to a level where they could be resolved. No one was the quarterback. No one was calling the play. No one was assigning roles so that government agencies could execute as a team.
We believe the solution to this problem rests with the creation of a new institution, the National Counterterrorism Center. We believe, as Secretary Rumsfeld told us, that each of the agencies need to “give up some of their existing turf and authority in exchange for a stronger, faster, more efficient government wide joint effort.” We therefore propose a civilian-led unified joint command for counterterrorism. It would combine intelligence (what the military calls the J-2 function) with operational planning (what the military calls the J-3 function) in one agency, keeping overall policy direction where it belongs, in the hands of the President and the National Security Council.
Again, we consciously and deliberately draw on the military model, the Goldwater-Nichols model. We can and should learn from the successful reforms in the military two decades ago. We want all the government agencies which play a role in counterterrorism to work together in a unified command. We want them to work together as one team, in one fight against transnational terrorism.
The National Counterterrorism Center would build on the existing Terrorist Threat Integration Center, and replace it and other terrorism “fusion centers” within the government with one, unified center.
The NCTC would have tasking authority on counterterrorism for all collection and analysis across the government, across the foreign-domestic divide. It would be in charge of warning.
The NCTC would coordinate anti-terrorist operations across the government, but individual agencies would execute operations within their competences.
The NCTC’s chief would have control over the personnel assigned to the Center, and must have the right to concur in the choices of personnel to lead the operating entities of the departments and agencies focused on counterterrorism, specifically the top counterterrorism officials at the CIA, FBI, Defense and State Departments. The NCTC chief would report to the National Intelligence Director.
We appreciate that this is a new and difficult idea for those of us schooled in government of the 20th century. We won the Second World War and the Cold War because of the great departments of government – the State Department, the Defense Department, the CIA, the FBI – organized against clear nation-state adversaries. Today, we face a transnational threat. It respects no boundaries, and makes no distinction between foreign and domestic. The enemy is resourceful, flexible and disciplined. We need a system of management that is as flexible and resourceful as is the enemy, a system that can bring all the resources of government to bear on the problem – and that can change and respond as the threat changes. We need a model of government that meets the needs of the 21st century. We believe the National Counterterrorist Center meets that test.
Reforms as a Complete
Package
Taken together, we believe these reforms within the structure of the Executive branch, together with reforms in Congress, and the many recommendations we have proposed for foreign policy, public diplomacy, border and transportation security, and national preparedness – can make a significant difference in making America safer and more secure.
We believe that reforms of executive branch structures, in the absence of implementing the other reforms and recommendations in our report, will have significantly less value than the value of these reforms as a complete package. In short, while we welcome each step toward implementation of our recommendations, no one should be mistaken in believing that solving structural problems in the executive branch addresses completely, or even satisfactorily, the current terrorist threat we face.
The Administration’s
Response
We are gratified by the rapid response of the White House to
our recommendations. President Bush has
acknowledged the need for a National Intelligence Director separate from the
head of the CIA. Senator Kerry shares
this judgment. It is our firm belief
that the National Intelligence Director must have budgetary appropriation authority
over the agencies of the intelligence community. Moreover, he should have hire and fire
authority for significant positions within the community. A National Intelligence Director without
these authorities would be, in our view, a mere figurehead, and there would be
no significant advance over the current arrangement, which we have found to be
inadequate to protect the nation.
Conclusion
The most important responsibility of
government is to protect the people.
We
have made specific proposals. We believe
they can make our country safer and more secure. We invite the American public
to join the debate.
We are gratified by the rapid response of the White House to our recommendations. We welcome the President’s support for a National Intelligence Director, and a National Counterterrorism Center. We welcome the support of Senator Kerry.
We
look forward to working with you on our recommendations.
We
should seize this historic opportunity and move expeditiously. With your counsel and direction, we believe
that the nation can, and will, make wise choices.
We would be pleased to respond to your questions.